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B. Abstract 
This thesis analyses the effects of gender inclusive policies or the lack of such on 
development at a time of conflict transformation.  
It has nowadays been established that the presence of women and the existence 
of gendered policies at a time of peace building are vital for the development of any 
country or region presently in this situation. Despite this knowledge, inclusion of 
women and gender has remained scarce and effects of their integration have thus 
proven difficult to measure.  
It is the aim of this thesis to support research in this area, by demonstrating the 
implications of incorporating or failing to implement different types of gender 
inclusive policies on the example of the actions taken in the Kurdistan Region of 
Iraq.  
The Kurdistan Region is currently in a unique position of its development. After 
withstanding decades of armed conflict, the region today is greatly autonomous 
and economically prosperous.  For the previous decade it has been the 
government’s aim to decrease the potential of new conflict, to become 
internationally competitive and to increase positive development for its people. One 
of their stated foci was thereby the promotion of gender and women’s inclusion in 
public policies. 
By comparing the policies deployed in the Kurdistan Region with experiences and 
knowledge from around the world, and by using the citizens of the region 
themselves as validators, this thesis will examine if the existing policies have had 
the desired effect, and if not, what should be changed.  
This will be done in the political, economic and social sphere (focusing on 
education), with the outcome that policies introduced by Kurdistan’s decision 
makers are partly positive, but lack in consistency, inclusiveness and gender 
sensitivity. This leads to a loss of human resources for the region, as well as to 
unequal effects within society, and thus to a lack of sustainable peace. 
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I. Introduction  
Interviews in the Kurdistan Region, 2012: 
Question: “How do you think it is possible to prevent further war?” 
Answer: “We need equality through respect, and a stop to 
discrimination.” 1 
Question: “And how do you think equality is achievable?“ 
Answer: “We just need equality in all areas: political, 
economic and social.” 2 
The time of conflict transformation is probably one of the most demanding 
circumstances any leaders of any state or region will ever have to face. The 
challenges seem endless and criticism is never far away. 
One region, which is currently in this position, is the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Since 
the fall of Saddam Hussein, the region has seen vast changes, but the ideal 
situation is said yet to be achieved. This is especially so when it comes to the 
enhancement of gender equality in society, the inclusion of women and gender3 in 
the region’s dealings as a whole, and the providing of sustainable peace for all 
citizens. 
How exactly the leading figures of the region have dealt with these issues, by 
including women and gender into their policies, and how successful these efforts 
have been, or if indeed some constructive criticism is required, will the subject of 
this thesis.  
It will be the focus of the following and first subchapter to elaborate, precisely which 
aims and objectives the thesis is led by when exploring this subject matter and 
what its unique contributions are to the area of study concerned: 
                                                            
1 Interview AR, Sulaimaniya on 21/05/2012 
2 Interview BF, Erbil on 29/06/2012 
3 ‘Gender’ thereby being understood as the sexual attribute in correlation with other types of personal 
identities, such as ethnicity, religion, age, or class. 
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A. Aims, Objectives and Contributions of the Thesis 
“Women’s involvement is essential to achieving sustainable peace”.4  
Already over two decades ago, the UN and the international community in general, 
started to recognize and to highlight women’s distinct suffering during war, as well 
as their unused capabilities when it comes to the work for peace.5 This has been 
preceded by an increase of academic interest on the matter, which has led to the 
establishment of the recognised correlation of gender equality and positive conflict 
transformation.6 As the UN Security Council stated on 8 March 2000, the first 
Women’s Day of the new Millennium, “Peace is inextricably linked with equality 
between women and men”,7 or as promoted by NGOs such as the Working Group 
on Women, Peace and Security, sustainable peace can only be achieved with the 
full and equal participation of women in all levels of decision-making.8  
Despite this knowledge, women today are still marginalized when it comes to the 
inclusion in peace building and the importance of gender quality throughout the 
process is, while often theoretically recognized, not implemented in practice.9 This 
was also acknowledged by the UN Secretary General in 2010.10 A study of 
academic writings and official reports over the decades reveals that little has 
changed. Reports11 which were written about 15 years ago on the necessity of 
gender consideration and women’s inclusion in the peacebuilding process have the 
same or similar critique, as those written today. This is despite several attempts 
during this period, for example through Resolution 1325, to change the existing 
                                                            
4 Deniz Kaniyoti, “Reconstruction & Women’s Rights in Afghanistan,” ISIM Review 20 (2007): 20. 
5 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Women and Armed Conflict, A 
Regional Analysis on Asian and the Pacific (Bangkok: December 2009), 4. 
6 Donna Pankhurst, “The ‘Sex War’ and Other Wars: Towards a Feminist Approach to Peace Building” 
Development in Practice 13(2/3) (2003): 154. 
7 United NaƟons. Press Release SC/6816. “Peace inextricably linked with equality between women and men 
says Security Council in InternaƟonal Women’s Day statement” (8. March 2000) 
hƩp://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000308.sc6816.doc.html. (Accessed on 10.10.2011) 
8 Sarah Taylor and Kristina Mader, Mapping Women, Peace and Security in the UN Security Council, Report of 
the NGOWG Monthly AcƟon Points, 2009‐2010 (NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, 
October 2010), 4. 
9 Donna Pankhurst, “The ‘Sex War’ and Other Wars: Towards a Feminist Approach to Peace Building” 
Development in Practice 13(2/3) (2003): 154. 
10 Security Council, Women and Peace and Security (Report of the Secretary‐General 173, 2010). 
11 Such as the report by Brigitte Sorensen, Women and Post‐Conflict Reconstruction, The War‐torn Societies 
Project (Occasional Paper No. 3, 1998). 
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prejudices and to convince countries to enhance the inclusion of women and 
gender in their official dealings. 
It follows that still more work needs to be done to make the public, as well as the 
policy makers, aware of the importance of the issue. One way of doing so is by 
demonstrating how successful implementation or the lack of inclusion of gender 
policies influences the development of a country or region and its society. It is the 
aim of this thesis to do so on the example of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.  
This will be done by firstly establishing potential effects of gender inclusive policies 
on the development of countries and regions and their people at a time of conflict 
transformation, by drawing on the experience of academics working in the field 
around the world, as well as on the established know-how of the international 
community. It is thereby the aim to use a vast variety of expertise, from different 
ends of the spectrum, in order to find common ground between them, as to be able 
to come to a conclusion on the most likely effects of gender inclusive policies in the 
respective areas of interest, and on how they have to be deployed and 
implemented in order to have a positive effect on wider development within a 
region, as well as on the individual lives of the citizens.  
It is further the aim of this thesis to test how the policies deployed and the actions 
taken by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) compare to the established 
theory, as to conclude which effects the respective policies, or the lack of such, 
have on the development of the region and its people at the time of conflict 
transformation.  
The results of the extensive interviews conducted during field research in the area 
will thereby be used as a ‘checking system’. The concrete and implied answers, as 
well as the behaviour of the interviewees will show the practical effects of the 
KRG’s policies.  
It is thus the aim of the thesis to evaluate the effects of the existence or non-
existence of different types of gender inclusive policies on national and individual 
development in a region at a time of conflict transformation, by using both, 
academic and practitioners’ expertise, and local knowledge of the people affected. 
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The analysis of the policies deployed is thereby not restricted to a single sphere of 
interest. Three areas have been chosen, namely politics, the economy and 
education; in all of which the existing gender policies and their effects will be 
evaluated. While these three spheres are far from inclusive when it comes to the 
fields to be considered at a time of conflict transformation, they are amongst the 
main areas to be dealt with when aiming for enhanced development and 
sustainable peace for all. By choosing to widen the focus and to not merely 
concentrate on one are of interest, the objectives of the thesis are threefold: It is 
firstly the aim to demonstrate the difficulties faced at the time of peace building, 
when it is also impossible to merely concentrate on one concern and to thus paint 
a slightly more realistic picture of the issue at stake. This was of special importance 
to the author, since he sole focus on gender inclusive policies, in comparison to 
policies considering children, the elderly, the disabled, different ethnic groups, 
religious groups etc., is already a very restricted one, when bearing in mind the 
amount of necessary issues to be considered at the time of conflict transformation. 
Secondly, it is the intention of the thesis to demonstrate the interconnectedness of 
the different spheres considered, and to thereby underline once more that there is 
never a single solution when it comes to enhance certain development. Finally, by 
analysing the deployment and their respective effects of gender inclusive policies 
in a variety of areas, it is the goal of the thesis to derive to a more inclusive 
conclusion on the KRG’s actions for the enhancement of gender equality within the 
region as a whole and its overall effects. 
By showing up the different effects gender inclusive policies or the lack of such 
have on development within the region and its citizens, it is the aim of the thesis to 
function as a tool to demonstrate to other academics, the public and also to policy 
makers how their considerations on gender inclusion effect wider development on 
a variety of levels. While the thesis can thus also be used as a guideline for other 
regions in similar situations, it has to be seen as a contemporary and context 
specific document, with its specificities being aimed at the Kurdistan Region in the 
year of 2012. 
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In order to arrive at all of the goals outlined above, the thesis is based around 
several assumptions. It is the first assumption that positive peace has not yet been 
achieved anywhere in the world and that it is the aim of development in the country 
to move towards this positive peace. 
It is a further postulation that if peace wants to be achieved for the whole 
population, including women, gender equality is needed at all levels. 
In addition, it is the notion of the thesis is that ‘peace’ is more than merely the non-
existence of armed conflict. Peace is necessary to be embedded in the minds and 
peace has to exist on a national, as well as on a personal level, to be able to truly 
talk about the existence of ‘peace’. Additionally peace and development are 
composed of many aspects, including the necessity of equality between religious 
groups, social groups, ethnicity or gender. As a consequence to this notion, it is a 
further aim of this thesis to show up the existence of this intersectionality. It thereby 
has to be noted that while all forms of intersectionality are of great importance, this 
thesis will focus specifically on the intersectionality between gender and class – 
rather than religion or ethnicity – as this has proved to be the most significant factor 
when it comes to considering the effects of gender inclusive policies in the 
Kurdistan Region. 
By achieving its different aims, this thesis will provide a series of contributions to 
different disciplines. Taking a feminist approach when analysing the time of conflict 
transformation on the example of the Kurdistan Region, the thesis will contribute to 
the areas of peace studies, gender studies, and will particularly form a unique 
contribution to the discipline of Kurdish studies. 
According to Eifler and Seifert the issue of gender in internal and international 
conflicts as well as throughout transformation processes is in general still an under-
researched terrain.12 It can be observed that research in this area has been 
focused only on specific parts of the world, with various studies of women’s 
participation in conflict situations existing about Africa, South America, Eastern 
Europe and infrequently Southern Asia, but independent research on the subject 
                                                            
12 Christine Eifler and Ruth Seifert, Gender Dynamics and Post‐Conflict Reconstruction (Frankfurt am Main: 
Peter Lang GmbH, 2009), 21. 
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being especially limited in the Middle East. While several international 
organisations such as the Heinrich Böll Stiftung,13 the Center for Humanitarian 
Dialogue14 and different UN organisations15 have published findings on women’s 
involvement in conflict transformation around the world, research is still limited 
when it comes to the Kurdistan Region.  
In general, academic research on the Iraqi Kurdistan Region is still very restricted 
as a consequence of the decades of preclusion from international dealings, during 
which it was difficult to access material on the region, as well as to access the 
region itself. Reasonable stability has only recently given the Kurdistan Region the 
chance to be accessed by academics from outside and to establish their own 
academia, after years of physical and cultural destruction. 
It is the aim of this thesis, by having conducted field research in the region with a 
focus on the civil society’s views on the process of conflict transformation, to try to 
fill a gap of existing research in the field of feminist, conflict as well as Kurdish 
Studies: 
While feminist academia was already occupied with the general issues of gender 
and conflict throughout the 1990s, with pioneers like Cynthia Cockburn16, Cynthia 
                                                            
13 Layla Al‐Zubaidi, Amdements to the Personal Status Law in Iraqi Kurdistan strengthen Women’s Rights 
(Heinrich Böll SƟŌung, Interview, 2009).; Layla Al‐Zubaidi, Der Streit um Frauenrechte und das 
Personenstandsrecht: Testfall für die Demokratie im Irak (Beirut: Heinrich Böll SƟŌung, 2009). 
14 Christine Bell and Catherine O’Rourke, Opinion, UN Security Council 1325 and Peace NegoƟaƟons and 
Agreements (Geneva: Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, March 2011); Cate Buchanan (ed.), Women at the 
Indonesian peace table: Enhancing the contributions of women to conflict resolution (Geneva: Center for 
Humanitarian Dialogue, November 2010); Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, Meeting report, Oslo forum 
2011, Annual Mediators’ Retreat (Oslo, Norway: 21‐23 June 2011);  Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, 
Peacemaking in Asia and the Pacific: Women’s participation, perspectives and priorities (Geneva: March 
2011); Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, Promoting gender issues in peace negotiations (Annual Report 
2010, Geneva: 2010). 
15 Secretary‐General, Report, Improvement of the status of women in the United Nations system (UN General 
Assembly, 65th session, Item 28(a), Advancement of women, 9.9.2010); UN ESCAP, Women and Armed 
Conflict; United Nations and World Bank, Joint Iraq Needs Assessment (October 2003); UNPO, Presidential 
and Parliamentary Elections, Kurdistan Region of Iraq, 25 July 2009 (ElecƟon ObservaƟon Report, 2009). 
16 Cynthia Cockburn, “'Democracy without Women Is No Democracy': Soviet Women Hold Their First 
Autonomous National Conference,” Feminist Review 39 (1991): 141‐148; Cynthia Cockburn, “Gender 
Relations as Causal in Militarization and War” International Feminist Journal of Politics 12(2) (2010): 139‐
157; Cynthia Cockburn, “On ‘The Machinery of Dominance: Women, Men and Technical Know‐How’” 
Women’s Studies Quarterly 37(1/2) (2009): 269‐273. 
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Enloe17, Deniz Kandiyoti,18 Simona Sharoni19, Christine Eifler, Ruth Seifert20 and 
Donna Pankhurst21 opening the doors for a whole new branch of academia, 
academic work on gender relations and women in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has 
only really started after 2003 with academics like Nadje Al-Ali, Nicola Pratt22, 
Andrea Fischer-Tahir23, Karin Mlodoch24, Shahrzad Mojab25 and Fatma Incesu26 
taking the lead. Research on the Kurdistan Region in general and on gender 
issues in particular, is still scattered when considering the topics researched and it 
is still often conducted exclusively or at least partly from outside the region. 
When considering research on conflict and peace, a similar pattern can be 
observed. While different academics work on the different concepts of peace 
                                                            
17 Cynthia Enloe, “’Gender’ Is Not Enough: The Need for a Feminist Consciousness” International Affairs 
80(1) (2004): 95‐97; Cynthia Enloe, “The Women behind the Warriors” The Women’s Review of Books 10(5) 
(1993): 23‐24; Cynthia Enloe, Globalization and Militarism, Feminists make the Link (Plymouth: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2007); Cynthia Enloe, Nimo’s War, Emma’s War, Making Feminist Sense of the Iraq 
War (Berkley: University of California Press, 2010). 
18 Deniz Kandiyoti (ed.), Gendering the Middle East, Emerging Perspectives (London: L.B. Tauris Publishers, 
1996); Deniz Kandiyoti (ed.), Women, Islam and the State (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992) 
19 Simona Sharoni, “Middle East Politics Through Feminist Lenses: Toward Theorizing International Relations 
from Women’s Struggles” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 18(1) (1993): 5‐28; Simona Sharoni, “The Myth 
of Gender Equality and the Limits of Women's Political Dissent in Israel” Middle East Report 207 (1998): 24‐
28; Simona Sharoni, “Women and Gender in Middle East Studies: Trends, Prospects and Challenges” Middle 
East Report 205 (1997): 27‐29; Simona Sharoni, “Women and the Gulf” Off Our Backs 21(2) (1991): 22. 
20 Eifler and Seifert, Gender Dynamics and Post‐Conflict Reconstruction; Christine Eifler und Ruth Seifert 
(Hrsg), Soziale Konstruktionen – Militär und Geschlächterverhältnis (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 
1999). 
21 Donna Pankhurst (ed.), Gendered Peace, Women’s Struggles for Post‐War Justice and Reconciliation (New 
York: Routledge, 2008); Pankhurst, “The ‘Sex War’ and Other Wars,”154‐177. 
22 Nadje Al‐Ali and Nicola Pratt, “Women in Iraq: Beyond the Rhetoric” Middle East Report 239 (2006): 18‐
23; Nadje Al‐Ali and Nicola PraƩ, “Women’s organizing and the conflict in Iraq since 2003” Feminist Review 
88 (2008): 74‐85; Nadje Al‐Ali and Nicole Pratt, “Between Nationalism and Women’s Rights: The Kurdish 
Women’s Movement in Iraq” Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 4 (2011): 337‐353; Nadje 
Al‐Ali and Nicola Pratt (ed.), Women and War in the Middle East, Transnational Perspectives (London: Zed 
Books, 2009). 
23 Andrea  Fischer‐Tahir, “Competition, cooperation and resistance: women in the political field in Iraq” 
International Affairs 86(6) (2010): 1381‐1394. 
24 Karin Mlodoch, “’We Want to be Remembered as Strong Women, Not as Shepherds’: Women Anfal 
Survivors in Kurdistan‐Iraq Struggling for Agency and Acknowledgement” Journal of Middle East Women’s 
Studies 8(1) (2012): 63‐91. 
25 Shahrzad Mojab, “Kurdish Women in the Zone of Genocide and Gendercide” Al‐Raida XXI(103) (2003); 
Shahrzad Mojab and Rachel Gorman, “Dispersed Nationalism: War, Diaspora and Kurdish Women’s 
Organizing” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 3(1) (2007): 58‐85; Shahrzad Mojab, “Theorizing the 
Politics of ‘Islamic Feminism’” Feminist Review 69 (2001): 124‐146. 
26 Fatma Incesu, Die Stellung der Frauen in der kurdischen Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 
2004). 
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building, as Johan Galtung27, Jonathan Goodhand28, Oliver Richmond29, as well as 
on conflict and gender relations in and around the Middle Eastern region, as Lila 
Abu-Lughod30, Valentine Moghadam31 or Simona Sharoni32 and finally there also 
exists general academic work on the Kurdistan Region, as conducted by Ferdinand 
Hennerbichler33, Faleh Jabar34 or Kerim Yildiz35, which all have an important role to 
play in the analysis of gender relations and conflict transformation in the Kurdistan 
Region and thus also form the basis of this thesis, academic research on the 
implications of national policies on gender relation’s development and conflict 
transformation in the Kurdistan Region, as done by this paper, has not yet been 
conducted. 
By concentrating on the issue of gender equality from a political side, as well as 
civil society’s view, and by widening the focus through introducing the effects of 
gender politics in political, economic and educational developments in the region, 
the thesis will provide the English speaking population with a current testimony of 
the situation in the Kurdistan Region, which is otherwise not available in this way, 
and will at the same time add to the current research on gender and peace studies 
from a still academically difficult to access region. 
                                                            
27 Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means, Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization (Oslo: PRIO, 
International Peace Research Institute, 1996). 
28 Jonathan Goodhand, Aiding Peace? The Roles of NGOs in Armed Conflict (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2006);  Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme, “From Wars to Complex PoliƟcal Emergencies: 
Understanding Conflict and Peace‐Building in the New World Disorder” Third World Quarterly 20(1) (1999): 
13‐26. 
29 Oliver Richmond (Review), “Peace and Development: Strange Bedfellows? Postconflict Development: 
Meeting New Challenges by Gerd Junne; Willemijn Verkoren” International Studies Review 7(3) (2005): 437‐
440; Oliver Richmond, “A Genealogy of Peacemaking: The CreaƟon and Re‐Creation of Order” Alternatives: 
Global, Local, Political 26(3) (2001): 317‐348; Oliver Richmond, “Emancipatory Forms of Human Security and 
Liberal Peacebuilding” International Journal 62(3)  (2007): 458‐477. 
30 Lila Abu‐Lughod, “Dialects of Women’s Empowerment: The International Circuitry of the Arab Human 
Development Report 2005” Int. J. Middle East Stud. 41 (2009): 83‐103; Lila Abu‐Lughod, “Saving Muslim 
Women or Standing with Them?: On Images, Ethics, and War in our Times” Insayat 1(1) (2003): 1‐12. 
31 Valentine Moghadam and Fatima Sadiqi, “Women’s Activism and the Public Sphere: An Introduction and 
Overview” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 2(2) (2006): 1‐7; Valentine Moghadam, “Peacebuilding 
and Reconstruction with Women: Reflections on Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine” Development 48(3) (2005): 
63‐72. 
32 Sharoni, “The Myth of Gender Equality,” 24‐28; Sharoni, “Women and Gender in Middle East Studies,” 27‐
29; Sharoni, “Women and the Gulf,” 22. 
33 Ferdinand Hennerbichler, Die Kurden (Mosonmagyaróvár: EdiƟon Ĭe, 2004). 
34 Faleh Jabar and Hosham Dawod (ed), The Kurds, Nationalism and Politics (London: SAQI, 2006). 
35 Kerim Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq, The past, present and future (London: Pluto Press in association with 
Kurdish Human Rights Project, 2004). 
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B. Hypothesis and Leading Questions 
It is the underlying hypothesis of this thesis that gender inclusive policies, if 
deployed and implemented correctly, will have a positive effect on gender equality 
within society, and will thus promote the establishment of sustainable peace and 
development for every person individually, the decrease of conflict potential, and 
the increase of positive national development.  
Following from the above, the hypothesis continues, when applied on the example 
of the Kurdistan Region, that while development is clearly visible, the fact that 
gender equality and positive peace is not yet a reality for all in the region, conflict 
potential is still clearly present, and national development is not as enhanced as it 
arguably could be, is partly due to gender policies not being deployed and 
implemented inclusively.  
This hypothesis leads to a series of questions including the following: 
 Does enhanced gender equality truly promote sustainable peace? 
 Which policies have been deployed by the KRG? 
 What are their effects on society and on the national level? 
 What steps have to be taken to support the development of gender equality 
and sustainable peace? 
These questions and many more will be discussed in the thesis and arguments will 
be presented to support the hypothesis. 
C. Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided in seven chapters, with chapters I and II introducing the topic 
as well as the methodology of the thesis, chapter III providing the necessary 
background information, and chapters IV, V and VI forming the heart of the thesis, 
by analysing the research findings, before leading to a conclusion in chapter VII.  
After giving an outline of the themes and objectives of the thesis, as well as the 
main hypotheses and values of it in chapter I, chapter II provides a description of 
the methods used and the challenges encountered as part of the research, 
especially going into depth on the field research conducted in the Kurdistan 
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Region. The researcher has thereby chosen not to include an extra ‘theory chapter’ 
as part of the introduction of the thesis, but rather to provide a section on the 
background of the theoretical and academic discussion at the beginning of each 
chapter it correlates to, for reasons of better legibility and wholeness. 
Chapter III is the last of the background chapters and has as its aim to enable the 
reader to better understand the prevailing circumstances in the region of research, 
with the aim of ensuring enhanced understanding of the methods deployed by the 
politicians, as well as the reactions of civil society, which will be discussed in the 
subsequent chapters. As part of this aim, the third chapter therefore provides a 
short essay on the author’s reflections on war, peace and gender, historical 
background information on the Kurdistan Region, an analysis of the roles of 
women during the time of conflict in general and more specifically during the 
previous conflicts, which took place in the region, and finally paints a picture of the 
development of women’s status within society and the existence of gender equality 
throughout time within the region.  
Chapter IV is the first of the three main chapters of the thesis, discussing the 
influence of different political actions and forces on gender quality in the country 
and consequently on the positive transformation of peace. Within the framework of 
the three subchapters it will be elaborated how women and gender have been 
included in Kurdistan Region’s politics, what the current possibilities for the 
inclusion are, i.e. national and international legislation, as well actions by the 
officials, how this is influencing society, through analysing interviews conducted in 
Kurdistan, and the development of conflict transformation, by inter alia taking into 
consideration already existing research on the topic, and which further steps 
should be taken. 
Chapter V will discuss how economy in general and women’s and gender inclusion 
in it, when it comes to macroeconomic policies, employment, and business, have 
the ability to influence the development of gender equality, and conflict 
transformation. It will be discussed how the inclusion of women and gender in the 
region’s economy or the lack thereof influences women’s personal development 
and peace within the families and society and how it influences economic 
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development in the region as a whole and consequently the rebuilding of an 
economically functioning region, which is considered to be a driving force in conflict 
transformation. 
The last of the three main chapters, chapter VI, will have at its centre the role of 
education in shaping social development, gender equality and conflict 
transformation. It will be discussed how education influences society in general, 
and women and girls in particular, when it comes to the questions of equality, as 
well as war and peace; and how women themselves have the ability to change 
society through education, on the examples of children’s schooling, higher 
education, adult education and women as educators in the Kurdistan Region. 
Finally, chapter VII will, after a short summary of the outcomes of the chapters 
above, draw a general conclusion on the issue at stake, namely that the 
enhancement of gender equality does indeed support the development of positive 
peace - although differently on the national and the personal level - and that while 
theoretical achievements have been vast in the Kurdistan Region, their practical 
implementation remains slow, and issues, such as the gap between different 
groups of society, are challenges which will have to be tackled by the government, 
in order to ensure true enhancement of equality, as well as the prevention of 
further conflict. 
II. Methodology - Methods and Procedure 
In order to access the material needed for this thesis, the researchers used two 
methods: library- and internet based research and field research. As a starting 
point, the researcher came into the field with certain hypotheses in mind, which 
were adapted and changed depending on the outcome of the research 
encountered. The researcher thereby tried to keep a very open mind and not to 
become static with the ideas previously developed, but to work with the different 
analyses and outcomes encountered as part of the research and to advance the 
thesis according to the new data established.  
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The following chapter will provide an overview of the techniques used to derive the 
data used in this thesis. It will elaborate challenges encountered and it will analyse 
the personal influences of the researcher on the data.  
A. Library- and Internet based Research 
Primary and secondary material for the study was derived through library based 
and internet based research.  
Inevitably nearly all the accessible material was either written by people in the 
West or by people from around the world whose work has been published in 
Europe or America.  
Special use was made of libraries from the different institutes of the University of 
Vienna, the library for development policy in Vienna, “C3: Bibliothek for 
Entwicklungspolitik”, the Kurdish library Casme Calil in Eichgraben, Lower Austria, 
and the library of the University of Exeter. 
Other material originated from extensive research online, comprising material from 
different UN institutions, such as the secretariat or UN Women, an extensive 
number of scholarly articles and various materials from different NGOs, as well as 
regional organisations.  
Primary sources include resolutions, constitutions, national regulations, as well as 
government reports and newspaper articles. Additionally secondary sources were 
used, such as books and articles comparing and evaluating the measures taken 
and the research conducted in the area.  
All the material was mainly in English or in German, with a few sources in Kurdish 
or Arabic. The limitation of language proved to be one of the challenges 
encountered as part of the research. As Kurdish is not the researcher’s mother 
tongue, it was impossible to access all material in the Kurdish language, which 
resulted in a loss of certain material.  
But even without the language barrier, it proved challenging to access authentic 
material when it came to research on the current situation inside the Kurdistan 
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Region. Material on the region is not yet freely available, and even when it is, it 
cannot always be trusted. 
Similar challenges could be encountered when it came to the field research: 
B. Field Research 
As explained in the introduction, it was the researcher’s aim to get a 
comprehensive picture of the effects of the policies deployed by the government, 
by using the expertise of the people directly affected. In order to meet this goal, the 
researcher got together with people of all ages, as well as different social and 
religious backgrounds, in order to get a feeling from the whole population on what 
changes have been happening inside the region, and what the role of women and 
gender is playing in them. This is based on the understanding that it is necessary 
to look at the “ordinary” people to understand the whole picture, as explained by 
Cynthia Enloe.36 
Since it was the interest of the author to look at the world views of members of a 
specific certain group and the author sees it as necessary to be sensitive to the 
participant’s interpretation of their social world, the research was led in the tradition 
of the qualitative research strategy. Exactly how the research strategy was 
conducted and by which stimuli it was influenced, will be subject of this chapter. 
Field research for the study was conducted exclusively in the Kurdistan Region of 
Iraq, as opposed to regions of Kurdish residence in other countries, or the whole of 
Iraq, for the reason of Kurdistan Iraq’s unique position in the conflict transformation 
process, and consequently the people’s unique experience from other parts of the 
region.  
Research was conducted in the Kurdistan Region on an on and off basis 
throughout the year of 2012, with the researcher being based in Erbil as well as 
Sulaimaniya, and taking trips to other parts of the region, such as Dohuk or 
                                                            
36 Cynthia Enloe, Connecticut College, Lectures, YouTube “Cynthia Enloe speaks on Women in Iraq” 
hƩp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BUVPm0vJINA (Accessed on 7.12.2011) 
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Halabja, with the research being based mainly on interviews, as well as personal 
observation. 
While the movement between the different parts of the region and also between 
different groups of people meant for the researcher that she was able to gain a 
broader knowledge of the issues at stake, it meant at the same time that it was 
difficult to establish tight connections with too many people, which had an influence 
on the interviews, as will be seen below. 
1. Methods of Data Collection 
Data was collected in two ways: personal observations and interviews. Even 
though the use of interviews was the main focus of the researcher, since it was the 
aim to draw conclusions from the points of views of the people involved in the 
situation, personal observation was of great important to fill the gaps left by the 
interviews. 
a) Interviews 
The researcher interviewed 63 men and women from different parts of the regions, 
the majority being from Erbil, then Sulaimaniya, the surrounding areas, as well as 
few from Kirkuk and Mosul. 
With the explicit aim of reaching people from different social backgrounds, in 
comparison to for example only interviewing high level politicians, or NGO workers, 
several challenges crossed the path of the researcher.  
As an “outsider” it is never easy to get into a community. In the particular case a 
lack of sufficient knowledge of the local languages, and the region as a whole, as 
well as the fact that it is seen as unacceptable in the region for a young woman to 
live alone by herself, made the situation more difficult.  
In order for the researcher to get access to the local community in the Kurdistan 
Region, she first established contact with Kurdish people based in her own local 
community, in Austria, Vienna.  
By becoming part of the Kurdish school of Vienna, by getting in contact with 
different politically engaged Kurds in Austria, by attending festivals and by getting 
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involved with the first scientific Kurdish society of Austria, the basis was formed, 
which opened the researcher the way into the Kurdish society in their own home 
country.  
The researcher got nearly all of her contacts of the interviewees through her 
already existing contacts in Kurdistan, which were different family members of 
Austrian Kurds, as well as university contacts.  
As giving an interview was for many participants seen as a sign of trust and of 
doing a favour, it was necessary for the researcher to have a “reference” or be 
accompanied by a local, so that the other party could be sure that the researcher 
can be trusted.  
This automatically narrowed down the groups of people who could be approached. 
At the interviews conducted the gender balance of the interviewees proved 
reasonably equal, with 57 per cent of female interviewees and 43 per cent men, 
but the age balance was not.  
There was a much higher percentage of younger women being interviewed as 
opposed to older women (with 60% of women interviewed being under the age of 
29) and in contradiction there was a higher percentage of older men being 
interviewed as opposed to younger men (with 62% of men interviewed being 
between the age of 29 and 50), the reason being that those groups were far easier 
to access. As experienced by the researcher, the young women were reasonably 
outspoken, while the older women rather held back, and with the men it was 
exactly the other way round.  
It was especially difficult to access people ready to be interviewed, who were over 
the age of 60, as they either did not want to be interviewed, or the people 
supporting the researcher were not ready to assist her in talking to the older 
people, either for reasons of respect for the elderly, or possibly uncertainty 
because of the type of interview questions, or because the elderly people were not 
regarding of still playing a role in today’s politics.   
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The research was directed at women and men in their normal day-to-day life. 
Through not only targeting political elites, international institutions and current 
peace activists, the author aimed to promote the increased participation of women 
at all levels of society and in all situations. In order to obtain a wide variety of 
participants, the researcher targeted different groups: politicians, NGO workers, 
people living in urban areas, as well as people from the country side and people 
who are well educated, as well as people who are not. Through this purposive 
sampling37 the researcher aimed at getting an insight into the views of the 
population as a whole, and not only of a specific group. Within diverse groups of 
people, the recruitment of participants was a probability sampling38, which 
depended on accessibility. Interestingly, it could be observed that no real pattern 
emerged of a clear male or female line or of questions being answered according 
to social status or even education. 
The interviews were held with students from different universities, teachers, 
doctors, workers, housewives, officials, people with very different religious believes 
(from very religious to atheists; Muslims, as well as Christians), different political 
opinions (PUK, KDP, Gorran, Islamic, or not political at all) and very different social 
backgrounds (from the very rich elite to families who could barely feed their 
children). Additionally, the researcher talked to people who have lived in Kurdistan 
their whole lives, as well as people who returned from exile and people who have 
decided to stay outside the country but who are regularly going for visits.  
It was particularly difficult for the researcher to get in close contact with people 
actually living in the country side, although interviews were conducted with people 
who are originally from the country side, as the people supporting the researcher 
were either not willing or able to support her with contacts in the country side and 
several attempts to talking to people in the country side failed, partly as a 
consequence of cultural misunderstandings. 
But language and cultural predicaments were only some of the obstacles faced by 
the researcher. A further challenge was provided by the issue discussed itself. 
                                                            
37 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Third ediƟon, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 458. 
38 Ibid. 
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The interviews were from their layout semi-structured with open-ended questions 
and interviewees were encouraged to answer in whichever way they wanted, even 
if it did not correspond with the question in order to get an insight into what the 
interviewee sees as relevant and important. 
In the interviews the interviewees were asked about their opinions on the situation 
of women in their country, their opinion on further inclusion of women, how this 
could be achieved, their satisfaction with the development of their country in 
general and their opinions on working methods of conflict transformation. 
Thereby the different questions which had a connection to conflict transformation 
were mixed, so that the interviewee, when coming back to a specific topic, was 
able to see it from a different point of view. 
The interviews were conducted one by one but also in small groups, in order to 
establish where and how people reacted differently in their answers.  
Initially it was the researcher’s intent to only conduct semi-structured interviews, 
but during the field research this proved impossible. While in some situations it was 
not possible to have any type of real interview, but rather merely a “loose 
conversation”, such as for example with a few students at a university, who were 
scared that the usage of pen and paper while they were talking could get them into 
trouble, because interviews were not officially allowed on university premises, but it 
was not possible to go out for them as well, other people were ready to provide 
information, but only if they were allowed to fill out the interview themselves in 
private and on a piece of paper, as they did not want to discuss any type of political 
questions in public. There were also several people who refused to talk about the 
subject or to answer certain questions, as they were scared of getting problems for 
certain opinions. It is also for this reason that the researcher decided to not use 
any names or other characteristics, which could identify the interviewees, in her 
thesis. 
As a result of the partial lack of free speech from several of the interviewees, the 
researcher could sometimes not be sure if the interviewees truly spoke what they 
were thinking or if they rather replied to questions in a way that they presumed the 
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researcher wanted them to answer. As explained by a 23 year old student “In our 
society there is the mentality that people give the “right” (“correct”) answer to 
everything they are asked. There is no freedom in giving answers”.39 These types 
of answers will be highlighted throughout the thesis.  
While these were some of the more challenging moments of the research, it has to 
be said that the researcher also had long and very open conversations with people 
who were extremely happy to talk about the issue at stake. 
In addition to the interviews, the researcher also relied on personal notes and 
observations: 
b) Personal Notes and Observations 
During the time of field research the researcher took notes on the general setting 
and circumstances, but also on the behaviour of participants during and around the 
time of interviews.  
This way of collecting data helped to further learn about and appreciate the culture 
of the social group and to get a feeling of why the interviewees are thinking in the 
way they are. At the same time it helped to divide words from actions, as it could 
be observed that many participants’ theoretical points of view were contradictory to 
their actions. 
The researcher specifically spent time travelling the region, being part of social 
gatherings and attending political meetings, as an observer with the research 
questions in mind. This more distanced way of research and the consequent active 
reflection on the observations made through the writing of notes, provided the 
research with an understanding, which would not have been present otherwise.  
While the researcher tried to be as objective as possible when conducting the 
research, this was impeded by more underlying influences: 
                                                            
39 Interview BW, Sulaimaniya on 08/08/2012 
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C. Influences on the Conduct of the Research 
“Different accounts and interpretations of events are linked to particular world-
views and frames of mind.”40 
Personal experiences and values of the researcher have a great impact on the 
research conducted. It can have an impact on the choice of area, the formulation of 
the research question, as well as the analysis of data or the conclusions drawn 
from the data.41 
Because of who we are (who speaks, who writes, where, what time, with whom, for 
whom…) there is always subjectivity. Even though researchers try to keep an 
objective distance, it is not possible to be truly objective. One’s own experiences 
and personality are central to the research process and make it subjective.42 
Concerning this difficult subject of personal influence on research, which is by 
many seen as having to be “objective”, the author supports the point of view, as 
held by Turnbull, who stated at the beginning of his book:  
“the reader is entitled to know something of the aims, expectations, 
hopes and attitudes that the writer brought to the field with him, for 
these will surely influence not only how he sees things but even 
what he sees.” 43    
It follows for the researcher that it is better to know about the author’s personal 
influences than to read the thesis with false expectations.  
The author of the thesis is a white, young, middle class, European female who 
grew up in an international environment, and who is married to an Iraqi citizen.  
The author comes from a critically thinking background with feminist influence. She 
went into the research with a very positive view on the society researched and on 
the subject of women and it was her aim and hope to on the one hand point out the 
current reality of the researched subject, but to also work for social change.  
                                                            
40 Nadje Al‐Ali, Iraqi Women, Untold Stories from 1948 to the Present (London Zed Books, 2007) 2. 
41 Bryman, Social Research Methods, 24. 
42 James Clifford and George Marcus (ed.), Writing Culture, The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986) 13. 
43 Colin Turnbull, The Mountain People (London: Picador, Pan Books, 1974) 13. 
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While the situation of the researcher, as a young woman from the West and 
married to an Iraqi was very positive in certain situations, it could mean obstacles 
in others, when it came to research for the thesis.  
Being a European and a woman meant that many people were rather prepared to 
talk to the researcher about issues, which they might not have discussed with 
somebody from inside the community or with a man. It was easier to get access to 
certain households and the researcher was not considered a threat.  
Additionally the fact that a European was so interested in the region to even 
conduct research there was regarded highly by many who all wanted to offer help.  
At the same time being a European meant that there existed several language as 
well as cultural misunderstandings, which are reflected in the choice of documents 
for the theoretical part of the research, as well as in the interviews. It was not 
possible to for the author to access official Kurdish documents and reports, in the 
same way as it would have been for a native speaker. At the same time, the 
researcher was not able to conduct or to fully understand the interviews in the 
interviewee’s mother tongue, which resulted in a great loss of material and different 
cultural understandings lead to the interviewer misunderstanding certain actions, 
and while some of them were clarified, there are certainly still several which were 
not.  
Being a European in the Kurdistan Region also meant that it was possible for the 
researcher to be allowed into the circle of high level politicians, as well as other 
wealthier families, but it also meant that it was more difficult to access other parts 
of society.  
Finally the fact that the researcher is married to an Iraqi meant on the one hand 
that many people responded more friendly, for reasons of religious belief or other, 
and that the researcher already had some insight into the culture before arriving for 
her field research. On the other hand it also meant that certain restrictions applied, 
which would not have applied if the researcher had gone there as a single 
European woman, because the welfare of the wider family had to be taken into 
consideration.  
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All of the obstacles described and experienced by the researcher were proof to her 
that the field of Kurdistan, especially when it comes to gender studies and conflict 
transformation, is still an under-researched terrain and is consequently a work in 
progress. The researcher therefore hopes that her study will be able to play a part 
in opening the pathway to further research in the area. At the same time the 
researcher kindly asks the reader to keep in mind the challenges encountered 
when reading the thesis and to keep an open mind for different ways of 
interpretation. 
Before starting off with the main analysis of the thesis, the following chapter will 
provide a variety of necessary background material: 
III. Setting the Scene 
This thesis comprises a variety of challenging topics, and more experienced 
academics have already dedicated books to question every one of these issues 
individually. As can be derived from the title, it is the thesis’ aim to discuss the 
interrelationship between gender and post-armed-conflict development, on the 
example of the situation in the Kurdistan Region. As to be able to fully and critically 
discuss the issue at stake, it is firstly necessary to derive a profound understanding 
of the different theories of “post-conflict development”, in order to appreciate if and 
how gender policies can affect development at the time of peacebuilding; to 
increase insight into the situation of women and gender relations during the times 
of armed conflict, as to comprehend the different challenges faced at the time of 
conflict transformation; to gain knowledge of the past and present situation of the 
Kurdistan Region, in order to apprehend the precise circumstances the thesis is 
embedded in; and to develop familiarity with the situation of women and gender 
relations in the Kurdistan Region, as to appreciate the effects gender policies are 
likely to have on development of the region, and the people themselves. 
It is the aim of the following chapter to provide this background knowledge, in the 
best way possible, by firstly reflecting on the issues of war, peace and gender, 
followed by an account of Kurdistan’s history, and a discussion on women’s roles 
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during the time of conflict, to finally elaborate the issue of women and gender 
equality in the Kurdistan Region. 
Tackling the most controversial question first, i.e. the existent relationship between 
gender equality and conflict transformation, is the first subchapter: 
A. Reflections on War, Peace and Gender 
“Women are crucial partners in creating the conditions for sustainable peace: 
economic recovery, social cohesion and political legitimacy.”44 
War and peace are ever present concerns in today’s world. Hardly a day goes by 
without people being confronted with violent conflicts either as individuals or 
through the media. At the same time there has emerged a global movement for 
peace. Millions are going rallying for peace on the streets, and ever more books 
and articles being written about wars as well as peace processes;45 the principal 
aim of the UN is the achievement and maintenance of global peace46, the 
international community increasingly supports peace-keeping activities and 
countries are sending their soldiers abroad in the name of peace. Nevertheless the 
number of conflicts around the world is not decreasing,47 their methods are, 
through advances in technology, arguably even more gruesome than before, and 
the aim for a global and sustainable peace is very far from achieved.  
The different violent conflicts occur for a variety of reasons and they all have their 
individual characteristics. Some wars are fought for economic reasons, such as 
challenging or defending established property rights48, others aim to achieve 
regional hegemony or a level of global control, for instance the so-called “wars 
                                                            
44 Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation, Building Security – a contribution to the debate on security policy 
(Stockholm 2011) 32. 
45 Roger Mac Ginty, No war, no peace: the rejuvenation of stalled peace processes and peace accords 
(Baskingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 12. 
46 See ArƟcle 1(1) of the UN Charter: “The Purposes of the United Nations are: To maintain international 
peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of 
threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to 
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, 
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;” 
47 UCDP, “Conflict Encyclopedia” Uppsala Universitet http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php 
(Accessed on 12.09.2011) 
48 Tony Addison and Tilman Brück, Making Peace Work, The Challenges of Social and Economic 
Reconstruction (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 2. 
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against terrorism”.49  Still others are caused by ethno-nationalist issues, by class 
issues, or by the oppression of one element of society by another.50 But whatever 
their origins, all wars lead to destruction. 
The logical question is how to re-establish or create a situation of peace out of the 
chaos and destruction of war.  
As explained by Lederach: 
“Conflicts do not just happen to people, people are active 
participants in creating situations and interactions they experience 
as conflict”.51 
It follows that conflicts are created, which leads to the assumption that peace may 
also be created. But in order to overcome conflict, and be able to create peace and 
constructive development for all, it is firstly necessary to understand the underlying 
situation which led to the conflict.  
All conflicts are multidimensional52 and every conflict is unique.53 The outbreak of 
war is thereby determined by pre-existing conditions, as is the behaviour of people 
during the conflict.54 War does not occur as an isolated event, which can be 
eliminated through a single action never to return again. Rather it is a complex 
phenomenon which derives from socially and historically defined relations between 
the different parties to the conflict. 55 As Quincy Wright puts it:  
“A war, in reality, results from a total situation involving ultimately 
almost everything that has happened to the human race up to the 
time the war begins”.56  
                                                            
49 Vivienne Jabri, “Revisiting change and conflict: On Underlying Assumptions and the De‐Politicisation of 
Conflict Resolution” Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management 5 (2006): 4. 
50 Cockburn, “Gender Relations as Causal in Militarization and War,” 149. 
51 John Paul Lederach, Preparing for Peace, Conflict Transformation Across Cultures (New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 1996) 9. 
52 Richmond, “A Genealogy of Peacemaking,” 326. 
53 Goodhand and Hulme, “From Wars to Complex Political Emergencies,” 17. 
54 Chris Cuomo, “War is not just an event: Reflections on the significance of everyday violence” Hypatia 
11(4) (1996): 33. 
55 Susanne Buckley‐Zistel, Conflict Transformation and Social Change in Uganda. Remembering after violence 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 21/22. 
56 William Nester, Globalization, War, and Peace in the Twenty‐first Century (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2010) 28. 
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This includes the legacy of previous political leaders, the availability of economic 
opportunities and also the relationship between the genders.  
While every circumstance surrounding the creation or de-escalation of armed 
conflict is important, the main focus of this thesis is with gender equality and with 
viewing the genesis of war and peace from a gender perspective. 
In many ways, the conducting of armed conflicts, as well as the construction of 
peace, are gendered activities in a variety of ways. Men and women are generally 
prescribed different roles from one another, with the specifics depending on age, 
class and cultural background.   
From a gendered perspective, wars deepen the divisions, which existed before, 
supporting men’s roles as perpetrators of violence and women as victims. Once 
again war makes it clear that women are oppressed and exploited through their 
bodies, legitimizing sexual violence against women, such as mass rape.57  
Furthermore, gender issues can be considered as root cause of war. As explained 
by Cynthia Cockburn “they foster militarism and militarization. They make war 
thinkable. They make peace difficult to sustain”58 
Transition from a state of war to a state of peace can only occur through a number 
of stages. Actions by the military and civilian leaders are needed to halt imminent 
large scale violence. Measures have to be taken to provide the general population 
with their basic needs and to initiate reconciliation within society. Finally long term 
provisions are required to eliminate as much as possible the potential of future 
conflict, which includes the elimination of potential root causes. Clearly these three 
stages can or even should overlap and the measures necessary to achieve them 
will vary from region to region and also from decade to decade. However all of 
them are necessary to achieve a state of peace.  
The concepts shortly outlined in the paragraph above are not new and are 
recognized by academics and practitioners today. However there is still arguably 
too much emphasis on the first of the three stages (i.e. action by the military and 
                                                            
57 Cockburn, “Gender RelaƟons as Causal in MilitarizaƟon and War,” 144. 
58 Ibid.p.149 
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civilian leaders) once a country or a region emerges from violent conflict. Even 
today it is still often assumed that it is only through the existence of armies and the 
threat or actual use of military force that peace can be achieved or maintained 
between nations.59 
This assumption could also be verified on the example of Kurdistan. The Kurdistan 
Region is highly disputed territory. According to the peace-brief of the United 
States Institute of Peace in March 2011 several measures are necessary to 
prevent the outbreak of further conflict in or at the borders of the Kurdistan Region. 
These include the operation of integrated security forces, the declaration of a 
demilitarised zone across the disputed territories, having a negotiating committee 
to resolve the conflict over the disputed territory, to appoint a UN Special 
rapporteur on the issue as well as to develop a team of local authorities, who can 
respond first to tensions arising on the ground.60 
While all these measures are necessary to prevent immediate conflict from arising, 
their militaristic and narrow character will not allow for sustainable peace to 
flourish. While it may be possible to achieve a short term peaceful solution by 
force, the goal of sustainable peace needs to be approached from a different 
angle.  The main challenge with analyzing conflict and the subsequent building of 
peace is the number of different layers which have to be considered. It is not 
possible to come up with one formula that sorts everything. Various dimensions 
including human rights, gender, health, religion, language, education, psychology 
and business practice need to be considered.61 It follows that the consideration of 
gender policies and their positive implementation are one of many steps to prevent 
further conflict by eliminating root causes and to work towards achieving 
sustainable, or even positive, peace within society.  
                                                            
59Bruce Bonta, “Conflict Resolution among Peaceful Societies: The Culture of Peacefulness” Journal of Peace 
Research 33(4) (1996): 409. 
60 Emma Sky, Preventing Arab‐Kurd Conflict in Iraq after the Withdrawal of US Forces, (Washington: United 
InsƟtuƟon if Peace, Peacebrief 86, March 2011) 4/5. 
61 Charles Webel and Johan Galtung, Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies (New York: Routledge, 2007) 
299. 
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As defined by Galtung, peace thereby is a never-ending process,62 which has to be 
maintained on a national, as well as a personal level. 
Only at the very basic level is peace understood as the opposite of conflict or war. 
Many would define peace as a time in which soldiers are not sent to the front and 
organized killing exists at a minimal level. But while one group might have a feeling 
of peace once they are back home from the battle field, another group might only 
experience peace once they are able to leave their houses again without fear. 
As Galtung explains there exist three types of violence: physical, structural and 
cultural.63 Today’s peace is defined through the elimination of only the first type of 
violence, the physical one and mainstream opinion is that the absence of large-
scale physical violence is enough for countries and people to live at peace, a 
“negative peace”. With negative peace there is no longer organized violence, but 
neither is there truly positive interaction and people are merely “coexisting 
peacefully”. Galtung introduced two other forms of peace: “positive peace” and 
“unqualified peace”. While there is some cooperation at a time of positive peace, 
but there are still occasional outbreaks of violence. “Unqualified peace” implies the 
total absence of violence in combination with a pattern of cooperation.64 
While unqualified peace is arguably unachievable in the near future, it nevertheless 
insufficient to aim merely for negative peace. For many women, as well as men, 
peace does not necessarily mean the cessation of armed conflict. As long as all 
people’s security needs are not met they will not feel in a state of peace. The 
meeting of these needs for women, if indeed they are ever achieved, will often take 
much longer than for men. Women will consequently experience a state of peace 
at a different time from men. Cynthia Enloe defines peace as “women’s 
achievement of control over their lives”. This would entail much more than violence 
outside their homes, or even violence at home, which many women experience 
                                                            
62 Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means, 265. 
63 Ibid.p.3 
64 Johan Galtung, Peace: Research, Education, Action, Essays in Peace Research (Volume 1, Copenhagen: 
ChrisƟan Ejlers, 1975) 29/30. 
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after a conflict. It involves the absence of poverty and the helplessness or 
dependency it creates.65 
“Peace” is thereby something personal to every individual. The perception of 
“peace” is as much dependent on a person’s beliefs and expectations as on his or 
her experience during war. Since everyone is different there are nearly as many 
ideas of peace as there are people. 
When people in the Kurdistan Region were asked what they associated with 
“peace”, the most common answer was “development”.66 Peace, for the people, 
goes together with development of the region, intellectually, but also 
economically67. It is peace that ensures the possibility of development of all 
aspects of society68. In the people’s experience development does not exist without 
peace and at the same time, peace does not exist without development.69 
Another very important aspect was that peace is what every human being needs 
for “life”. Peace is the foundation of life and it is not possible to truly live without 
peace.70  
Others commented that peace for them means to live in unity and harmony71 and 
that peace needs to comprise all levels of society, in the sense that all the different 
ethnic and social groups can live together in harmony72. In general people rather 
thought of peace in a wider sense. They said that peace is to live together 
everywhere (in the whole world) without hate and envy and that peace means 
acceptance and a willingness not to enforce anything on anybody else.73 For one 
person especially, peace meant that everybody in society can have the religion and 
                                                            
65 Cynthia Enloe in Nadje Al‐Ali, “Reconstructing Gender: Iraqi women between dictatorship, war, sanctions 
and occupation” Third World Quarterly 26(4‐5) (2005): 742. 
66 See e.g. Interview AG, Erbil on 13/04/2012; Interview AH, Erbil on 15/04/2012; Interview AS, Sulaimaniya 
on 23/05/2012; Interview AW, Sulaimaniya on 01/06/2012; Interview BE, Erbil on 26/06/2012; Interview AX, 
Sulaimaniya on 03/06/2012, Interview BG, Erbil on 02/07/2012; Interview BN, Erbil on 17/07/2012 
67 Interview AG, Erbil on 13/04/2012 
68 Interview AN, Erbil on 03/05/2012 
69 Interview BG, Erbil on 02/07/2012 
70 Interview BT, Erbil on 24/07/2012 
71 Interview AV, Sulaimaniya on 28/05/2012 
72 Interview BW, Sulaimaniya on 08/08/2012 
73 Interview CE, Vienna on 21/10/2012 
  
Page | 36  
 
belief they want, that the private sphere is accepted and that everybody can have 
access to education.74 
Still others considered peace as being “freedom”, something that gives spirit and 
happiness to life75. Such “freedom” provides the basis to live in wealth and with 
stability76. In view of all these elements of ‘peace’ from a gender perspective, it can 
be concluded that “true” peace will only exist when it is possible for every man and 
woman to live in freedom, without oppression, either from the state or from the 
people around them; to live without discrimination; and to be empowered to 
develop themselves. In the words of one elderly woman: “Peace means that there 
are no differences between men and women”.77 
The correlation between gender equality and the existence of peace is still a highly 
disputed theory among academics, as well as civil society. Many are of the opinion 
that while gender and other elements of equality amongst the population are 
significant, they do not rank in importance for peace building with other issues, 
such as disarmament, political actions and the reconstruction of the economy. At 
the same time people held the opinion that a correlation does necessarily exist. As 
explained by a 20 year old student,  
“equality in a region leads to enhanced possibilities because of the 
different experience people have, and consequently makes the 
establishment of peace easier.”78   
Additionally it was explained by a housewife and a middle-aged doctor that it is not 
possible to create a homogenous state without equality between the sexes and 
that equality and unity are the basis for peace, as people will always resume 
fighting and conflict, if they do not feel equal.79 
From a feminist point of view peace is more than the mere absence of great-scale 
physical violence.80 Peace encompasses humanitarian as well as social, economic, 
                                                            
74 Interview CK, Vienna on 20/10/2012 
75 Interview AQ, Sulaimaniya on 19/05/2012 
76 Interview AK, Erbil on 20/04/2012 
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political and cultural issues. In order to achieve this “positive peace”, as discussed 
above, structural as well as cultural violence need to be eliminated in all their 
forms. Structural violence, in the form of social exploitation and repression, 
together with cultural violence, namely symbolic violence in religion, ideology, 
language, art, science, law, media, education etc., create the justification for 
physical violence. It follows that only through their elimination will it be possible to 
have real peace. 81 And there is a need for social transformation when wanting to 
achieve true peace.82 
Structural and cultural violence can arise from a variety of issues including 
economic classes, ethnic and religious groupings as well as sexual orientation and 
gender. To the extent that mainstream research on peace and armed conflict takes 
a gender neutral approach for granted, it may be argued that it implicitly assumes a 
male-centric approach. This has to change, since, according to Cynthia Cockburn, 
it is gender relations which “push the wheel around”.83 Although gender relations 
have changed dramatically around the world in the previous 200 years, equality is 
far from achieved, either at a national, or at a personal level. Women are still 
underrepresented in decision making positions, little has changed in the sexual 
division of labour, and women are still disproportionately affected by violence, 
especially domestic violence.84 
Women are exploited through not having the same opportunities as men for their 
personal development. This structural violence against women is maintained 
through “socialization, gender stereotyping, and a constant threat of violence” 
which identify women as inferior. Even if they manage to get outside the house, 
they do not have the same opportunities as men. Women often get inferior jobs 
receive less pay and thus enjoy fewer opportunities for public participation. 
Structural violence is created and sustained by cultural norms. It is therefore 
cultural violence which legitimises structural violence and gender issues are 
integral to both. Gender inequality exists in every state, and although women’s 
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83 Cockburn, “Gender Relations as Causal in MilitarizaƟon and War,” 149. 
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Across the World (Berlin: Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2009) 5. 
  
Page | 38  
 
power varies across regions and states, full equality is yet still to be achieved in 
any state.85 
It follows that from a gender point of view positive peace does not exist in today’s 
world. More and more scholars are agreeing with the concept of a continuum 
effect, when it comes to war. Wars are no longer seen as single events, but rather 
as being timeless conflicts, at different stages of development. For feminists it is 
especially so, since women report that they are experiencing similar coercion by 
men during the so-called peace time as during war.86 
Women’s equality is as much a prerequisite for sustainable peace, as sustainable 
peace is for women’s equality. War determines and deepens gender differences 
and positive peace will only be achievable if all forms of inequality are 
extinguished. It follows that movements for peace and movements for gender, as 
well as for religious, ethnic and class equality, need to go hand in hand. 
Women, as approximately fifty per cent or more of the population, play an 
important role in the transformation of the country and the development of society. 
But rather than receiving support after the end of armed conflicts, women often 
suffer a backlash in their relations not only with men but also against any new-
found freedoms and they are forced back into their “traditional roles”.87 
In order to achieve peace in a country it is necessary to have a plan for an 
effective, multi-layered structure, comprising political reconstruction of a legitimate 
and capable state, economic reconstruction, social reconstruction, including the 
build-up of a democratic society, and to provide general security.88 All of the 
different components interact with one other and if any of them are missing, it is not 
possible to achieve a successful reconstruction of a state. 
Elements of the international community have recognized and long worked on a 
“new vision of peace”. Already in 1992, UNESCO adopted its Culture of Peace 
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Action Programme, and called at the international peace conference in 
Yamoussoukro, Cote d’Ivoire in 1989 for 
“a new vision of peace culture based on the universal values of 
respect for life, liberty, justice, solidarity, tolerance, human rights and 
equality between women and men”89 
In 2000 the UN initiated the Year of a Culture of Peace, which was widened to the 
Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World 
(2001-2010)90.91 
The Culture of Peace, in comparison with related research, focuses specifically on 
the content and conditions of peace. As described by David Adams: 
“A culture of peace consists of values, attitudes, behaviours and 
ways of life based on non-violence, respect for human rights, 
intercultural understanding, tolerance and solidarity, sharing and 
free flow of information and the full participation of women”92 
The Culture of Peace, has to start on all levels: political, legal, educational and 
social. It defines peace as “the well-being of all”, including social justice.93  
As one of the key priorities of a Culture of Peace, peace researchers, like Werner 
Wintersteiner, see the necessity of social inclusion and of gender democracy.94 
The Culture of Peace, from its beginnings included the necessity of equality 
between the sexes and full participation of women in the community95. 
But while the need for a new outlook on peace has become more and more 
acceptable, especially in the academic sphere, practice still largely seems very 
different. 
                                                            
89 first book by Father Felipe MacGregor in Viktorija Ratkovic and Werner Wintersteiner (Eds.), Yearbook 
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Peace is not a passive concept. It has to be worked for, by individuals as well as 
groups. It needs to grow from within and it is part of a collective commitment and a 
whole culture. Peace cannot be enforced by outsiders, but is made possible by 
creating opportunities for the population to enhance the process to peace.96 
The basis for achieving all of this is to recognise equality between different states, 
cultures, ethical groups, religious groups, as well as the two sexes.  The link 
between inequality and violence, including the link between gender inequality and 
violence, leads to the conclusion that inequality in society, including inequality 
between women and men is an obstacle to sustainable peace. As explained by 
UNESCO, “equality between men and women is an essential condition of a culture 
of peace”.97 It follows if real or “positive” peace wants to be achieved it is first 
necessary to overcome social relations of domination and submission,98 because 
societies in which “tolerance and respect for the rights of opponents” are practiced, 
whether in the domestic or in the international sphere, they are less likely to resort 
to violence.99 
Putting the knowledge acquired in this chapter together on the example of the 
Kurdistan Region, the region is currently dealing with a number of challenges, 
which are likely to hamper the achievement of sustainable peace. These have 
been well summarized by Nuria Tornas and Ana Villellas as part of their report in 
2009. More immediate and outside risks, which might need to be fought against on 
a political and militaristic level in the short run, include the troubled relationship 
between Baghdad and Erbil and the issue of the disputed territories.100 
Furthermore there are a number of internal challenges, which are not likely to 
directly lead to armed conflict, and which are less visible because it especially 
affects people outside the political sphere and does not occur in public, but which 
have a substantial impact on human safety and structural violence and which are 
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slowing down the peace process. These problems include an inadequacy in good 
governance and participation, human rights and women’s rights. As derived from 
the results of this chapter, and as once more explained by Tornas and Villellas, 
these difficulties have to be tackled, in order to avoid conflict from forming beneath 
the surface.101 The issue of women’s rights in the region is thereby seen as 
especially challenging, since the relative stability of the region seems to stand in 
contrast with the high level of violence against women, and the level of legal 
advances and theoretical debates are contrary to the actual circumstances of the 
women in the region.102  
The main political parties in the Kurdistan Region are very supportive of gender 
equality in public. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) considers itself as a 
“political and pro- women’s advancement party” and, as part of its program seeks 
to “promote the political, social, economic and cultural rights of women”.103 
As noted by the current prime minister Nechirvan Barzani in November 2012, at 
the launch of a sixteen day campaign to combat domestic violence: 
“At the Kurdistan Regional Government we are determined to 
protect women’s rights and promote equality of opportunity.”104 
Such statements are still often criticized by opponents for being merely loose talk 
with no action. In order to answer the criticism, Barzani continued: 
“This campaign is not a show for the media; it is rooted in the belief 
of the Kurdistan liberation movement and the Kurdistan Regional 
Government on women’s rights.”105 
This thesis will analyse whether these statements are reflected in Kurdistan’s 
politics today, and how the existence of gender inclusive strategies, or the lack 
thereof, influence the individual and social development of peace for the people in 
their local communities and in the region as a whole. Peace will be defined as “the 
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well-being of all”. But before analysing the specific strategies and their impacts in 
detail, the current situation within the Kurdistan’s Region will be discussed, in order 
to enhance the understanding of the Kurdistan’s Region current situation: 
B. Kurdistan’s History – The Long Path to Autonomy 
Understanding the past is vital for understanding the present and for imagining the 
future. Knowledge of past difficulties within a region, as well as its cultural 
foundations and the unique experiences of the people, is important for appreciating 
current events and hence for finding solutions to present problems and foreseeing 
potential complications.106 For this reason the following subchapter will provide a 
short background on the history of the Kurdistan Region and its people. 
Kurdistan, the “Land of the Kurds”, stretches across the north of historical 
Mesopotamia.107 The Kurds have a very vaguely estimated population of between 
twenty and forty million people, of whom about 5,6 million live in Iraq108, which is 
about 15 to 20 per cent of the Iraqi population.109 As a consequence, the Kurds are 
often described as the world’s largest nation without a state.110 
The Kurds see themselves as the native inhabitants of their land and as ethnically 
distinct from the Turks, Persians and Arabs.111 Their language, customs, and 
traditions are distinct as well as their clan history, which comprises over 800 tribes 
in Kurdistan.112 
Kurdish society is based on family and tribes,113 with the Kurds having embraced a 
variety of religions, with the majority today being Sunni Muslims. However, they 
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also follow other Islamic believes, as well as the Yazidi belief, Christianity and 
Judaism.114 
The ancient history of the Kurds and Kurdistan dates back several thousand years. 
Human skeletons were found from the time of the Neanderthals and the first village 
found in the regions was dated at 7000 B.C.115.  
The more recent history of Kurdistan was shaped by the incursion of different 
groups and empires which destroyed and reformed the region time and time again. 
From the 7th century until shortly before the collapse of the Arab Caliphate in 1258, 
Kurdistan was under Islamic occupation.116 Shortly after being freed from the 
Arabs, Kurdistan was invaded by the Mongols during the 13th and the 14th 
centuries,117 and from the 16th century to 1918 Kurdistan was forcibly divided 
between Iran and the Ottoman Empire.118  
After the First World War and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the British and the 
French split the Middle East in different mandates at the conference of San Remo 
in 1920. As a result, Turkey and Iraq were defined with their current borders, but 
there was no country for the Kurds. The western Kurdish part, previously occupied 
by the Ottoman Empire, was consequently divided between Syria, the transformed 
Ottoman Empire, Turkey, and the newly created state of Iraq.119 What followed was 
a time of non-recognition of the Kurds as a people. While, the existence of the 
Kurds and their right to independence was still recognized in the Treaty of 
Sèvres120 from 10 August 1920, the treaty never came into force. In the Treaty of 
Lausanne from 24 July 1923, the treaty of peace with Turkey, the Kurds were not 
mentioned. The next time the Kurds officially were internationally recognized was 
in the UN Security Council Resolution 688 from 5 April 1991.121 
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In the wake of these historic developments, today’s Kurdistan is impossible to 
identify as one would identify a recognized state. There are no international 
boundaries to the territory, and even the internal ones are disputed. The region of 
the Kurds is divided between south-eastern Turkey, north-eastern Syria, northern 
Iraq and north-western Iran. The countries between which the Kurdish region is 
divided refuse to acknowledge the existence of a unified Kurdish geographical 
entity and, in the case of Turkey, reject the idea of a distinct Kurdish people and 
culture.122 This division of the Kurdish land, created by the Allied powers, became 
the geographic fate of the land of the Kurds, which they have contested until today.  
The consequence of their separation into different geographical entities, with 
different overlords, also led to the separation of the different Kurdish communities. 
While they had always ideologically held together against their common enemy, 
the overlord, they have arguably more and more drifted apart more and more in 
practice.123 Even though all the Kurdish people are unified by the aim to achieve 
liberation, they are hardly united in any other way. They have different historical 
experiences, different cultural traditions, as well as religious differences and their 
dialects also vary greatly. The differences between the northern and southern 
Kurdish dialects, Kurmanji and Sorani, are so different, that they are often not 
mutually understood by native speakers124.125 Furthermore an important divisive 
factor in Kurdish society is the inherent tribal structure. Members of a certain tribe 
believe in a common descent and are often loyal to a traditional chieftain; rivalries 
exist between different tribes.126 I followed there has not been a unified struggle for 
independence, but rather separate nationalist movements.127 
Whether as unified or separate movements, the Kurds have, throughout their 
history, fought against the forced assimilation by the occupying powers. They 
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aimed at achieving self-determination through revolts and the struggled for the 
maintenance of their national culture and language.128 Until now they have only 
been partly successful.129 This fight for independence became the predominant 
feature of Kurdish history, which shaped all other issues in the regions.  
Turning to historic developments directly relevant to the Kurdish community in Iraq, 
it can be observed that the wish of the Iraqi Kurds to have their own country, 
separate from Iraq, is as old as “Iraq” itself,130 but was never achieved. While 
Britain supported the Kurds during the First World War, they later rejected the idea 
of an independent Kurdistan, in in view of their own strategic interests.131 The 
period from 1918 to 1991, was marked by an unstable relationship between the 
Iraqi Kurds and ‘the others’, which was replete with promises made, but not kept, 
and a consequential flaring up of violence. 
During the period of British administration in Iraq, the Kurds took up their fight for 
independence under Sheikh Mahmud Barzani (1881-1956), but without success.132 
The general inability to create a Kurdish country at any time in history, is principally 
due to two main reasons. On the one hand there was the internal separation of the 
Kurds as discussed above, and on the other, the political influence of the outside 
forces which opposed Kurdish interests. 
The new state “Iraq” was founded intentionally with difficult power-relations inside 
the country. Sunnis, Shias, and Kurdish were forcibly incorporated into a 
geographic entity, arguably in order to facilitate control from outside.133 The fight for 
independence following the First World War, saw a lack of political interest for an 
independent Kurdistan. However, the Kurdish determination led to active hostilities. 
The British bombing the Kurds and their use of chemical weapons against them in 
the 1920s is reminiscent of the later conflict with the Saddam regime.134 
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In 1921 the British created a kingdom in Iraq under King Faisal, which existed until 
after the British left the country in 1932.135 Throughout his reign, the Kurds struggle 
for recognition continued. When Mosul officially became part of Iraq, the League of 
Nations tried, through the Treaty of Ankara in 1926, to ensure that the Kurds’ 
identity was respected and that they would become an autonomous region within 
Iraq with their own justice system, administration and official language.136 However 
these aims were not achieved. Further, Iraq’s admission into the League of Nations 
in 1932, it was on the condition that the government should introduce Kurdish as 
an official language, next to Arabic, in the areas which were predominately 
Kurdish. This condition was also not fulfilled.137 
As a consequence of these failures, Kurdish nationalism in Iraq further flared up 
during the 1930s and 1940s. After the Second World War the Kurds continued their 
fight for autonomy, this time under Mullah Mustafa Barzani (1903-1979).138 The 
resulting consequences were closely connected to the different political 
developments in Iraq at a national level.  
On 14 July 1958 a group of revolutionary officers ended the monarchy and Iraq 
became a republic under general Abdel Karim Qasim.139 It was under him that 
“national rights” for the Kurds were recognized140 the first time,141 as stipulated in 
Article III of the Iraqi Constitution of 1958, which stated that Arabs and Kurds enjoy 
equal rights.142 Through this action, the Kurdish population in Iraq received a level 
of recognition far ahead of the Kurdish people in the neighbouring countries.143 
Nevertheless they did not achieve what they aimed for. While the Kurds were 
assured by Abdel Karim Qasim that they would receive more autonomy, the 
promise was not kept. 
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When the Ba’ath regime took over power in the 1960s the Kurds hoped that the 
new government would prove sympathetic to their autonomy but the reverse was 
true.144 In 1961 war between the Kurdish region and Iraq flared up once again.145 
The rest of Iraq cracked down on the Kurdish North, which led to armed resistance 
in Kurdistan and to an armed conflict that lasted for thirty years, until the US-led 
Gulf War of 1991.146 During that time several attempts were made to resolve the 
difficult relationship between the Arabs and the Kurds, but remained unsuccessful, 
such as the negotiations in Baghdad led by Jalal Talabani in 1963.147 In 1966 the 
Bazzaz-Declaration promised a decentralisation of Kurdistan within Iraq, but as 
with earlier promises, this was only kept on paper. 148  
Under the Iraqi president Al-Bakr in 1970 the Kurds once again hoped for change 
and for some time it seemed that they would finally achieve their goal of autonomy. 
However in the mid-1970s, the US, Iraq and Iran, which had previously supported 
the Iraqi Kurds, changed their position, and allied against the Kurds, as reflected in 
the Algiers Accord from 1975.149  
As a consequence, from 1976 onwards new battles between the Iraqi army and the 
Kurdish partisans, the Peshmergas, flared up, as well as struggles for power 
between different Kurdish groups.150  As a consequence, since the 1970s, a 
considerable proportion of Kurds left the region and went into diaspora. Others 
were forced by the Iraqi government to leave districts like Kirkuk and Khanaqin, 
which are very rich in oil, and were replaced by Arab peasants.151 It was the aim of 
the Ba’ath regime to crush the Kurds and they initiated an “arabization” process 
that continued until the end of the regime in 2003.   
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But this was not the first attempt to eradicate the Kurdish culture from outside. 
Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurdish North has been greatly 
influenced by the Arab region of Iraq, and the Kurdish are said to have suffered 
from cultural genocide under the Baathist regime. Their language, identity and 
culture were banned. Children were not allowed to speak Kurdish in school, people 
were killed for speaking up and talking about the Kurdish situation in public.152 
Additionally, the arabization was promoted through the resettlement of Arabs on 
Kurdish land, as well as, for example, offering Iraqi Arab men money if they 
married Kurdish women.153 Even after the creation of the “safe haven”, the Iraqi 
government tried to further “arabize” for example by selling land in Kirkuk either 
cheaper or exclusively to Arabs.154 
At the same time, throughout the rule of the Baathist regime, the Kurds suffered 
from campaigns of mass arrests, displacements and killings. From the early 1970s, 
Faili Kurds living in Baghdad and other cities in Southern Iraq were arrested. 
Additionally family members of Kurdish fighters, as well as people who had power 
in Kurdish society were arrested, sent to concentration camps or disappeared for 
ever.155 In the later years of the Baathist rule, the Iraqi army went against the 
Kurdish rural areas, destroying villages, deporting the inhabitants and transferring 
thousands to concentration camps throughout the country.156 As a consequence, 
Kurdish refugees settled all over the world, with the first wave departing in the 70s 
as noted above, and a substantial number leaving their home after the uprising of 
1991.157 
During the time of struggles the different countries with Kurdish communities 
supported the uprisings among each other’s Kurds, whenever it suited their political 
plan. Iran supported the Kurdish movement in Iraq led by Mulla Mustafa Barzani 
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financially as well as militarily from 1963 to 1975. But once the Iraqi regime made 
concessions to Iran, Iran stopped supporting the Kurdish movement and obliged 
Barzani to give up. Similarly, during the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq supported the Kurdish 
movement in Iran, while Iran allied itself with the Iraqi KDP (Kurdistan Democratic 
Party).158 
From 1979, the Kurds experienced the darkest time in their recent history. Under 
Saddam Hussein the Kurds, together with the rest of the Iraq’s people were part of 
the eight year war against Iran159, the invasion of Kuwait160, the constant struggle 
between different ethnic groups,161 as well UN sanctions imposed on the 
country.162 Under Saddam, the Kurds were deported, had to flee and were 
massacred.163 Apart from the normal consequences of war, the Kurds suffered 
from attacks with chemical weapons, one of the most destructive being the attack 
against Halabja in March 1988, where a whole village was destroyed.164 But 
Halabja was only one part of the bigger “Anfal” campaign, during which Saddam 
bombarded several Kurdish regions with chemical weapons.165 The Anfal 
campaign166 consisted of eight military offensives by the Ba’athist military 
machinery over six months, in spring and summer 1988. During the Anfal 
campaign chemical weapons were systematically used against Kurdish military as 
well as civilian targets. About 3000 villages were destroyed, approximately 1.5 
million people were displaced and there were mass executions of civilians. It is 
estimated that around 180.000 people died as a result of this campaign.167  
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As a consequence of the weaker position of Saddam after the First Gulf War the 
Kurds tried to rise against the regime in 1991.168 But as the revolution was not 
backed by the US or the international community, it was easily crushed and more 
than 100.000 people were taken into detention, many never to be seen again. A 
total of 20,000 people were reported killed as a result of the crackdown 169 and 
about 5000 villages were destroyed. As a consequence a huge exodus began. 
Until 1990 about 370.000 Kurds fled into Iran, over half a million Kurds took refuge 
in Turkey and 10.000 came to Western countries.170 Additionally it is believed that 
in 1990 as many as 1.5 million Kurds were displaced inside Iraq and they were 
confined in prisons or refugee concentration camps throughout the country.171 It 
was only through these operations, which caused the near destruction of the 
Kurdish culture, that their autonomy within Iraq was finally made possible in 
1991.172 
Following the first Gulf War and UN Resolution 688 from 5 April 1991173, it was the 
US and Britain’s declaration of a “safe haven” for the Kurds in northern Iraq, which 
allowed for a “territorialisation” of Kurdish nationalism. With the protection of the 
US and Britain the Kurds were able to create a Kurdish Regional Government 
(KRG) and to proceed with elections.174 
The main Kurdish areas in the North of Iraq, Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaimaniya, were 
parted from the Central Government in Baghad (ICG) after the ICG was forced to 
withdraw from the area in 1991, and left control to the Kurds themselves.175 
It was thus after 1991 that the Kurds could start practicing their culture again. 
Kurdish books were reprinted, new centres of education were established176 and 
the Kurds started an autonomous political system. As a result of the elections in 
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May 1992, the Parliament, representing the legislative power of the Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq, was established in Erbil.177  
But the early days of the newly established autonomous region of Kurdistan was 
not easy. The election results were contested and led to internal conflict between 
the different Kurdish factions, for about six years after the first elections.178 From 
1994 to 1998 renewed fighting between the two factions broke out, which left 
thousands of people dead on both sides. The fighting was such that Barzani and 
his KDP asked for the assistance of Saddam Hussein to fight the PUK, which had 
allied with Iran. As a consequence Saddam’s troops entered the North of the 
country again and the fighting continued. In 1997 Turkey entered the war. It was 
only in September 1998 that Talabani and Barzani agreed to and signed a US-
mediated power-sharing treaty, the Washington Agreement, in which they agreed 
to share power and revenue but not to allow Iraqi troops or the PKK (Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party) into the region again.  
It was during the civil war in the 1990s that KDP and PUK became the main 
powers in the region. Previously there had been several other entities such as the 
Socialist and the Communist parties, as well as various tribes, which all acted in 
their own interests fighting for or against the Iraqi regime, as well as against one 
another. During the 90s, the KDP and PUK gained basically total control by 
defeating other party or tribal leaders or by forcing them into alliances.179 
This is a period of history many Kurds today avoid discussing. The population 
suffered under the civil war and many were discontent with the parties’ fighting.180 
As a result, the civil population took part in limited and temporary social protests, 
which were according to Faleh Jabar and Hosham Dawod widely supported by the 
public, but to which the parties were indifferent. In 1994 and 1995 numerous peace 
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demonstrations and strikes were conducted, but to no avail and fighting 
continued.181  
In addition the civil population suffered under the imposition of the international 
sanctions on Iraq by the UN after the Gulf War. Saddam Hussein’s food rationing 
system led to increased hardship for the local population, despite the new 
“freedom”.182 
As a consequence of the decades of war, the suppression by the regime, as well 
as the direct and indirect effects of the UN sanctions183 the people suffered from a 
destroyed infrastructure. From technical facilities, to hospitals and educational 
institutions, everything was demolished.184 Throughout the 1990s the value of the 
Iraqi currency fell and many people had to live from aid alone. There was 
insufficient food and people lived in poverty185 within an administrative vacuum. 
Everything from security, to health care, education, governance, employment and 
human rights had to be restored.186 Moreover, the Kurds still lived under the 
constant fear of Saddam returning to the region.  
It was at this time that the Kurds had to redefine themselves, while suffering from a 
humanitarian crisis and while constituting part of a country, whose regime tried to 
exterminate them. Robert Olson argued that this time was a period for the two 
Kurdish groups learned to understand one another and to tolerate the other’s 
demands.187 This became a reality around the turn of the new millennium,188 and 
was manifested in 2003, with the fall of Saddam Hussein. 
Today Kurdistan has a pluralistic political system with over one hundred civil 
society institutions, many of which are women’s organisations. There is free 
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education for all children.189 The Kurdish region is reasonably stable and most 
secure in the whole of Iraq. 
In recent years, the Kurds in Iraq have gained importance and international and 
internal attention, which would have been unthinkable of in previous decades. 
Kurdish is an official state language in Iraq, schools are taught in Kurdish and 
Kurds have the right to broadcast.190 Universities have been established in the 
Kurdistan Region and books are published in Kurdish. Additionally there exists a 
variety of Kurdish newspapers and magazines and the government is planning to 
develop a Kurdish cinema.191 Democracy is progressing in Kurdistan, with 
opposition movements slowly emerging which challenge the monopoly of the two 
political parties. The ‘Goran’ movement and the Kurdish Islamic Union (KIU) are 
the most important.192 The Kurds are able to govern themselves through an 
electoral process which, while far from perfect, is moving in the right direction 
towards achieving the people’s wishes. The President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, is not 
only Kurdish but also the leader of the PUK, one of the two most important parties 
of the Kurds in Iraq. Consequently at present the times of Kurdish isolation as an 
unheard minority are gone, at least for the Kurds in Iraq.193 
After 2003, and at the time of the drafting of the interim constitution of Iraq, known 
as the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), the Kurds managed to present 
themselves as a united front, in comparison to the divided Sunni and Shia Arab 
factions. With the support of the Western constitutional law experts, the Kurdistan 
Region was established as an autonomous region with considerable rights under 
the Iraqi constitution.194 Kurdistan today is recognized as a distinct federal region 
within Iraq195 and it has the right to exercise executive, legislative and judicial 
powers in accordance with its own Draft Constitution. While this is not allowed to 
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contradict the Iraqi Constitution, and except for “those authorities stipulated in the 
exclusive authorities of the federal government”,196 the Kurdish parliament and its 
authorities have a great leeway in dealing with their own citizen except for the 
matters dealt with by the federal government, which include international dealings, 
national security policy, the formulation of fiscal and customs policy, the distribution 
of water and the use of oil and gas.197 Additional the Kurds are able to exercise 
some influence over the whole of Iraq through their politicians in Baghdad.198  
Dramatic progress can be seen in the Kurdistan Region, even though the region is 
still not economically self-sustainable, social problems exist and party support is 
still very important to ensure individual success.199 In comparison to the rest of 
Iraq, Kurdistan today is not anymore suffering from violent deaths on an almost 
daily basis200, and the region has used the time for reconstruction.  
The current leading politicians have great aspirations for the future. In his inaugural 
speech on 5 April 2012, Prime Minister Barzani, stated that he will work to continue 
the political, economic and social development in the region, by devolving more 
powers to the provincial and district councils, as well as by respecting the 
opposition, tackling corruption, reducing party influence in governance, enhancing 
the rule of law, improving economic and social services, increasing transparency 
and reviving the agricultural sector. Further, he will work towards respecting all 
people within his jurisdiction by strengthening democracy and human rights, 
especially for women and children, “by protecting them from domestic violence and 
empowering women through allowing them to assume better and more effective 
roles in the KRG.”201  
Despite all the positive developments over the previous decade and the even more 
ambitious plans for the future, problems in the region, as well as between Erbil and 
Baghdad still persist, and cannot be forgotten. The Kurds claim that 40 per cent of 
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the whole Kurdish region of Iraq is still under Iraqi leadership, namely Kirkuk, 
Makhmour, Khanaqin, Mandeli, Sheykhan and Sinjar.202 Furthermore discussions 
of the allocation of oil and gas resources between Baghdad and Erbil are still on 
the daily agenda. Additionally, elements of the population have been disillusioned 
in recent times. Many households still do not have electricity or running water 24 
hours per day and have the feeling that only people linked to the political parties 
are able to get jobs and money. They feel that there is no rule of law, that the 
political leaders today are just as corrupt as in the past and that the system has not 
much changed. Opposition parties basically still do not exist and it is therefore 
questionable whether it is really possible to have any independent voices. 
From first hand field research it could be observed that when the people are asked 
today if they are satisfied with the reconstruction process in their region, about half 
are very satisfied, while the others still have various criticisms. While everybody 
recognizes that a lot has happened in the region throughout the last years, many 
believe that too much is done on the outside, such as the construction of streets, 
malls, new houses, but that the transformation is not going “deep enough”.203  
Nevertheless there are certain aspects in the transformation process which people 
where especially happy about: Several expressed pride that Kurdistan is now seen 
as a “developed region” region from outside and that they do not have to feel 
“backwards” anymore204. Especially several people of wealthier backgrounds were 
of the opinion that the poorer people benefitted from the transformation process 
and that the divide between rich and poor is getting smaller205, although this was 
disputed by the other side.206 Other positive aspects included the achievement of 
reasonable stability.207 Many were of the opinion that they “have reached their 
goal” in both being and feeling free208. Only very few people recognized as a 
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positive achievement that women were part of the development209 and that legal 
developments had occurred210.  
While a number of people expressed the belief that transformation so far failed, 
they also feel that the politicians do not care enough about the region and its 
people211, and that not everybody is benefitting from the improvements.212 They 
feel that corruption is still rife, there is a lack of public services,213 and that the “old 
ways” are still persisting.214 Despite all of this, the most commonly held opinion 
was that people are happy with the transformation process, in comparison with 
what existed before. As explained by a clerk:  
“If one compares it with the past, I am very happy. But there is still a 
lot to be criticized and there is a lot than can be made better, but 
Kurdistan is on the path of hope.”215 
Especially when it comes to the poorer people, many had the feeling that more 
needs to be done.216  
While the population appreciates that elections have taken place, that the 
infrastructure has improved and that they have enhanced opportunities for 
travelling and leisure time217, many complained that they had the feeling that the 
changes are merely taking place on the surface.218 People from the opposition had 
the feeling that there is no true democracy and that the opposition still has no 
chance.219 The more open people explained that they felt that the mentality is still 
the same and that this should finally change.220 However, many said that the 
situation had already improved.221  
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Even the politicians suggested unofficially that they would like to see more 
happening:  
“As representative of my country I am satisfied, but as a private 
person I would wish for more and that the reconstruction was 
quicker. For example not even the hospitals are reconstructed in 
the correct way (there are not enough good doctors). The biggest 
problem is corruption. There should be more control systems 
when it comes to corruption. But the control systems are very 
slowly getting better. For example there were already a few 
restaurants closed by the health authority because of a lack of 
hygiene, which would have never been possible to even think of a 
few years ago, because everybody was just bribed.”222 
Ten years after finally laying down arms, the transformation process can be 
described as on-going. The current “peace” in the region is frail, and further 
development will be needed to ensure the quality and longevity of peace.  
Coming from the general background to the more specific one of gender relations, 
the following sub-chapter is going to outline the influence of the different armed 
conflicts on the role of women in society as well as gender relations: 
C. Women During the Time of Conflict 
When discussing the role of gender in conflict transformation, as with commenting 
on the region as a whole, it is of great importance to understand the past, in order 
to evaluate the present and assess the future. It is first necessary to know about 
women’s positions during times of conflict, in order to understand what influences 
their current position and to derive realistic suggestions for the near future. This will 
be done by analyzing women’s roles within conflict, to then lead to a discussion on 
women’s standing within Kurdistan’s society throughout time in the subsequent 
sub-chapter.  
Women occupy different roles during and in the aftermath of armed conflict. They 
are victims and actors at the same time, fighting against war, promoting it, and 
suffering from it. The different actions against women and perpetrated by them 
during the time of conflict are influenced by society, just as they will, in return, 
influence society at the time of conflict transformation. It will be the aim of the 
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following chapter to outline and discuss the specific horrors women had to go 
through in the Kurdistan Region during the time of armed conflict, as well as the 
different actions they took and how these experiences continue to influence conflict 
transformation today. 
1. Women as Victims during Armed Conflict and Beyond 
Both, men and women, suffer during conflict in numerous and far-reaching ways. 
However the nature of their suffering varies greatly and research shows that in 
comparison to men, women are disproportionally victimized.223 The type of 
victimization has changed with the nature of the war. Major General Patrick 
Cammaert even suggests that “it is now more dangerous to be a woman than a 
soldier in modern wars.”224 
This is not to say that men and women are not both suffering equally strong from 
the effects of war, but, as stated by the Red Cross, rather than to prioritise one 
gender over the other when it comes to helping victims, it is vital to recognize the 
specific vulnerabilities of each group.225 Men, women, children and the elderly 
suffer during and after armed conflict in different ways. While in Iraq for example 
the percentage of people suffering a violent death was much higher for men 
(approximately 90%) than for women (approximately 10%).226 However there are 
certain crimes which are generally specific for women, such as rape, trafficking and 
sexual slavery, which impact on their physiology, psychology and general social 
well-being.227  
As every conflict is unique, so also is the specific type of suffering unleashed on 
the civilian population.  
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A 40 year old Kurdish woman, who is today very much engaged with women’s 
rights activism and the PUK, described her own experiences and the suffering of 
her mother and grandmothers, as follows: 
 “In Kurdistan women always had to suffer more than men. Like men, 
the women suffered under the war, but additionally they suffered 
under the suppression by men. During the Anfal campaign for 
example many women were raped by the Ba’ath regime and then 
they were expelled by their own families, because they were raped. 
Women always supported men during the war. It was the most 
horrible for them to sacrifice their own children, but they did it. The 
women never stopped the men in fighting for law, freedom and the 
home land. And for this they are respected today.”228 
It will be the aim of this section to elaborate and discuss the different ways in which 
women have been victimized and have been forced to suffer during armed conflicts 
in general and during the recent conflicts in the Kurdistan Region in particular. This 
should lead to a better understanding of their situation and their needs after the 
cessation of violent conflict. 
Violence against women is a daily occurrence during armed conflicts. According to 
UNIFEM (the United Nations Development Fund for Women; now UN Women) half 
a million women were raped during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. In Sierra 
Leone the number of war-related acts of sexual violence was as high as 60,000 
among internally displaced women from 1991 to 2001.229 According to the UN an 
average of forty women daily were raped in South Kivu, in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, during the time of conflict and between 20,000 and 50,000 women were 
raped during the Bosnian war in the early 1990s.230 Even though numbers in Iraq 
are difficult to extract, activists claim that thousands of Iraq women have been 
raped since the American invasion in 2003231 and it is known today through victims’ 
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accounts that rape was used as part of the war machinery by Saddam Hussein232, 
although numbers are still unclear.233  
Acts of sexual violence are thereby being used strategically to deliberately destroy 
the lives of the enemy and to give them the feeling that they are unable to protect 
their families. Rape destroys the “self”, and by destroying the sense of the self in 
an individual, in the long run, the perpetrator not only destroys the individual, but 
also the whole community, the “enemy” group, to which the individual belongs.234 
A specific example against the Kurdish population was at the so called “Anfal 
campaign”, carried out by Saddam’s regime officially from February 23 to 
September 1988, with the aim of “eliminating” the Kurdish problem. During different 
stages of assault the Iraqi troops used chemical weapons against approximately 40 
Kurdish villages, the largest being Halabja on March 16, 1988, which killed 
thousands of people and left many permanently blind. Many still suffer cancer, 
other illnesses and disfigurements as a result of the chemical weapons. In some 
villages, especially those which tried to defend themselves, the whole population 
was shot. However in most villages only the men were shot and the women, 
children and elderly were taken to relocation camps. An estimated 182,000 Kurds 
died as an effect of the campaigns.235 
The women, children and elderly were pushed through different transitional camps, 
many ending in the prisons of Dibs and Nugra Salman in Southern Iraq, before 
being put in camp-like settlements, where they remained under military control until 
1991.236 Women who spoke out later on their experiences in camps told about 
soldiers raping and killing women in the prisons.237 
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These events were later acknowledged by the Iraqi High Tribunal, as part of the Al-
Anfal Case, where the crime of rape and other sexual violence was used as proof 
for “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group”,238 for 
“deliberately inflicting on the group living conditions calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part”239 as genocide, for “deportation or forcible 
transfer of population”240 and for “torture”241. 
As part of the investigation for the trial, victims and witnesses of sexual violence in 
detention facilities spoke out, as follows: 
“In (Tupzawa) men were separated from women, and there they 
took my son, father, and mother; they still remain with an unknown 
fate. I stayed with my grandfather and grandmother who died in the 
detention facility. We were badly treated in the detention facility. And 
once while we were standing in line waiting for food an officer 
named (Ja'far Al-Halawi) tore the clothes of a pretty girl and asked 
for the presence of her parents and raped her in front of her parents 
and the people, and killed her after that, by shouting her in the head 
and then we were taken to (Nuqrat Al-Salman) detention facility. We 
were treated very badly; they separated men away from women and 
young women away from elder ones. In (Nuqrat Al-Salman) 
detention facility I was in a hall with six other girls, [NAME 
REDACTED] from (Kirkuk), ([NAME REDACTED]) from 
(Hawraman), ([NAME REDACTED]) from (Kuysinjaq) and there 
were guards and officers who used to enter the room and assaulted 
all girls in the room and their names are (Hajjaj), (Shawqi) and 
(Sakhr) who were (Hajjaj) guards. (Hajjaj) used to rape the girls in 
front of the other girls. He raped me and raped (Sazan). We shouted 
and resisted, and once I put my nails in his face, he hit me in the 
face and until now the marks of the wounds are still on my face and 
then we were moved to (Tupzawa) camp. I am presenting a 
complaint against Saddam Hussein, suspects and the officers who 
raped us.”242 
This was also confirmed by other women, who added for example that “in Dibis 
detention facility, they used to take the girls in order to rape them and return them 
after midnight […]”243. 
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And a housewife from Kalar County reported that  
“there was an officer named (Hajjaj) [in (Nuqrat Al-Salman) 
detention facility] used to rape women and I used to see him taking 
a girl named [NAME REDACTED] to his room raping her 
constantly”244. 
But women were not the only suffering through killings and rape. Women in 
Kurdistan, just as in other conflict zones became victims of sexual slavery, 
trafficking, forced marriage or forced domestic labour.245  The numbers increased 
following the loss of the stability of the community, such as occurs amongst 
communities of refugees or internally displaced people (IDPs).  
When armed conflict reaches the villages and cities it results in the migration of 
individuals, families or even whole communities.246 The number of displaced 
people and refugees is generally being considerably higher for women than for 
men. In Iraq, according to the Iraqi Red Crescent, 70 per cent of all refugees are 
women and children under 12 years of age.247 This process of migration often 
leads to more physical danger and sexual violence for women.248 The status of a 
refugee or internally displaced person makes women and children even more 
vulnerable. They lose any power they might have had and are unable to represent 
themselves. They are seen as superfluous and are not accepted as a full member 
of society in their new environment. They become “secondary-citizens” which 
results in even less stability and consequently the possibility of further exposure to 
physical violence.249 Women as refugees often need to feed their children by 
themselves without being able to get a job. As a consequence many of them are 
forced into illegal work, including prostitution, in order to feed the family.250  
Throughout the decades of fighting, hundreds of thousands of Kurds became 
refugees, and many more became internally displaced people. As part of their 
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experience as refugees many Kurdish women had to live in the mountains for 
years or endure the hardship of refugee camps. 
The consequences of the displacement of millions of people throughout Iraq can 
still be seen today. In 2011 the estimated number of internally displaced persons, 
or IDPs, in Iraq was 1.3 million.251 In the district of Sulaimaniya alone in 2010 there 
were still an estimated 7000 internally displaced families, or over 40.000 
individuals, living in the area, and Sulaimaniya is one of the few places in Iraq 
which still has IDP tent camps.252  
In the displaced communities, as in society as a whole, it is generally the role of 
women to be the primary caretakers of their families and the home.253 During war 
women tend to assume a much greater burden than men in the care of children, 
the elderly and the survivors as well as ensuring the provision of food, and 
maintaining the general social life.254 In situations of armed conflict women are 
often forced to fight for their own and their family’s survival, because the men are 
either away fighting or they are injured or killed. This was also the case in the 
Kurdistan Region. 
The destruction of infrastructure as well as the destruction of healthcare facilities 
and the general economy has a major impact on family lives. It becomes more 
difficult and dangerous for women to provide household goods, and this eventually 
leads to malnutrition and starvation.255 If women are forced to accept work in order 
to be able to feed their families, they are often badly remunerated. Since the formal 
sector often stops functioning, and since many women are not trained for a job, 
they often have to work in the informal sector.256 However, work in the informal 
sector often increases the likelihood of violence or other abuse. Even after the 
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cessation of conflict, the main employment chances for women continue in the 
informal sector, since the formal sector takes longer to recover.257 
The struggle of women to provide their families with basic goods is further 
enhanced as a consequence of the higher percentage of women-lead households 
after wars. This is especially difficult for women in patriarchal societies, in which 
matriarchal households are traditionally unknown, and have little chance of 
assimilation into the social fabric. 258 
As a result of campaigns like the Anfal, there developed a large percentage of 
women-headed households, especially within the internally displaced persons 
population of the Kurds, as well as a high number of female refugees.259 As a 
result of the events in the Kurdistan Region, female-headed households in the 
governorate of Sulaimaniya amounted to 18 per cent in 2000.260 Throughout the 
whole of Iraq there are today an estimated 1 to 3 million women-headed 
households, or about 10 per cent of all households. This number is higher in 
Kurdistan (14%) than in the south and centre of Iraq (9.5%).261  
Due to of Iraq’s patriarchal system women are hardly able to live a life without an 
adult male relative, because they lack economic, physical and social protection and 
support.262 It is normal in Iraq that young widows return to their in-laws and that 
older widows stay with their children, who are expected to provide for them and 
any young children. However as a consequence of the wars fewer and fewer 
families in Iraq are able to provide this safety net, or the women have no surviving 
male relatives to turn to, because they were all killed.263 Even though widows 
receive help from the government, this is difficult to access, because of the 
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complex process, as well as shortcoming of the administration and the usual 
problem of corruption.264 
As indicated above, the victimization of and violence against women does not stop 
with the official cessation of armed conflict. The post-armed-conflict situation is 
even worse for some women than the time during armed conflict. Women are often 
unable to leave their houses, after the cessation of the official conflict, because of 
insecurity on the streets. This was the situation in Iraq, where the militias which 
appeared after the end of the official war were nearly all men. When they entered 
the neighbourhoods, security, especially for women, was not provided.265  
Also human rights abuses of women often stay the same or can even get worse 
after the official end of armed conflict.266 In 2009 Amnesty International reported 
on-going human rights abuses against the people in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. 
These include allegations of torture and other ill-treatment against the Asayish, the 
official security agency in Kurdistan,267 the holding of political detainees without 
charge or trial,268 the lack of fair trials269 and a still existing lack of freedom of 
expression.270 When it comes to the specific issue of discrimination and violence 
against women, Amnesty International acknowledges the positive developments 
which have been taken place in the region, but argues that the execution of 
women’s rights, such as the protection from violence, is still insufficient.271 Women 
who fight for human rights are often subject to discrimination or violence 
themselves.272 Many women in the Kurdish region still have restricted life choices, 
are vulnerable to violence and some are subjected to forced or early marriage. 
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Many girls only receive little or no school education and have limited employment 
opportunities.273 
A further consequence of conflict is increased domestic violence. It has been 
observed that the increase of “manliness” during war and the decrease of a good 
lifestyle makes domestic violence more common during times of conflict.274 There 
is a strong correlation between violence on the battle field and violence in the 
home later on.275 Women face increased violence not only from enemy forces, but 
also from their own family members before and after conflict.276 The Iraq Family 
Health Survey of 2006-2007 showed in this respect that over ten per cent of 
women in the Kurdistan Region had suffered from physical violence, over sixty per 
cent experienced controlling behavior by their husbands and nearly twenty per cent 
suffered from emotional violence.277 
In Kurdistan the official number of killings within families rose after 1991. Some 
argue that this was due to the reinforcing of old tribal rules as well as 
fundamentalist Islam, while others are of the view that an increased awareness 
simply lead to enhanced acknowledgement of the killings in the public.278 The so 
called “honour killings” did not only increase within the families, but were also 
inflicted by armed groups. According to King, the peshmerga fighters after 1991 
killed Kurdish women who were suspected of having sexual relations with Arab 
men.279 Furthermore, the Kurdistan Region is still struggling with widespread 
female genital mutilation, with up to 40 per cent of women and girls between 
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eleven and 24 years of age, having been subjected to such operations, according 
to a survey in 2009.280 
Next to the physical victimization after the cessation of armed conflict, often women 
who suffered physically during war continue to be victimized in society after the 
cessation of armed conflict. The surviving widows of the Anfal campaign are tragic 
examples. Their social and legal status was unclear. They often stayed with their 
dead husband’s families in order to be able to stay with their children. In the difficult 
circumstances of the time they were often considered a burden. In addition the 
knowledge of or assumptions concerning tabooed sexual violence they suffered 
stigmatized them and made them into a problem for the family’s honour.281 As 
elaborated by Karin Mlodoch, the women were expected to live in grief. They were 
expected to live a life without happiness as befits the role of victims. At the same 
time they had to be strong for themselves and to manage to feed their children with 
minimal support.282 If women experienced sexual violence during the time of armed 
conflict and survive, they could seldom confide in anyone, and especially not with 
male relatives.  They had to cope with the trauma themselves, because they were 
seen as having brought shame over the family.283 Sometimes women could not 
even go back to their families or were rejected from their society, when it became 
known that they had been victims of sexual violence or that they were pregnant 
with or had an illegitimate child.284 
As a consequence, the women themselves felt unwanted by society. This feeling 
was exacerbated by the lack of support provided by the state, even though the 
situation has improved since 2003. They now receive budgets to build houses, and 
the infrastructure, as well as provisions for health and education services in the 
areas affected. However these improvements have taken about 20 years to 
commence.285  
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Further psychological implications, which still affect society 20 years on, are the 
long-term impacts of surprise chemical weapons attacks on civilians, such as the 
one in Halabja. As a study by Jonathan Dworkin and others shows, post-traumatic 
stress disorder symptoms and poor general functioning, which are more likely for 
women and the elderly to occur, remain major problems in society, even decades 
after the traumatic events.286 
These manifold experiences as victims outlined in this section have had a profound 
effect on the women’s current needs and aspirations. As a result of their 
experiences during and immediately after armed conflict, personal security is of 
great importance for many women, often more so than personal freedom.  
Additionally, as a consequence of the years of hardship and having to provide for 
themselves and their families many older women especially support the 
reestablishment of the ‘old structure’ of shared responsibilities, with the men 
working outside and providing for the family. However, others have become 
accustomed to managing everything alone as a result of the war. Many women 
either wish to or are forced to continue in this way and must be given the 
opportunity.  
Finally, the different experiences during war, which ranged from extreme situations, 
such as the Anfal campaign, to the varying experiences of those women who were 
forced to flee, and those who stayed, have created a diverse society, where one 
element does not truly understand the other. And while some would prefer to forget 
the past and move on, it is important for others to maintain the memory. 
It is therefore of great importance that the views and experiences of the whole 
society are included in future decisions of the region, while giving all citizens the 
chance to follow their lifestyle options. In order to alleviate the on-going 
victimization of women in society, so that the can also experience the feeling of 
peace, it is vital to ensure as far as possible their security in the public as well as 
the private domains.287 For women peace can only begin once their security is 
                                                            
286 Jonathan Dworkin et.al, “The Long‐Term Psychosocial Impact of a Surprise Chemical Weapons Attack on 
Civilians in Halabja, Iraqi Kurdistan” The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 196(10) (2008): 774/775. 
287 Al‐Ali, “Reconstructing Gender,” 741. 
  
Page | 69  
 
ensured, their human rights are respected and they are no longer beaten in their 
homes and assaulted on the streets.288 At the same time the work for personal 
freedom should not be forgotten. 
2. Women as Actors 
But women are not only passive victims during war. They also play very active 
roles in supporting, as well as trying to end or prevent armed conflict. While men 
commit on average more atrocities during the time of war than women, and more 
men are fighting as soldiers and militants,289 this does not follow that women are 
simply victims. They are also actors during conflict in a variety of ways. They join 
the military, participate in liberation movements290, support the general 
militarization of their country or region291, or fight for peace.  
As explained by the wife of a Peshmerga fighter, who lives in exile today:  
“War in Kurdistan has a very long and horrible history. And the 
women were always part of it. The women also lived as fighters 
and they supported their men. Of course they were also 
housewives and mothers. Actually the women only fought. They 
fought with arms and they fought without arms. The women had 
to live in the mountains. I myself stayed in the mountains for 
many months with one baby and pregnant. Can you imagine? 
There was nothing to wear, nothing to eat. The women were 
arrested just as the men. Women and men suffered exactly in the 
same way.”292 
One way in which women ‘fought with arms’ was as soldiers:  
Women have served in the Iraqi Army since Saddam’s regime.293  In addition 
women could join the “people’s army” and in the first years of war tens of 
thousands of Arabic and Kurdish women availed themselves of this opportunity.294 
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Nevertheless, the number of women serving as active fighters is still comparatively 
small.  
Another area, in which women were actively involved were the guerrilla forces, that 
is in general non-state armed forces: 
Kurdish women took part in conflicts and in the fighting as part of their national 
movements. They were involved in the Peshmerga forces, by fighting with and 
supporting the men and have thereby women have played an active role in the 
liberation struggle. An official Peshmerga Force for Women was established in 
1996, which, while only comprising a few hundred women soldiers, nevertheless 
earned respect.295 Many women who were Peshmerga now have prominent roles 
in one of the two parties. 
Women had been encouraged to join the Peshmerga forces from the 1980s 
onwards. Most undertook administrative tasks, but they were also used for acting 
as a courier and to smuggle clothes, medication and weapons, especially in the 
cities, where, because of the enhanced involvement of women, they were omni-
present and less noticeable than men.296 
Women’s participation in the active fighting influenced the conflict, as well as the 
women themselves. Reasons for their participation included political conviction, the 
desire to make themselves heard297 but also the opportunity to lead a different 
life.298 Through their active participation in the war machine, women freed 
themselves from their traditional roles. Their increased participation may therefore 
be seen as a twisted approach towards emancipation.299 Many women became 
part of movements such as the PKK300 or the Peshmerga forces to get away from 
the strict family structure and to enjoy more freedom.301 According to Fatma Incesu 
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the PKK liberated women because they believed that men could only be beaten, if 
women achieved more power. They therefore supported women in all parts of the 
organisational structure.302 In 1993 the women of the PKK inaugurated their own 
women’s army. They saw it as liberating to be able to fight for themselves and they 
wished to achieve liberation for all women of society.303 The issue of women’s 
liberation is very important for the PKK. It is not possible to have socialism without 
the liberation of women.304  
Women had similar reasons for participation in the Peshmerga forces in Northern 
Iraq, including the feelings of hate for the regime, and the need for revenge after 
their men had been tortured and murdered by Saddam Hussein.305 
Despite these involvements, women as active fighters still only comprise a small 
fraction of the actual female population of a region. While the female fighters are 
made visible on pictures and through articles, there is another role of women in 
conflict, which is far more significant, but often not recognized or forgotten when 
considering “actors” of conflict, namely their support of war and of the militarization 
process from below. As explained by a social researcher at one of Kurdistan’s 
universities: “Women did not only have an important role in their bodily work, but 
that they were very important morally, in supporting ideas.”306 
It is crucially important to remember the role military wives and mothers play in 
maintaining up the military system. It is they who keep the camps running, who 
make it possible for their husbands and sons to go to war and who help the state in 
caring for injured soldiers.307 This is true around the world. In Iran for example, 
during the war with Iraq, widows and single women were paid to marry disabled or 
wounded soldiers, to free the state from having to care of them itself.308 States or 
groups within states are only able to lead violent conflicts if there are men who are 
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willing to serve as soldiers and if there are women who are ready to support and 
take care of the home front by themselves.309 If women and wives would not take 
care of the wounded soldiers, it would not be possible to wage war in the same 
way, because all costs would have to be borne by the state.310  
Women, as wives, girlfriends, hostesses and prostitutes help to create stable 
diplomatic and military communities. Without them such communities would not be 
possible. It is they who care of wounded soldiers, work in factories to produce 
clothes, and bring food etc.311  
At the same time women and families are used as a reason by men to go to war. 
Men are told that they need to fight and kill in order to maintain the “socially 
constructed notions the woman embodies”.312  
Women are often perceived to be the cultural custodians as well as the biological 
reproducers of a nation.  
As the biological reproducers of the nation women are often put under pressure by 
the state to either have more children or fewer according to the national need. This 
pressure depends on the woman’s membership to a specific national collective and 
can vary depending on the situation.313 While the women who are fighting at the 
front are expected to not have any children, women at home are expected to give 
birth to as many as possible in order to produce more warriors and workers.314 
Women are giving birth so that their sons can be killed again and mothers of 
martyrs are celebrated to encourage them and other women to have even more 
children.315 
At the same time women are cultural custodians of the nation. They are seen as 
symbolic “border guards”, who can “identify people as members or non-members 
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of a specific collectivity.”316 It is considered shame for the whole family if a woman 
forcibly or willingly engages with an enemy or somebody from a different ethnic, 
cultural, or religious heritage.317 Women are seen to have an important role in 
maintaining the cultural traditions of an ethnic group or a country especially at a 
time of social instability. They are therefore associated with the future and through 
“proper” behaviour and “proper” clothing they embody the line which defines the 
collective’s boundaries and ensures that the cultural heritage will continue. Hence 
women are also seen as representing collective honour and this in turn is used as 
a reason to legitimize the control and oppression of women.318  
Furthermore it is the women who are giving birth to new heirs of an ethnic group or 
of the nation. They are the first to teach their children to identify with their family, as 
well as with a specific ethnic or religious group. Consequently it is partly due to 
women’s teaching of loyalty to a specific group and their support of the patriarchal 
structure that men continue to go to war.319 Women are expected to raise the next 
generation, who will again fight for their country again and to teach them the 
appropriate standards of their society. Thereby mothers convey to their children 
certain attitudes which can either support or work against the militarization of 
society.320 
In the Kurdistan Region today, the different roles that women occupy during the 
years of conflict are generally highly respected. It is often be heard that, as with 
men, a woman’s most important role is to dedicate herself to the service of her 
homeland.321 Both, men and women, have played important and leading roles 
throughout the wars and thereby command respect.322 When the people are asked 
exactly which role was women’s most important and active role during conflict, they 
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most often respond that it was the women’s support of the fighting from their 
homes.323 
The Kurdish people therefore describe themselves as having worked “together”324 
or “side by side”325 during war. Most men tend to expresss the view that the women 
“supported” the men,326 while many of the women have the feeling that they did 
“everything”.327 As explained by one young woman who grew up as a child in Erbil 
during the struggle: 
“The women did everything! They had to work when the men were 
away to feed their families and in addition they also had to help 
the Peshmergas. As a little child, they gave me the messages to 
bring it to other Peshmerga fighters on the other part of town. 
They wrote the messages on little pieces of paper, rolled them 
together and put a plaster around it. Then they put it into my 
mouth and told me where to go. I went through the whole town to 
the other person. It was dangerous. It would not have been good if 
somebody had found the message in my mouth.”328 
Despite slight discrepancies between different views it can clearly be seen that the 
active role of women, especially in day-to-day life, including cooking for the men, 
helping the wounded and transferring messages, is clearly recognized. 
It can be seen that women’s roles during conflict vary greatly and their variety is 
countless. Apart from being victims or perpetrators, women during the time of 
conflict occupy important roles in society, as mothers, wives, employers and 
employees, and many more. While some of the roles occupied by women are 
gender specific such as their role of mothers and as victims to specific violence, 
while others are traditionally male such as becoming active actors during war, 
being employed and becoming main breadwinners. 
Finally, many women play very positive roles, often unnoticed or in the 
background, working for peace. They work with NGOs, religious groups, 
sometimes at the political level or simply in their communities to actively oppose 
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war.329 They use “motherhood” to protest against atrocities committed and many 
make efforts to impose more positive values on the military or the militarized 
society, by promoting activities such as sport, music or reading, rather than 
gambling, drinking and prostitution.330 This will be elaborated further in the section 
on women’s activism below. 
Women’s active role in supporting or fighting against armed conflict is greatly 
influential is shaping the next generation, and thus the country’s future and should 
therefore not be underestimated or even forgotten, when it comes to considering 
plans for the region’s development.  
When it comes to women’s personal development and the achievement of gender 
equality within society, personal and cultural identity as well as past national and 
international developments each play a part. This will be the subject of the 
following sub-section. 
D. Women and Gender Equality in the Kurdistan Region – Then and 
Now 
Just under seventy per cent of people in the Kurdistan region when asked whether 
they thought that men and women were equal within society today, replied in the 
negative331. Most people were of the opinion that women are respected, but that 
they simply cannot yet do everything to the level expected of men332, that they 
have their specific roles333 and that the theoretical thinking about quality is different 
from the practice334. For some people this “inequality” is not necessarily bad and it 
has become a common point of discussion that there exist differences between 
Western and Eastern ideas of “equality” and that it should rather be about “being 
worth the same” than actually “being the same”.335 This opinion is criticized by 
some as being used as justification, especially by feminists and people who 
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returned from Europe, and that there is no equality336, with one man from a small 
village even explaining that “we do not have respect for women”337 and others 
reporting that they do not believe that equality is even possible to achieve in 
Kurdistan.338 Whatever particular position people might take, it was generally 
observed, that the Kurdish population does not perceive itself as a society of equal 
opportunity. While some people are of the view that women in Kurdistan have 
never been truly equal and should follow Europe towards a path of equality, others 
believe that the Kurdish women were equal in times gone by, but that changed as 
a result of wars, politics or religion. 
When people spoke about their concepts of equality, opinions ranged widely and 
included the ideas that “behind every great man, there is a great woman”,339 that 
women are intellectually equal, but not otherwise340, that women are already 
equal,341 and that women will never be equal in the region as the people do not 
behave accordingly.342 
It will be the aim of the following section to close the circle of background 
information, by describing and analysing women and gender equality in the 
Kurdistan Region in the past and present. This will further deepen the 
understanding of the challenges faced in the conflict transformation process, for 
which the achievement of equality is vital.  
Traditionally, Kurdish men and women had had their distinctive roles. Women 
worked in the fields and took care of the children and the elderly, while men tried to 
earn extra money, and dealt with business in the cities and in general with people 
from outside.343 
Travellers around 1900 saw the Kurds as “monogamous” with a family, seldom 
exceeding three or four. They described the Kurdish women as having a 
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“remarkable” freedom and defined them as “brave”, hardworking and beautiful.344 
The women were described as joining with the military, doing manual labour and 
keeping the family in order. The Kurdish women were said to be more open than 
their Turkish or Persian neighbours and adultery was said to be unknown. 
Additionally most marriages were said to have arisen from mutual attraction and 
there was an especially good understanding between the sexes.345 The veil was 
said to have been unknown to the Kurds and the women did not hide their faces.346  
Also today, there is a general tendency towards a solely positive picture of Kurdish 
women’s situation in the past. Women are said to have lived on an equal footing 
with men, working with them on the farms as well as fighting with them for a free 
Kurdistan.347 
According to several Kurds, Islam worsened the situation for women and made 
men superior. If one believes many Kurdish nationalists, women originally had 
equal rights in the tribal society, as evidenced by the existence of women tribal 
chieftains. However this equality was lost through the domination by Islam.348 This 
belief is deeply rooted, especially in some of the more Westernized people. When 
one woman was told during the interview that some believed that Islam brought 
equality, she got very excited and said:  
“Religion does not help the women. That is not true. Maybe it was 
true 1500 years ago, but not now. The men always say that the 
women are equal, but when it comes to the point that a woman 
really wants something, then they are always against it.”349 
Another reason for the loss of equality within society is said to have been the 
process of industrialization.350 The increase in urbanization was said to have been 
problematic for many in the tribal society. Women lost their status in the cities, 
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because they did not have the opportunities for work.351 At least in theory women 
and men were respected as equals in the villages.  While in practice women had 
no power over goods or property, they were able to acquire a certain status 
through hard work,352 and the village structure made it possible for women to 
secure positions of power. According to Mustafa Gundogdu, a worker at the 
Kurdish Human Rights Project, there has always been a basis for equality of 
women in Kurdish society through participation in leadership and decision making. 
Even though in villages women and men were separated by their specific roles, 
women were not exploited. They held meetings and were part of the decision 
making as were the men.353 But once these structures disappeared, the women’s 
status fell as well.354   
While Kurdish society has always been highly male-dominated, there were women 
in Kurdish history, who reached high positions and became political or military 
leaders of the communities. Many of these women became national symbols and 
are seen by many Kurds as the proof for the respected position of women in 
Kurdish society and the Kurds’ superiority over their neighbours.355 Women who 
reached the peak of the social pyramid and who became chiefs of their 
communities included Adela Khanum of Halabja356, Khanzade Sultan357, Kara 
Fatima Khanum358, Perikhan Khatun359 and Shemsî Khatun360. They all ruled 
different tribes in the Kurdish region at different times.361 While all of these women 
occupied powerful positions, they only achieved these positions through the 
prestige of their families, through highly supportive husbands or through their 
husbands’ deaths.362 According to Martin Van Bruinessen it is not known whether a 
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Kurdish woman of “humble origins” ever rose to a high position by her own efforts. 
However there are examples of men who did.363 Nevertheless in some districts of 
Kurdistan female rule was so common that it was explicitly referred to in the 
records of customary law by the Ottomans.364 The female tribal leaders were highly 
respected and seen as leaders in their own right as evidenced by the people using 
their leaders’ names, rather than the names of their husbands or fathers.365  
Also in recent time there have been women who have played a leading role in 
Kurdish public life, including Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s second wife, Hamayl 
Khanum, during the 1960s or as some of the women Peshmergas366 as well as 
high level Kurdish female politicians, such as Leyla Zana in Turkey in the 1990s.367 
All these women were powerful and great leaders in their own right. However, as 
with female Kurdish leaders centuries before, they stepped into their situation 
through their families’ relations and continued their struggle for power from there. It 
might therefore be concluded that once a woman reached a high status, through 
birth or marriage, her gender no longer mattered. While high birth may compensate 
for the female gender disadvantage, gender equality does not spread beyond 
special classes.368  While strong women are seen as admirable in stories and 
folklore and while there are women with great influence in Kurdish society, gender 
equality is not a widespread characteristic of today’s society.369 
Nevertheless, Kurdish women are today generally described as free, especially by 
the Kurds themselves. They are said to play a more active part in political and 
social life than women in other Middle Eastern societies and they are often 
unveiled, the veil thereby often being a symbol, either of freedom or restrictions, 
depending on the people talked to.   
Public views on equality reflect the fact that women have become a symbol of 
identity for a nation and its society. This can be especially seen in the Middle East, 
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where the issue of women’s rights is part of an “ideological terrain” in which the 
society’s culture and individuality, as well as autonomy are discussed. The 
situation of women may serve as an indicator to the rest of the world of local 
culture and as a boundary marker for other cultures.370 Women’s equality is often 
presented as a question of tradition versus modernism and of East versus West. 
Women are often used as a pawn in the struggle between the competing forces of 
East and West. The women are used as “us versus them”. 371 In the Kurdish case 
certain sectors in society congratulate themselves on their openness between men 
and women in comparison with the Arabic, Persian and Turkish cultures around 
them. However other sectors of society aim to distinguish their culture, and 
therefore their behaviour towards women, from the West.372  These differences in 
the portrayal of women as part of a political statement can be observed throughout 
history.   
Before 1992 Kurdish women in Iraq were disadvantaged on several levels. Apart 
from economic hardship and their oppression as women, they were disadvantaged 
because of their ethnicity. After 1992 their situation was arguably raised 
considerably above that of Iraqi women elsewhere in the country.373  
Despite the ethnic discrimination, Kurdish women also profited from positive legal 
developments affecting women throughout Iraq. Still today several men and 
women tell stories about the 1970s and 80s having been more open, especially 
when it comes to dress code. Women in Iraq have long been the regional pioneers 
of gender-equality, at least outwardly. Already in 1948 a woman became a judge 
and in 1959 Dr. Naziha Al-Dulaimi became the first female minister in the Arab 
world.374  
After the creation of modern Iraq as a sovereign state, women’s rights were first 
put on the political agenda after the military-led revolution of 1957 by Qasim. Under 
Qasim the family law was reformed. He replaced the Sharia courts, restricted 
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polygamy, empowered wives to initiate divorce and instituted equal inheritance 
shares. After the next coup, under Abdul Salem Aref, several of the new laws were 
reverted to the old ones, because of religious pressure. However many stayed.375    
Women’s rights and their status were further enhanced during the early times of 
the secular Ba’athist socialist rule.376 During the 1970s changes in the law were 
made, which made it possible for judges to prevent fathers from forcing their 
daughters to marry early, to prevent a polygamous marriage of her husband 
without the permission of the first wife and to permit women to join the armed 
forces.377 Furthermore it was made easier for divorced mothers to get custody of 
their children and reforms were made in the conditions in which women could seek 
a divorce.378 According to the Iraqi constitution drafted in 1970, which was 
suspended in 2003, women were guaranteed equal rights with men.379 Women 
enjoyed equal rights before the law, even though this was restricted through the 
patriarchal nature of Iraqi society380 as well as through the situation of war in the 
country. However, the real situation of women always depended on the part of 
society and type of family they lived in. While wives and daughters of families close 
to the regime were certainly more able to benefit from the new legislations, than 
women from opposing factions, or from ethnic groups the regime worked against, 
at least in theory the general situation of women improved. 
Also in practice measures were put in place in the second half of the previous 
century, which are generally used as measures for describing enhanced gender 
equality within a society, such as the support of women in education, employment 
and political participation:  
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In 1980 16 from 250 seats in the Iraqi Council were won by women. Five years 
later it was 33 seats, or 13 per cent.381 
In 1979 legislation was passed which required all illiterate Iraqis between 15 and 
45 to attend reading classes and in 1976 primary school attendance was made 
compulsory to all children between six and ten. As a consequence, female literacy 
in Iraq before 1991 was the highest in the region.382 In the Kurdistan Region, which 
had been under partly autonomous administration since 1974, classes were 
conducted in Kurdish. This later changed into Arabic. It was the official aim of the 
regime to include the country’s women in the modern society. But when women 
were later asked about the benefits of the reading and writing classes, many 
replied that since their lives did not change in any other way, they had no great use 
for reading and writing. It follows that the campaign was designed not so much to 
support the emancipation of women, but rather to further a system of 
manipulation.383 Nevertheless it must be conceded that the capability of reading 
and writing can also be the first step for some to build their self-esteem and to 
move towards an independent life. 
At the same time the percentage of women in university courses was reasonably 
high. By 1979 51 per cent of first-year medical students at Baghdad University, and 
75 per cent of students in English translation were female.384 
Additionally, especially in the 1970s and 1980s women were actively incorporated 
in the labour force by the government. Their participation increased during the 
years of the Iran-Iraq war in order to replace the male soldiers.385 Women received 
opportunities in the civil services, maternity benefits and freedom from harassment 
in the workplace through employment laws. As a consequence women’s 
employment rose.386 In the 1980s approximately 15 per cent of factory workers, 16 
per cent of government employees, 29 per cent of physicians, 46 per cent of 
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dentists, 46 per cent of teachers and 70 per cent of pharmacists were women.387 
Working women had maternity leave and the jobs of pregnant women were 
protected.388 Under Saddam Iraq accomplished nearly entirely inclusive primary 
school education for boys and girls and Iraqi women were permitted to run for 
political positions, to vote, to drive and to work in jobs traditionally done by men.389 
But these advances did not reach everyone. The enjoyment of rights depended 
very much on social class, as well as on political affiliation. 
The Ba’ath party encouraged women to join the party and also to seek election to 
parliament. The Ba’ath regime, while prohibiting any other political movements, 
supported its own women’s organisation, the General Federation of Iraqi Women 
(GFIW), which had an estimated one million Iraqi women as their members.390 
From 1975 onwards many women, especially those working for educational 
institutions and for the government, were forced to join the GFIW to protect their 
jobs. This was another way for the regime to enhance total control.391 
Further positive legal developments for women occurred in 1978, when a new 
Personal Status Code was adopted, which outlawed forced marriage and made it 
easier for women to get divorced and to have custody over their children. While it 
took into account some of their demands, women activists were still not satisfied 
with the code, as it did not achieve any radical change for women.392  
To further enhance the image of the secular regime of the Ba’ath party and to 
support women’s equality also on an international level, Iraq was one of the first 
Muslim countries to ratify the CEDAW in 1986, despite reservations applied to 
Articles 2, 9 and 16, which addressed women’s rights in the private sphere as well 
as the issue of nationality.393 
But the reality of most women’s lives under Saddam did not correlate with the 
advances made on paper. A lot was only de jure and women did not have true 
                                                            
387 Neshat, “A Look into the Women’s Movement in Iraq,” 56. 
388 Moghadam, Modernizing women, 60. 
389 UNIFEM “Iraq”  
390 Al‐Ali, “ReconstrucƟng Gender,” 754. 
391 Salvesberg, Hajo und Borck, Kurdische Frauen und das Bild der kurdischen Frauen, 160. 
392 Al‐Ali, Iraqi Women, 140. 
393 Freedomhouse, “Iraq”  
  
Page | 84  
 
power. The only way for a woman, just as for a man, to get a higher status in 
Saddam’s Iraq was to join the regime. While these women enjoyed more freedoms, 
others were tortured and raped either for being dissidents themselves or for 
extracting information from other dissidents394 and Saddam’s sons Uday and 
Qusay were symbols in Iraq for violence against women, by openly raping, 
molesting and beheading women.395 
By allowing women more rights and freedoms Saddam ensured their support for 
the regime, as well as ensuring that there was always a sound labour force, 
despite absence of the men fighting.396 Hence Iraq during the Ba’athist rule is a 
prime example of how the change in the status of women is used to achieve 
certain political goals. Saddam supported the women’s movement at a time when 
he needed women to fill in the vacancies in civil society left by soldiers at the front 
as well as for economic development. A further aim was to shift the loyalty of 
women away from the tribes and ethnic groups, through recruiting them into state-
controlled agencies and through public schooling. However, Saddam again 
removed women’s rights, when he needed more jobs for the returning men and 
when he wanted to save his power by connecting with local tribes and trying to 
garnish support from clan leaders 397 
At the onset of the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam changed his policies accordingly. The 
picture of the perfect woman changed from a young, educated, working woman to 
a patriotic, mourning widow who was dressed in a black ‘abaya398.399  
From 1982 married women were not allowed to travel unless accompanied by their 
husbands and unmarried women needed written consent from their father or 
guardian to do so.400 In 1986 all birth control devices disappeared from pharmacies 
in order to encourage women to give birth to the next martyrs.401 During the Iran-
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Iraq War women were expected by the government to have at least five sons to be 
a “Patriotic Mother”.402 Further legal reforms gained for women were reversed after 
1991, as Saddam turned to tribes and religion, in an attempt to reinforce his power. 
As a consequence, in the 1990s penalties for honour killings were reduced from 
eight years to six months, wives’ consent for polygamy was no longer needed and 
women’s personal status and their standing in labour law and criminal justice were 
weakened.403 
The following years of war destroyed parts of Iraqi society and Iraqi women lost 
their achievements, gained in the previous decades. While they had gained many 
freedoms and rights from the end of the Second World War to the beginning of the 
1980s, the situation changed dramatically with the collapse of Iraq’s economy in 
1990-91 and the civil unrest that followed.404 One big factor in these upheavals was 
the impositions of sanctions405 by the UN in response to the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990 which were maintained for the next 13 years.406  
In Iraq, the UN, through Resolution 661407, put a total ban on trade and trans-
border financial transactions. There was a list of over 300 banned goods, ranging 
from light bulbs, socks, and ovens to needles, nails and refrigerators. There was a 
ban on all items which would have made it possible for Iraq to be self-sustainable 
in agricultural production. The sanctions were so efficient that only one month after 
the passage of the first Resolution, in September 1990, the Security Council felt 
the necessity to adopt a new Resolution, 666408, to ensure that the civilian 
population would survive.409 
As early as 1991 the situation had become so precarious that the Security Council 
Sanctions Committee, established to monitor the implementation of the sanctions, 
sought to allow food and medical supply because “humanitarian circumstances 
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applied with respect to the entire civilian population of Iraq.” As a consequence 
Resolution 687410 was passed on 3rd April 1991 to exempt foodstuffs and medical 
supplies from the sanctions regime. In May 1996 Iraq accepted the “oil-for-food” 
arrangements, laid out in Resolution 986 from April 1995,411 which exchanged oil 
for food.412 
According to Kurdish sources, the Kurdistan Region suffered tremendously under 
the sanctions, which greatly affected peoples’ lives. The Kurds suffered from the 
international embargo, since it was still part of Iraq. In addition Saddam put an 
embargo on them, since the region was no longer under state control and finally 
the neighbouring countries, Turkey and Iran, refused free access to the Kurdish 
region. It was further claimed that the international support from the UN, as well as 
international NGOs was not sufficient.413 However, according to Arabic sources414 
the Kurdistan Region was better off than the rest of the country, since it received 
significant international humanitarian assistance and could more easily receive 
goods from neighbouring countries. Whichever version is true, it can definitely be 
said that the civil population over the whole of Iraq suffered greatly under the 
sanctions. They changed peoples’ lives, as well as the whole society.  
The various armed conflicts in the region, as well as the sanctions had a great 
impact on women’s roles in society. Even though economic shortages and 
sanctions were tough on the whole of the population, they arguably hit women and 
children disproportionally. The food shortage caused damage to a whole 
generation of children, of whom many were at “severe nutritional risk.”415 During 
the sanctions, work in the public sector lost all its value with an average employee 
earning only about US$ 1,50 to 4,50 per month. As a consequence many women 
gave up their jobs because their work was not seen as worthwhile for the family 
anymore and because services previously provided by the state, such as transport 
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and kindergartens, closed down, which made it impossible for women to continue 
with employment.416 While it was still possible for men to try to find employment in 
the private sector, many jobs such as taxi drivers or as sales men on the street 
were not acceptable options for women and they were pushed back into their 
“traditional” roles.417 As a result of money losing its value, about 60 per cent of the 
population became dependent on monthly food rations, paid for by the oil-for-food 
programme.418 
The wars, as well as the sanctions also resulted in fewer opportunities for women 
in education. Through the destruction of educational establishments women and 
girls were less able to receive education, because their mobility was reduced in 
comparison to boys’ and they had no way of reaching other institutions. 
Additionally families no longer saw a reason for educating their daughters, because 
there were no job prospects.419 Even though the situation is continuing to change 
the education level of women is still highly dependent on their place of residence, 
as well as their family background.420   
Furthermore the destruction of the health care system followed the sanctions and 
especially women and children died from shortages of food, medicine and pure 
water.421 The sanctions affected women, as well as men, differently depending on 
their places of residence, rural or urban, their ethnicity, Kurdish or Arabic, their 
religion, Shi’a, Sunni or Christian, and especially their social class. During the war 
and throughout the sanctions a broad and stable educated middle class became 
impoverished and gave way to a class of war and sanctions profiteers.422 
As a result of the change in the economy and the never ending insecurity, the 
people’s thinking changed. Families became more conservative, and while the 
parents of many young people today, especially from the middle-class, used to 
mingle relative freely between boys and girls, today’s young people have problems 
                                                            
416 Al‐Jawaheri, Women in Iraq, 35. 
417 Ibid. p.37 
418 Ibid. p. 746 
419 Ibid. p.66 
420 Al‐Ali, “Reconstructing Gender,” 747. 
421 Keddie, Women in the Middle East, 128/129. 
422 Al‐Ali, “ReconstrucƟng Gender,” 746. 
  
Page | 88  
 
meeting one other.423 Girls fear losing their reputation and bringing shame to their 
families and hence have even less chance of marriage by doing something that 
might be considered “wrong” by some people, such as talking to men etc.424 As a 
consequence women became more vulnerable and more dependent on their male 
family members. At the same time increasing numbers of women needed to 
survive independently, because they lost their husbands, sons, brothers and 
fathers in the wars,425 with eleven per cent of Iraqi households headed by women 
in 2008.426 It followed that women were often stuck in their houses, especially 
when violence on the streets started to rise. A lack of security, whether it is through 
police or military forces, or because of harassment by their own people, prevent 
women and children from leaving their houses and makes it impossible for them to 
lead an ambitious life in the public sphere.427 The fear of violence results in women 
not feeling safe enough to take up employment outside their houses or to get 
involved in political decision making.428 As an example, women’s rights activists 
such as Yanar Mohamed who founded the Organisation for Women’s Freedom in 
Iraq, received death threats and had to hide in order to protect themselves and 
their families.429  
Women have not only suffered violence outside their homes, but domestic violence 
against women has also risen due to increased unemployment and the high levels 
of poverty. There is a lack of support for women survivors of violence and a weak 
legislative framework.430 Violence against women by their male family members is 
still widely accepted in Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region, mainly because of 
prevalent social attitudes, the misinterpretation of religious scriptures and the weak 
political initiatives. Many women have learned to accept violence as part of being a 
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“righteous woman”.431 As a result of international pressure two family protection 
departments have been established in Baghdad. They are not active, but they can 
provide a basis for the future.432 
On a national level, the situation has not much improved since the American 
invasion in 2003. 
The public perception of gender equality is still highly ambiguous. After 2003, 
women were also not included in discussions of their security and peacebuilding at 
a national level.433 
Even though officials from the US government met with women’s groups to hear 
their views on Iraqi women in post-war Iraq, in practice the needs of women were 
hardly addressed at the beginning of the occupation. Women were not adequately 
included in leadership positions and they were not included in post-war 
reconstruction processes.434 One of the reasons stated by the US for not further 
including women in the reconstruction of Iraq was that they did not want to violate 
Iraqi sensibilities. But as Safia Al-Souhail pointed out, they forced many changes 
on the country, so it is legitimate to ask why these changes did not adequately 
include women’s rights. It may be argued that by ignoring women, the Coalition 
encouraged the development of the rule of conservative male authorities.435 There 
were not many women included in the discussions concerning the creation of an 
interim government and ultimately only three women were made part of the interim 
Iraqi Governing Council in 2003: Aqila al-Hashimi, who was later assassinated, 
Sondul Chapouk and Raja Habib al-Kuzaai.436 The following interim government of 
2003-2004 comprised 31 ministers, of which only five were women.437 
The 2005 Iraqi Constitution prescribes that 25 per cent of parliamentary seats must 
be occupied by women.438 The success of this quota could be seen by the fact that 
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in January 2005 women won 31 per cent of parliamentary seats. However when 
the government was formed there were only six female ministers out of thirty-six. 
Additionally at the drafting of the Constitution only nine women were included out 
of fifty-five members and only two women became part of the committee for 
constitutional amendments. In the parliament elected in December 2005 the 
percentage of women elected fell under 25 and only four women were appointed 
ministers.439 Today the Council of Representatives for Iraq has 82 out of 325 seats 
occupied by women, which is 25.2 per cent which might arguably be less if the 
quota did not exist.440 While the introduction of a women quota can be seen as a 
success, the constitution is nevertheless far from inclusive, which arguably results 
of the unequal representation at its creation. When the Iraq Constitution was 
drafted only a few women were part of the committee in charge and most of those 
women were conservative Shi’a from the United Iraqi Alliance. As a consequence 
secularist female activists’ voices were hardly heard and their ideas scarcely 
incorporated.441 
It was noted by women activists that because of the political bargaining between 
the male party leaders in parliament the support for women’s quota in the 2009 
elections for national as well as provincial council nominations had been watered 
down. Compared with party interests, women’s rights are not seen as important 
anymore.442 
In principle, opportunities for women’s inclusion and gender equality are present. 
Iraq, and thereby also the Kurdistan Region, is part of all international human rights 
conventions, agreements and declarations, including the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (ICESCR), UN Security Council Resolution 1325 
(2000), adopted by the SC at its 4213th meeting on 31 October 2000 (Res 1325) 
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and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women 1979 (CEDAW).443  
In addition all women in Kurdistan, as in the rest of Iraq, are assured rights under 
the Iraqi constitution. The preamble states that attention will be paid to women and 
their rights.444 The Iraqi constitution further stipulates that all Iraqis are equal before 
the law not withstanding inter alia their gender445 and that “equal opportunities shall 
be guaranteed to all Iraqis”446. Additionally the State guarantees social and health 
services447, especially to women and children, and prohibits “all forms of violence 
and abuse in the family, school and society”448. But at the same time the Iraqi 
Constitution declares that all laws inconsistent with Islam will be invalid,449 that 
individuals only have personal privacy as long as it does not contradict public 
morals450 and that they “are free in their commitment to their personal status 
according to their religions, sects, beliefs or choices”.451 Different women’s groups 
have thereby pointed out that the current interpretation of women’s rights in Islam 
by some judges might be disadvantageous to women.452 In addition the 
Constitution sometimes contradicts itself453, and many laws which contradict the 
Constitution have not yet been repealed.454 Further, other laws which have been 
pronounced by the Constitution offer no or little protection in practice455.456 
Relative to the national level, women’s legal status, as well as their political 
participation are said to have been improved dramatically in the Kurdistan Region: 
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Politicians maintain that participation of women in politics as well as the progress 
towards gender equality is actively encouraged. According to Abubakir Ali 
(Kurdistan Islamic Union) 48 per cent of the party’s members are women. There 
are women in the leadership committee and women are part of all centres, as well 
as in the parliament in Kurdistan and in Baghdad. A woman could well become 
party leader as well as the president of the KRG. The Kurdistan Islamic Union 
portrays itself as a reformist party which works to improve women’s conditions. 
According to Abubakir Ali the roots of abuse of women in Kurdistan come from the 
current transitional phase, with its instability and its insecurity, in which the country 
is in at the moment.457 Pshtiwan Sadek from the KDP also supports this picture. He 
states that the KDP is working towards abolishing the social and traditional culture 
concerning women and the party is developing women’s rights. The government is 
tackling the issue of violence against women, even though he states that this issue 
is often exaggerated. In addition he underlines the fact that women have equal job 
opportunities. In Erbil about half of the school principals are women. Women are 
civil servants, nurses and teachers.458 According to the politicians equality has 
already greatly improved and they are working on improving it even more. The 
extreme nationalists again believe that the Kurdish women are free and equal and 
have a strong and important role in their own society. They contend that it was due 
to Arab occupation that the women became unequal. While this might not be the 
whole truth, it shows that the perception of different people is very dependent on 
their general ideology. However, as will be seen further below, there is wide 
agreement that at this moment in time women and men in practice are not equal in 
Kurdistan although this is changing.  
In 2001, the KRG amended articles of the Iraq Personal Status Code and the Iraq 
Penal Code, to limit polygamy and to enhance criminal responsibility for honour 
crimes. During the 6th Cabinet, the High Council of Women Affairs was established, 
together with the Women’s Rights’ Monitoring Board at the Council of of Ministers, 
in order to combat violence of women from above. In 2007, several Directorates to 
Face Violence against Women were established at the Ministry of the Interior, as 
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well as in all major cities of the region. In 2011 a law to combat domestic violence 
was passed, as part of which specialist judges were appointed and specialist police 
stations established to investigate domestic violence in the region.459   
The positive developments, described by the politicians have certainly occurred, 
but represent only one side of the coin. 
The specific legislation deployed to enhance women’s position has its focus very 
much on physical protection, and gender inclusive policies to increase wider social 
development or to ensure the women’s psychological well-being do not yet exist. 
And the existing legislations are often not implemented well enough, as also 
recognized by the politicians.460  
When it comes to the acquisition of power, in 2003 only two of 20 ministers in the 
Kurdistan Regional Government were women and their public involvement in the 
Kurdish region was and still is opposed by conservative male political actors.461 
Today (2013) only one of the 21 ministers, including the prime minister, is a 
woman.462 
It is for reasons like these that according to many women’s rights activists the 
improvements already achieved for women in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region are 
only superficial. In practice women are still not truly equal before the law and often 
lack adequate opportunities to go to court.463 The Kurdish Human Rights Project is 
critical that women are unable to seek redress for gender discrimination because it 
is difficult to get access to remedies due to the social structure and the impact of 
the conflict.464 Furthermore it is critical that politicians ignore the struggle for 
women’s rights in favour of the “greater political struggle for Kurds”. Women rights 
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are seen as secondary, which only need to be addressed later, once everything 
else is resolved; but this “later” most often never arrives.465 In addition, as argued 
below, the actions taken by women, especially when it comes to public efforts in 
the transformation process, are often not supported and only partially 
acknowledged.  
One example where the differences between theoretical and practical 
developments can be seen is the issue of domestic violence, including honour 
killings. While the Kurdistan Regional Government has removed the motive of 
honour as a mitigating factor in murders, activists interviewed in 2007 complained 
of an absence of prosecutions for killing female relatives.466  Accurate statistics on 
the victims of violence do not exist, despite the interior ministry registering cases 
reported to the police, and numbers are not reliable, first and foremost because 
many cases are not reported to the police. For instance, the official number of self-
immolations in 2009 was 400, although it is assumed that the real number is much 
greater.467  
According to data published in 2005 by the Soran Qadir Coste of Norwegian 
People’s Aid over 50 per cent of both married and unmarried women of Kurdistan 
state that they have experienced domestic violence.468 It is said that in the whole of 
Iraq 59 per cent of women believe that it is justifiable for a husband to beat his 
wife. The research also showed that the percentage varied widely depending on 
the region. They ranged from a high of 85 per cent of women, in Dhi Qar to a low of 
31 per cent in Sulaimaniya. In Baghdad, 67 per cent of women affirmed that they 
believed that it is their husbands’ right to beat them. Although this variation is likely 
due to a number of factors, it may point to the success of the awareness 
campaigns run by different Kurdish organisations since the 1990s.469 
However improvements cannot be seen in all parts of the region. Women’s rights 
organisations are critical that women and children generally do not get adequate 
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support or advice within the traditional structure of Kurdish society. There is 
substantial control by men, so that women tend not to behave in a way which might 
not be appreciated. 470 Many women, especially in rural areas, are often totally 
dependent on their male family members.471 The percentage of illiterate women in 
the rural areas of Iraq’s North lies at up to 50 per cent, while women in urban areas 
have a literacy rate of up to 90 per cent, depending on age.472 There are full legal 
provisions for gender equality in employment, housing, etc. However, level of 
equality and freedom allowed to the woman very much depends on the family and 
social settings. Social pressure discourages women, for instance, living by 
themselves, getting specific jobs or having relationships before marriage. Only now 
can women seek to influence public opinion to change these traditions.473 
To understand the situation many women in the Middle East, including Kurdish 
women, live in, it is crucial to understand the concepts of shame and honour within 
the families. The honour of the family, and in particular of its males, depends 
greatly on the good reputation of its females, which is dependent on their sexual 
purity. As a consequence contact between the sexes is always seen as potentially 
bringing shame to the whole family. If a woman in Iraq for example tries to 
emancipate herself and live apart her husband or seeks to live alone before 
marriage, she must be ready to fight. It is very likely that all people: family, friends 
and everybody who means something to her, will refuse to support her and she 
risks acquiring a bad reputation.474 
Two very open girls from university explained it as follows: 
“You have to know that girls are still discriminated even in their 
families. Boys would rather get computers or iphones or 
something like that, but girls wouldn’t, because they think that 
they don’t need it. Simply everything depends on the family. If you 
have a good family, you are lucky, if not it is a problem. Really 
everything in life depends on your family. In Sulaimaniya it is a lot 
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better than in Erbil. There it is more open and the women can do 
more things. 
You can also feel that with jobs. Women can only do jobs in 
science and with fixed, short working hours. She has to leave at 9 
and be back by 3 or 4 or 5 o’clock. Everything else is not 
acceptable. And even these jobs are hard because guys often say 
that IT is nothing for women. And if a woman gets married life is 
often over anyway. You only have to have babies. No work. That’s 
why it is so important to be so careful whom you marry. You have 
to choose the right guy to marry to still have options. If it is the 
wrong choice, your life will stop. Even the guys at university often 
are against strong women. I would only have a guy from 
Sulaimaniya, not from Erbil.”475 
In general women’s positions in society are very dependent on their family’s 
situation. The Kurdish society is clearly a patriarchal society, whether in the tribal, 
rural or urban social domain. The exercise of this patriarchal power over women 
depends very much on the social class, the religion, and the political ideology 
embraced by the family. In Kurdish society, like in many other traditionally 
patriarchal societies, the broad majority of women receive their status through 
marriage and motherhood, but not in their own right.476 For example, while some 
Kurdish women have been members of parliament in Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkey and 
Europe since the 1990s, others continue to be violently punished by their husbands 
and families if they do as little as talk to another man.477 And while girls and women 
in the Kurdistan University in Erbil celebrated International Women’s Day on March 
8, 2008478, other women would not know that an International Women’s Day exists. 
When the people themselves were asked in which areas women need more 
support or help, they generally replied “in all”.479 They complained that the poor do 
not get enough social support or that it is not accessible.480 About one third were 
not satisfied with the women’s security situation and believed that more support 
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was needed in this area.481 People with a connection to the West, especially, felt 
that more needs to be done in the legal area, as for example support for access to 
courts.482 By contrast many people from the Kurdistan region did not really 
consider the legislature or system of courts as part of their life. Improved 
infrastructure was not considered important by the people. Many people and 
especially women still do not have a driving license, but have the option of moving 
around by public transport. In general, the people agreed that a lot has changed 
positively, especially when it comes to political involvement. Women receive much 
more support than previously but it is still lacking in many areas.483 This having 
been said, it was unclear from where the support was lacking. The people who 
support the government explained that the lack of support did not come from the 
regulations or the government itself. It came from different sources which could 
include the corruption of minor officials or the lack of support by husbands for their 
wives.484 The people who opposed the government maintained the exact opposite 
position.485  
Clearly the situation of women in Kurdistan at the moment can be described as 
highly contradictory; a view held by several feminist scholars, such as Nadje Al- Ali. 
On the one hand the region is opening up and is presented as a success story. 
Education is flourishing and the number of women at school and university is 
increasing. At the same time the number of female suicides and honour killings486 
is very high. Domestic violence has increased and is higher than a few decades 
ago. There are large gaps between urban, middle class women and women from 
other levels of society as well as women from the country side.487 
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These type of contradictions can be seen in many areas, when applied to the 
status of women. There are great discrepancies between city and country life as 
well as between the lives of different families. Women and girls, clothing and 
behaviour varies greatly; from very open to very conservative. For an outsider it is 
difficult to assess the exact level of freedom or state of equality women enjoy. 
While they are attending university and dancing at the Nawroz festival, there are 
hardly any women on the street after sunset and they are seldom seen on their 
own. While the government says it is trying to assist all people, the gaps between 
different segments of the population seem to be increasing rather than decreasing. 
While richer families and especially families returning from the West, raise their 
children, including girls, in a Western style, by sending them to international 
schools, and living in areas resembling European or American cities, girls and 
women from lower classes lack these opportunities. While individual people may 
have very open views and be very supportive of women’s equality, it is still the 
general feeling that it is the men who take the lead and who make decisions for the 
women in their family, as well as society; i.e. it is the men who largely influence 
what is seen as acceptable and unacceptable for women to do. There are so many 
influences from all sides, especially through TV, with channels from around the 
world, through people having more opportunities to travel and through more 
tourists and returnees gradually arriving in the region. It seems unclear in which 
direction the development of equality for women will go. 
As noted above women in Kurdistan are pushing for and also achieving reforms. 
However they still have to fight social, political and legal restrictions. Kurdish 
women are sometimes perceived as more open than the rest of the region, 
because they do not veil and they are financially better off and hence have to 
money to dress accordingly. This sometimes hides the fact that there are still many 
issues which need be addressed. The simple fact of dress does not always 
represent a woman’s social or economic power or her education level. In 
Kurdistan, Islam is often used as scapegoat when women’s inferiority is discussed, 
especially by the upper classes. However it is often the Islamic parties in 
government which give women more seats than the secular ones.  
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Similar perceivable contradictions can be observed in day-to-day life. While women 
are employed in good positions, many  are still restricted in their choice of jobs and 
are expected to have jobs, which are seen as respectable for women, and allow 
them to be home by mid-afternoon. At the same time women now have many 
public places to socialize. For instance, the creation of shopping malls has 
enhanced the opportunities for women to socialize outside the house. However 
these are still few, and only suite people from a certain social and financial 
background. Even though women can be seen more and more in expensive 
restaurants and bars, there are no places for poorer women to go.  
Reasons for this contradiction are inter alia a lack of the practical implementation of 
announced measures by the government, as well as the lack of certain parts of 
society to put their theoretical ideas and ideals into practice in their day-to-day life. 
In conclusion, the status of women in society in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region has 
constantly developed and changed, in response to the surrounding political, 
economic and social situation. The status of today’s women in Kurdish society can 
be said to be at a stage of transformation. It is still unclear which pathways will be 
taken by society and by the women themselves. The situation of women has 
improved in sympathy with the general betterment of the region. Nevertheless 
there is still a lot of work to be done at all levels. Despite the enhanced 
development of independent women’s organisations, and despite the enhanced 
presence of international communities in Kurdistan since 2003 and the on-going 
legal improvements, research shows that violence against women at all levels, 
both domestic and employment is at an alarming level.488 According to several 
women’s rights activists it is due to religion, tribal practices and “backward” cultural 
attitudes that women’s rights are still hard to realise in practice.489 
Research shows that this situation cannot simply all be attributed to “society as a 
whole”. When asked if they believed that men and women should be treated equal, 
nearly everyone replied positively. It has to be remembered that this does not 
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mean that everybody truly believes in total equality. However, many also said that 
they wanted women to be equal in spirit, but not necessarily all have the same 
roles and functions. The sense of gender equality is very present, more than it is 
sometimes recognized by activists or officials. 
The following three chapters will present a detailed analysis of how the government 
and decision makers have influenced gender developments in the region during 
the current transformation process. The analysis will cover the political, economic 
and social dimensions of these developments and how they are affecting both 
transformation within society and the building of sustainable peace at both a 
national and an individual level.  
When analysing the different policies deployed, the reactions towards them, as well 
as their influences, this chapter has shown that several historical region-specific 
issues have to be considered, which can be summarized as follows: 
As indicated in the second subchapter, Iraq and Kurdistan have had a long history 
of occupation and suppression. Because of this, the people and the country as a 
whole, need to re-establish or find their own identity. Whenever the situation of a 
country changes, the values of its people change with it. At the same time, the 
Kurds have had a very strong feeling of their ethnical identity, because of their 
separation from the other groups of Kurds in the region and the lack of their own 
country. The achievement of an independent Kurdistan may therefore be at the 
forefront of some people’s minds when thinking of the issues of conflict and peace.  
When it comes to internal change, people’s minds today are affected by the 
lengths of the various conflicts which lasted for over a generation. There is a 
generation of children and adults who have never known a stable and peaceful 
time in their life and may therefore not cope well with the new situation. There is 
residual hatred and distrust between the different groups which exist in the country 
and who have done so much harm to one another in the past. At times of war, 
dictatorship and submission, the social values are different from those during 
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periods of democracy, economic prosperity, and personal freedom,490 which has 
an influence on what is seen as important at the time of peacebuilding.  
In general there is a substantial divide between urban and country life in Kurdistan 
as in the whole of Iraq. This is especially visible when dealing with education and 
has to be taken into account when considering the increased participation of 
women. At the same time there are great difference between the people who have 
stayed in Kurdistan their whole lives and those who have returned after spending 
years or decades in exile, and these lead to antagonisms between people of 
different mind-sets. 
When evaluating different people’s opinions it is also important to keep in mind 
their different experiences during conflict. The Ba’athist regime which suppressed 
many of them was socialist. At first it promoted more openness towards Western 
values, including the equality between men and women. People who had bad 
experiences during the time of the regime, might not only turn against those who 
supported it, but also against the values the regime promoted. Consequently 
people might rather see a more conservative way of life as the solution, since the 
socialist alternative brought them destruction. 
At the same time, religion is often used as a basis for exercising certain rights or 
behaviour against women. However religion can also play a very positive part in 
the development of a region and Islam is interpreted by many to support men’s and 
women’s equality. Notwithstanding the different ideas of religion, the role of religion 
in general is very strong in the development of Iraq, as well as the Kurdistan 
Region.  
Because of the Kurdish ancient tribal culture the people grow up in with a very 
strong patriarchal tradition. This is not the case in all parts of the world. 
Domestically Kurds, as well as Arab Iraqis, live in a very divided society where 
women and men are quite strictly separated. Personal contact in public between 
men and women who do not have a family relation is not acceptable. This divide in 
                                                            
490 Helmut Klages, Wertedynamik, Über die Wandelbarkeit des Selbstverständlichen (Zürich: Edition 
Interfrom, 1988) 40‐45. 
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the society determines people’s thinking as well as their opportunities, since roles 
are often already set at birth.  
America has recently had a great influence on the whole country, which has lead 
some to strive for Western values, and others to despise them. This might 
influence moves towards women’s empowerment which still seen by many as a 
product of the West. Many people in the Kurdistan Region feel that they have been 
left alone by the rest of the world for a very long period of time and therefore want 
to move away from any Western influence now. However many others try to 
cooperate with and follow the Western countries, with the aim of making their 
region internationally acceptable and competitive and of distinguishing themselves 
from the Arabs in the country. 
Finally, true unity amongst the Kurds has never existed, and today’s ruling alliance 
between the PUK and the KDP, might not always be accepted by the local 
population. 
In conclusion it can thus be said that the situation of the Kurdistan Region, just as 
the situation of any region at a time of conflict transformation, is a complicated one. 
The possibility of a further conflict is an ever present threat because of the unstable 
situation in and around the Kurdistan Region, and the elimination of gender 
inequality as one root cause of the unstable situation inside the region, might be 
challenging as a consequence of the conflicting influences present. How exactly 
the government has dealt with this situation in the political dimension will be 
subject of the following chapter: 
IV. Gender, Women and Politics 
“The fate of women is often indicative of the fate of whole societies.”491 
Post-conflict situations provide extraordinary opportunities to set new norms, 
introduce new laws, engage new leaders and build new institutions.492 It is a time 
                                                            
491 Al‐Ali and Pratt (ed.), Women and War in the Middle East, 19. 
492 Addison and Brück, Making Peace Work, 104. 
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when everything is new and everything can be done.493 It is possible to open up 
decision making for civil society, to support minorities, the under-privileged and to 
set the basis for gender balance, by introducing quota systems and by opening up 
the political sphere for all.  
Despite these possibilities, it is a common perception that it is “warriors” taking 
over once more in the political sphere. From a gender perspective, it is men who 
negotiate for peace, men who make decisions on future political measures, and 
men who head the state institutions. While there exist some exceptions, this 
perception is largely true.  
While it should be the focus at a time of transformation to give citizens rights they 
did not have during conflict494 and to rebuild an acceptable standard of living for all, 
it can be seen that there prevails in general a very militaristic approach to 
peacemaking. This point of view often excludes women from contributing to 
reconstruction efforts on the rationale that they did not fight in the war. Armed 
conflict is thereby seen as a temporary breakdown of law and order, and once this 
“breakdown” is overcome, it is often the aim to return to pre-war conditions, as 
defined by the men in power.495 As a consequence, women can hardly be found at 
the negotiation table after the end of armed conflict, their positions as high level 
politicians and decision makers are scarce, and while they are involved in 
grassroots level politics, their influence is often only minimal. 
But is this true? Is there truly such a lack of gender balance? What difference 
would it make if the political sphere were gender inclusive? How is society 
influenced by enhanced equality at the top? And most importantly, what value does 
political gender balance, or the lack of it, have for the process of conflict 
transformation? These and more questions will be addressed in the following 
pages. 
                                                            
493 Engelhardt, Starke Frauen für den Frieden, 147. 
494 Cahn, “Women in Post‐Conflict ReconstrucƟon,” 344. 
495 Laura Shepherd (ed), Gender Matters in Global Politics, A feminist introduction to international relations 
(London: Routledge, 2010) 172. 
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Taking up the hypothesis that  positive conflict transformation is tightly correlated to 
gender equality, it is the aim of the following chapter to discuss the influence of 
different political actions and forces on gender quality in the country, on society 
and consequently on the positive transformation of peace.  
In order to do so, a short introduction will first be given on the current academic 
and world political views on the issues of gender, women and politics at the time of 
conflict transformation. This will lead to the specific example of Kurdistan, by 
focusing on three different types of political activities in the region: peace 
negotiations, parliamentary activities and grassroots activism. 
Within the framework of the three subchapters it will be elaborated how women 
and gender have been included in the Kurdistan Region’s politics, what the current 
possibilities for the inclusion are, i.e. national and international legislation, as well 
actions by the officials. The resulting impacts on society, on national development 
and on the transformation towards peace at a personal level will be reviewed as 
well as further steps which should be taken. 
1. A Theoretical Overview  
“Representation of the world, like the world itself, is the work of men; they describe 
it from their own point of view, which they confuse with absolute truth” (Simone de 
Beauvoir)496 
Today it is widely acknowledged by scholars and political theorists that the 
inclusion of women and the maintenance of gender equality in political decision 
making is important at the time of conflict transformation, in order to ensure that the 
outcomes will underpin positive future development. 
As explained by Andrés Pastrana, President of Colombia497, everybody who is 
willing to fight for peace is needed, in order to achieve its aim.498 Individual women 
                                                            
496 Tickner, Gender in International Relations, 1. 
497 1998‐2002 
498 Swanee Hunt, interviews with 15 Club of Madrid members on the importance of womens leadership in 
politics and peace processes, YouTube “Inclusive Security: The Importance of Women's Leadership in 
Conflict ResoluƟon” (Club of Madrid's 2008 conference on Global Leadership for Shared Societies) 
hƩp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NgNgWBiI950 (Accessed on 10.10.2011) 
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may thereby have distinct resources and capacities,499 which will be lost if not 
included in the process. In the words of Eleanor Roosevelt: 
 “Too often the great decisions are originated and given form in 
bodies made up wholly of men, or so completely dominated by 
them that whatever of special value women have to offer is shunted 
aside without expression” 500 
Suthanthiraraj and Ayo, taking up the point, argued that women, as at least half of 
a national population, are an important resource which cannot be overlooked. 
Ignoring their capacities and their abilities in peace building would be 
counterproductive for their country. 501  
Mark Boyer, Brian Urlacher and others go even further, and argue that an 
increased number of women at decision making would necessarily bring a new 
outlook to peace making,502 because of the different outlooks of men and women, 
which result from different experiences, as well as different views of their “self” and 
their position in society.503 They base this conclusion on the fact that women’s and 
men’s lives, as well as the lives of different generations of women, are marked by 
different experiences which they bring with them at the time of transformation,504 
This argument was also recognized by the former President of Tanzania, Benjamin 
Mkapa505, according to whom women have to be heard, as it is only they who can 
fully appreciate the impact of political and legal provisions on women; and only 
through their participation is it possible to have a balanced legislation and 
implementation.506 He reasons that women will speak out for their different 
                                                            
499 Judith Gardam and Hilary Charlesworth, “Protection of Women in Armed Conflict” Human Rights 
Quarterly 22(1) (2000): 156. 
500 Tickner, Gender in International Relations, 1. 
501 Kavitha Suthanthiraraj and Cristina Ayo, Promoting Women’s Participation in Conflict and Post‐Conflict 
Societies, How Women Worldwide are Making and Building Peace (Global Action to Prevent War, NGO 
Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 
August 2010) 11. 
502 Mark Boyer et al., “Gender and Negotiation: Some Experimental Findings from an International 
Negotiation Simulation” International Studies Quarterly 53 (2009): 24. 
503 Ibid.p.27 
504 Mary Caprioli and Mark Boyer, “Gender, Violence and International Crisis” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
45(4) (2001): 505. 
505 1995‐2000, 2000‐2006 
506 Hunt, “Inclusive Security”. 
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needs,507 and may also speak out for other women’s rights, which can lead to more 
general equality in all areas of living, including access to land, loans, elections, 
etc.508 
According to Zuckermann and Greenberg, it is a pre-requisite for more 
economically sustainable and physically secure societies that the violent and 
dominating power relations, which are commonly associated with masculinity are 
broken.509 This can be achieved through the inclusion of women in the political 
process, as shown by Caprioli and Boyer: By measuring percentages of women in 
parliament and the number of years that women have had the right to vote, a 
correlation between gender equality and violence in a country has been observed. 
As the percentage of women in the legislature increases by 5%, as state is nearly 5 
times less likely to use violence against another country or different group of 
people.510 
Such statistics are controversial, as it cannot yet be known the type of difference a 
stronger presence of women in positions of authority would make to the institutions 
of government and parliament, and in the long run to the country itself. Although 
the level of women is not yet great enough and has not existed for a long enough 
time to be certain of its influence, feminist scholars, such as Pankhurst, agree that 
the existing patterns of masculinity in institutions, as well as in the state as a whole, 
will not change without the increase of the participation of women as a 
precondition.511 Such change could help diminish a country’s propensity towards 
armed conflict. 
While the necessity for the general inclusion of women has been supported for 
some time, feminist scholars have recently introduced a new topic for discussion. 
For example Al-Ali512 has pointed out in order to ensure gender equality, 
                                                            
507Engelhardt, Starke Frauen für den Frieden, 63. 
508 Ibid.p.34 
509 Elaine Zuckermann and Marcia Greenberg, “The Gender Dimensions of Post‐Conflict Reconstruction: An 
Analytical Framework for Policymakers” Gender and Development 12(3) (2004): 79. 
510 Caprioli and Boyer, “Gender, Violence and International Crisis,” 514. 
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consideration needs to be given not only to the number of women, but also to 
which women are involved. 
As a hypothesis it is proposed that a more inclusive representation at the decision 
making process during conflict transformation, will lead to a more balanced gender 
sensitive perspective and in turn to different decisions affecting the general 
development of the region. They include many issues influencing a woman’s 
individual opportunities, her personal development and standing in society such as 
security, economic measures, and the rule of law and the building of 
infrastructure,513 which will consequently influence women’s individual possibilities, 
and thus their personal development, as well as their standing in society. 
The development of increased gender equality thereby is said to not only have an 
impact on women, but it also influences the general population. They become more 
sympathetic to equality and develop, as argued by Caprioli and Boyer, a more 
favourable disposition towards diplomacy and compromise,514 which will lead to 
lesser support of using military and violent measures as a first mean to solve 
conflicts.  
It is clearly not sufficient that equality between men and women is appreciated. The 
equality of all humans, regardless of their religious, ethical or economic 
background, needs to be recognized, to make it unacceptable to use violence 
against any group. But as Erik Melander argues the values that define equal 
relations between men and women, such as respect, are the same values that 
need to be brought to bear on other relations in societies, such as between political 
opponents or ethnic minorities.515 
As a consequence of international lobbying, resolutions, such as the UN Security 
Council Regulation 1325, were adopted over a decade ago, to publicly 
acknowledge and support women’s and gender inclusion and awareness in conflict 
                                                            
513 Suthanthiraraj and Ayo, Promoting Women’s Participation in Conflict and Post‐Conflict Societies, 17. 
Galia Golan, “Viewpoints. The Role of Women in Conflict Resolution” Palestine‐Israel Journal 11(2) (2004): 
93. 
514 Caprioli and Boyer, “Gender, Violence and International Crisis,” 509. 
515 Erik Melander, “Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict” International Studies Quarterly 49(4) 
(2005): 696. 
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transformation. Nevertheless it has been argued by many feminist scholars, like 
Suthanthiraraj and Ayo, that there has been unequal progress towards the 
empowerment of women and their full participation at the time of conflict 
transformation, especially at the political level,516 and this has led to a reverse 
effect on development. This discrepancy between theory and practice will be an 
issue coming up time and time again throughout this study, and especially in the 
following subchapteron gender and women in peace negotiations: 
A. Gender and Women in Peace Negotiations 
"No approach to peace can succeed if it does not view men and women as equally 
important components of the solution."517 
Peace negotiation, understood as discussions with some or all of the conflict 
parties, whether government or non-government forces, which address armed 
conflicts, with a view to ending it518, are used as a tool to initiate the process of 
peace. The outcome of these negotiations have the capability, if successful, to end 
the bulk of the existing violence and to build the foundation of positive conflict 
transformation.  
Despite their importance for the whole population, most peace negotiations are not 
inclusive. While it is in theory agreed on that all parties who have an interest in a 
peaceful society should sit at the table of such negotiations,519 this is most often 
not the case. It is not the representatives of all parts of the popoulation who are 
leading the negotiations, but rather the former fighters, as it is perceived that 
parties which have previously used violent tactics and possess weapons are in the 
best position to end violence.520  
                                                            
516 Suthanthiraraj and Ayo, Promoting Women’s Participation in Conflict and Post‐Conflict Societies, 14. 
517 Ambassador John D. Negroponte, United States Permanent Representative to the UN in Cohn, “Feminist 
Peacemaking,” 8. 
518 Christine Bell and Catherine O’Rourke, “Peace agreements or pieces of paper? The impact of UNSC 
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“All interested parties” most often focus on political parties, ethnic groups, or 
religious groups. However women, other representatives from the civil society, 
minority groups or people from different class backgrounds are hardly 
considered;521 forgetting that the outcome of the negotiations should and will 
influence the whole of society and not just these groups. According to the UN, 
about 50 per cent of all civil wars since 1990 have ended with peace 
agreements,522 but only 2.4 per cent of peace process signatories since 1992 have 
been women.523 Considering that it is already during this time of negotiations that 
the bases of future state structure, legal provisions etc. are laid, which will 
influence the lives of the whole population of the region affected, it is arguably 
especially counterproductive to not have women included in negotiations, as 
sustainable peace can only be achieved when a holistic participation in peace 
processes is assured.524  
The widespread ignorance of the consequences of under-representing women in 
the official peace negotiations and in the drafting committees for peace 
agreements is difficult to understand. This is especially so given the international 
focus on the connection between gender equality and world peace, as recognised 
by many countries through the UN over the better part of the last century. 
From its foundation, the UN has been concerned with the elimination of armed 
conflict and the creation of gender equality. The preamble to the Charter states: 
“We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice 
in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small, and to establish 
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations 
arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be 
                                                            
521 Ann Jordan, “Women and Conflict Transformation: Influences, Roles, and Experiences” Development in 
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University Press, 2008) 27. 
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maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards 
of life in larger freedom […]”;525 
The commitment to equal rights between men and women was reaffirmed in Article 
2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948, which stipulated a 
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of a distinction of any kind, including sex.   
More recently, the UN, through Resolution 1325, expressed the need for women’s 
inclusion in all levels of peace-building, by  
“Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and 
resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stressing the 
importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all 
efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, 
and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard 
to conflict prevention and resolution.”526 
While the introduction of the resolution can be seen to having had a positive effect 
on the inclusion of women in general in peace negotiations, as will be seen below, 
the scope of inclusion and the increase of gender, as compared to sexual, equality, 
is deemed unsatisfactory. 
Despite the theoretical support of women’s inclusion in peace processes practical 
implementation of the resolution has remained slow, one reason being that there 
are no monitoring mechanisms in place and no people in place to ensure 
implementation and accountability. Further the achievement of women’s inclusion 
and gender awareness are still treated as an aspiration rather than a requirement. 
Hence while women are still hardly ever seen present at official peace 
negotiations, they often play an important role in the negotiations on the grass root 
level. 527 In many cultures, especially indigenous cultures, as in Nepal, the 
Philippines and many others around the world,528 it has always been the women 
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who were responsible for the mediating and resolving of conflicts. These have 
included armed conflicts, as in the Pacific Islands (Fiji, Papua New Guinea and the 
Solomon Islands) where the mediation processes seldom extended beyond the 
grassroots level.529 
As stipulated by many Kurds, also in Kurdistan, it was the women who had the role 
of resolving conflicts in society, especially in the past when the Kurds still lived in a 
more rural structure.530 Concerning the current role of women in conflict resolution, 
opinions amongst the population are split between those who strongly believe that 
women should have a role “in everything”, and those who believe that women had 
or have no role in the resolving of conflicts. However, the vast majority considered 
that women in general should contribute to negotiations. As will be shown below, 
parts of the Kurdish female population have been very active in contributing to 
peace and advancing women’s rights at during the current conflict transformation 
even if such contributions are not fully recognised by society.531 Despite their 
acknowledged capabilities, and their efforts to have their voices heard, women in 
Kurdistan, as in other regions, were mostly ignored once the peace negotiations 
reached an official level. 
This lack of involvement and its consequences will be discussed in the following 
sections. Particular attention will be paid to the negotiation processes involving the 
Kurdistan region namely: the Washington Agreement, the Helsinki Project and the 
current negotiations between Erbil and Baghdad.  
1. Women’s Involvement in Negotiations 
Over the previous 20 years there has arguably been substantial progress in 
advancing women’s participation in official peace building, although the process 
still remains slow. There is a growing literature on the necessity of women’s 
participation, women are slowly being selected for peace building positions in the 
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UN and other international and regional organisations, and a number of conflict-
ridden countries have started to acknowledge women’s right to input. Further, 
organisations such as the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC), work aim to 
increase the participation of women in peace processes and to include gender 
issues in the substantive discussions, by creating networks of female negotiators 
and mediators in Africa and Asia.532 
The different efforts have borne fruit, for instance in several African States, such as 
Burundi, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, where women actively tried to 
contribute to the peace process.533 Further, women have been an important force 
in initiating peace agreements in Liberia, where they participated in the Akosombo 
Peace Talks, as well as in Rwanda,534 the Philippines535 and many other countries. 
Women were also represented in the peace talks on Afghanistan in Bonn in 
2001536. 
The increase of women’s representation in the Kurdistan Region’s negotiations in 
its recent history, has not been so successful. 
While there is not yet an official peace agreement between the Kurdistan 
autonomous region and Baghdad or between the different Kurdish fractions, 
negotiations have taken place over the last decades, including the Washington 
Agreement and the Helsinki Project. Such initiatives are continuing with the aim of 
finding lasting solutions between the leaders of Erbil and between Erbil and 
Baghdad.537 
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The current negotiations between Baghdad and Erbil generally involve 
representatives from the main political parties, including, from time to time, 
representatives from the opposition.538 However representatives from other 
segments of society are excluded in the official negotiations, as are women. The 
stance taken by the KRG when it comes to putting together negotiation teams 
seems to align with the traditional view outlined at the beginning of this chapter, 
namely that it is the old fighters, or the male politicians in general, who are in the 
best position to “build peace”. Considering that the percentage of female politicians 
in the KRG is constantly increasing there seems no obvious reason why women 
should not also be included in negotiations, especially considering the advantages 
outlined above. It would appear that the decision makers consider that issues 
raised at the negotiations not to require a specific gender input. They thereby fail to 
consider the potential consequences to their region of allowing a one-sided view to 
dominate the outcomes of their negotiations. 
But the absence of more balanced presence in negotiations is not only due to the 
KRG itself, as gender equality was not only absent in negotiations within the 
region, but also when help from outside was sought. At the Washington 
Agreement, which was signed by representatives of KDP and PUK, and which was 
mediated by the US, no women were present. 539 
In addition, at the Helsinki Project, in which Iraq’s main parties to the conflict tried 
to solve their differences with support from outside no women were present. This is 
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despite the fact that the smaller political parties were included, to ensure 
representation from the different fractions in Iraq, including Sunnis, Shias, Kurds, 
Turkmen, as well as Assyrians.540 Delegates met twice near Helsinki (in 2007 and 
2008), and in Baghdad in 2009 to discuss “The Helsinki Agreement & The Future 
of Kirkuk”,541 and at none of the meetings women were present. 
It is noteworthy that the Helsinki Agreement was led by senior representatives from 
Northern Ireland as well as South Africa to share their insights from similar peace 
processes.542 Nevertheless gender was not taken into account despite the fact that 
the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC) had formed part of the 
negotiations to the Good Friday Agreement, and it is agreed, in retrospective, that 
the benefits that Northern Irish women gained in the aftermath of the struggle, 
would not have been possible if they had not been present at the negotiations.543 
Further, it is notable that there was not one woman appointed to the nine member 
committee, charged in 2004, with drafting the interim constitution of Iraq and only 9 
of 55 members of the final drafting committee were women.544 
Finally in the Kurdistan Region, the general perception holds true that it is the ‘old 
warriors’ who retain power, rather than shared arrangements with new parties, and 
a more representative cross-section of the population, no matter who sets up the 
negotiations. 
Interestingly, even though research shows that women were not represented in 
Kurdistan’s delegations in negotiations, many of the interviewees among the 
general population had a different perception. When asked, whether women 
already participated in peace negotiations or more generally in official peace 
building efforts, the answer was very quickly yes, but when it came to naming 
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some of these women, the people were unable to do so.545 It is possible that they 
tended to reply positively on questions concerning the inclusion of women within 
their region, as to present a positive picture of their homeland to the European 
researcher. However is more likely that the increased presence of women in 
regional politics and the generally positive attitude towards the inclusion of women 
at all levels has lead to a misguided public perception of the extent of balanced 
representation at negotiations on a national level. It would appear that while 
knowledge of the matter is limited, the people at large believe that women are 
included in the process. 
It is argued that the real lack of women’s participation has serious implications on 
the region’s future. Having only men at the negotiating table poses the question of 
how representative the negotiators really are of the whole population and if the 
outcome of the negotiations will adequately meet their hopes and expectations. 
The sole inclusion of former fighters in peace negotiations might be useful in 
putting an immediate end to a violent struggle. However women’s participation in 
the negotiations is crucial for the future balanced development of the country as a 
whole.546 Clearly those present at the talks and negotiations and the interests they 
promote, will have a significant effect on how the future of the country will be 
shaped and whether the peace will be sustainable.547 In Kurdistan today, the 
descendants of the old warriors are in power. As the public demonstrations in 
2011, as well as interviews with the people, showed, not everybody is happy about 
the existing political landscape and a shift in the population’s political support, as 
well as a possible uprising are predicted by several scholars in the West.548 
Further, improvements in legislation affecting women and increases in their level of 
participation have taken place, but full gender inclusion has still not occurred. 
Arguably, these trends could have been have been counter-acted had the 
processes of negotiation been gender inclusive and involved civil society . 
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As noted above, the negotiations for peace agreements between warring parties 
define the power relations and identify priorities for action immediately after the 
conflict. It follows that if peace agreements are merely negotiated between 
traditional military regimes, they will dominated by the ideas of these military 
regimes, including most likely a traditional gender regime,549 which mitigates 
against the development of full equality in the country. From this idea it follows that 
the higher the percentage of men in negotiation teams, the more male-dominated 
will be the vision of post-war society incorporated into the agreements.550 Such 
one-sided agreement, will rarely contribute to a just society.551 It can be argued 
that this happened in Kurdistan, where the representation at the negotiations was 
hugely unequal. As shown through different interviews in this thesis, people, are 
still largely unhappy with the progress towards equality within society. Although 
improvements have occurred, they not go far enough. While it is possible to argue 
that gender inclusive peace negotiations would not be the whole solution to these 
problems, they would have been a first step in the right direction; a step which was 
not taken. 
Arguably, if women had been involved in the political process, they might have 
been able to introduce strategies which engender widespread support from other 
women and consequently change the social outlook. However, this view is not 
shared by all. Sumie Nakaya argues from the example of Guatemala and Somalia, 
that the inclusion of women in the peace process does not bring any structural 
changes. She shows that despite the inclusion of Guatemalan and Somali women 
in the peace negotiations, women in both countries are still sidelined and gender 
equality has not been achieved.552 
Nevertheless, when women were part of the official negotiations, a pattern could 
be observed in the issues they sought to have included in the peace agreement. 
These issues included the establishment of rights for women to own property and 
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to receive inheritance, the creation of a system to penalise perpetrators of gender-
based crimes, a specific quota for the inclusion of women in politics, actions to 
support the return of displaced women, assurances of equal treatment for men and 
women as well as the upholding of women’s rights through statutes.553 It may be 
argued that since these issues are exclusively the concern of women, they would 
not have seen as very important by male negotiators or even raised. This appears 
to be the case in the Kurdistan Region. 
At the same time it needs to be acknowledged that even if a woman takes part in 
the negotiating process, she may still not advocate gender issues. The mere 
inclusion of women in the discussions will not guarantee that a gender inclusive 
approach will be taken. Not all women are sensitive to women’s issues, or would 
help other women, just because they are women.554 It follows that there is the need 
to include a much higher number of women in peace process, including women 
who speak out for gender issues.555 Gender expertise requires specific 
experiences and skills, which are needed in the process, and which can be 
provided by women as well as by men.556 Practical experience, for instance from 
the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, shows that it is crucial to include gender 
awareness groups, women and/or men, who are sensitive to women’s and gender 
issues.557 
For peace agreements to be truly successful in the long run, they must reflect the 
aspirations of society as a whole, including those of women from different political 
parties.  
As Andrew Levin rightly remarks, true benefits and national reconciliation in any 
society will only be achieved if negotiations are “fully inclusive”. All people need to 
have an input in the transformation of their country, as this makes it possible to 
influence the development of the country or region as a whole, as well as the 
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development of the different people and groups of society individually.558 Full 
inclusion is thus of crucial importance at the time of negotiations. And this includes 
women. 
This view was shared by the majority of the Kurdish interviewees. Most of the 
people indeed stated that the involvement of more women in official peace talks 
would make a positive difference.559 While many were unable to state a reason 
why, in their opinion, it would make a difference, and some were uncomfortable 
speaking about it560, which raised the question if all of them truly believed that an 
increased participation of women is indeed necessary, others, especially the ones 
who were highly interested in politics, stated a variety of reasons why women 
should be present at the region’s negotiation tables. The arguments for women’s 
involvement thereby overarched any religious, social, age or sexual differences: 
A 23 year old female student from a very religious family explained that in her 
opinion there is no doubt that more women need to be involved in official peace 
talks, in order to break the cycle of an exclusive “male society”, and to work against 
patriarchy.561 A 50 year old blacksmith added that, through inclusive participation, 
women “can show that they have also got something to say”.562 And another 
student stated that women have to be involved simply to show them respect, for 
their role in society and for everything they have done until now;563 women’s 
inclusion thereby being used further the interests of women throughout the region, 
to make them more visible and to push them away from their traditional roles. 
Additionally, a range of people, including teachers, politicians and NGO workers, 
were of the opinion that women are able to drive negotiations forward. They 
believe that women have more understanding for the emotional needs of other 
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women564 and are better in solving “women’s problems”, which would improve the 
situation for women over the region, “since there do not only exist male problems 
on this earth”.565 Still others expressed the view that it is easier for women to have 
empathy566 and that are more polite at talks567 or that they are calmer than men568, 
which would be positive in negotiations. Some interviewees considered that 
women think differently and forgive quicker than men and hence reconstruction 
would move forward more quickly. The inclusion of women in the peace talks 
would change the dynamics of the negotiations because men behave differently if 
women are in the room.569 As explained by an old lady, it would be much better for 
women to be involved, since “women would work for women, since men solely 
work for men”.570 
However, not all interviewees agreed that positive change is possible. A more 
pessimistic view came especially from several educated middle-aged men, who 
were of the opinion that women’s inclusion would not make any difference, since 
society itself is far too focused on men571 and that it is firstly necessary to radically 
change society itself, which already has to start in Kindergarten, in order to 
produce a new culture which will then allow for women to assume positions of 
power and to also have influence therein.572 The men thereby did not believe that 
the further inclusion of women in the peace talks might actually start this “culture of 
change”. 
The only person who openly stipulated that women should not be involved in peace 
talks was one village man, who was very much in favour of women’s equality within 
their family, but who believed that there are certain things in Kurdish society which 
women cannot do by themselves and for which it is better to have men. 573 
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The majority of the Kurdish population consequently follows the traditional feminist 
position, namely that in general women should be included. However, it is not 
necessary to have specific requirements or target gender equality or class 
inclusion. This might reflect the fact that no women have until now participated in 
high-level negotiations. Hence, it is necessary as a first step to think about the 
concept of inclusion, before proceeding to the next step and consider gender 
equality. 
Despite the fact that women are lacking from negotiations in practice, it would 
appear that many people are in favour of women’s equal participation, and are 
aware of the benefits that such participation would bring to the region. That these 
ideas are not being implemented in practice, arguably leads to a loss both in 
potential national development, and an opportunity to increasing women’s standing 
within society. Given the potential beneficial impact on development in the region 
and on society, and given the general support within the population it seems 
surprising that the KRG has refrained from including women in peace negotiations. 
Had the KRG had already invited women take their place at the negotiation table, 
the region would now be one step closer to achieving true gender balance within 
negotiations and the consequential benefits outlined above. 
We cannot yet quantify what impact a significant percentage of women at peace 
negotiations, such as 40 or 50 per cent, might have, since it has never happened 
and the impact of the few women who had been involved in peace talks is 
questionable, since their influence was not great enough.574 Therefore it is only 
possible to surmise what influence women might have had. Considering the 
arguments by Suthanthiraraj, Ayo, Bayer, Urlacher and Hunt elaborated above,575 
namely that women are needed in political decision making as an individual 
resource, that women can bring a new outlook to peace building through their 
different experiences and that women’s participation will most likely result in a 
more balanced legislation, which will be beneficial to civil society, it may be 
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concluded that the KRG and the people in power, have passed over a chance for 
national  and personal development for their people. Further, it seems self-evident 
that the earlier the positive transformation is started, the earlier the benefits will be 
seen. Consequently, even if the lack of gender consideration at the early time of 
negotiations does not set society back, it results in another lost opportunity to work 
for positive peace, and could prolong the conflict. 
However, choosing the make-up of the negotiating teams is only one way of 
controlling the impact of the outcomes on society and on the region as a whole. 
The other way, which is more likely, but not necessarily under the control of the 
people at the negotiations, is through the contents of the ratified negotiation 
agreement: 
2. Gendering the Contents of Agreements 
The impact of the enhancement of gender inclusion on agreements reached during 
the negotiations depends as much on qualitative factors as on quantitative 
numbers. 
Apart from not being present in person at the peace negotiations, ‘women’, in the 
sense of gender considerations within the negotiated documents, are also seldom 
included in the peace agreements themselves resulting in the loss of opportunity to 
fight underlying issues of discrimination in society’s structure. As elaborated by 
feminist scholars, such as Antonia Potter, peace agreements need to be written in 
a “gendered way”. The word “women” has to be included, as the words used in the 
peace agreement will later either shut off or open up vital spaces for the 
implementers.576 
The inclusion of women’s issues in peace agreements can be the starting point for 
achieving general legal and political gains for women.577 Since a peace agreement 
often has the status of a quasi-constitution or is even the basis for a future 
constitution, it is vital for future development that the document include rights for 
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and concerning women.578 But rather than considering gender issues, as it is 
“called upon” by the international community, through Resolution 1325,579 the 
contents of peace agreements often focus solely on issues such as disarmament 
and demilitarisation, while ignoring or down playing other issues which pose equal 
threats to civilians. Specifically measures concerning women and security are often 
considered “fine tuning”580, overlooking the fact that the contents of the peace 
agreement will have a lasting effect on the future governing of the country. 
It has been observed that the lack of the consideration of gender issues and 
women’s roles in societies in peace agreements often results in a loss for the 
future development of the country, as well as in a loss of possibility to increase 
gender equality. As observed by Swanee Hunt, former US Ambassador to Austria, 
a reason for the failure of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Yugoslavia in 1994 was 
the lack of women’s involvement in the negotiations, as well as the lack of 
consideration of the general, as well as gender related impact of the agreement on 
society. The limited mind-set that the men brought to the table, most of whom were 
soldiers with no legitimacy as peacemakers, led to further problems for the 
population,581 which could have been avoided by including a balanced 
representation of society. This was also recognized by Mr Zlatko Lagumdzija, 
Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina,582 who developed the view, from his 
experience with the Dayton Agreement, that the outcome of peace agreements, 
would be better for everyone, if a true representation of society were involved in 
their negotiation including fifty per cent women.583  
Similar mistakes have been made all around the world. A quantitative and 
qualitative assessment of several of the world’s peace agreements’ references to 
women, as conducted by Christine Bell and Catherine O’Rourke, shows that only  
an average of 16 per cent of all peace agreements contain references to women, 
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although this number has increased from 11 to 27 per cent since the passing of 
Res 1325. However while the quantitative assessment of peace agreements 
confirms a positive development, the qualitative assessment shows that the 
references to women are often poor in quality, sometimes contravening CEDAW 
provisions and only rarely illustrating good practice.584 The assessment showed 
that most agreements which mentioned women did so in the context of women as 
victims, as well as women in politics. Only a few mention women in a legal context 
or specifically provide for the promotion of women’s organisations and 
infrastructure.585  
In the case of the principal agreements reached between the two main parties in 
the Kurdistan Region, as well as agreements between Erbil and Baghdad, not even 
the above mentioned inclusions can be found. 
The main provisions of the Washington Agreement of 1998 between the KDP and 
the PUK included the formation of an interim joint government, the normalization of 
main towns, to the equal development of the PUK and the KDP areas and the end 
of the PKK presence as well as that of the Iraqi forces. The vagueness of the 
different clauses, as well as continued disagreement between the parties made the 
implementation of the agreement difficult. As with other peace agreements, the 
Washington Agreement merely involved the two conflicting parties. There were no 
other Kurdish parties or people involved, which meant that no other view points 
from the Kurdish society were represented and many issues of potential 
importance to the civil population and might have even solved certain matters, 
were not heard.586 There was not a single clause within the agreement dealing with 
gender relations or any other aspect of social development. 
The same is true of negotiations between Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq. Three 
main topics were raised time and time again between the two forces: Oil and gas 
law; the implementation of Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution, which concerns the 
resettlement of displaced persons, as well as the people’s right to determine their 
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own national and ethnic affiliation, especially when it comes to Kirkuk, and finally 
issues concerning the Peshmerga forces.587 While other topics, such as the 
provision and delivery of basic required services for all citizens, were discussed in 
the negotiations,588 the above named issues certainly took priority. As with the 
Washington agreement, gender was not considered in any way.  
Again the Helsinki Agreement, which was drafted as a consequence of the Helsinki 
Project and aimed to define “general principles of joint national action”, did not 
include the issue of gender. While the agreement ensures the commitment to 
peaceful negotiations, and to opposing international interference, respecting 
human rights and ensuring participation and equality of all, it thereby merely 
focuses on sectarian, ethnic and political differences, but not on gender.589 
As explained above, the lack of gender consideration at this early stage of conflict 
transformation is likely to have had an aversive effect on the region’s subsequent 
development, even though it cannot be proven. One indication of a detrimental 
development in the Kurdistan Region is that a more extensive adoption of 
gendered legislation only began in recent years, more than a decade after the 
establishment of the “safe haven”. 
It follows from the arguments above that the Kurdistan Regional Government, as 
well as political parties or in general parties to conflict, would be well advised to 
consider enhanced gender inclusion in future agreements, in order to ensure 
representation of the whole of society and to enhance the possibility of positive 
conflict transformation within society.  
It must be conceded that the lack of gender inclusion in negotiations does not 
seem to be detrimental to the region’s standing within the international community, 
as in truth other members of the international community do not put a great 
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emphasis on the inclusion of women. However, the author argues that there is 
likely to be a slowing of positive gender development within society, as negotiated 
agreements can provide an impulse for future progress. 
At the same time, it cannot be forgotten that, while reaching an agreement on 
specific factors might mark the initial point for an official end to the conflict, it does 
not resolve all problems. New procedures must be put in place and new institutions 
established in order to assure that the peace accords are observed and that on-
going social tensions and inequalities will be mitigated. In order to achieve this, the 
work for peace, which includes the recognition of diverse social identities and their 
capacities, has to be integrated into the development of the state.590  One way of 
doing so is by fully including representatives of all society in high level politics, 
including parliament: 
B. Gender, Women and Parliament 
A positive influence from state representatives is vital in all societies, and 
especially so at a time of peace building, since it is this time, which will be decisive 
on whether new conflict will erupt, or lasting peace will be achieved.  
Through their roles as representatives and their influence on national affairs, 
members of parliament and other high officials have an important role in 
developing the state and influencing the lives of its citizens.591 According to the 
people interviewed for this study, the majority believed that it is the responsibility of 
“the government”, “the ministries” or “the politicians” to take the primary role in 
questions of war and peace. Young women and those at university especially, but 
also many of the more socially disadvantaged people, were of the opinion that the 
most important drivers of the reconstruction effort had been the politicians. 
Regardless of whether or not they are feminist or sexist, or even whether or not 
they support the ruling parties, the people believe that the policy makers are the 
driving force in the transformation process. They see it as the government’s role to 
                                                            
590 Ho‐Won Jeong, Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis (Thousand Oaks SAGE, 2008) 241. 
591 Cynthia Enloe, “Police and Military in the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict” Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 433 (1977): 138. 
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set a new agenda for the achievement of peace building, thus giving the authorities 
the power to craft the state according to their beliefs or desires. 
In the construct of a state, it is the state representatives, who form the structure 
and “being” of a state. Consequently if the high-level representatives of a nation or 
region are principally derived from a selected ethnic, social or gender groups, the 
state institutions will reflect those groups. In terms of gender balance most states 
today would thus be described as “masculine”.592 While many countries around the 
world have achieved a substantial percentage of women in parliament, no country 
has a female representation, reflecting the female percentage of their general 
population.593 And there are only two countries in the world have more than fifty per 
cent women in their parliaments.594 
Femininity or gender equality are thereby often still not seen as “fitting” a state 
structure. It is frequently seen as unacceptable to have certain gender relations 
represented in politics, including open homosexuals and “female” women, and 
there is only a specific type of person who is accepted in politics.595 There is only 
the ones who “fit the picture”.596 As a consequence of this uniform representation, 
the policies deployed by mainstream politicians will reconstruct certain types of 
gender relations, which will have a lasting impact on the development of society.  
On the other hand if balance and awareness on issues such as gender and 
ethnicity are achieved at a high political level, they will in the long run be reflected 
in society. If the state works towards equality for its entire people, notwithstanding 
sex, social class, ethnicity, religion etc. and if a situation is achieved where people 
regard themselves as a whole community based on the principles of justice and 
fairness, violent conflict is unlikely, and the people will be one step closer to 
positive peace. For this development to occur, it is necessary to move towards 
                                                            
592 Laura Sjoberg, Gender and International Security, Feminist Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2010) 38. 
593 As’ad AbuKhalil, “Toward the Study of Women and Politics in the Arab World” Spring Feminist Issues 
(1993): 4. 
594 Rwanda: 56,3% (elecƟons: 2008); Andorra: 53,6% (elecƟons: 2011); see: Inter‐Parliamentary Union, 
“Women in NaƟonal Parliaments” (31 August 2011) http://www.ipu.org/wmn‐e/world.htm (Accessed on 
10.10.2011) 
595 Tickner, Gender in International Relations, 6. 
596 Ibid.p.37 
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equality between different social groups in politics, including women in high-level 
politics. As explained by Moghadam and Sadiqi, the emergence of women as 
political actors as well as as voters leads to the engendering and feminization of 
the public sphere in the country as well as to a democratization through the 
participation of all citizens.597 
This was also the opinion of several representatives of Kurdistan’s civil society. 
They held the view that progress towards the equality of women in political 
positions creates more balance in society; and that a society is not able to develop 
itself and move forward without the involvement of women in all levels, including 
positions of power.598  
It will be the aim of the following subchapter to discuss the above theory with 
reference to the Kurdistan region. Special attention will be paid to if and how 
enhanced sexual and gender inclusion in parliament influences the development of 
a more balanced society and the process of conflict transformation. 
1. Supporting Women’s Inclusion 
The Kurdistan Region today provides the basic framework to enhance sexual 
equality in decision making positions. In theory all women have the opportunity to 
become part of the decision-making force and women also have the public support 
from current male politicians to raise their numbers in high-level politics. But while 
the support for sexual equality is on the rise, it will be seen that the support for 
high-level political inclusion does not cover women from all elements of society. 
Consequently, women are still an unequally represented decision-making force in 
politics, despite their general inclusion. 
As a signatory to the CEDAW, as well as to Resolution 1325, Iraq, and the 
Kurdistan Region, agreed to  
“take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in the political and public life of the country and, 
in particular, to ensure to women, on equal terms with men, the 
                                                            
597 Moghadam and Sadiqi, “Women’s AcƟvism and the Public Sphere,” 3. 
598 See e.g. Interview BL, Erbil on 12/07/2012; Interview BH, Erbil on 05/07/2012; Interview CJ, Vienna on 
28/10/2012 
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right […] to participate in the formulation of government policy 
and implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform 
all public functions at all levels of government”599; 
as well as to 
“ensure increased representation of women at all decision-
making levels in national, regional and international institutions 
and mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution 
of conflict”.600 
These commitments were introduced into national legislation, through the inclusion 
of Article 20 into the Iraqi Constitution, which stipulates that 
“Iraqi citizens, men and women, shall have the right to 
participate in public affairs and to enjoy political rights including 
the right to vote, elect, and run for office.” 
More explicitly, women are ensured a minimum of 25 per cent representation as 
members of the members of the Council of Representatives.601  
The Kurdistan Region went even further by enshrining in its Draft Constitution that 
women have a minimum of 30 per cent of seats reserved for them in the elections 
of the regional parliament, local councils as well as municipalities.602 
In addition to the fixed quota for female MPs, the Kurdistan Parliament dedicated 
one of its standing committees to the area of women’s rights.603 The Women’s 
Protection Rights Committee, which was founded in 2005, has eleven female 
members and is given the opportunity to contribute to policy making through the 
right to participate in and comment on decisions concerning women in 
parliament.604 While the committee gives the women of the region an important 
platform to lobby for their rights, it does not yet ensure gender inclusion, as the 
                                                            
599 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of DiscriminaƟon Against Women 1979, ArƟcle 7(b) 
600 UN Security Council ResoluƟon 1325 
601 ConsƟtuƟon of Iraq 2005, ArƟcle 49 
602 Draft of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s ConsƟtuƟon 2009, ArƟcles 41(2) and 106(2) 
603 KRG, “The Kurdistan Parliament” 
hƩp://www.krg.org/arƟcles/detail.asp?rnr=160&lngnr=12&smap=04070000&anr=15057 (Accessed on 
15.10.2012) 
604 Alsayid, Combating Physical Violence Against Women in Iraqi Kurdistan, 31. 
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impact of the committee is limited when it comes to decision making which does 
not explicitly concern “women”.   
Furthermore, in 2011, the Supreme Council for Women’s Affairs was established 
with the aim of addressing political, economic, social and cultural rights of women 
in the region,605 and in 2012 a new monitoring body to protect women’s rights, the 
Women’s Rights Monitoring Board, was created,606 which has as its aim to bring 
together representatives of several key ministries, such as the Ministry of Justice, 
the Interior, Labour and Social Affairs, Planning, Health, Education, Higher 
Education and Religious Affairs, to coordinate and improve gender politics in the 
region.607 
Clearly big steps have been taken in recent years to ensure the enhanced 
presence of women in parliament, which provides the possibility, as argued by 
Zuckermann and Greenberg,608 of initiating the necessary steps towards breaking 
with the old power relations and incorporating their own outlook into policy. Further, 
as argued by feminist scholars like Hunt, Posa, Al-Ali or Pratt,609 measures such as 
the female quota for political representation is vital to secure long-term goals 
including opening the way for more women in leadership positions.610 
Steps have not only been taken at the legal level. Authoritative figures have sought 
to enhance the public recognition of women’s role in high level politics. Recently, 
well-known politicians have started promoting the idea of women’s inclusion in 
public. As part of this movement, the President of the Kurdistan Region, Masoud 
Barzani, congratulated women on International Women’s Day 2012 and underlined 
the proposition that the political leaders are defenders of women’s rights and 
promoters of women’s participation in political processes and social 
                                                            
605 KRG‐DFR, “Swedish rights training programme” (4 October 2011) 
hƩp://dfr.krg.org/a/d.aspx?l=12&a=41303  (Accessed on 9.5.2012) 
606 Rudaw, “New monitoring body established to protect women’s rights” (13 August 2012) 
hƩp://www.krg.org/a/d.aspx?a=45015&l=12&r=73&s=02010200&s=010000 (Accessed on 11.7.2013) 
607 Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation, “Iraqi Kurdistan: Condemning Femicide” (14 
September 2012) hƩp://www.unpo.org/arƟcle/14855 (Accessed on 03.08.2013) 
608 Zuckermann and Greenberg, “The Gender Dimensions of Post‐Conflict Reconstruction,” 79. 
609 Swanee Hunt and Cristina Posa, “Iraq’s Excluded Women” Foreign Policy 143 (2004): 43. 
610 Al‐Ali and Pratt, “Women in Iraq,” 19. 
See also: Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Gender Politics Makes A Difference, 13. 
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development.611 Also Dr. Fuad Masum, who heads the Kurdistan Alliance bloc in 
the Iraqi Council of Representatives, announced on International Women’s Day 
that he “wished women to occupy sovereign position in the Iraqi state in the near 
future”.612  
Such statements are criticized by their opponents as being ‘mere talking’ and as 
showing off in public rather than implementing in practice.613  However, based 
solely the increasing numbers of women in parliament over time, the politicians 
have kept their promises. Between 1992 and 2005 there were only eight female 
members of parliament (MPs) out of a total of 111. The number increased to 24 in 
the second parliament from 2005 to 2009, and in the session of 2011 41 MPs were 
women, which counts for 37 per cent of the seats.614 
The support of political actors for the issue also had an impact on society. The 
supporters of the two main political parties recognise and appreciate the work of 
their leaders.615 In particular many highly educated men and women expressed the 
view that it is important for women to aspire to work in parliament or for politics in 
general. As explained by a lawyer: “Women today have an important role in 
Kurdistan. Their quota of participation is 25% with all the new decisions in the 
state,” to which an 18-year old pupil added: “Today women in Kurdistan work as 
teachers or lawyers or members of parliaments. Those are their most important 
roles.” People from all parts of the political spectrum maintained that their party 
contributed most to reconstruction. If they wished to be polite, they said that both, 
                                                            
611 PUKmedia, “President Barzani congratulates Kurdistan Women” (9 March 2012) 
http://pukmedia.co/english/kurdish‐women/179‐president‐barzani‐congratulates‐kurdistan‐women 
(Accessed on 4.5.2012) 
612 PUKmedia, “Dr. Masum: We wish woman to occupy sovereign posiƟon in Iraq” (8 March 2012) 
http://pukmedia.co/english/kurdish‐women/178‐dr‐masum‐we‐wish‐woman‐to‐occupy‐sovereign‐position‐
in‐iraq (Accessed on 4.5.2012) 
613 Interview BW, Sulaimaniya on 08/08/2012; Interview BY, Sulaimaniya on 10/08/2012 
614 The Kurdish Globe, “Statistics suggest women's role is "weak" in government, politics and civil society” (1 
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615 Interview AA, Erbil on 03/04/2012; Interview AE, Erbil on 09/04/2012; Interview AM, Erbil on 
27/04/2012; Interview BV, Sulaimaniya on 06/08/2012 
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Talabani and Barzani, did a lot for conflict transformation and social development 
in the region616, including working for gender awareness. 
On the KDP side, especially Nechirvan Idris Barzani, the grandson of KDP founder 
Mustafa Barzani and prime minister between 2006 and 2009 and from 2012, was 
seen especially as the driving force in reconstruction, and in the recognition of 
women’s rights. To underline this point, one man told the following joke:  
“One man says to another: Before, everything was horrible and 
my wife could not even leave the house. I did not really like that 
and I am happy for her to have more freedom now, but it is 
getting a bit much. Now she is coming home at 2 o’clock in the 
morning and because of Nechirvan I cannot even ask her where 
she was…”617 
While the joke is without doubt an exaggeration, it is an acknowledgment by 
Kurdistan society, or part of it, of the political efforts supporting women’s issues. 
Further actions to place the issue of enhanced gender inclusion on the public 
agenda included organising and funding various conferences, which put “Kurdish 
women” in the centre of attention: 
In March 2007, a conference was held on Kurdish Women for Peace and Equality, 
which showed the recognition of the importance of the issue by the officials.  
In 2009, the ministry of higher education sponsored the World’s Women for Life 
first international women’s conference in Erbil. The conference was attended by 
several high-level politicians, and addressed the difficulties faced by the Kurdistani 
women’s movement.618 
On 27 and 28 January 2011 a conference was held in Erbil on “The Role of 
Women in Peace-Building, Reconciliation and Accountability in Iraq”, which was 
organised with the support of the Kurdistan Regional Government, the Iraqi Council 
of Representatives, the Kurdistan Parliament-Iraq and the Government of Italy. The 
                                                            
616 See e.g. Interview BS, Erbil on 24/07/2012; Interview BW, Sulaimaniya on 08/08/2012; Interview CE, 
Vienna on 21/10/2012 
617 Interview CI, Vienna on 26/10/2012 
618 Soraya Fallah, World’s Women for Life, “Press Release ResoluƟon and SuggesƟon” (29.08.2009) 
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conference gathered more than 300 political figures, including high-level 
representatives from Iraq, the Kurdistan Region, the UN, the Arab League, the 
Organisation of Islamic Conferences as well as international experts from across 
the world.619 The recommendations from the conference covered most of the 
women’s issues in the public arena and620 included commitments for further 
provisions and regulations for the enhanced involvement of women and for gender 
equality in the political field.  
And in 2012, 200 women delegates met for the second National Conference on 
Kurdish Women in Erbil, which was organized under the leadership of Amina Zikri 
MP. The main goal was to “integrate Kurdish women into Kurdistan’s political 
process”.621  
While the holding of these conferences is certainly a positive sign, their effects on 
the local population are as yet unclear. They are not widely known about by the 
population, and their contents are subject to criticism. For instance an observer at 
the 2007 Conference remarked that the conference only reflected a fraction of the 
women’s voices and while it celebrated the achievements of Kurdish women, it did 
not concentrate on the challenges they faced622 and there was no place for open 
and critical debate.623 Certain issues, such as the side-lining of women’s rights in 
order to receive further political support, were not discussed624 and consultations 
with Kurdish women were not sufficiently taken into account.625 
These criticisms reflected those of several women’s activists. They suggest that 
the government is putting on a show when it comes to women’s rights and only 
allow them, as long as there is no disadvantage to the politicians themselves, or as 
                                                            
619 No peace without justice, “International Conference on “The Role of Women in Peace‐Building, 
ReconciliaƟon and Accountability in Iraq”” (Erbil, 27‐28 January 2011) 
http://www.npwj.org/MENA/International‐Conference‐%E2%80%9CThe‐Role‐Women‐Peace‐Building‐
Reconciliation‐and‐Accountability‐Iraq%E2%80%9D (Accessed on 1.10.2011) 
620 The subject of women and religion and the state for example could not be brought to a conclusion 
621 ChrisƟan Chung, Rudaw, “Conference in Erbil Focuses on Women’s Role in PoliƟcs” (27.05.2012) 
hƩp://www.rudaw.net/english/kurds/4780.html (Accessed on 16.10.2012)  
622 Nadeen El‐Kassem, “InternaƟonal Conference on Kurdish Women for Peace and Equality, March 8, 2007, 
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624 Ibid.p.107 
625 Ibid.p.108 
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long as they do not break any boundaries and that the government is not truly 
caring about gender equality.  
Also the higher percentage of female MPs is not seen as wholly positive, as 
explained by an Austrian political scientist: 
“There exist a few “token women” in political positions. But they 
are not independent and nearly exclusively deal with so called 
“women’s issues”, as for example social and family matters, but 
not for example with security subjects. In their self-perception the 
Kurds believe to be very progressive, but in reality this is not 
really the case.”626 
The reality of the 30 per cent quota is sometimes criticised as simply being used as 
an indicator of the region’s model development. This criticism is directed towards 
politicians and representatives of civil society, who emphasise the opportunities for 
women through the quota, while not considering necessary further advances. This 
could also be observed when asking the people, if they can think of any prime 
examples of female politicians in recent times. They were either unable to name 
anybody, or they referred to women like Hero Talabani, the wife of the current 
president, Bayan Sami Abdul-Rahman, daughter of the former deputy-prime 
minister Sami Abdul-Rahman, or Hamail Barzani, the late wife of Mullah Mustafa 
Barzani and mother of Massoud Barzani, who could all be classified as “token 
women” as all are connected to an influential male leader.627 
Despite the lack of further considerations on gender issues, actions, such as the 
introduction of the quota, has had an effect on society. For example, as argued by 
Caprioli and Boyer628 the growing acceptability of the concept of women in 
leadership positions, if continued, is likely to lead to more sympathy for gender 
equality within society as a whole. When surveyed, nearly three quarters of people 
signaled that they would support having even more women in positions of 
power.629 However the respondees noted that the women must have the necessary 
                                                            
626 Interview CB, Vienna on 04/12/2012 
627 See e.g. Interview BZ, Sulaimaniya on 10/08/2012; Interview AA, Erbil on 03/04/2012; Interview CH, 
Vienna on 05/11/2012 
628 Caprioli and Boyer, “Gender, Violence and International Crisis,” 509. 
629 See e.g. Interview AK, Erbil on 20/04/2012; Interview AR, Sulaimaniya on 21/05/2012; Interview AS, 
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abilities and be suitable for the position.630 The supporters of women’s rights were 
especially of the opinion that there should be no discrimination and that there 
should be just as many women as men in high positions.631 There was a small 
number of people questioned who did not think that women should be in positions 
of power. They felt that men were better in politics, or that politics is “not a 
woman’s role”.632 Among the people who opposed women’s equality in politics, 
prejudices persisted including: women are too emotional,633 or women are not 
capable because of biological factors. A young teacher, who was described by one 
of her former pupils as extremely smart and loved by all her students, announced 
that “there are differences, because men are more intelligent than women. Anyway 
all the scientists are men”.634 In addition there were a few people who stated that 
they are happy to see women in high positions, as long as they are not too high 
and who were of the opinion that the very high positions are better preserved for 
men.635  
Nevertheless, despite the persistence of some gender-related prejudices, the vast 
majority of both women and men, believed that there should be more women in 
positions of power, at least in theory.  
Reality showed that several people simply articulated their ideals or what they 
thought was expected from them, since it could be observed that the people do not 
take upon themselves the prerequisites needed in order to achieve those ideals in 
practice. As with peace negotiations, there is a great discrepancy between theory 
and practice when it comes to the realization of gender equity in politics. 
Even with those who truly support the idea of women’s inclusion in parliament, 
many distinguish between “women in general”, and women from their own families.  
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As explained by two female students at one of Kurdistan’s most prestigious 
universities: 
“Women cannot really be involved in politics, because they have 
no say. Everything in this regard only looks good on the outside 
at the moment. Nearly no families would accept their daughter to 
become a politician. It is not a respectable job. She would have to 
stay out late and be in the eyes of the public. Women even have 
to fight for a representative position at a university. I am a 
representative at the university, and it was so hard. The people 
told me that I am bringing shame to my family and that I will get a 
bad reputation. Additionally the guys think that women are not 
capable, and that they should only be in the kitchen. Even here at 
uni most guys’ mentality is against women. If you have a 
discussion it usually ends with, that’s the way it is because you 
are a woman.”636 
This lack of actual support for getting women into positions of power makes it 
nearly impossible to achieve gender equality. This has led to a lack of gender 
balance in Kurdistan politics; and the introduction of the quota has arguably not 
changed this situation greatly up until now. As remarked by Gareth Stansfield in an 
interview with James Simon, there have been efforts to put women into high 
positions in the KRG and women had always had prominent roles in the parties. 
The government is moving to empower women, but it is questionable whether this 
happens in practice, since women in public life are still just part of the patriarchal 
system.637   
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion. The increase of 
numbers of women in parliament is certainly positive for the outside perception of 
the region. At the same time it has a positive influence within the region, by 
enabling public discussion of enhanced inclusion of women in politics. However it 
is questionable whether the increased numbers have already had an effect on 
women’s personal lives. There is certainly still a long way to go to ensure that the 
inclusion into decision making becomes a reality for women from all parts of 
society. The practical impossibility for many women to become engaged in politics 
arguably hampers a more gender inclusive transformation and development of the 
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Kurdistan region It also hampers individual opportunities for the development of 
women from all levels of society, as will be more fully elaborated in the following 
section: 
2. Searching for Gender Equality  
Assessing women’s participation is not solely a matter of counting how many 
women are working in an environment. Considerations of which women are able to 
participate, the nature of their participation and how much power they have through 
their participation are crucial. The mere inclusion of a higher number of women in 
the political process is not enough to ensure achievements for women’s equality. 
This is supported by the UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index, which shows that the 
mere percentage of seats by women in national parliaments does not correlate with 
the development status of the countries.638 As yet there is often so much 
concentration on getting more women involved that the further steps are 
forgotten.639  
Not all women are feminists and not all women support their fellow female citizens. 
This could also be seen through the interviews conducted. Although the majority of 
women spoke in favour of supporting women in high positions,640 there was a 
considerable number of women, who did not trust their fellow female citizens to 
lead the country and to support development.641 
Furthermore, it has often been seen in the past that female politicians from a 
certain party or group would rather vote for their demands, than build a bridge to 
other women.642 Women cannot be expected to work together and to function as a 
coherent group. Just as with men, women are not a homogenous group and many 
are loyal to their political party and think of their own interests first. While some 
women bring their distinctive style to politics described, by Mary Robinson, the 
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former president of Ireland643, as “less hierarchical and more enabling”644, others 
behave exactly as their male counterparts.645  
Behaviour within a power structure depends upon the unique attitude of the 
woman, as well as her personal development. For instance, Cynthia Enloe asserts 
that women behave differently if they rise from a women’s basis. If women have a 
women’s, or at least a mixed base, such as the previous prime minister of Norway, 
Gro Harlem Brundtland646 or the previous president of Chile, Verónica Michelle 
Bachelet Jeria647, they are more conscious of women’s realities and needs and 
consequently support women more. However if women simply advance through 
patriarchal system they will not make a difference to the country.648 
Hence if gender equality is to be achieved, it is necessary to go further than merely 
include women as a whole in politics. There needs to be a consideration of how 
women can impact the most on the political process. As explained by the Heinrich 
Böll Stiftung, “distinctions like social or ethnic origin, religion, or sexual orientation 
have to be taken seriously in any gender-equitable and feminist politics”, as it will 
only then be possible to build truly emancipatory political strategies.649 Involvement 
should thereby not only be restricted to an elite, or one type of women, but 
available to a spectrum of women, including those who have been directly affected 
by conflict. Additionally a representative for women should be included, as inter alia 
argued by Azza Karam, so that the women’s views are heard as well, and not only 
the opinions of the various parties.650  
Peace-building strategies, including political development strategies, usually do not 
address these challenges and either see women as a single group or take them to 
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be genderless members of other groups.651 This trend could also be observed in 
the Kurdistan Region.  
As explained by Nadje Al-Ali in Iraq today, as in the Kurdistan Region, the 
challenge is not with having women involved in politics, but the challenge rather 
lies with the type of women who are involved and the way in which they are 
involved. She emphasises that the participation of women in every party, whether 
Islamic or communist, is a positive development, but that numbers are not 
everything. Just because women have a say does not mean that they will support 
women’s issues; some women rather hinder than support women’s rights. This can 
be seen in the Iraqi parliament, where the quota system is in place, but the women 
having a seat do not support women’s rights. They are often the wives, daughters 
or sisters of conservative male politicians, who merely support the decisions of 
their male party members but who do not stand up for women. It will still take some 
time for women to insert their own opinions into the political discourse.652  
Also in the Kurdistan Region it is widely criticized in this regard that the women 
who manage to become involved in high-level politics only manage to do so 
through personal relations, such as existing family ties, but not merely through their 
ability. The ruling families and the families which enable their own women to enter 
politics are said to be very similar in education and background. Several amongst 
the people interviewed had the feeling that the lifestyles of their leaders are not 
shared by the local population.653 Consequently the women in parliament are not 
representative of the whole population. It follows that it is still not possible to have a 
truly balanced outcome, and this hampers development for all.   
Women from less advantageous backgrounds often have no possibility of 
accessing high level politics. There are social-economic obstacles hindering the 
involvement of women from lower class backgrounds including lack of adequate 
financial resources, limited access to the profession of choice and the dual burden 
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of professional and domestic obligations.654 Furthermore culturally enshrined 
gender roles are also hindering including the pre-determined roles assigned to 
women and men, the consequential lack of support for women running for 
elections, as well as the lack of confidence in themselves.655 Two men who are 
themselves closely connected to the political system, explained that while 
government supports women to enter high-level politics, it remains the public view 
is that it is better for women to stay at home and take care of the family and the 
children.656 It can thus be seen that government’s inclusion of women into 
parliament has until failed in making it easier for the majority of women to become 
involved in decision making. As a consequence, the population as a whole accepts 
that women in general can be part of the process, but they do not include 
themselves, as they do not identify themselves or the women of their families as 
being of the same standing as women seeking election.  
The men further noted that is still the men who decide which women are suitable 
and what is considered to be a good position for a particular woman. In reality this 
means that they are often supported once they or somebody from their family 
achieves a certain position in society, but not otherwise.657 The government itself 
thereby arguably only supports a certain types of women to participate in high level 
politics. It is usually women who have relatives in high positions or who have 
received a certain type of education, but not women who represent other elements 
of society. This leads to a loss of experiences within the decision makers, as well 
as a lack of balanced representation, and thus identification with all parts of 
society. Consequently the influence female parliamentarians might have on the 
general population, who do not feel connected could be impeded. At the same time 
the limited mind-set and experience in dealing with different social groups, is 
possibly reflected in issues brought before parliament by the MPs, and the 
resulting legislation. Both the issues discussed and the ultimate legislation are 
likely to be different, and more in line with the needs of the population as a whole, 
when considered or enacted by MPs representing all social groups.  
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But a lack of equal representation is not the only problem women in Kurdistan’s 
parliament have to face. Women do not have sufficient power even if they have 
significant numbers, and this leads to even less gender influence on the output of 
the political process. As feminist scholars like Al-Ali or Naggar elaborate, it is not 
enough to have 30 per cent of women in parliament, if they not appointed to other 
official positions. Women should be present at all levels, and gender awareness 
needs to be incorporated at all levels.658  
This was also the view of some of the Kurds surveyed, who explained that it is not 
worth having women in these positions, if this does not bring a certain power with 
it.659 They added that the reasons for having women in positions of power include 
the maintenance of women’s rights, because “women are sometimes better in 
certain things than men are”.660 Further it gives women the possibility to “free 
themselves” from oppression,661 which is all only possible if they also have certain 
power associated with the position.  
In Kurdistan as in many other countries, the increase in numbers of women in 
parliament does not necessarily mean an increase in their power. The feminist 
critics of the current ruling party, as well as, unofficially, some party members, 
maintain that it is a problem with Kurdistan’s politics today that it is the old warriors 
who are still mainly in power and who do not allow others, especially women, to get 
through with their demands. This often prevents the current women establishing 
themselves, and having their voices heard and their ideas implemented.662 
The limited power given to women, can already be seen reflected in the positions 
they have acquired: After the Kurdistan elections in July 2009 only two have the 
roles of heads of a parliamentary bloc: Sozan Khala Shehab for the Kurdistan List 
and Kwestan Muhammad for the “Change” List.663 In addition, women in the KRG 
have never held senior positions such as speaker or secretary. Of the 19 
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permanent parliamentary committees only one, the Women’s Rights Protection 
Committee, is chaired by a woman.664 Finally there is currently only one female 
minister, Ms. Asos Najib Abdullah, who heads the ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs.665 
Women often face a variety of obstacles when it comes to their inclusion in politics. 
Problems continue once they are on top, as they are arguably not given the power 
needed. Such women often only engage with the so called ‘women’s issues’, like 
the family, children or women’s affairs in general, which is, while very important, 
not enough.666 Furthermore, through the prevalence of a “masculine model” in 
politics, women can only be successful if they comply with the standards laid out by 
men. If they are unwilling to do so, reduced party support, in the form of limited 
financial support or limited access to political networks, will often be the result.667 
Women MPs themselves point out that their actions have been extensive, but they 
are fighting a constant battle to have their proposals approved by parliament. As 
explained by Hazha Sleman, the current head of the Women Committee, at the 
2012 parliamentary discussions on the budget, the women committee presented a 
proposal to allocate funding for the High Women Council, as well as for the 
directorate of counter violence against women. In addition, the women urged 
parliament to allocate a budget to fund women who had lost their husbands. 
However the government did not implement any of the proposals.668 
Similar problems emerge with legislation. The female MPs have already been 
successful in promoting legislation such as law against domestic violence, against 
polygamy. However, the problems of women’s under-representation in other 
decision making and the lack of implementation of laws which exist for women, 
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remain. This situation was publicly criticized by Hazham Sleman, when it came to 
the prohibition of ‘women provocation’.669 
In order to fight the problem of being not being heard, Kurdish female MPs met 
with met with delegates from the British parliament to share relevant skills and 
experiences in order to work more effectively for the needs of women in the 
country. They decided to set up a women’s lobby group, aimed at achieving 
greater influence on a number of issues in parliament.670 However, the practical 
implications of this initiative are unclear.  
The lack of women’s power within parliament is well known within the region and 
has already been raised on the agenda, although with limited success. In their 
recommendations, the participants of “The Role of Women in Peace-Building, 
Reconciliation and Accountability in Iraq” conference in Erbil in January 2011, for 
example asked for an upgrade of the State Secretary for Women’s Affairs to a full 
State Ministry. They also requested enhanced inclusion of women within the 
party’s leadership structure; an enhanced involvement of civil society in political 
decision making, and called for the establishment of a ‘National Council for 
Women’, consisting of organisations and ‘leading personalities’. However these 
recommendations have not yet been put into practice.671 
The failure to incorporate true gender equality into the political sphere or society, 
lead to the people having the feeling that women’s inclusion and gender balance 
are unnecessary in the state structure, as well as private decision making, as the 
current experience shows that it does not bring any fundamental change.  
Through the interviews it could be observed that despite all the efforts of female 
MPs to promote women’s issues and to enact legislation for women, there is little 
impact on the general population. 
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Kurdish people, especially from the upper class with close ties to Europe, are 
critical that women do not have enough power. However, many are also of the 
opinion that it is the women’s own fault. They criticize the women for being not 
active enough, for only complaining and for not using all the opportunities. Women 
who had already achieved positions of power were criticized for not trying hard 
enough to move even further forward due to laziness and a fear of confrontation. 
They were further criticised for supporting the unjust system and slowing down the 
process towards equality.672  
Also amongst the Kurds in Kurdistan, there were several who did not consider 
women yet have a true role in politics or decision making, “because they simply 
don’t manage to ‘prove their presence’ in society”.673 Several interviewees were of 
the view that the existing women politicians are simply part of the already existing 
political machinery and would rather wish them to be more independent and to do 
more work on their own, as explained by several interviewees.674 
At the same time it should be conceded that the women, who are currently facing 
the challenges of parliament every day have assumed pioneering roles, which will 
make it possible for other women in the future to follow their paths. However it 
follows from the arguments above that it is not sufficient simply to ‘let them be’, as 
has arguably happened in the Kurdistan Region until now. Rather it is necessary to 
grant the female MPs including those in favour of gender equality certain power but 
also to make them accountable. Only in this way will women’s political 
effectiveness be enhanced.675  
This opinion was supported by a young housewife, who was generally very in 
favour of women’s equality, but explained that there is no equality when working 
with men. Women have no say and therefore they cannot achieve a lot in high 
positions.676  
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In conclusion it can be observed that progress has occurred in the Kurdistan region 
when it comes to women’s participation in parliament. However the impact of this 
development has not yet had an extensive influence on equity and positive conflict 
transformation within society. The implementation of a quota, and the continuous 
growth of the number of female representation in parliament, has been a positive 
move and has certainly given the KRG a platform to shine from. However 
considering the Kurdistan Region’s standing within the international community and 
bearing in mind the current attitudes towards women in the West, the lack of 
inclusive representation, as well as the lack in power granted to the female 
representatives has resulted in their influence for social change being smaller than 
otherwise might have been. While the current developments have made gender 
equality in parliament in principle acceptable, a lot more still needs to be done to 
achieve this aim in practice for society as a whole. While legislation has been 
introduced and Kurdish officials have supported the inclusion of women in 
parliament, the focus has been on numerical balance. True gender equality is far 
from being achieved. 
This is reflected in society, where the majority of people talk in favour of women’s 
involvement, but they do not see themselves as being part of this involvement. 
While there is certainly still a long way to go, the KRG’s efforts to include women at 
all need to be recognized. While women’s aspirations are yet to be fully realised, 
their integration into parliament has been a big step forward and puts the KRG into 
the forefront of governments with a high percentage of women in decision making 
posts. This has certainly had an impact on the region’s development. 
To now go one step further and to ensure that representatives from the whole 
society are involved in politics, there needs to be an environment which gives the 
general population the opportunity to participate.677 Work has to be done inside 
and outside of parliament to make it more accessible and a more positive place for 
women to have impact and for gender equality to flourish. This will enhance the 
impact of parliamentary institutions on society as a whole. To ensure that politics 
becomes gender inclusive, other aspects of life have to become gender inclusive 
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as well, and accessible for all, such as education and the economy.678 This will be 
discussed later in the thesis.  
The political landscape of a country or region is not only influenced by high ranking 
officials. Other forces, such as grassroots activism within the region or international 
policy making can play a decisive role in the forming of a state. This ‘other political 
activism’ will be subject of the following subchapter.  
C. Other Political Activism  
 “We cannot achieve democracy and lasting peace in the world unless women 
achieve the same opportunities as men to influence developments at all levels of 
society”.679 (Thorbjom Jagland, Nobel Peace Prize Committee Chairmain, 2011) 
While official peace building and high level politics have an important role to play in 
the development of a country or region, positive conflict transformation cannot be 
achieved by officials alone. As explained by several of the interviewees “every 
force is needed in order to build up a country”, including the people themselves. 
People can be the driving force in initiating political developments and without the 
population at large, no development initiated by the officials can be brought to 
fruition. As explained by a woman NGO worker: 
“Of course also the people were a driving force. The people really 
support the security forces. The people hold together now. There 
are also attempts of suicide bombings in Kurdistan, but they 
could be prevented, because of the people.”680  
Just as with the security situation, it is the people who influence which laws will be 
passed, ensure that laws will be observed and for example that equality is put into 
practice. It is at this “local level” that women come most often into play, who, 
through their unique position in society and during the time of armed conflict, have 
knowledge, which can and should be used by all stakeholders, who aim at 
supporting the building of peace in the region. 
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As the previous chapters showed, women, especially from lower classes and less 
advantaged families, only seldom have access to formal peace politics. They are 
typically left out of the official peace negotiations and the formal work of the 
reconstruction of society and the value of their knowledge and experience is not 
recognised. Only a very limited number of women have managed to participate in 
formal peace talks and in the signing of peace accords681 and equality between 
men and women is far from achieved. However this does not mean that women 
remain inactive. They often work for peace at the grassroots level. Their activities 
can be in social groups, religious groups and the community in general. It is in 
these groups that women, as well as men, raise their voices, work for democracy 
and thereby support the population’s political influence on the developments, which 
will impact on their lives.682  
All around the world there are women who stand up for themselves, for fellow 
women and for peace in their country, even in the most dangerous of 
circumstances. Women fight for their laws683 and for their recognition684, in order to 
improve the situation for themselves, their families and their whole country. 
Additionally women participate in wars, revolutions, protests, rebellions, social 
change and peace building685 and organize groups and networks to fight 
militarization, prevent violence conflicts and to achieve sustainable peace.686 
Examples of their fighting for equality as well as peace throughout the world are 
countless. 
For instance, during the Chechnyan war, the Russian Committee of Soldiers’ 
Mothers demanded that their sons be sent back home and Yugoslav women 
protested in front of the National Army barracks in 1991 so that their sons be 
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brought back home.687 In 2010, 20.000 women and men from the Congo and other 
countries, peacefully marched against war and gender violence.688 Sudanese 
women marched through their town naked to draw attention to the kidnapping of 
their children for use as soldiers.689 Also in Sri Lanka women organized themselves 
during conflict to protest the killings and disappearances of their sons.690 In 
Afghanistan youth groups and women’s groups organize marches against street 
harassment.691 The ‘Women in White’ in Liberia organized non-violent protests for 
peace by standing on a field for weeks to remind people of the importance of 
change and by making themselves heard by calling for a sex strike.692 During the 
uprising in Libya women helped to smuggle ammunition for the revolutionary 
forces.693 Women in Israel and Palestine are working for peace through 
organisations such as the Jerusalem Link, Bat Shalom or the Women in Black.694 
Women of Venezuela and Iran are striving toward a fundamental grassroots-driven 
transformation of politics and power in their countries.695 And during the uprising in 
Egypt it was women, as well as men, who organized protests via Facebook, who 
camped on Tahrir Square and who fought the police696 and it was the women who 
went on the streets after pictures were released of a woman having her clothes 
ripped off and being kicked by soldiers while lying on the ground.  
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Furthermore there have been a number of women who sacrificed a part or the 
whole of their lives to work for their country or for their fellow women. Tawakkul 
Karman left the comfort of her home to stand up for a change in Yemen and to give 
confidence to other women and young people to do the same.697 Chanu Sharmila, 
“the Iron Lady of Manipur” (India), has been in police custody in a hospital room for 
over ten years, being force-fed via nasal tubes as part of her act of civil 
disobedience to draw attention to an on-going conflict in India.698 Leymah Gbowee 
made it her life’s mission to make Liberia a better place and to help women 
overcome their traumas.699 Further, politicians like Aung San Suu Kyi and Benazir 
Bhutto gave their life, or part of their life, to stand up for their people. 
The countless acts of women’s peace activism were recently recognized with the 
awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2011 to three women rights activists for their 
work for women’s rights, their safety and their full participation surrounding conflict 
situations: Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Leymah Gabowee, and Tawakul Karman. In 
explaining the reasons for their choice the Nobel Prize Committee stated that it 
hopes that the prize will help end the discrimination against women.700 
It can thereby be seen that the peace movement and the feminist movement are 
often intertwined, with many women not only being fighters for peace, but also 
supporters of the wider women’s movements and of equality with men.701 
Through their various actions, women have achieved enhanced gender equality. 
Only in 2010, the UN General Assembly established UN Women, the UN Entity for 
Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, which is a superagency 
headed by an Under Secretary General. Several Middle Eastern countries such as 
Libya, Palestine, Tunisia and Yemen have changed their national laws to grant 
women equal treatment under the law.702 In 2011 the citizens of Morocco 
accomplished after months of protesting succeeded in having their constitution 
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reformed. Reforms included reinforcing women’s equality to men under the 
constitution. Through protests in Egypt, the courts banned virginity tests carried out 
by the army on women. In addition, women have achieved increased political 
participation, with quotas in parliament having been put into place in about 100 
countries of the world.703 And these were only some of the victories achieved for 
women and by women. 
These worldwide developments have also taken place in the Kurdistan region. 
Over the previous decades women have engaged in grassroots activism 
supporting peace and women’s rights. Despite many challenge, they have 
succeeded in enhancing gender equality to a certain extent.  
The following section presents a short overview of the historical movements by 
women in the Kurdistan region as well as discussing current actions on the ground. 
The aim is to address the question of how these movements for equality influence 
social development and whether they have the potential to progress positive 
conflict transformation, and gender equality at all levels. 
1. The Kurdistan’s Women’s Movement – A Historical 
Abstract 
"Women are not just victims of violence. They are often the driving force for 
peace."704 
Women’s movements in the Kurdish regions have their origins in the early 20th 
century. In 1913 the Women’s World (Kadinlar Dunyast), a journal to promote the 
equal status of men and women, was published and in 1919 the first Kurdish 
women’s organisation, The Society for the Advancement of Kurdish Women (Kurd 
kadinalri Teali Cemiyeti) was established in Istanbul.705  
Early in the history of their movement, women activists used the struggle for their 
ethnic group as a basis to enhance not only the rights of the general population, 
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but also their own. In Kurdistan, as in other similar regions, the women’s movement 
was closely interwoven with the nationalist movement throughout its history. 
Nationalism and the fight for autonomy, although not always unproblematic, have 
provided many women with a platform to pursue a more public role.706 The struggle 
as such was two-fold: on the one hand against the old social, economic and 
religious order and on the other hand against the oppression by European and 
other colonialists.707 During the 1940s and 50s women were actively involved in the 
struggle for more rights as part of the revolutionary movement against the British 
influence as well as against the Iraqi monarchy. They were involved in 
humanitarian assistance, welfare work and also participated in strikes, 
demonstrations, and underground political activism, from all sides of the political 
spectrum.708 Women, especially from the upper-class, were active in women’s 
branches of charitable organisations, such as the Child Protection Society, or the 
Red Crescent Society.709  
More and more women’s organisations were created throughout the region during 
the second half of the 20th century, often associated with political parties. For 
example the League of the Defence of Iraqi Women’s Rights (Rabitat al-difa’ ‘an 
huqu al-mora’)710, was founded in the early 1950s by female members of the Iraqi 
Communist Party. The League gained wide influence and was arguably most 
influential in changing women’s legal rights, including for example contributing to 
the passing of the unified personal status code in 1959.711 In addition the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party, the Daawa party and the Ba’ath Party founded different 
women’s organisations. However all of them, except for the General Union of Iraqi 
Women, established by the Ba’ath party, fell prey to the conflict.712 As a 
consequence, it was virtually impossible for years to achieve any improvements, 
which lay outside the will of the ruling party.  
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When it was no longer possible to continue the fight from inside, other ways had to 
be sought. As a result of the great flows of refugees, who settled in other countries 
around the world, as well as the inability to operate effectively within the region, the 
Kurdish women’s and peace movement continued the struggle outside their 
territory. Several organisations including the Kurdish Human Rights Watch and the 
Kurdish Women’s Association, were first set up in America, as in this case, or 
Europe, to fight for Kurdish rights from outside.713 The above-mentioned 
organisations are now present in Kurdistan as well. 
The establishment of the safe haven in the North of Iraq enabled women’s groups 
and organisations to mushroom out of the region after 1991. The safe haven once 
again enabled Kurdish women, who had been active in political parties for a long 
time, to increase their involvement through participation in women’s organisations, 
women’s unions, and groups not affiliated to political parties.714 The civil society 
was once more allowed to become involved in party politics and to establish civil 
society associations. As a consequence dozens of organisations working actively 
for women in the region began appearing throughout Iraq’s North during the 1990s. 
With money from the Oil-for-Food Programme for example about 400 centres were 
established for women. Classes were held teaching them how to read and write, as 
well as training workshops, etc.715 The NGOs and women’s organisations provided 
opportunities for women not only to acquire new skills but also to step out of their 
traditional roles and to take position on political issues.716 
While it was the hope of activists that women’s rights would come to the fore once 
the Kurdistan Region established its own government, this did not entirely 
happen.717 In 1993 for example, several women’s organisations presented a 
petition to parliament with over 30,000 signatures, demanding an improvement in 
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the legal status of women. However the proposal never made it through to 
parliament, as the factions in power refused to have it discussed.718 
While the influence of the Ba’ath party had disappeared, new political and societal 
forces influenced the independent work of the women activists. Before the first 
elections in May 1992, a women-only committee was established and 
commissioned with working on family law and drafting alternative legislation. The 
committee consisted of women from all the main political parties in Kurdistan, 
including the KDP, PUK, the Communist Party, the Democratic Independent Party 
of Kurdistan, and the People’s Party of Kurdistan, and received wide public 
support. Nevertheless the proposal failed and the old law remained. The new 
powers in the region tried to recreate a society of tribalism, in which women’s 
initiatives were regarded with suspicion719 and women’s issues were marginalized 
during the phase of reconstruction. Other issues, such as federalism or the 
question of oil were always more important.  
Despite these challenges, women nevertheless managed to achieve certain power 
and to contribute to progress in gender equality. Local Kurdish women’s rights 
movements lobbied successfully for the reintroduction of women’s rights in the 
legislature and raised the awareness of women’s rights and gender issues in 
general. 720 
Apart from becoming more active in the struggle for women’s rights, Kurdish 
women also actively encouraged a peace movement to stop civil war from erupting 
between the KDP and the PUK in 1994.721 On May 23, 1994, Kurdish women 
organized a Peace March from Sulaimanyia city to the Kurdish parliament in Erbil 
to ask the political leaders to end their conflict. They called themselves 
representatives of all the mothers, wives and sisters of the men being killed and 
the representatives of those desiring freedom, as well as representatives of half of 
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society. They begged the politicians to stop the hatred and the selfishness and 
finally end the killing.722  
In the Kurdistan region, as with other countries around the world individual women 
took the fight for their people into the public domain. This was difficult and also 
dangerous during the war. Nevertheless there were still some women who stood 
up for their beliefs, despite the danger. One young woman who lost her life in her 
fight for Kurdistan and who is still a martyr among many Kurds is Leyla Qasim. 
Others included Nesreen Berwari who was the minister of public works in the 
provisional Iraqi government as well as the minister of reconstruction and 
development for the Kurdistan Regional Government, Songul Chapouk, who 
represented the Turkoman population on the Iraqi Governing Council and who 
founded the Iraqi Women’s Organisation in Kirkuk, which trains women in 
computer skills, literacy and agriculture;723 and Ala Talabani, who was a former 
vice president of the Kurdistan Women’s Union and who returned to Iraq in 2003 to 
cofound Women for a Free Iraq and the Iraq Women’s High Council724 and many 
more. 
Today women continue to be very active in the struggle against violence and for 
equality. After the demonstrations in Sulaimaniya in 2011 as part of the Arab 
Spring and the consequent violent response by the government, women activists 
joined together and created the ‘Sulaimaniya’s Women’s Group’ to demand an end 
to the violence and a dialogue between the parties. Together with other protesting 
groups, they put pressure on the parties to dialogue and build peace in the 
region.725 Women have also been active in their struggle for enhanced equality. In 
2008 for example women activists actively worked for a unified law against 
polygamy.726 In addition there was a week-long campaign to raise awareness on 
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violence perpetrated against women, to speak for equality and to highlight the 
government’s commitment to women’s rights.727  
It can be observed that throughout the previous century Kurdistan’s women have 
been very active in standing up for themselves as well as their region. How this has 
influenced women’s actions today and what consequences these actions have for 
the development of the region, as well as for the development of gender equality 
within society will be subject of the following section: 
2. Grassroots Political Activism Today 
a) The Possibilities 
After long years of suppression, the Kurdistan Region and its population today 
have more autonomy than ever before. The Kurdistan Parliament is free to make 
its own laws in all areas, which are not exclusive to the federal government, 
including laws on the rights of women.728 However, it is not only the officials who 
have more freedom to make changes, but also the people at large who now have 
the right to make themselves heard and to influence the dealings of their region.  
As Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates: 
“Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without 
any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 (namely without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status) and without unreasonable 
restrictions:  
a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives.” 
The Iraqi Constitution supports this right by stating in Article 20 that 
“Iraqi citizens, men and women, shall have the right to participate 
in public affair […].” 
While the Kurdistan Region Draft Constitution does not explicitly guarantee the 
right of the population to take part in the conduct of public affairs, it provides the 
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people with the right to freedom of expression (Article 18), the right “to submit a 
complaint or petition with the authorities of the Region, who may not refuse to 
accept it” (Article 21). Further, it guarantees the people the right to “form and to 
freely join professional associations, unions, organisations and federations”. 
(Article 26) 
Through legislation, people have the right to participate in the country’s affairs, to 
speak up for any issue, including for example women’s involvement and equality. It 
consequently rests upon the people to have their voices heard; to use the new 
freedom; to speak up for change to long standing laws and traditions which 
prejudice sections of the population; and to express their ideas for the future 
development of the region. 
b) The Actions 
Many women in Kurdistan today use the above-mentioned rights and are actively 
involved in their region’s affairs, by supporting civil society projects and by 
campaigning for the promotion of peace, as well as equality. They are involved in 
different local and international NGOs and women’s rights organisations, such as 
those which have mushroomed in Northern Iraq since the end of armed conflict.729 
These organisations are involved in a broad range of activities, such as charity 
work, the protection of human rights, the strengthening women’s political rights and 
political understanding as well as working on commercial projects.730 They also 
deal with aspects of women’s lives such as rights advocacy, legal literacy, income 
generation, health and education and thereby provide an important basis for 
articulating and dealing with women’s needs and play a part in the enhancement of 
equality and in influencing the transformation process. 
The specific actions of women as part of different political actions was described by 
one of the interviewees as follows:  
“Officially only men take part in peace building, but women work 
for women, but quietly, in the background. There are many 
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foreign and local organisations in Kurdistan today, which are 
nearly only lead by women. Individual women did a lot. The wife 
of Talabani for example campaigned a lot for women.” She 
continued that “since the 1990s women work together a lot, but it 
is still a problem that many women are not brave enough to take 
a step forward. It is a big problem that the honour of the family is 
so important and that it is so amazingly important to not bring 
shame to the family. The women have to assert themselves 
more. As a start, especially in the family.”731 
Despite the critical tone from certain parts of the population, it is clear that women 
are once more very active at the grassroots level. This is also reflected in the 
actions of many Kurdish NGOs and women’s organisations. The various 
organisations have made a great effort in trying to reform masculinity and gender 
relations and to contribute to state-building through making themselves and their 
needs heard in the political arena.732 Their actions have been wide ranging: 
Civil society and women’s rights groups have been very active in contributing to the 
drafting of the regional constitution. According to WomensNews, hundreds of 
documents, lists and letters were collected from women’s organisations who have 
sent in their suggestions from 2005. In this way they tried to increase their 
influence on the constitutional committee, only one member of which was a 
woman, Pakhshan Zangana, from the Communist Party.733  
Actions by NGOs supporting women’s rights also included the drafting of a ‘Charter 
for the Rights and Freedoms of Women in the Kurdish Regions and Diaspora’ by 
the Kurdish Human Rights Project and Kurdish Women’s Project after years of 
consultations with women across the region. The Charter was presented to the 
Kurdish National Assembly and was followed up with a training manual to facilitate 
its implementation at grassroots level 734.735  
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In addition women’s organisations drafted a proposal of a bill of rights for women, 
as presented by the Khatuzeen Center for Women's issues. This includes the 
elimination of discrimination against women, equality before the law, the 
eradication of all forms of violence against women, the elimination of harmful 
practices, political rights and the right to education.736 While unlikely to pass in the 
near future, the proposed bill of rights was another way for women to express 
themselves and make their views public.737 Women activists are currently working 
to enhance women’s involvement in political decision making, by calling for 
qualified women to be offered high positions.738 
In the long run the various efforts have borne fruit. On June 21, 2011 parliament 
approved the Family Violence Bill, which bans female genital mutilation; 
criminalizes violence against women; criminalizes forced and child marriage as 
well as the psychological abuse of girls and women and makes it easier for alleged 
victims to press charges.739  
In August 2011 the KRG passed the Anti-Domestic Violence Law, in an effort to 
deal with the issue of violence against women. This was the first law of its kind in 
Iraq. It defines domestic violence as “any act, word or threat against members of a 
family that might lead to physical, psychological or sexual damage and violation of 
rights and freedoms.” The law also prohibited female circumcision, the prevention 
of female education, forced marriage, and corporal punishment against children. A 
special anti-domestic violence court has already started its work, although this still 
needs to be enhanced. According to Pakhshan Zangana, Secretary General of the 
Supreme Council of Women's Affairs, "if the law is dealt with consciously, then it 
will bring peace to families and help strengthen social relationships in society."740 
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Furthermore the Kurdish parliament has banned forced marriage and marriage for 
minors and has restricted polygamy. Legislation also does not allow for the 
sentence for a conviction of honour killing to be reduced.741 The Draft Constitution 
of Kurdistan stipulates that discrimination, as well as violence and abuse are also 
prohibited in the family, and that the government shall provide shelter to protect 
women “who have lost family security because of social reasons.”742  
Finally, according to Judge Mohammad Amin Al-Shirfani and Kurdish MP Karim 
Bahri Bradoust, it was due to the continuous demands by different women’s 
groups, who requested amendments of the laws for women’s rights, such as the 
restriction of polygamy, that the personal status law was amended by the Kurdistan 
parliament in favour of women’s rights.743 
Despite these successes, implementation of the provisions is not consistent and 
women are still suffering from honour crimes and other forms of discrimination.744 
Even though the simple existence of the law can be seen as a success, it was not 
widely promoted by the officials to the public out of fear of a confrontation with 
conservative forces. As a consequence the public perception of violence against 
women is not changing as quickly as it might.745 The legislative changes, while 
absolutely vital for future development of the legislations, as well as development 
of the region as a whole, have until now not had the direct effect on many women’s 
lives, as they are still not often lived in practice and especially women from lower 
classes of society are not aware of the legislations. As shown by the interviews, 
women especially from lower classes of society are generally not aware of the 
legislation. Even if they were aware, many women would not use their rights in 
practice, so as to not put shame on their families. 
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In order to enhance the implementation of this legislation and to promote further 
ideas, women activists at the grassroots level are actively speaking out about legal 
concerns, and are supporting change in society more directly. 
They go on the street to publicly campaign for the equality of women, to let the 
public hear their voices and they work to enhance the women’s knowledge of their 
rights,746 as it happened for example on 8 March 2013, on International Women’s 
Day.747 Support services are provided for misused women to cope with trauma, by, 
for instance, the Women’s Union of Kurdistan, the Independent Women’s 
Organisation and the Women’s Shelter Center in Sulaimaniya,748 and women’s 
shelters are provided to give women the possibility to seek refuge, if their families 
suspect them of having relationships outside of marriage, which can put their lives 
in danger.749 NGOs work to prevent future violence against women, for example by 
campaigning against female genital mutilation (FGM) and by talking to people from 
different villages and explaining to them the dangers of FGM, as done by “Wadi”.750 
Other actions include the caring for women inmates, who have been imprisoned for 
prostitution or adultery, to work on perspectives for the future, and to help the 
women to return to their families, as done by Khanzad. In addition, women’s 
centers have been created for example in Halabja, Kifri and Biara, where women 
are given the opportunities to attend classes, to inform themselves of their rights, to 
attend computer, sewing or hair dressing courses and to visit the libraries. In 
Halabja the first coffee house for women was created.751 And this is only a small 
fraction of the actions taken. 
These targeted initiatives all have the potential to empower the population, to 
support exchange of knowledge and to push forward the movement towards 
equality. However their practical impacts on women’s personal development and 
on gender equality within the family is disputed by the people themselves. Opinions 
                                                            
746 Ariz Askari and Lawen Sagerma, “Injustices have been committed” soma, An Iraqi‐Kurdish Digest 49 
(2008): 1. 
747 Christian Peacemaker Teams, Kurdish Activists’ Observations, 6. 
748 Mojab, “Kurdish Women in the Zone of Genocide and Gendercide,” 24. 
749 Naggar, “Women’s Rights in Iraqi Kurdistan”. 
750 Abdulrahman and Vormann, “ Iraqi Kurdistan: Free yourself from FGM”.  
751 WADI, “Drei erfolgreich geführte Frauenzentren in Halabja, Kifri und Biara“ http://www.wadi‐
online.de/index.php?opƟon=com_content&view=arƟcle&id=79&Itemid=16 (Accessed on 16.11.11) 
  
Page | 160  
 
are very dependent on personal experience. While some interviewees received 
new employment or training opportunities through the NGOs and feel ‘empowered’, 
others are ignorant of the different initiatives. Some feel that the NGOs are not 
helping them, but only following their own agendas and that nothing is changing 
within the families.752 
Nevertheless arguably much has already been achieved through these efforts. The 
grassroots activists have managed to change legislation, to put sensitive issues, 
such as FGM and honour killings, on the public agenda, and to provide local 
women with the opportunity to enhance their skills and knowledge. However the 
fight to make the peoples voices heard and to enhance gender inclusion in the 
region is not an easy one. Challenges are being encountered which come from 
outside, as well as from inside the region, which hamper the success of some of 
the grassroots movements.  
The activists have had to fight forces from all directions, including tribal leaders, 
religious clerics, conservative attitudes in society, and even Parliament753 in order 
to be able to live the rights, which are in theory already theirs. This is especially so 
for gender equality. 
In Iraqi Kurdistan the issue of true democracy, in the sense of full public 
participation, is a highly disputed. While Kurdistan officials, as well as politicians 
from outside have long declared Kurdistan to have the most democratic system in 
the region, this has been contested by many academics and political activists. 
They maintain that the power sharing between the KDP and the PUK does not give 
the people opportunity for real choice in open elections. Genuine competition does 
not exist, as opposition parties or independent candidates have reported threats 
and intimidation754 and voices of opposition in the population are still not accepted. 
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It is said that the KRG, counter to its own public statements, is taking measures 
against any organisation or person who works against the parties’ interest. Despite 
the official rhetoric, namely that the government is fighting for women’s rights and 
is supporting women in the region the reality is often different. Women and 
women’s organisations have been continuously suppressed and harassed by the 
government, if they did not work in the way preferred by the officials. For example, 
the Independent Women’s Organisation (IWO) in Sulaimaniya, had to close down 
in 2000, because of pressure from the government.755 Even though this situation 
has arguably improved today, the old values have not yet been eradicated. For 
instance, in 2006, when thousands of people demonstrated in Sulaymania to 
express their unhappiness about the current lack of energy and jobs, the women’s 
organisations which linked themselves to the demonstrators had their funding cut. 
Additionally many women’s activists are still harassed if they speak against the 
government.756 
The consequent ambivalent progress towards women’s political activity, as well as 
the influence of the government on the women themselves and the NGOs, were 
described by an interviewee, who was herself very active in a political women’s 
organisations, but has lived in Europe for the majority of her life, as follows: 
 “Women rather fight for peace than men. Men only want revenge 
and more violence. That is not good for Iraq. Today the old 
fighters dominate the country: the Barzanis, the Talabanis… This 
is not good for the country. Everything is really politicised. There 
is nothing like real NGOs. In Kurdistan the women have been 
integrated since the 70s. There are many women at university, 
they have the right to vote and they have access to different 
institutions. But there is no true recognition of women and there is 
no equality. In the previous elections for example not even the 
women voted for the other women. The women are not trusted. 
Without the quota there would not be any women in parliament. 
But the women managed to achieve legal reforms, like for 
example the family law. Because of that men are not guardians of 
the women legally anymore. There are also men who fight for 
                                                            
755 Al‐Ali, Iraqi Women, 207. 
756 Dr. Nadje Al‐Ali in Simon, “Kurdistan, Women in Iraq”. 
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women’s rights. But there are still so many counter movements, 
especially from the Islamists.”757 
Taking the above allegation that “there is nothing like real NGOs” as a starting 
point, it is clear from various interest groups, especially scholars who are affiliated 
with the west, that the role of NGOs and of other non-governmental activities in 
Kurdistan and their role in the transformation of conflict are not seen wholly 
positive. NGOs and women’s organisations, as with other organisations, are said to 
be corrupted or to not have the desired influence. While the local actions can be 
seen as a development of the civil society and a sign of the emergence of true 
democracy, it can also be interpreted as a new form of imperialism, dependent on 
the NGO’s ideology, which might be linked to forces in the region or to their 
funding.758 
In Kurdistan today, three different movements have developed on the ground: the 
“local”, the “international” and the “party affiliated”.  
The number and names of civil society organisations are countless. They include 
for example the Kurdish Women’s Rights Watch (KWRW), which supports and 
promotes women’s rights in the Kurdish community759, the People’s Development 
Association (PDA), which realizes projects concerning human rights760, the Kurdish 
Human Rights Watch (KHRW), which inter alia focuses on the equal participation 
of Iraqi women in the new democracy761, Wadi which supports programmes and 
projects for self-help and for the empowerment of human and women’s rights762, 
and WEO, the Women Empowerment Organisation, which aims to enhance 
women’s political, social, economic and cultural participation.763 Other 
organisations include Asuda, an organisation for combating violence against 
women, the Rewan Women’s Centre, the Al-Amal, Breeze of Hope Organisation, 
                                                            
757 Interview CJ, Vienna on 28/10/2012 
758 Islah Jad, “The NGO‐isation of Arab Women’s Movements” IDS Bulletin 35(4) (2004): 34. 
759 Kurdish Women’s Rights Watch, front page, http://www.kwrw.org/ (Accessed on 16.11.11) 
760 People’s Development Association, front page, http://www.xelik.org/En/Default.aspx (Accessed on 
16.11.11) 
761 Kurdish Human Rights Watch, “About us”, hƩp://www.khrw.org/?page_id=2 (Accessed on 16.11.11) 
762 WADI, front page, http://www.wadi‐online.de/ (Accessed on 16.11.11) 
763 Women Empowerment Organisation, “WEO Profile”, http://www.weoiraq.org/ (Accessed on 17.10.2012)  
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and the National Center for Gender Research in Sulaimaniya,764 just to name a 
few. Further, the PUK, as well as the KDP, have their own women’s unions, which 
they support. The unions organize seminars and training programs, have issued 
their own newspapers, and are supporting women victims and encouraging women 
to join politics 765.766 While they all try to work for civil society’s inclusion in decision 
making and the enhancement of equality in their own way, they are all criticized for 
working against their people and the development of equality, for different reasons.  
For instance the group of women’s organisations founded by one of the political 
parties is heavily critiqued for being influenced from outside. Such NGOs are said 
to merely support the party policies and to find excuses for work not being done.767  
In addition, the close relationship of many women’s organisations with the political 
parties is criticized of not being consistent and inclusive. The relationship might 
backfire on the women one day, as political protests and growing dissent in Iraqi 
Kurdistan slowly starts undermining the KRG. To the extent that they ally 
themselves with the government, they risk being linked to a corrupt regime, which 
will make it impossible for them to continue their work.768 It is also claimed that the 
strong political affiliations of many women’s rights activists with the two main 
political parties result in further inequality, as women could achieve high positions 
in women’s rights organisations because of their membership of a specific party 
and not because of their abilities.769 At the same time Kurdish women activists who 
are linked to a main political party still view others with suspicion resulting in a 
separation of women who would otherwise fight for the same cause.770  
Nevertheless their work should not wholly be condemned. At the end of the day the 
aim of grassroots organisations is to work for the whole population. Affiliated 
organisations can most directly influence the political parties, because they rather 
listen to them than to others. While their work is appreciated by many, such 
                                                            
764 Al‐Ali and PraƩ, “Between NaƟonalism and Women’s Rights,” 340. 
765 KDP, “Kurdistan Women Union” http://www.kdp.se/?do=women (Accessed on 15.10.2012)  
766 Alsayid, Combating Physical Violence Against Women in Iraqi Kurdistan, 31. 
767 Ibid. 
768 Al‐Ali and PraƩ, “Between NaƟonalism and Women’s Rights,” 352. 
769 Kreutzer, Schmidinger (Hg.), Irak, Von der Republik der Angst zur bürgerlichen Demokratie?, 217. 
770 Al‐Ali and PraƩ, “Between NaƟonalism and Women’s Rights,” 344. 
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organisations are criticized by independent women’s activists for not pushing the 
boundaries, when it comes to social change. The ones which are truly pushing the 
boundaries are independent organisations, but their influence is limited as they do 
not receive funding. 
The influence of organisations depends very much on the money available to them, 
as well as on any political support. For this reason, civil society organisations, 
which are funded by or affiliated with an international organisation or a local or 
foreign government, have many more resources and hence power than the others. 
It follows that, while some of the small local organisations are trying very hard, their 
influence is often limited, especially at a national level. They do not have the 
funding and the capacity to realize large scale projects or to be heard by policy 
makers. In addition, their work is often not well known to the population and some 
are criticized by the people, especially when it comes to sensitive issues, such as 
FGM, because they are thought to “work as Kurds against the Kurds”.771 
Nevertheless they play a vital role, as they originate from the people themselves, 
and their work can serve as an opportunity and a role model for other citizens to 
get involved. While they might be criticized for their work in specific areas or the 
way they are conducting their work, they cannot be criticized for being influenced 
from outside or wanting to imperialize. 
In comparison with local organisations, the international institutions as well as 
institutions from outside the country are often considered to have a high status. 
Work of the international NGOs is often positively received by the population and it 
is considered prestigious to work for one of these NGOs.  
The international bodies have funds and are in the best position to remain 
independent of the local regime. However, as seen by some, there is a problem of 
latent imperialism. They are criticized for prioritising their own agendas ahead of 
the will of the people. 
                                                            
771 Interview BC, Erbil on 25/06/2012 
  
Page | 165  
 
Organisations such as the Iraqi Women’s Democracy Initiative,772 and the Kurdish 
Human Rights Watch,773 today organize programmes and workshops to build the 
capacity of Iraqi women in media skills, leadership, political participation, 
constitutional rights etc. With funding from the US, the START Social Development 
Organisation project was launched to empower women and enhance their skills,774 
through the International Republican Institute (IRI), a taskforce on discrimination 
against women, as well as to enhance the democratic process in the Kurdistan 
Region and the whole of Iraq.775 There is a view that these democratisation 
initiatives, which are mainly funded from outside create a new type of imperialism. 
Certain ideas are promoted among those participating, while at the same time 
marginalizing the women’s movements which come from within the country.776 
Movements which do not conform with the picture of the ‘correct’ democratization 
process are excluded.777 Furthermore there has been criticism that it is always the 
same women who are supported, who appear at conferences and in the media and 
who act as representatives outside the country778.779 However, they are not 
representative of the majority of women in the region.780 
Further criticism occurs when external funding leads to debates about authenticity 
and independence of the NOGs. The accusation of imposed imperialism and 
Westernization seems valid to a certain degree when considering the record. For 
example, it was announced in 2004 that the US would provide a $10 million grant 
to NGOs for a “Women’s Democracy Initiative”. These grants were the distributed 
among seven, US chosen and US-based, organisations, including Kurdish Human 
                                                            
772 Iraqi Women’s Democracy IniƟaƟve, “Fact Sheet, Women’s issues” (30 April 2010) 
hƩp://www.state.gov/s/gwi/rls/other/2010/141080.htm (Accessed on 27.2.2012) 
773 Kurdish Human Rights Watch, “Women’s’ Programs” hƩp://www.khrw.org/?page_id=90 (Accessed on 
25.2.2012) 
774 KRG, “START Social Development OrganisaƟon concludes pilot women's skills programme” (11.10.2012) 
http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=02010100&rnr=223&anr=45529 (Accessed on 
15.10.2012) 
775 International Republican Institute, “Taskforce on Discrimination Against Women Launched in Iraq” 
(27.01.2012) http://www.iri.org/news‐events‐press‐center/news/taskforce‐discrimination‐against‐women‐
launched‐iraq (Accessed on 17.10.2012) 
776 Nadeen El‐Kassem, “The pitfalls of a ‘democracy promotion’ project for women of Iraq” International 
Journal of Lifelong Education 27(2) (2008): 138. 
777 Ibid.p.139 
778 These include Dr. Maha Alattar, Tamara Quinn and Zakia Hakki 
779 El‐Kassem, “The piƞalls of a ‘democracy promoƟon’ project for women of Iraq,” 140. 
780 Ibid.p.144 
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Rights Watch.781 Through these grants the beneficiaries became far more powerful 
than many other women’s organizations, while staying loyal to the granting bodies. 
However, not only NGOs from other countries, but also the Kurdish people 
themselves are responsible for Western trends in Kurdish affairs. Millions of Kurds 
have lived in Western societies in exile and on returning to Kurdistan bring with 
them the values acquired during their time in exile. Those returning are often very 
eager to contribute to regional developments and have often substantial means to 
do so, which is welcomed by the public officials.782 However during their exile, their 
way of thinking and acting has changed. The experiences of the people returning 
can be used positively, by taking the best values of both cultures and unifying 
them.783 Nevertheless, people from the diaspora sometimes evoke resentment 
which might have negative consequences for local movements.784 Often women, 
and men, returning from exile, are not warmly welcomed, because they are 
perceived as having left the country at a time of suffering, of being ill informed of 
the realities within the country,785 and, as with the international NGOs, of wishing to 
imperialize. 
Many of the initiatives taken for women, while very positive, are certainly influenced 
by Western thought. While this pervasive Western influence is seen as negative by 
those who believe that the organisations are trying to impose Western values and 
to eradicate the local culture, it is welcomed by others. According to Nadje Al-Ali 
pressure from outside helps to push governments, in this case the Kurdish 
government, in a positive direction for women’s rights.786 
In order to deflate such criticism, and to support lasting development, it is important 
that women’s organizations especially, are built up by the locals themselves 
                                                            
781 Al‐Ali and Pratt, “Women’s organizing and the conflict in Iraq since 2003,” 77. 
782 Alasor Roni, Ararat News and Publishing, “Minister Falah Mustafa: Kurdish Diaspora is an important asset 
for our future” (15.10.2012) 
hƩp://www.krg.org/arƟcles/detail.asp?smap=02010200&lngnr=12&rnr=73&anr=45562 (Accessed on 
15.10.2012) 
783 Mustafa Gundogdu in Simon, “Kurdistan, Women in Iraq”. 
784 Al‐Ali, “ReconstrucƟng Gender,” 743. 
Interview AO, Sulaimaniya on 13/05/2012 
785 Al‐Ali and Pratt, “Women in Iraq,” 21. 
786 Simon, “Kurdistan, Women in Iraq”. 
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without mirroring Western counterpart organizations. At the same time it is vital that 
the antipathy against the West, or indeed against any power, is not be used to 
prevent women from establishing themselves.787 
One organisation which is arguably capable of promoting gender equality at the 
grassroots level as well as at the very top, without being linked to a particular 
regime, is the UN: 
The UN, as the representative of the international community, and a neutral party, 
has the ability and capacity to support positive conflict transformation. However 
despite some initiatives, it is criticized for not doing enough.  
The UN is actively involved in the region. The United Nations Assistance Mission 
for Iraq (UNAMI), which was established on 14 August 2003,788 works in all the 
eighteen governorates of Iraq through such entities as the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women 
(UN WOMEN), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)789. These bodies 
undertook the task of supporting free elections in Iraq, of assisting the drafting of 
the constitution, of advising the Iraqi government in developing effective civil and 
social services, of contributing to the delivery of reconstruction and humanitarian 
assistance, as well as promoting the protection of the rule of law and human rights 
in Iraq, including the rights of women.790 
With reference to women and gender inclusiveness, different UN agencies, such 
as the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF), support and fund projects for 
peace and democracy building in the whole of Iraq, including the North. They aim 
                                                            
787 Kurdish Human Rights Project, The Role of Women in Civil society, 757. 
788 UNAMI, “Facts and Figures” hƩp://unami.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=2835&language=en‐US 
(Accessed on 8.5.2012) 
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hƩp://unami.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3431&language=en‐US (Accessed on 8.5.2012) 
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Page | 168  
 
to promote knowledge of human rights and fundamental freedoms to ordinary men 
and women.791  
In November 2006 UNIFEM conducted a workshop “Towards Iraqi Gender 
Sensitive Constitution” in Amman, which included representatives from the Al – 
Tawafoq Iraqi Front Coalition, the Hewar National Iraqi Front, National Iraqi List 
and UNIFEM‘s partners from the Civil Society Organizations. The aim of the 
workshop was to discuss the main points relevant for a gender-balanced 
constitution and one which guarantees human rights for women.792 In the same 
month, UNIFEM conducted a workshop in Amman for women parliamentarians of 
the Kurdish region and representatives from the Kurdish alliance from parliament in 
order to establish women blocs within the main political parties.793 UN Women also 
provided grants for certain programmes, for example a project by Asuda, for the 
promotion of education for girls in Sulaymiyah.794 And international pressure has 
arguably played a part in supporting the introduction of the quota and supporting 
more gender-friendly legislation. 
While these actions are positive, if successful, the level of support is still limited. 
The level of involvement of the UN in women and gender matters in the Kurdistan 
region remains low. According to the Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit 
(IAU), there were only 5 UN Women Project activities in the whole of Iraq, three 
from the governorate and two on a national level.795  
In addition to project support, the UN, provides the member states and citizens with 
international provisions, which are intended to enhance positive development. 
These provisions, such as the CEDAW and Res 1325, can empower citizens in 
their dealings with officials. 
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As part of their commitment for gender equality, the United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Iraq organized a roundtable discussion in 2011, bringing together 
representatives from the KRG, the Kurdistan Parliament, civil society 
organisations, women activists and UN agencies. At this meeting, different 
speakers also urged the UN to do more to implement Res 1325, on a national 
level, as well as on the grassroots level.796 
As explained by Sundus Abbas, the UN has failed to implement Res 1325 
thoroughly in its mission, particularly when it comes to the protection of women 
refugees and women being trafficked and kidnapped.797 Not enough is being done 
to support the women’s actions and to help implement Res 1325, through for 
example raising awareness of the resolution’s existence.798 
This is supported by Yanar Mohammed, who is of the opinion that the Iraq 
government has not complied with Res 1325, while at the same time claiming to be 
fair to women. As explained by Mohammed, Res 1325 calls upon all parties to fully 
respect international law concerning the rights of women, including inter alia the 
CEDAW799, and it calls on all parties to protect women and girls from gender-based 
violence.800 However, in Iraq today women’s movements are not supported, killings 
of women take place for reasons of honour, there are no government facilities to 
support the victims, women are being trafficked. Further, under the 2005 
constitution domestic violence is legal, polygamy is allowed, abortions are illegal 
and economic rights, such as inheritance, are unequal.801 
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Res 1325 indeed provides a framework for women who are engaged in peace 
activism and it has helped to successfully frame their demand of the introduction of 
a women’s quota in parliament. However as argued by Sundus Abbas, concerning 
the situation in Iraq,802 not enough is done by the government and the UN to 
implement it. 
Since the UN’s mandates included assistance in drafting of the constitution as well 
as promoting women’s rights, it is clear that women’s rights were once again not 
high on the international agenda.  
In addition hardly anybody in the general population is aware on any practical 
programme implemented by the UN. The people therefore do not consider the UN 
as a force in supporting their needs. 
In general many of the local people interviewed were not aware of grassroots 
actions by and for women, or simply did not consider them a source of influence. 
This is despite all the work of different organisations at all levels, and from all 
sides. About one third of the interviewees were of the opinion that women have 
had no role in the peace building in Kurdistan or only a very small one.803 While 
some people criticized the leading political parties for not letting women participate 
and for not using the abilities of the whole population,804 hardly anyone took 
account of grassroots activism. Such activism per se is not seen as a true political 
movement and it is widely believed that its influence is minimal.805  
While it was recognized by some that women participate in the transformation 
process by fighting for women’s rights, this participation is seen as “trying” for 
development and peace, rather than being effective or successful.806 There was 
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only one very enthusiastic feminist student who stated that the women have the 
ability to succeed in achieving peace.807    
By comparison, many believed that women are not able to fully participate in any 
political action or peace building efforts, as they have their roles in the families to 
fulfill808 or because they are suppressed by the patriarchal structure or the 
authorities.809  
As a young woman from university explained: 
“What role do you expect the women had after the end of the 
war? Both, men and women could not talk out. They were not 
free to express their opinions (against the political parties) and 
they were not involved. So women could not really contribute to 
peace. They had no chance.”810 
There were only two women who thought of women’s roles as a means to prove 
themselves in different environments; to show other women the right path; or to 
fight for women in general.811 
A possible reason for the lack of a ‘feeling of connection’ to the grassroots 
movement by the people at large, is that the grassroots sector in the Kurdistan 
Region suffers from a perceived lack of effectiveness. By comparison, NGOs have 
the ability to reach women from all backgrounds, urban and rural, and to give them 
an opportunity to enhance their skills and to provide them with their own space to 
develop. However, it is argued that these opportunities are often not taken. As 
Shahrzad Mojab explains, there is often a huge gap between the programmes 
implemented and funded and the actual poverty and marginalization experienced 
by a significant percentage of the population. The people involved in NGOs and 
women’s organisations, are often urban-based and middle-class and are said to 
therefore not be in touch with other parts of society.812 As argued by Simpson, 
some gender-specific NGOs merely support women of a certain social class, 
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Page | 172  
 
namely the ‘class of civic activists’ but ignore policies towards the underprivileged 
women who are not connected with this ‘new elite’. The NGOs are consequently 
criticized for helping some privileged women to be more equal to some privileged 
men, but not working for more equality in general.813 As explained by one female 
student, who was herself closely connected to women’s rights organizations and 
NGOs, the NGO training programmes are very good, but they are only for 
educated women, women who already know their rights. However they should 
rather be designed for people from an economically less advantageous 
background, who do not know their rights and who might not have the opportunity 
to find out about them.814 Nevertheless there are also organisations who have a 
broad membership and who have branches all over the country, including cities as 
well as the country side.815  
Just as the structure and work of the different organisations and movements are 
ambivalent, so are the outcomes of their efforts. It is arguably the greatest problem 
in the region as a whole the level of de jure and de facto compliance with core 
international standards as well as their own legal provisions, and activities is not 
the same, especially when it comes to women’s rights. While women have equal 
rights to participate in politics and other decision-making positions, they in fact still 
often lack true power in these positions in practice.816 The same discrepancy 
between the legal provisions and their practical realisation for many women is true 
for health care817, education,818 as well as labour and economic rights.819 Equality 
is far from achieved, especially when it comes to practical day-to-day life. 
While activism from different sides has contributed to the passage of more gender 
sensitive legislation and the partial raising of awareness of the issues in society, as 
well as the creation of programmes for women, and while individuals are 
benefiting, the achievements are not leading to a ‘big movement’ throughout the 
                                                            
813 Eifler and Seifert, Gender Dynamics and Post‐Conflict Reconstruction, 37. 
814 Interview BY, Sulaimaniya on 10/08/2012 
815 Al‐Ali and PraƩ, “Women’s organizing and the conflict in Iraq since 2003,” 78. 
816 Iraq Legal Development Project, The Status of Women in Iraq: Update to the Assessment of Iraq’s De Jure 
and De Facto Compliance with International Legal Standards (American Bar AssociaƟon 2006) 12. 
817 Ibid.pp.36,41 
818 Ibid.p.129 
819 Ibid.p.162 
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population. Within the ever widening circle of the different movements and 
organizations, there is no clear structure and insufficient cooperation. The people 
speak with different voices, although this was said to have been improved by 
activists in 2013, who stated that the sense of collaboration between the different 
groups is growing and that there are in general more people becoming politically 
active.820 
While a multitude of individual and scattered actions will achieve something, it will 
take much longer to achieve a larger aim, including the aim for equality. It is still 
unclear in which direction the current situation will take. 
The lack of a unified movement, as well as the lack of people’s awareness and the 
recognition of the existing activities, slows the process towards equality and 
positive peace. The people have the feeling that they are not in a position to 
influence policy making, and consequently remain passive. In addition the different 
criticisms of the imposing and imperializing nature of the movements makes many 
people vary of them. This can even lead to certain groups within society acting 
against the movements, in order to take a stand for their own culture. 
Nevertheless, despite the criticism of certain activities at a local, as well as an 
international level, and despite not knowing just how far the influence of the 
different movements goes, they all have some role to play in the process of conflict 
transformation. As noted above the problems of conflicts are multidimensional and 
it can therefore be argued that a more multidimensional approach towards 
peacebuilding can only be positive.  
Women raising their voices for equality, reminds others in the population of the 
importance of the issue. It gives other women the strength to support their struggle 
and pushes policy makers to take action in the long run. Speaking out also 
encourages the NGOs to provide a platform for people who might not otherwise be 
able to get involved. According to an Austrian women’s rights activist, who is 
closely involved with the grassroots level actions in the Kurdistan region, the NGOs 
and women’s organizations give the women more opportunities and help to create 
                                                            
820 Christian Peacemaker Teams, Kurdish Activists’ Observations, 3. 
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freedoms. As such they partly help to raise the living standard of some women 
and, if they work together with people from different ethnic groups, can enhance 
the feeling of solidarity. All of these factors contribute to positive peace. 
In order to move the process towards positive peace even further, it is important 
that the different grassroots movements put behind their differences and start 
working together; that they concentrate their work only on the needs of the people; 
and that they make themselves heard even more clearly amongst the population. 
All women need to be made aware of the importance of politics for their own lives 
and that they need to be encouraged to participate. Just because women are not in 
public does not mean they do not have an opinion that needs to be heard.821 The 
civil society has to be made aware that if they lack the political will, knowledge, or 
confidence, they are unable to influence their own lives and the country’s 
development.822 By renouncing the women’s ability to speak up and by separating 
the domains of politics and civil society, the people indirectly reduce the power of 
their own voices. 
As a general conclusion on the gender policies deployed at a political level it can 
be said that while a lot has happened in the previous ten years, their potential 
influence on national development and the enhancement of gender equality within 
society is far from exhausted.  
When it comes to negotiations between different parties, and especially with 
factions from outside the region, women and gender considerations are not on the 
agenda; and it is said to be merely the old warriors who take charge. This has 
arguably changed within national politics. With the thirty per cent quota, women 
have achieved a break in the gender divide, which previously characterised power 
relations. Women are starting to be seen as an individual source for the region’s 
development. On the downside, the increase of women in parliament arguably did 
not lead to a true gender balanced perspective as only certain fractions of the 
population have access to the political sphere. While not diminishing the positive 
                                                            
821 As Cynthia Enloe showed, even beauty salons can become political spaces: Enloe, Nimo’s War, Emma’s 
War, 21. 
822 Buchanan (ed.), Women at the Indonesian peace table, 12. 
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achievements of the current politicians, this hampers development by not ensuring 
a truly balanced point of view in politics. While the increase of the number of 
women in parliament is seen from the outside as positive for the region, on a local 
level, the influence has not yet been great enough due to the lack of equal 
representation. The increase in female representation has led to increased 
sympathy for gender equal politics within society. However, this sympathy is often 
theoretical and not in practical and it is often not transferred into day-to-day life.  
While developments in parliament can be seen to influence society as a whole in a 
similar way, the influence of grassroots activism within society differs from 
individual to individual, and is very much dependent on personal experience. From 
a national point of view, the existence of the grassroots sector itself promotes the 
democratic development within the region. However, the great differences between 
the different forces and their lack of cooperation, including also from the 
government side, hampers their influence on national development. As noted 
above it is still unclear what the true effect of the NGO and grassroots movements 
are on society as a whole.  
It can thus be seen that while broad opportunities have been widely opened up, 
positive peace in general and gender equality in particular are far from achieved. 
But it is not only politics and political activism, which can influence national 
development and the attainment of peace for individuals. One further factor to 
consider is the power of economy: 
V. Gender, Women and the Economy 
“The greater the role of women in the political and economic aspects of society, the 
less likely that the state will engage in militarized interstate conflict.823” 
A rising economy is connected with prosperity and development, not only on an 
economic level, but also on a social and personal level. Positive economic 
development for every country and region is seen as vital around the world, as the 
economic situation of a country or region influences the region’s standing in the 
                                                            
823 Patrick Regan and Aida Paskeviciute, “Women’s Access to Politics and Peaceful States” Journal of Peace 
Research 40(3) (2003): 289. 
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international community, as well as the citizens’ quality of living. A stable and 
balanced economy enriches society, while an unstable and unbalanced economy 
is often an underlying factor for an outbreak of conflict and an eruption of violence, 
as the increasing discontent with the economic situation leads to the rising of 
frustration and consequently to either emigration824 or conflict. Hence the state of 
the economy is partly responsible for an increase or decrease in the potential for 
conflict. In conflict ridden regions economic development can, in principle, 
contribute to the prevention of reignited armed conflict and the support of a positive 
peace building process.825 However this is not an easy process.  
The economies of countries in post-conflict situations are often characterized by 
high levels of unemployment, poverty and disrupted markets.826 Only when this 
situation is ameliorated and people consequently experience a rise in their quality 
of living and of economic prosperity that they will tend to think about maintaining 
peace rather than pursuing further conflict. Further, the people will tend not support 
extremism, but politicians who can ensure further economic growth.827 Experience 
shows that every region in a post-war situation, which wishes to decrease conflict 
potential in the short, as well as in the long term, needs to concentrate on 
economic growth and the stabilisation of its economy. 
For example since the decrease in violence within the Kurdistan Region, it has 
been the government’s high priority to secure rapid economic growth in order to 
prove themselves to the international community, as well as to improve their 
citizens’ standard of living. While in the past the region’s economy was destroyed 
through the internal and external conflicts, as well as through imposition of 
sanctions, today, signs of economic prosperity are visible everywhere. New roads 
are being built, houses are being constructed, there is a rising number of new 
exclusive residential areas, and people spend their leisure time in newly 
constructed malls. The region’s politicians express pride in the impressive 
                                                            
824 Jens Stilhoff Sörensen, State Collapse and Reconstruction in the Periphery, Political Economy, Ethnicity 
and Development in Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosovo (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009): 248. 
825 Richmond, “Peace and Development,” 437. 
826 Michael Pugh, “Normative Values and Economic Deficits in Postconflict Transformation” International 
Journal 62(3) (2007): 480. 
827 Michael Bhatia, “Postconflict Profit: The Political Economy of Intervention” Global Governance 11(2) 
(2005) 206 
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economic development of the recent years. Economic prosperity is seen as the key 
to international standing and peace and economic reconstruction is generally seen 
as one of the most important measures to ensure future development.  
The interviewees were also of the opinion that one of the driving forces behind the 
reconstruction of their region was the economy, trade, and the financial power. 
People from all backgrounds, young and old, men and women, rich and poor, 
religious and non-religious, agreed that the power of physical reconstruction, but 
also peace building, lies with money, as well as with the workers.828 
However, as will be discussed throughout this chapter, in order to truly ensure 
positive development and sustainable peace, the positive economic development 
needs to be accessible to and felt by all people. Despite the correlation between 
the economy and peace in a region, it has to be remembered that peace does not 
automatically appear with a higher GDP. The success in the reconstruction of a 
country will depend closely on the nature of the post-conflict economy. While a war 
economy can destroy a country, a “peace economy”, including open markets for 
all, anti-corruption policies and the participation of ordinary people is able to rebuild 
a country.829 As such the economy cannot be seen as an isolated domain. It is 
interconnected with political and social developments, where each influences the 
other.830 Without positive social development, such as the decrease of violent 
conflict between different groups within society, or the creation of an educated 
people, positive economic development will not be achievable. At the same time, 
without positive economic development violent conflict is more likely to occur, and 
education is less supported. A similar correlation can be seen between the 
economy and politics.  
In the Kurdistan region it is argued by many interviewees that the politicians have 
as yet been unable to synchronise economic and social development for all parts 
of society. Not everybody is benefitting from the region’s economic prosperity to 
the same extent and there is a need for enhanced social services and a fairer 
                                                            
828 See e.g. Interview BX, Sulaimaniya on 09/08/2012; Interview BQ, Erbil on 21/07/2012; Interview AZ, 
Sulaimaniya on 06/06/2012; Interview BF, Erbil on 29/06/2012 
829 Pugh, “NormaƟve Values and Economic Deficits in Postconflict TransformaƟon,”485. 
830 Stilhoff, State Collapse and Reconstruction in the Periphery, 27. 
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distribution of wealth. The fight against corruption and the fostering of national 
resources is needed to ensure that no further conflict will arise.831 It is also here 
that women and gender equality come into play. 
Women play a crucial role in a country’s economy, as consumers, employees or 
entrepreneurs. In today’s Western world it is generally accepted that the successful 
inclusion of women in the economy will support the development of social equality 
and will help to eradicate poverty. However, even today there is not a single 
country in the world, where women share totally equal economic rights with men or 
have the same access to resources as men.832 In order for women to play a part in 
the economic cycle, they need to have the opportunities for employment or to 
establish their own businesses. This will enable them to feed their families, to 
contribute to a rise in the economic prosperity of the country, as well as to further 
their own personal development.833 
But is this true? Is women’s economic inclusion and empowerment necessary for 
national productivity? And if it is, how does this ‘empowerment’ reflect on women’s 
personal state of peace? 
As clearly laid out by the World Bank Development Report of 2012834 gender 
equality in the economy benefits development and raises productivity especially at 
the national level. By contrast a lack of usage or a ‘misallocation’ of women’s skills 
comes at an increased economic cost. At the same time women’s personal 
empowerment, increases with financial power, as it gives them the opportunity to 
manage their lives more independently and thus provides them with confidence.835 
Despite this knowledge there is often a lack of consideration of women’s inclusion, 
and the links, argued by True, between macroeconomic policies, trade 
                                                            
831 See e.g. Interview AR, Sulaimaniya on 21/05/2012; Interview BP, Erbil on 21/07/2012; Interview BT, Erbil 
on 24/07/2012 
832 Jacqui True, The Political Economy of Violence against Women (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 5. 
833 BhaƟa, “Postconflict Profit,” 220. 
834 The World Bank, Gender Equality and Development (Washington: World Development Report, 2012) 3. 
835 Ibid.p.94 
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liberalisation and the effects of financial crises on different forms of violence 
against women are overlooked.836 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse how the Kurdistan region’s macroeconomic, 
employment, and business policies and and the inclusion of women’s and gender 
issues therein can influence progress towards gender equality, as well as positive 
conflict transformation on a national and a personal level. The discussion will cover 
the resulting impact on women’s personal development and peace within the 
families and society and how this influences economic development in the region 
which is considered to be a driving force for positive conflict transformation. Firstly 
a short overview will be presented on the existing literature on the economy, 
gender equality and peace and the various academic views encountered. This will 
be followed by an outline of the legal opportunities for women in today’s 
Kurdistan’s economy and by a discussion on the KRG’s macroeconomic policies 
and their influence on gender equality and positive conflict transformation within 
the region. The role of business and employment will be analysed with reference to 
women’s empowerment and economic prosperity, and the resulting influence on 
the propensity for conflict within society. This will lead to the conclusion that the 
sought after positive development  has only been realised for select groups of the 
population resulting in a loss of human resources for the region, and little or no 
progress towards gender equality. 
1. A Theoretical Overview 
Apart from promoting general development, economic measures can influence the 
transition from conflict to peace. A whole area of academic research namely ‘peace 
economics’, seeks to define the right policies to optimise this transition. According 
to Walter Isard in 1994 they are,  
“generally concerned with: (1) resolution, management or reduction 
of conflict in the economic sphere; (2) the use of economic 
measures and policy to cope with and control conflicts whether 
economic or not; and (3) the impact of conflict on the economic 
                                                            
836 True, The Political Economy of Violence against Women, 5. 
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behavior and welfare of firms, consumers organisations, government 
and society”837 
For example, measures to adjust women’s participation in the labour force, is a 
way to decrease unemployment, reduce poverty and diminish conflict potential 
within society.  
Concerning the correlation between women’s inclusion and economic 
development, the official position of the international community is clear: 
“Gender equality, poverty eradication and sustainable development 
are intrinsically linked. These linkages cut across the social, 
economic, environmental and governance dimensions of sustainable 
development. Acknowledging how development challenges and 
responses affect women, as well as women’s vital contributions to 
economic progress, is essential for the success of sustainable 
development and poverty eradication policies and practices. 
Initiatives that engage women as full stakeholders have proven to 
enhance sustainable livelihoods of local communities and national 
economies.838” 
Many feminist economists agree that the inclusion of women in economic 
reconstruction following an armed conflict is vital for the country’s economic, social 
and political development and criticise the international community for not 
implementing its official position.839 
Jacqui True argues that women’s participation in national or regional economies 
and labour forces is crucial, especially after war, due to the under supply of male 
workers as a consequence of death and disappearance as well as a lack of 
incoming migration.840 She argues further that economic opportunities and 
economic security are closely linked to political participation. True continues that 
gender inequality in the economic and social arenas, leads reduced economic 
security. As a result, women are less available to participate in public decision 
making, and this limits their contribution to long term policy development, which is 
                                                            
837 Raul Caruso, “On the Nature of Peace Economics” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 16(2) 
(2010): 1. 
838 UNDP, Powerful Synergies, Gender Equality, Economic Development and Environmental Sustainability 
(Report, September 2012) 3. 
839 True, The Political Economy of Violence against Women, 85. 
840 Ibid.p.88 
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vital for the region.841 It follows that women’s economic empowerment is the basis 
for their political empowerment.842 
This view is supported by Günseli Berik and others, who assert that inequality in 
income, as with economic inequality in general, leads to reduced political and 
social power, which is detrimental to the national as well as to the women’s 
personal development. One way of counteracting this trend is through 
macroeconomic policies. Feminist economists, such as Günseli Berik, Yana van 
der Meulen Rodgers or Stephanie Seguino, maintain that macroeconomic policies, 
when directed to human well-being rather than the traditional goals of price stability 
and growth rates, would have a beneficial effect on peace building at all levels.843 
For macroeconomic measures to benefit all, the perspectives of the whole 
population need to be considered. Feminist academics, such as Anne Tickner have 
asserted that ‘knowledge’ is not universal, but rather dependent on the person 
sharing the knowledge. In today’s world most ‘knowledge’ coming from high 
decision makers is male and based on male experience.844 With this idea in mind, 
feminist economists, such as Brigitte Young and Christoph Scherrer have 
concluded that, in general, the mainstream theories underpinning policy 
development in finance, trade and macroeconomics are ‘male’ and mostly based 
on a traditional understanding of gender roles.845 To counter this tendency, the 
Platform of Action stressed the necessity to incorporate “a gender perspective in 
budgetary decisions on policies and programmes”.846 However, many feminist 
academics also note that, in the political sphere, not all women are in the same 
situation and it depends very much on which group are being considered.847  
At a personal level, economic development arguably impacts women in a very 
different way than men. As reported by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, jobs in general 
                                                            
841 Ibid. 
842 Ibid.p.89 
843 Günseli Berik, Rodgers Van der Meulen and Stephanie Seguino, “Feminist Economics of Inequality, 
Development, and Growth” Feminist Economics 15(3) (2009): 2. 
844 Anne Tickner in Brigitte Young and Christoph Scherrer (eds.), Gender Knowledge and Knowledge 
Networks in International Political Economy (Baden‐Baden: Nomos, 2010) 9. 
845 Ibid. 
846 United Nations, Beijing Platform for Action 1995, Chapter VI: Financial Arrangements, para 345 
847 Al‐Ali in Simon, “Kurdistan, Women in Iraq”. 
  
Page | 182  
 
have enabled some women to gain more independence although many of the jobs 
for women are still too often badly paid. This leads to further restrictions for 
women, as they are unable to earn enough to support themselves. As a result 
women worldwide comprise about sixty per cent of the working poor,848 which, 
according to the Arab Human Development Report leads to women’s 
disempowerment and should be opposed.849 
According to Agneta Soderberg Jacobson, the job market is only one reason for 
inequality in outcome for women’s economic efforts. Unequal distribution of 
resources in families exacerbates this trend and makes it possible for the women in 
a family to be poor, while their husbands and sons are not. According to Soderberg 
Jacobson, issues such as inheritance, property ownership and the right to work are 
of particular importance for women and their personal development especially after 
armed conflicts.850  
At the same time women contribute greatly to families’, communities’ and national 
economy, especially in the country side, without having their work acknowledged or 
remunerated. This was also acknowledged by the Arab Human Development 
Report 2005: Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World,851 which noted that 
the true extent of women’s participation in social and economic activities in Arab 
society is not recognised and that women are not adequately rewarded for their 
participation.852  
Feminist economists point out that non-marketed activities, such as household 
work are not regarded as economic activities and are thus not included within 
macroeconomic policy. This is criticized, as paid and unpaid labours are clearly 
tightly interrelated. When public spending decreases, especially in areas such as 
social services, unpaid work, which is mainly carried by women, automatically 
increases. For instance Diane Elson claims that the decrease of social welfare 
                                                            
848 Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Gender Politics Makes A Difference, 52. 
849 UNDP, Arab Human Development Report 2005, ExecuƟve Summary, (2005)  http://www.arab‐
hdr.org/publicaƟons/contents/2005/execsum‐05e.pdf (Accessed on 28.11.11) p.10 
850 Soderberg Jacobson, Security on whose terms?, 14. 
851 Abu‐Lughod, “Dialects of Women’s Empowerment,” 83. 
852 UNDP, Arab Human Development Report 2005,  6. 
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spending affects the entire economy, as it leads to a forced reallocation and 
arguably also a reduction of human capabilities.853 
Consequently in order to enhance national economic development, as well as 
women’s individual situation, the recognition of non-marketed activities on the 
economy, as well as the impacts of the associated economic policies, are of vital 
importance.  
As argued by Brigitte Young and Christoph Scherrer, whatever way is preferred, 
whether women rather work in the formal economy, while the state is undertakes 
social services, or work full time in the home, it is imperative to see ‘homes’ as 
areas of economic productivity and acknowledge the work accomplished therein, in 
order to “reveal the hidden costs of economic reconstruction”.854 
As argued by Maria Floro and Hella Hope, how and to what extent trade and 
financial policy reforms improve or reduce gender equalities, are not always 
measurable or even apparent. However it is clear that income and employment 
patterns influence a household member’s authority and control over resources, as 
well as on his or her decision making role.855 As noted by Jacqui True there is a 
connection between gender based abuse and violence and a woman’s lack of, or 
reduced access to, productive resources such as income, employment, land, 
property, technology, credit, and education.856 
This opinion is not shared by all. The findings of the World Bank, suggest that it is 
not always clear, whether, on a personal level, increased economic productivity by 
women leads generally to a greater or lesser standing in the family and in society 
for women. While it is argued that women with their own income have more power, 
less dependency, and experience less domestic violence, it is also observed that 
higher paid women especially are seen as a threat to the male status. This leads to 
                                                            
853 Young and Scherrer (eds.), Gender Knowledge, 59/60. 
854 Young and Scherrer (eds.), Gender Knowledge, 60. 
855 Isabella Bakker and Rachel Silvey, Beyond States and Markets, the Challenge of Social Reproduction 
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an increased work load of women in comparison to men, and thus to more 
conflict.857  
While there is a general tendency, especially among Western feminist academics, 
to view women’s increased participation in the formal economy as a wholly or 
mainly positive development, it has been pointed out that the resulting increase in 
women’s independence is seen by some men as a direct challenge to their 
dominance. This can lead to violence against women, as well as social unrest. 
Masculine identity has traditionally been built around the man’s role as the main 
breadwinner. As this identity is challenged, the perceived loss of status by some 
men can result in the outbreak of conflict in the private, as well as the public 
space.858 According to True, this could be observed in several countries, such as 
Pakistan or Bangladesh, where violence against women increased, at the same 
time as the percentage of women obtaining paid employment and higher education 
increased.859 While the economic empowerment of women might lead to further 
personal conflict and tensions within society, as a result of a loss of identity felt by 
men, nevertheless it is debatable whether this is a short or long term development.  
In conclusion the current prevailing opinion of the international community, as well 
as the majority of feminist scholars, that economic empowerment of women is vital 
for the country’s development. It is important to widen the categories  of recognised 
‘economic activities’ to include household work. At the same time opinions on the 
effects of economic ‘empowerment’ on women’s personal ‘peace’ are split. While it 
is generally agreed that the access to assets are vital, pushing women into 
employment, especially when badly remunerated, is crticised by several economic 
feminists. Nevertheless it is generally agreed that is vital to open up economic 
opportunities for women, especially after the end of armed conflicts.  This will 
support positive conflict transformation and provide women with the possibility for 
further personal development as demonstrated in principle in the Kurdistan Region.  
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2. Legal Foundation 
The importance of the economy to the Kurdistan region is already apparent from 
the highest law of the region. In its draft constitution the current government 
enshrined that 
“The Kurdistan Region shall adopt a competitive legal market 
economy, which encourages and embraces economic development 
on modern foundations, as well as public and private investment.  
Monopolies shall not be allowed, except as regulated by law.”860 
When it comes to the equality between male and female citizens in the economic 
sphere, Iraq, and thus the Kurdistan Region, by becoming a party to the ICESCR, 
agreed to: 
“[…] ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of 
all economic, social and cultural rights […]”861. 
These rights were reiterated in the Kurdistan Draft Constitution, where it states in 
article 20 that 
“Men and women shall be equal before the law.  The Government of 
the Region must seek to remove all obstacles hindering equality in 
all spheres of life, and in civil, political, social, cultural and economic 
rights.  The Government of the Region guarantees that all shall 
enjoy their rights, as stipulated in this Constitution and the 
international charters signed by the State of Iraq.862” 
When it comes to specific economic rights, every Iraqi citizen has the right to own 
property863 and to conclude a contract, unless restricted to do so by law864. 
Also concerning the right to work, Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region, have, 
through their acceptance of the different international covenants, including the 
ICESCR, the CEDAW, the ILO Convention on Equal Remuneration for Work of 
Equal Value from 1952, the Convention on the Abolition of Forced Labour from 
                                                            
860 Draft of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s ConsƟtuƟon 2009, ArƟcle 15 
861 InternaƟonal Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ArƟcle 3 
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Page | 186  
 
1857 and the Convention on Discrimination in Employment and Occupation from 
1958,865 have agreed to  
“recognize the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to 
the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or 
accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.866” 
and to  
take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of 
equality of men and women, the same rights.867 
Additionally they have agreed to 
“take into account the particular problems faced by rural women and 
the significant roles which rural women play in the economic survival 
of their families, including their work in the non-monetized sectors of 
the economy, and shall take all appropriate measures to ensure the 
application of the provisions of the present Convention to women in 
rural areas”.868 
The indiscriminate right for equal opportunities of employment is also enshrined in 
the Iraqi Constitution, as well as in the Draft Constitution of the Kurdistan Region. 
However the Iraqi Constitution limits the right to work wherever this would not 
ensure a “dignified life” for the worker. While certainly honourably in its motive, this 
qualification is open to interpretation, especially when considering the issue of 
gender.  
“Work is a right for all Iraqis in a way that guarantees a dignified life 
for them”.869 
“Everyone shall have the right to work in a profession or an 
occupation to which he or she freely consents.  
Every worker shall have the right to equal pay for equal work.  The 
relations between workers and employers shall be regulated by law 
and founded on economic bases, while taking into account the rules 
of social justice”.870 
                                                            
865 International Trade Union Confederation, 2012 Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights – Iraq 
(6 June 2012) 1. 
866 InternaƟonal Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ArƟcle 6  
867 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 1979, ArƟcle 11 
868 Ibid, ArƟcle 14 
869 Iraqi ConsƟtuƟon 2005, ArƟcle 22 
870 Kurdistan Region DraŌ ConsƟtuƟon 2009, ArƟcle 24, Fourth and FiŌh 
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The equal rights to work, including equal pay for equal work, are endorsed in 
national law in the Labor Code of 1987, which 
“[…] guarantees the right to work, under equal conditions and with 
equal opportunity, to all citizens who are able to work, without any 
discrimination on the basis of sex, race, language or religion [...]”871 
and additionally ensures 
“the principle of equality of remuneration for the same type and the 
same quantity of work performed under identical circumstances.”872 
But since there is no law, which determines minimum wages, it is difficult to 
determine whether women are paid the same as men.873 
In addition to the provisions of equality, the Iraqi Labor Code provides for the 
protection of women workers. It prohibits the employment of women in “arduous 
work or work which is harmful to health874”, assigning work to pregnant women 
work, which is Iikely to endanger their health or the health of their fetus875, and 
obliging women work at night, with certain exceptions.876 Furthermore the act 
ensures maternity leave877, as well as sick leave for any child under the age of 
six,878 with 62 days of the maternity leave being fully paid under the act879, and any 
additional time being subject to the consent of the employer.880 Finally, the 
provisions of the act do not apply to women who  
“are engaged in a family enterprise in which only family members 
work and which is under the authority and supervision of the 
woman's spouse, father, mother or brother.”881 
                                                            
871 Iraq Labor Code, Act No. 71 of 1987, ArƟcle 2 
872 Ibid. ArƟcle 4(2) 
873 UNDP – Iraq, Women’s Economic Empowerment, Integrating Women into the Iraqi Economy (March 
2012) 10 
874 Iraq Labor Code, Act No. 71 of 1987,  ArƟcle 81 
875 Ibid. ArƟcle 82 
876 Ibid. ArƟcle 83 
877 Ibid. ArƟcles 84‐86 
878 Ibid. ArƟcle 87 
879 Ibid. ArƟcle 84 
880 Ibid. ArƟcle 86 
881 Ibid. ArƟcle 89 
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Apart from the fact that the Labor Law of 1987 could be interpreted in a way that 
precludes women from certain types of jobs, and is not applicable to all women, 
one of the greatest problem of the act is that the people are not aware of its 
existence or its provisions. According to a monitoring report, initiated by Harikar 
NGO in 2011, on the implementation of the Iraqi Labor Law 71 of 1987 in Dohuk, 
approximately 75 per cent of workers were not aware that the labour law existed in 
the region or what it entailed. This resulted in the law not being implemented 
appropriately.882 
The labour laws are of great importance, as they can open up the labour market to 
the whole population and ensure equal treatment. One provision is of particular 
importance for many women in the Kurdistan at present, since only about 17 per 
cent of women are officially ‘working’. It relates to a functioning social security 
system.  
By becoming a member of the ICESCR, Iraq agreed to 
“[…] recognize the right of everyone to social security, including 
social insurance.”883 
This right to social security was also enshrined in the Kurdistan Draft Constitution, 
which states that 
“Everyone shall have the right to social security, especially in cases 
of motherhood, sickness, unemployment, injury, disability, old age, 
displacement, and loss of one’s means of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond one’s control”884 
Different social security and welfare laws in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region ensure 
social security to every citizen during his lifetime, as well as his survivors after 
death.885  
                                                            
882 Rasheed Bakhtiar Ahmed, Hussein Delshad Arif, ImplementaƟon of Iraqi Labor Law 71 of 1987 in Dohuk 
Governorate (Dohuk: Monitoring Report, Hawar Printing Press – Dohuk 2012) 25. 
883 InternaƟonal Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ArƟcle 9 
884 Kurdistan Region DraŌ ConsƟtuƟon 2009, ArƟcle 24, Third 
885 Social Welfare Law No. 126 of 1980, see: Institute for International Law and Human Rights, Women and 
the Law in Iraq (Washington: December 2010) 82. 
  
Page | 189  
 
The different laws provide for workers’ pensions and social security in the public886 
and the private spheres.887 In all cases old age, disability, survivors’ benefits and 
maternity leave are covered.888 
As part of the survivor’s benefit, the surviving spouse, underage children and any 
other dependents of the breadwinner are entitled to a share of the insured person’s 
old-age pension.889  
In addition all vulnerable families, who are on a very low income, or no income at 
all, as well as widows and divorcees with minor children, are entitled to a family 
welfare allowance890, which provides these families with a monthly cash benefit by 
the state.891 
As with the labour law, the different social security schemes in Iraq and the 
Kurdistan Region, provide an important safety net and benefit society in general. 
However they are in need of improvement, as they are not applicable to all in the 
same way, and even where they are, it is not always possible in practice for the 
citizens to benefit from the provisions.  
As explained for example by the Institute for International Law and Human Rights, 
which analyzed “Women and the Law in Iraq” in 2010, the Workers’ Pension and 
Social Security Law offers a comprehensive scheme, under which workers are 
protected, but they exempt those employed by their close relatives, those in 
temporary employment, domestic servants and those working in agriculture892 from 
the protection of the law. According to the institutes, these are all employment 
sectors, which are dominated by women workers.893 
In addition, as argued by the UNDP, the Iraq laws often fail to establish equal 
provisions in the economic sector for both genders, as a result of their flawed 
                                                            
886 Civil Pension Law No.33 of 1966  
887 Workers’ Pension and Social Security Scheme under Law No. 19 of 1971  
888 Amjad Rashid, Julian Havers (eds.),  Jobs for Iraq: An Employment and Decent Work Strategy 
(International Labour Organisation 2007) 75. 
889 Worker’s Pension and Social Security Law No.112 of 1969, ArƟcle 39  
890 Social Welfare Law No. 126 of 1980, ArƟcle 3   
891 Rashid and Havers (eds.), Jobs for Iraq, 79. 
892 Workers’ Pension and Social Security Law No. 112 of 1969, ArƟcle 3 
893 Institute for International Law and Human Rights, Women and the Law in Iraq, 87. 
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interpretations.894 Furthermore, too many people are still not aware of their 
rights,895 or are not able to receive the benefits applicable to them. For too many 
people, the benefits are not adequate for their needs.896 
Finally, there are certain provisions, such as child support by the divorced father, 
which are in need of reform, in order to ensure economic security for all.897 
In conclusion, despite a few points of criticism, the legal provisions for 
inclusiveness and fair treatment in the work place, as well as for social security and 
the general support of the population within the economy are in  place, although 
not always implemented as illustrated with some examples below. However, when 
it comes to economic inclusion, legal provisions alone are certainly not sufficient. 
National level macroeconomic policies are also important: 
A. Influencing the Economy from a National Level– Macroeconomic 
Policies 
 “[We] recogn[ize] that women’s poverty and lack of empowerment, as well as their 
exclusion from social policies and from the benefits of sustainable development, 
can place them at increased risk of violence, and that violence against women 
impedes the social and economic development of societies and states, as well as 
the achievement of the internationally agreed development goals, including the 
Millennium Development Goals”898  
Macroeconomic policies can shape society. Through the adopted measures it is 
possible to decrease or increase equality, and lead the country towards economic 
or social development. Through the budget the government can support or oppose 
specific national policies or projects. 
Adequate macroeconomic financing is supremely important for stability and 
prosperity in the region at a time of peacebuilding. During such a period especially, 
the macroeconomic policy should be designed to ensure positive development by 
                                                            
894 UNDP – Iraq, Women’s Economic Empowerment, 7. 
895 Institute for International Law and Human Rights, Women and the Law in Iraq, 82. 
896 UNDP – Iraq, Women’s Economic Empowerment, 7. 
897 “By law, divorced Iraqi men are only required to provide alimony or financial payments to their ex‐wife for 
a three month period after the divorce.” See: UNDP – Iraq, Women’s Economic Empowerment, 22. 
898 UN Economic and Social Council 2010 ResoluƟon 45/4 Women Economic Empowerment 
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raising the standard of living of the population through reduced unemployment, 
ensuring a low inflation rate, reducing poverty, ensuring economic growth and 
uplifting society’s well-being in general.899 
It is in the hands of the major economic players, namely the international 
investment and trade organisations, as well as the different governments, to 
influence employment and income patterns,900 as well as to provide for social 
security, the enhancement of education and general economic opportunities for the 
citizens. The major economic players should endeavour to ensure that these 
possibilities are equally accessible to every citizen notwithstanding their ethnic 
group, class or gender. It therefore lies partly in the hands of the government 
whether or not women have the opportunities to enhance their incomes and 
consequently also their authority. 
With reference to macroeconomic policies and gender, it is still the prevalent view 
among feminist scholars, such as Tina Johnson, that the formulators of policy at 
the World Bank, the IMF and national ministries of finance too often view their 
domain gender neutral.901 At the same time it is known that women and men are 
affected differently by macro-economic policies because of their different economic 
roles in society.902 Cutbacks in the expenditure for health services or the civil 
service sector for example mean that women are less likely to be able to find a job 
and to help provide for their families.903 It is argued that macroeconomic policies 
are often implemented without due consideration for their effects on the primary 
and secondary incomes of citizens, especially those with few economic and social 
resources. 904 It is consequently argued that in order for the policies to be beneficial 
                                                            
899 Hashim Al‐Ali, “Towards establishing a viable macroeconomic and medium‐term fiscal framework 
integrated approach for the Iraqi economy” International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies 6(2) (2012): 
196. 
900 Bakker and Silvey, Beyond States and Markets, 40. 
901 Tina Johnson (ed.), Small Change or Real Change? Commonwealth Perspectives on Financing Gender 
Equality, (London: Commonwealth Secretariat 2008) 10. 
902 Zuckermann and Greenberg, “The Gender Dimensions of Post‐Conflict Reconstruction,” 73. 
903 Ibid.p.74 
904 Johnson (ed.), Small Change or Real Change?, 10. 
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to the development of the country, as well as to the majority of its citizens, gender 
differences as well as differences in classes need to be considered.905 
Despite this knowledge, peacebuilding processes often do not support the creation 
of economic opportunities for women. Women remain side-lined, even though a 
high percentage of them have become heads of households after war, and that 
their economic participation, and the recognition thereof, would greatly contribute 
to the economic uplift of the war-struck region. They are often not provided with the 
opportunities to become economically active, either through employment or 
through recovering income-generating property, as governments often fail to 
anticipate the need for legal reform, when it comes to women’s rights to assets and 
economic opportunities in general.906 
In the Kurdistan Region it is the official position of the government that women’s 
economic participation as part of the reconstruction efforts has to be seen as 
increasingly important for the region’s development, as well as for progress 
towards gender equality. However, as argued by representatives of the people, this 
position has not yet been fully implemented. On this basis the participants of the 
conference on “The Role of Women in Peace-Building, Reconciliation and 
Accountability in Iraq”, which took place in Erbil in January 2011, for example 
crafted the following recommendations: 
“48. Social security and employment laws should be reformed in an 
effort to facilitate and encourage the participation of women in public 
life, including by: 
(a) The provision of better working conditions for women 
(b) Extending and increasing social security with rises in oil revenue 
(c) Include provision for prioritising the applications of women 
49. Train women and those supporting their families so as to aid 
them in their search for employment 
50. Investment, banking, and labour laws should be reformed to 
encourage women to enter the formal economy and private sector, 
                                                            
905 Ibid. 
906 True, The Political Economy of Violence against Women, 83. 
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including the oil sector, including by giving the applications of 
women priority when allocating loans and investments 
51. Job creation programmes for women should receive more 
funding and attention, as opposed to a focus only on welfare 
programmes. This should include a job creation programme for 
women with limited education 
52. Ensure the neutrality of all State institutions, as these are 
required to represent and provide services for all of Iraq without any 
discrimination. 
53. Give women priority in job applications in cases where she is 
equally qualified to competing male candidates”907 
They were not alone with their recommendations. The participants of the 
“International Conference on Kurdish Women for Peace and Equality” asked for  
“creat[ing] job opportunities for women to be independent financially 
of their husband and other members of the family, because 
economic independence of women will result in self-confidence and 
lowering the abuse against them.”908 
Decision makers are responding to the ever increasing lobbying for gender equality 
within the economy. For example, in October 2012, the first Women’s Economic 
Empowerment Conference was held in Baghdad, and was attended by inter alia 
the Head of the High Council of Women’s Affairs in the Kurdistan Region. The 
Deputy Prime Minister Shaways stated that it was the aim of the conference to 
work to ‘kick-start’ further support for women in accessing more and better jobs.  
The conference itself was initiated by the UNPD Iraq, together with UN Women, 
ILO and IOM, which shows the importance to international organizations of 
demonstrating support for women in the economy. They recognise the correlation 
between national or regional development and a gender inclusive economy, as well 
as between a gender inclusive economy and international recognition. This was 
expressed by Ms. Jacqueline Badcock, Deputy Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary-General for Iraq in Development and Humanitarian Affairs, by stating 
                                                            
907 No Peace Without Justice, The Role of Women in Peace‐Building, Reconciliation and Accountability in Iraq, 
Outcomes and Recommendations (Erbil , Kurdistan‐Iraq, 27‐28 January 2011) 
908 The Kurdish National Congress of North America, International Conference on Kurdish Women for Peace 
and Equality, Resolution and Suggestions (Press Release – March 20, 2007) para.11 
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that “without including women, a country will never be able to have a strong 
economy, a key to its development.”909  
To what extent the recommendations of the Conference are being put into practice 
by the KRG and the resulting impact on development, will be subject of the 
following sections: 
1. The KRG & Economic Measures for Conflict 
Transformation 
In the Kurdistan Region, the main political parties at the moment have three main 
economic goals, which are all translated in the PUK’s aims and objectives, namely 
to support the redevelopment of agriculture, as well as to encourage private sector 
industries and to build up domestic as well as international trade, as part of the 
economic policies.910  
The increase of ‘internationality’ is thereby one of the KRG’s main foci for the 
economic sector at the moment. The KRG aims to work with regions around the 
world to improve its economic standing and make Kurdistan’s economy highly 
internationally competitive.911  
Together with the international organizations active in the region, the KRG also 
aims to strengthen the private sector, and to create a shift in the balance of 
employment from the public to the private sector.912 
                                                            
909 Juliette Touma, UNDP Iraq, Women’s Economic Empowerment Conference held in Baghdad (UNAMI 
NewsleƩer, Issue 27, October 2012) 6/7. 
910 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Leadership Council, “Program”.  
911 See for example: KRG, “Kurdistan Investment Board Chairman visits Austria and Slovakia to discuss 
investment and trade opportuniƟes” (January 2013) 
http://www.krg.org/a/print.aspx?l=12&smap=010000&a=46083 (Accessed on 22.1.2013) 
Law No.4 of 2006, Law of Investment in Kurdistan Region – Iraq  
912 See for example: ILO, “Private Sector Development Programme” (IRQ/08/01/UNQ, 2009‐2011) (03 April 
2012) hƩp://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/arpro/beirut/what/projects/iraq/irq_08_01_unq.htm 
(Accessed on 22.1.2013) 
Stephen Rimmer and Mohammed Al‐Ani, Supporting Private Sector Development in Iraq (World Bank, MENA 
Knowledge and Learning, Quick Notes Series, Number 48, November 2011) 
Zebari Abdel Hamid “Amendments Act of reƟrement and social security conference in Arbil” (30.10.2011) 
hƩp://onedinar.forumoƟon.net/t37184‐amendments‐act‐of‐retirement‐and‐social‐security‐conference‐in‐
arbil (Accessed on 27.01.2013) 
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Finally, it is the current government’s aim to rebuild the agricultural sector, which is 
of great importance to the region. Apart from the fact that the people feel closely 
connected to the land which they see it as their cultural heritage,  agriculture still 
one of the most important sectors in Kurdistan’s economy, behind the oil and gas 
sector.913 In the past, the Kurdistan Region has been largely built upon the 
agricultural sector, which was destroyed through the years of wars and sanctions. 
According to the Minister of Agriculture, Serwan Baban, the production of foodstuff, 
such as red meat, oat, corn, milk, sunflower, tomatoes and various fruits was less 
than half of that required for self-sufficiency in 2011. Hence the aim of the 
Agricultural Ministry is to raise the agricultural productivity of the region. The 
minister plans to rebuild village life and support the farmer, in order to ensure that 
Kurdistan can be largely self-sufficient once again.914 
From a gender perspective these different objectives lead to a variety of potential 
opportunities for the economic empowerment of women at a personal level. The 
enhanced internationalization of the economy might benefit big businesses directly, 
as well as indirectly by facilitating more interaction with the rest of the world, 
through business travel, study, training, or simply tourism. However, such benefits 
flow to only a small fraction of the population in general, and to an even smaller 
fraction of women. Through first-hand experience of the life of young Kurdish 
women today, the author observed that even if they had the opportunity to go 
abroad, only a small percentage would be permitted by their families to travel alone 
and only a similarly small percentage would be willing to defy their families’ 
strictures in such a matter. It follows that while the internationalization of 
Kurdistan’s economy, is certainly positive for the development of the region as a 
whole, its positive influence on gender equality is currently limited, although it is 
conceded that all available options are of value, as they may lead to enhanced 
gender inclusion in the future. 
                                                            
913 USAID, Kurdistan Region, Economic Development Assessment (RTI International, Local Governance 
Project, Final Report, December 2008) 5. 
914 Lorin Sarkisian and Roni Alasor, Ararat News‐Publishing, “Minister Baban: Kurdish agricultural production 
should be self‐sufficient and untimely provide food security for the region” (26 October 2012) 
hƩp://www.araratnews.eu/nuce.php?aid=627 (Accessed on 27.01.2013) 
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With reference to support of the private sector, both international organizations, 
and the government are committed to including women in microfinance projects 
and support them in running their own businesses.915 While this might offer women 
the opportunity of increasing their family’s income, it is questionable how far their 
businesses will be able to compete with the leading companies of the region, which 
benefit through the increased internationalization. At the same time, the increased 
support of private sector employees, mainly influences women’s lives through the 
impacts on their husband’s situation, as private sector employment is still 
principally a male domain. However appropriate legal and practical transformations 
of the sector may open it up for an increased female work force. While, a more 
thorough analysis of gender and the workforce will be provided further below, it 
should be noted that gender inclusion in the private sector is a highly disputed topic 
within the region as most of the employment is seen as socially unacceptable by 
society. Such perceptions on the one hand diminish women, but on the other hand 
limit the risk of women being exploited through labour as has happened in other 
regions, which focussed on rapidly boosting their economies. In summary, while an 
increased private sector is seen as positive for national development, it is highly 
questionable whether it leads to the advancement of gender equality in any way 
and so far does not seem to advance women’s personal development.  
Finally, the support for rebuilding the agricultural sector can have very positive 
effects on national development, as well as personal development including gender 
equality. The majority of rural women in the Kurdistan Region are working in 
agriculture. If the rebuilding of the agricultural sector includes a gender perspective 
and if women’s traditional work is properly recognized, benefits would accrue not 
only to the national economy through rising agricultural production, but also to the 
farmer’s personal lives and those of the female workers.  
Hence while the current KRG’s three main macroeconomic objectives may 
contribute to the development of the region as a whole, two of them will have little 
influence on gender equality. The impact of the third will largely depend on how it is 
put into practice. Exactly if and how the governing authorities have included 
                                                            
915 World Bank, “Gender Dimensions of Private Sector Development, Capacity Building for Women in 
Business, The Example of Iraq” PSD Gender Notes 1(1) (2004): 1‐4. 
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strategies for enhanced gender inclusion in the national economy, and its effects 
on national and personal development, will be the subject of the following section: 
2. Budgeting for Gender Equality 
Given the Kurdistan Region’s current very advantageous economic position, the 
region has every opportunity at this point in time to influence society’s 
development, including progress towards gender equality in the economy from 
above.  
Iraq’s economy, including that of Kurdistan, is largely based on the oil industry. 
According to the national budget for 2011, 95 per cent of anticipated government 
income is from oil revenues.916 While the oil industry as such does not provide 
much employment, the income from oil exports can be used to advance other parts 
of the national economy. Hence the importance of budgeting should not be 
underestimated. Currently, much of the oil money is invested in the public sector, 
which accounts for 60 per cent of the full time employment in the country as a 
whole.917 
The people in the Kurdistan Region are aware of the resulting opportunities. Many 
see the oil as a curse, because of the sufferings of the past. However, they also 
see oil as a pathway to security since they are of the opinion that trading with other 
nations will enhance development and reduce the likelihood of armed hostilities. 
With oil income streets and houses can be rebuilt, jobs can emerge and economic 
activity generated through a range of investments.918 
The size of the national or regional budget and the way the money is disbursed is 
an essential tool to achieve the above. The annual budget largely determines the 
economic well-being of segments of the population. As argued by feminist 
economists it is consequently vital to insert gender awareness into budgetary talks, 
                                                            
916 UNDP – Iraq, Women’s Economic Empowerment, 10. 
917 Ibid. 
918 Interview BX, Sulaimaniya on 09/08/2012; Interview BM, Erbil on 13/07/2012; Interview BO, Erbil on 
18/07/2012 
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so that the whole of the population is able to profit from the macroeconomic policy 
making.919 
As argued by Young, Tickner and Scherrer,920 it is detrimental to gender 
development if macroeconomics are solely defined by men. Contributions from all 
parts of the population are needed to ensure that the policies can benefit everyone. 
From this perspective, the Kurdistan Region is not in an optimum position. Since 
the annual budget is approved by the high level political representatives, decisions 
on how to distribute public resources are not based on considerations of gender 
equality. Hazha Sleman, the current head of the Women Committee, explained that 
at the 2012 parliamentary discussions for budget, the women’s committee tried to 
enhance the gender perspective in Kurdistan’s budget, and presented a proposal 
to allocate budget for the High Women Council, as well as the directorate of 
counter violence against women. In addition the women urged parliament to 
allocate a budget for funding for women who had lost their husbands, but the 
government did not implement any of the proposals.921 One of the consequences is 
that the national budget is not spent in a gender equal way, or with gender 
considerations in mind. In Young and Scherrer’s view is detrimental to the region’s 
and its people’s development.922  
In 2009 UNDP Iraq initiated a project to support the KRG in its budget execution, 
control, policy and planning, with inter alia  the aim to “improve policies stratefies 
and relation institutional developments that are sensitive to […] gender equality 
and pro poor economic growth.”923 While the project showed up that the KRG’s 
problems included that there were no regional and sectoral strategies and policies 
linked to budget planning924 and that further detrimental factors include lack of 
transparency and accountability, no monitoring, weak reporting and low 
                                                            
919 Young and Scherrer (eds.), Gender Knowledge, 29. 
920 Anne Tickner in Young and Scherrer (eds.), Gender Knowledge, 9. 
921 Warvin, “Regional Parliament Denies Women Demand, Endorses Budget”.  
922 Anne Tickner in Young and Scherrer (eds.), Gender Knowledge, 9. 
923 UNDP Iraq, Budget Execution Support in the Kurdistan Regional Government (Project Document, April 
2009) 1. 
924 Ibid.p.11 
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credibility,925 there was no clear proposal on how the measures proposed to 
counter these challenges will have a positive effect on gender equality. 
Still in 2011, the usage of the budget in the region is unclear. The allocated budget 
for the Kurdistan Region was $11.8 billion (USD), which was divided among on-
going long-term projects, provincial development projects and new projects. Most 
of the money for new projects went into power generation and improvements in 
electricity distribution, while part of the long-term project money contributed to the 
insurance and pension fund, and to pay for and create more government jobs. 
While $21 million were assigned to the creation of jobs and small loans, $170 
million were given to the political parties in the region.926  
Also in 2012 the budget was about $12 billion, which only passed under a wave of 
criticism. According to the opposition, the budget is not sufficiently transparent. 
Further criticisms include the following: the budget was mainly allocated to 
operating costs, with under one third set aside for investment; the amounts 
allocated for the regional leadership, the intelligence services and the security 
apparatus were too high; and there was a presumed deficit.927 
Next to the public spending for politics and security, the KRG has included 
measures to benefit the poorer people on the ground individually, even though, as 
argued by critics, the percentage of the budget allocated is far from adequate. 
In order to reduce poverty, the government is working to decrease the 
unemployment rate in the region. The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs initiated 
the project ‘Jobs for Everyone’, through which it gives about 150.000 Iraqi Dinars, 
approximately 130 US Dollars, to business owners for each job they create. At the 
same time vocational training centres were opened to train workers, and the 
government supported the pension fund for private sector employees, so that the 
                                                            
925 Ibid.p.13 
926 KRG, “Council of Ministers finalises 2011 Kurdistan Region draŌ budget” (3 March 2011) 
hƩp://www.krg.org/a/d.aspx?l=12&s=02010100&r=223&a=39080&s=010000 (Accessed on 22.1.2013) 
927 Sangar Jamal, Niqash, “Iraqi Kurdish State Budget Passes – Eight Months Late, Against Strong Opposition” 
(12 July 2012) hƩp://www.niqash.org/arƟcles/?id=3085 (Accessed on 22.1.2013) 
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private sector becomes more attractive for the citizens.928 Furthermore, the annual 
budget also provided for a so called ‘marriage loan’, which is available to newly-
weds on low incomes, and which was increased from $850 to $2.125 in 2011.929  
Finally, the government supports small loan projects. As part of one of these 
projects, any citizen between sixteen and 35 years of age, who is unemployed can 
apply for a tax-free loan between 1 and 15 million Iraqi Dinars (approximately $860 
to $13.000) which has to be paid back within five years.930 
While some of the measures described above can, in principle, foster development 
and gender equality, there is no clear gender strategy visible from outside. It is not 
clear that women’s skills are considered or that specific provisions are in place 
which make it necessary to consider the gender effect of the budget spending. The 
general lack of transparency of the annual budget leads to lost opportunities for 
economic improvements for the whole population, and thus for the region as a 
whole. 
This point of view was also shared by several representatives of the civil society. 
When people in the Kurdistan region were asked whether women are economically 
supported in the region today, the univocal reply was that the women who are most 
supported by the state are those already working, and especially those who are 
working for the public authorities and are themselves politicians or politically active 
in one of the two main parties.931 Therefore it was the opinion of the interviewees 
that women needed more support to reach the employment market especially 
when it comes to the private sector.932 They had the feeling that it was hard for 
anybody to get a job, but especially for women, without the necessary 
connections.933 In addition a number of men had the feeling that many women 
were not treated well in their workplace.934 Comparable numbers of men thought 
                                                            
928 Eli Doosky, Kurdish Globe, “Government works to reduce Kurdistan unemployment” (10 May 2011) 
hƩp://www.krg.org/a/d.aspx?s=02010200&l=12&r=73&a=39943&s=010000 (Accessed on 22.1.2013) 
929 KRG, “Council of Ministers finalises 2011 Kurdistan Region draft budget”. 
930 Doosky, “Government works to reduce Kurdistan unemployment”. 
931 See e.g. Interview BO, Erbil on 18/07/1012; Interview AZ, Sulaimaniya on 06/06/2012; Interview BB, Erbil 
on 24/06/2012; Interview BC, Erbil on 25/06/2012; Interview BP, Erbil on 21/07/2012 
932 Interview BQ, Erbil on 21/07/2012; Interview BG, Erbil on 02/07/2012; Interview BK, Erbil on 12/07/2012 
933 Interview BF, Erbil on 29/06/2012; Interview AI, Erbil on 16/04/2012 
934 Interview BQ, Erbil on 21/07/2012; Interview AN, Erbil on 03/05/2012 
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that women should be further supported because a great work force is needed to 
build up the country.935  
By and large, the interviewees felt that support is lacking and that there are no 
social provisions and help for citizens in general, and women in particular, who do 
not work for the state.936 While it can be seen as positive that working women are 
supported, it has to be remembered that the vast majority of female population, 
about 83 per cent, in the region are not working and therefore feel that they receive 
little or no financial support. 
While all the prerequisites are there, it appears that budgetary measures are not 
being used to the fullest extent to improve people’s lives within the region. If they 
are, it is not apparent from outside, as a consequence of a lack of transparency.  
There has been widespread discussion of including women into the economy and 
of the benefits to their personal development and the regional economy of progress 
towards gender equity. Unfortunately such discussions are not yet reflected in the 
annual budget. This was also supported by women’s rights activists in the region, 
who put as one of the government’s necessary points of action in 2013 to address 
gender equality in the national budget.937 
3. National Strategies – Putting Theory into Practice?  
In response to issues such as discussed in the previous section, the country as a 
whole has developed two National Development Strategies, from 2007 to 2010, 
and from 2010 to 2014: 
As part of its National Development Strategy in 2007, the country set itself the task 
to “transform Iraq into a peaceful, unified federal democracy and a prosperous, 
market oriented regional economic powerhouse that is fully integrated into the 
global economy”,938 by ‘strengthening the foundations of economic growth’, 
through a stable macroeconomic strategy, improving the performance of the oil 
                                                            
935 Interview AE, Erbil on 09/04/2012; Interview AQ, Sulaimaniya on 19/05/2012; Interview BA, Erbil on 
21/06/2012 
936 Interview AP, Sulaimaniya on 18/05/2012; Interview AV, Sulaimaniya on 28/05/2012; Interview AY, 
Sulaimaniya on 04/06/2012 
937 Christian Peacemaker Teams, Kurdish Activists’ Observations, 8. 
938 IAU, Iraq, The NaƟonal Development Strategy (2007‐2010) (March 2007) i. 
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sector, and diversify the economy,939 by ‘revitalizing the private sector’, by 
‘improving the quality of life’, and by ‘strengthening good governance and 
improving security’.940 
The National Development Strategy of 2007 included measures which arguably 
benefit the country as a whole, such as the strengthening of the private sector, the 
banking sector, the improvement of the infrastructure, as well as human 
development goals, such mitigating poverty, achieving education for all, ensuring 
access to water and decent housing and controlling corruption.941 
With respect to gender equality, the Development Strategy included in its goals to 
increase the representation of women in decision making,942 to support women 
entrepreneurs through technical resource networks,943 to increase women’s 
employment944, to enhance women’s education,945 to expand micro finance 
programs especially for women,946 as a measure to decrease poverty, and to 
support women within the public health system.947 While it was not explained in 
detail how this will be achieved, it is clear that gender equality is seen as vital when 
it comes to human development. By comparison, general macroeconomic or 
financial policies were seen as gender neutral. 
As indicated throughout this thesis, the objectives set out in the Development 
Strategy of 2007 have been partially realised in the Kurdistan Region. The 
numbers of women involved in decision making has increased, employment 
opportunities for women have been created, micro finance programs targeting 
women have been established, and the number of women in higher education is 
rising. Nevertheless the impact on the entire population, as well as on national 
development, arguably remains low, as the different measures principally target 
one segment of the population, namely upper class women.  
                                                            
939 Ibid.pp.ii‐iv 
940 Ibid.pp.v/vi 
941 Ibid.p.62 
942 Ibid.p.vii 
943 Ibid.p.53 
944 Ibid.p.60 
945 Ibid.p.61 
946 Ibid.p.63 
947 Ibid.p.80 
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The National Development Strategy 2010-2014 in comparison gone much further 
and concentrated on improving the financial sector, agriculture and water 
resources, infrastructure, public services, issues of social status, environmental 
sustainability, the private sector and good governance.948 
Apart from raising the GDP and diversifying Iraqis economy, the Development 
Strategy also has as an objective to reduce the poverty rate by focusing on rural 
development and creating job opportunities, especially for the youth and for 
women. The strategy includes providing adequate health and educational services 
for so called ‘vulnerable groups’, which include women.949 
Women are thereby seen as outsiders, who do not play an economically active 
role, a situation which needs to be changed in order to “make women capable”. 
The strategy is to provide women with adequate education, health services and 
social security, as well as with the opportunities to obtain resources and to become 
aware of their rights.950 Gender issues are clearly being considered, but within 
limits. There is no consideration of gender issues when it comes to infrastructure, 
the environment or industry. As already noted, women appear to be seen as 
outsiders in their own country, at least when it comes to the national economy. 
While there is definitely a real intent to raise the overall educational levels and the 
standard of living of the people, it remains questionable if any underlying problems 
leading to the above issues will be addressed by government.  
From the allocation of the anticipated investments under that development plan, it 
is clear that the government currently prioritises the industrial sector, followed by 
construction, oil, electricity, and the agricultural sectors. Education has the lowest 
allocated investment, and social services are not being considered under this 
plan.951 It may therefore be argued that the strategies for more gender inclusion 
are rather considered in principle rather than implemented in practice and it is not 
apparent that this will change greatly in the near future. 
                                                            
948 Ministry of Planning – Republic of Iraq, NaƟonal Development Plan for the Years 2010‐2014 (Baghdad 
2010) 
949 Ibid.p.18 
950 Ibid.pp.134‐136 
951 Ibid.p.18 
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In conclusion it is clear from the actual policies and planned strategies elaborated 
above, that efforts for transformations have been made, which benefit the 
population and development of the country as a whole. However, when it comes to 
the impact of economic measures on social and gender transformations, still more 
is discussed in principle than implemented in practice. This also affects the peace 
building and the conflict potential within the region.  
As Hashim Al-Ali pointed out in 2012, “Iraq could be considered a unique example 
for macroeconomic and fiscal management irrationality in recent times.”952 Iraq, 
and especially the Kurdistan Region, is one of the regions of the world, with access 
to enormous economic resources, especially oil and gas, and a well-educated 
people, especially those returning from the diaspora. Nevertheless Iraq, including 
the North, although arguably less so, is characterized by high rates of 
unemployment, poverty, a low quality or lack of public services and low 
productivity. According to Hashim Al-Ali this situation can be attributed to 
mismanagement in public finance, and “the absence of a realistic and proactive 
socio-economic development strategic vision based on well-articulated, actual 
needs and priorities.”953  
Also USAID Iraq concluded in its Economic Development Assessment of the 
Kurdistan Region conducted in 2008 that the Kurdistan has the possibility for a 
bright economic future in industry, agriculture, as well as tourism, but the current 
lack of information and transparency from the Government’s side, as well as the 
absence of a modern banking system, a lack of suitable infrastructure, and the 
absence of an educational system, which works to meet the demands of the 
market economy, hamper Kurdistan’s development.954 
As noted above, macroeconomic policies have can change relations between 
different social groups. This has to be taken account, as otherwise it is likely that 
inequalities will be established through the policies, including gender-based 
inequalities, which would in turn limit probable benefits to disadvantaged 
                                                            
952 Al‐Ali, “Towards establishing a viable macroeconomic and medium‐term fiscal framework,” 202. 
953 Ibid.p.203 
954 USAID, Kurdistan Region, Economic Development Assessment, 1. 
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households.955 It follows that if legal rights to make land and housing transactions, 
as well as equal rights in marriage, employment and mobility, are not secured after 
conflict, many poor women, and especially those who lost their close male relatives 
through war, will not be able to rise from poverty.956 Next to providing equal 
opportunities, the state needs to finance, through its macroeconomic policies, 
equal outcomes. It is not sufficient to merely allow women the access to income 
generating activity. It is vital to ensure equity within these activities, as women, who 
are in disadvantaged employment situations, will most likely also suffer when it 
comes to quality health service, education, food security, water, or housing,957 and 
this will affect their family and consequently also society. 
As explained by Zuckermann and Greenberg from the example of the World Bank, 
too little attention has been focused on the connection between gender and macro-
economic policies. While the World Bank produces extensive and prominent 
gender studies, it fails to incorporate them into investment strategies.958 The same 
is arguably true for the Kurdistan Region, but while the World Bank’s employees do 
not suffer greatly under the lack gender inclusive investment strategies, the 
development potential in the Kurdistan Region is impaired through the lack of 
socio-economic, including gender, considerations, which could lead to a rise in 
conflict potential in the future.  
B. Women, Gender and the Labour Market  
Another factor which is said to be greatly influential on the social fabric, as part of 
economic development, is the employment level and the type of employment made 
available to the population. 
When it comes to women and employment, opinions around the world are split. 
While some are of the view that it is a woman’s place to do the housework and to 
take care of the children, others insist on the importance of women working, in 
order to ensure their equality within society, as well as their country’s economic 
progress. It has been argued that every available working person is needed and 
                                                            
955 Bakker and Silvey, Beyond States and Markets, 38/39. 
956 True, The Political Economy of Violence against Women, 84. 
957 Ibid.p.85 
958 Zuckermann and Greenberg, “The Gender Dimensions of Post‐Conflict Reconstruction,” 73. 
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that equality in the labour market increases personal as well as regional 
development, and thus fosters peace building. The involvement of women is vital 
as it is often they, who are in the best position to acquire new skills and keep the 
country or region running, while the men were fighting. 
Times of war and conflict change the social fabric of a region. During the time of 
conflict women are often forced to enter the work force and to acquire new skills. 
This can happen in their home country as well as in refugee or internally displaced 
camps, or in the diaspora; everywhere where labour is in short supply. Additionally 
women often become more involved in politics, and other occupations previously 
dominated by men,959 as a consequence of men no longer being available to fulfil 
these posts. As argued by Sorensen, it is these new skills and abilities acquired by 
women, which are needed in post conflict times to rebuild the country.960 
However rather than embracing these opportunities, contrary developments are 
often observed. While gender roles often change during the time of armed conflict 
and become more open or fluent, the opposite is often true after the arms are laid 
down.961 
After the time of war male unemployment is usually very high and it is seen as an 
important political goal to provide employment opportunities for men, even if this 
means that women lose their jobs. Women’s unemployment is not seen as a 
political threat. Women are merely seen as reverting what is “natural” and 
consequently no intention is paid to their employment.962 As a consequence, 
women can be forced to resign their jobs or accept lower wages than the men 
returning from conflict.963 
                                                            
959 UN ESCAP, Women and Armed Conflict, 12. 
960 Sorensen, Women and Post‐Conflict Reconstruction, 5. 
961  Bouta and Frerks, Women’s Roles in Conflict Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post‐Conflict 
Reconstruction, 39. 
962 Cynthia Enloe, Connecticut College, Lectures, YouTube “Cynthia Enloe speaks on Women in Iraq” 
hƩp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BUVPm0vJINA (7.12.2011) 
963  Bouta and Frerks, Women’s Roles in Conflict Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post‐Conflict 
Reconstruction, 39. 
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This is especially problematic for women who retain sole responsibility for their 
households.964 The impoverishment of a large part of society is an inevitable 
consequence of war. On an individual level, if the breadwinner loses his or her 
employment or if a wife is widowed it is difficult for the whole family. It is often next 
to impossible for women to find work and an income, and they and their children 
then become dependent on other family members or on some form of social 
services.965 At the same time the impoverishment of society and its effects makes it 
difficult for the war torn region as a whole to recover economically, which in turn 
leads to further conflict potential. Consequently, it is questionable whether the 
country can afford the loss of women’s formal economic activity at a time of peace 
building.  
In addition, a severe lack of employment opportunities especially for males has had 
detrimental consequences on the social construct. Men who face unemployment 
and poverty, especially after returning from fighting or displacement, often 
succumb to alcoholism and drug abuse resulting in a rise in domestic violence and 
prostitution.966 Consequently it is necessary to be careful that women’s control of 
resources and their successful efforts to generate income do not create a backlash 
against them.967  
These are only few of the challenges related to the employment situation after the 
end of violent conflicts, and they cannot be taken lightly. As UNDP early warning 
reports show, jobs are the top priority in the reconstruction of countries, after 
physical security.968 Only after people can once again feed their families and the 
country has a sufficient workforce and expertise to build up a necessary 
infrastructure, will the population feel that the conflict is over.969 While it is 
important to employ men, for all the reasons mentioned above, missing out on the 
opportunity to further employ women in the formal sector could have devastating 
                                                            
964  Ibid. 
965 Chandler, Wang and Fuller (ed.), Women, War and Violence, 118. 
966 Lidauer (ed.), Women in Armed Conflict, 9. 
967 Sanam Naraghi Anderlini and Judy El‐Bushra, Post Conflict Reconstruction (Inclusive security, Sustainable 
peace: A toolkit for advocacy and acƟon) 64. 
968 Pugh, “NormaƟve Values and Economic Deficits in Postconflict TransformaƟon,” 481. 
969 UNDP, “Gender Inequality Index and related indicators”. 
  
Page | 208  
 
impacts on the post-conflict reconstruction.970 The following sections will discuss 
how the Kurdistan Region has reacted to these male and female employment 
issues, how many women are currently employed and in which type of 
employment, how this affects the women’s individual and the wider national 
development and whether the adopted strategies are a step towards positive 
peace. 
1. Including Women into the Workforce – Raising the 
Numbers 
As a prosperous economic region, the Kurdistan Region today does not face the 
same problems as other poorer regions, recently emerging from conflicts. As 
discussed above, it is one of the government’s major goals to make Kurdistan 
economically competitive, also in the international sphere, and to use all available 
resources including the contributions from women to achieve this goal. As a 
consequence the government is providing women, especially at a professional 
level, with every opportunity to join the labour force. 
With reference to the specific advancement of women in society, it is relevant that 
the only female minister in the current KRG cabinet is the Minister for Labour and 
Social Affairs, Asos Najib Abdullah. While some of the interviewees were of the 
view that she is “just as the others”,971 the general feeling towards her is very 
positive. She is said to have been working hard to improve the social security 
situation, especially when it comes to the elderly and disabled.972 She is currently 
focussing her work on reducing unemployment, especially amongst the young by 
providing training programs and offering micro loans to young graduates. As part of 
their programme specifically for women, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 
runs and supports the women’s shelters of the region. It was one of Asos Najib’s 
                                                            
970 Ibid. 
971 Interview BI, Erbil on 08/07/2012 
972 Mufid Abdulla, The Kurdistan Tribune “Asos Najib Abdullah: an exemplary KRG minister” (20 October 
2012) hƩp://kurdistantribune.com/2012/asos‐najib‐abdullah‐exemplary‐krg‐minister/ (Accessed on 
27.01.2013) 
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aims to improve the quality of the shelters and also to raise awareness amongst 
the women regarding their rights.973 
As discussed above, labour laws in the region ensure equal access to work, for 
men and women974, and also ensure equal remuneration975, as well as special 
provisions for women’s workers.976 Women have the opportunity for maternity 
leave, there are kindergartens in the region and some companies even provide a 
space where children can be looked after. 
Apart from ensuring their legal rights, the KRG is working to further increase the 
employment rate through for example the establishment of training centres,977 or 
the hiring of female employees in the public sector. According to Rudaw, the 
number of women employed by the government is steadily rising. In 2011, 4000 of 
7600 people newly employed by the government in Sulaimaiyah were women, 
raising women’s participation in the public sector in that city to 41 per cent. It 
should be noted that the majority of women working for the government are still 
employed in the education and health sectors and it is still difficult for women to 
gain promotion,978 which impedes the attainment of a level of gender equality 
beyond simple numbers. The effects of this will be discussed in the next section. 
The recent economic boom in the Kurdistan Region also provides new job 
opportunities in the private sector including the new malls where women are 
particularly wanted. It is arguably easier for women to find jobs in certain areas, as 
there are fewer women looking for jobs than men and some employers specifically 
seek to hire women, for example in stores for women’s clothing. However, it is still 
the case that in almost every company the employment opportunities are biased 
against women, as are the level of the positions offered.979 
                                                            
973 Najiba Mohammed, Rudaw “Kurdistan Govt To Introduce New System To Shelter Threatened Women” 
(16 November 2010) hƩp://www.rudaw.net/english/culture_art/3298.html (Accessed on 27.01.2013) 
974 Iraq Labor Code, Act No. 71 of 1987, ArƟcle 2 
975 Ibid. ArƟcle 4(2) 
976 Ibid. ArƟcles 81‐89 
977 Doosky, “Government works to reduce Kurdistan unemployment”. 
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Finally, in order to support women’s economic inclusion hundreds of projects 
throughout Iraq, and dozens in the Kurdistan Region, have been conducted by 
NGOs, as well as government organisations, including vocational training, 
awareness raising, income-generation and food and non-food distribution.980 
According to UNDP, the projects provided women with opportunities for economic 
empowerment as many were very keen to increase their skills and experience. The 
projects can also impact on the women’s mind-sets, can provide them with more 
confidence, and build hope for a better future.981 However the projects suffer from 
inadequate or unreliable funding and from difficulties in accessing certain groups of 
women.982 
While the in principle opportunities for women to work in Iraq and the Kurdistan 
Region are given, the reality looks different. Women do not avail themselves of all 
of the opportunities either out of personal choice, or through social circumstances.  
Unlike elsewhere in the world, Iraq’s and the Kurdistan Region’s greatest challenge 
for the national economy does not necessarily lie with excessive unemployment 
rates, but rather with economic inactivity. According to the Iraq Household Socio-
Economic Survey, conducted by the Iraqi Government, with help from the KRG and 
the World Bank, the economic activity rate in the Kurdistan Region in 2007 i.e. the 
percentage of the general population engaged in formal economic activity, 
amounted to 69.7 per cent for men and 12.9 per cent for women, an average of 
only 40.3 per cent.  The unemployment rates were similar between men and 
women, with 5.8 per cent of economically active men being unemployed, and 7.2 
per cent of women.983 
In 2012, according to the Kurdistan Region Statistics Office, the level of 
unemployment was 6.0 per cent, with 4.6 per cent of men being unemployed and 
12.6 per cent of women. In addition, the survey revealed that the level of 
unemployment is higher in the rural areas than in the cities and that the level of 
                                                            
980 UNDP – Iraq, Women’s Economic Empowerment, 15/16. 
981 Ibid.p.23 
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unemployment correlated with the level of education, with illiterate women having 
the highest level of unemployment, at 16.3 per cent.984 According to the Kurdistan 
Region Statistics Office, there are several reasons for women’s very low rate of 
economic activity (14%) in comparison to men’s (67.3%) including the following.  
Firstly, women have ‘specialized’ in household work and there is no need for them 
to work outside the home, and secondly, the number of women looking for jobs is 
generally low, even if they do not have to work at home.985 
At the same time it should be noted that the percentage of economically active 
women has slowly but steadily risen again since the fall of Saddam Hussein, 
although numbers are still low. According to UN data 12.5 per cent of the adult 
female population in Iraq was part of the labour force in 2000. This number slowly 
rose to 13.5 per cent in 2005 and 14.1 per cent in 2008.986 By comparison, in 2008 
52.6 per cent of the UK female adult population participated in the labour force.987 
The low percentage of the economically active population, resulting from the very 
low percentage of women participating in the formal labour force, arguably 
impedes on Kurdistan’s international competitiveness and general economic 
development, as only less than half of the population’s human resources are being 
used.  
With reference to the influence on women’s personal development and 
empowerment opinions are split. As explained in the theoretical section above, and 
as noted by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung,988 while increased participation in the labour 
force can increase women’s independence, it can also lead to further restrictions 
and inequality.  
While it is possible that it is the women’s free choice to not work, and thus their 
‘economic inactivity’ ensures their personal freedom and peace, it is very unlikely 
                                                            
984 Kurdistan Region Statistics Office, Labour Force (Fact Sheet 3, September 2012) 1. 
985 Ibid.p.2 
986 UNdata, “Iraq”, http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Iraq (Accessed on 16.09.2011) 
987 Undata, “United Kingdom”, hƩp://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=United%20Kingdom 
(Accessed on 16.09.2011) 
988 Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Gender Politics Makes A Difference, 52. 
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that the majority of Kurdish women prefer to work in informal employment or to be 
housewives. As explained by a young woman, who is herself currently not working: 
“The women in Kurdistan really want to work. Basically everyone 
wants to work. That is clear, because they want to be independent 
from the men. Can you imagine what it feels like when you have to 
ask a man for everything? Whenever you want clothes, for every 
book, you have to go to your husband or father and ask them for 
money.”989 
She further maintained together with other women interviewed, that concerning 
employment, women meet opposition from all different directions, including the 
government, society, and their own families. This makes it almost impossible for 
them to work, should they so wish. Hence the measures adopted by the 
government to increase the numbers of female employees are not sufficient as 
there has not yet been a huge increase in women taking up employment.  
This shows once more that the current measures are insufficient to give women 
genuinely equal opportunities for employment. Rather it is necessary to consider 
the surrounding circumstances and view the generating of employment through a 
gender lens. It will later be argued that success will contribute to ensuring peace 
for individuals, as well as for the region, by ensuring prosperous economic 
development for all.  
If and to what extent gender equality is manifested in Kurdistan’s labour force, how 
this is working out in practice and what influence these initiatives or the lack thereof 
are having, will be subject of the following section: 
2. From Work to Gender Equality? 
When it comes to the current employment situation in the Kurdistan Region in 
general, feelings are very mixed. While one side believes that region is currently 
full of opportunities and proudly talk about the different high-paid job opportunities 
in the Region,990 the other side has the feeling that they are unable find any job, 
                                                            
989 Interview AP, Sulaimaniya on 18/05/2012 
990 Interview CF, Vienna on 16/11/2012 
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and if they do, they cannot feed their families. This side believes that the few jobs 
left are taken by migrant workers South East Asia or Africa.991 
At the same time many of the companies complain that the Kurdish population is 
not willing to accept hard manual work anymore and that they have no option but to 
employ migrant workers. They claim that the local population has become 
accustomed to government jobs, where they receive all the salary and social 
security for fewer working hours than private employees.  
There is in general a large discrepancy between the different types of labour as 
well as a wide range of earnings. This results in the privileged classes raising the 
prices, while the lower class have the feeling that it is not worthwhile for them to 
accept jobs with low salaries, as they will not be able to appropriately feed their 
family.992 
With respect to working conditions and prospects for women, the situation in the 
Kurdistan Region is highly variable as it is with education, social life and any other 
aspects of living. As noted by the World Bank, women in today’s world have a 
better chance of equal employment, since the importance of physical strength in 
the workplace is declining, while the importance of cognitive skills is on the rise.993 
However this is true only for that extremely small percentage of women in 
Kurdistan who have the benefit of higher education and can choose whether or not 
they wish to be employed and in which area. Women from other parts of society 
either do not have any possibility to work, or must work under harsh conditions. 
The latter is true for women from low income families. Support to offer them 
employment by the government is much lower than for women from the upper 
class, and at the same time many of them, who either want or have to work, are 
forced to deal with great social obstacles, as they are either expected by their 
families and social surroundings to not work at all or they are expected to only 
execute certain types of professions.  
                                                            
991 Interview BS, Erbil on 24/07/2012; Interview BJ, Erbil on 09/07/2012 
992 Nabard Hussein, Rudaw, “ConflicƟng Unemployment Rates in Kurdistan” (07 March 2012) 
hƩp://www.rudaw.net/english/kurds/4502.html (Accessed on 22.1.2013) 
993 The World Bank, Gender Equality and Development, 272. 
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In general, the types of jobs and positions seen as acceptable by society are very 
clear cut. While some occupations are considered to be ‘shameful’ and 
unacceptable, others are regarded very highly.  
In addition more conservative families oppose women working in a “male 
environment”. The women are then either forced to not work at all or to choose a 
different work place. 
Hence women who want to work and have an adequate education are often not 
able to accept their preferred employment.  This diminishes their freedom of choice 
and leads to a waste of human resources for the region.  However this is not the 
case for all parts of the population: 
In Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region, there have long existed opportunities for a 
certain class of professional women, especially those whose families belonged to 
the upper class and had political influence. Chandler describes Iraq before the first 
Gulf War as a  
“prosperous, modern, secular state with universal education and one 
of the best healthcare systems in the region, where most women 
were well educated, many working in professional fields as doctors, 
lawyers and engineers.”994  
Today, it may be observed that the majority of women in employment are either 
professionals or working in agriculture. By comparison, the majority of men work in 
services or sales and in crafts and related trades.995 In addition it may be observed 
that women mainly work in the public sector (over 78%), while equal numbers of 
men work in the public and the private sector.996 
There are barriers for women seeking access to the private sector, as this is not 
seen as ‘acceptable’ by the wider society. Even within the public sector, not all 
types of positions are distributed equally between men and women. According to 
the Kurdish newspaper Rudaw female leaders and high-ranking civil servants were 
decreasing in 2011, because they were being replaced by men. The Rudaw 
                                                            
994 Chandler, Wang and Fuller (ed.), Women, War and Violence, 126. 
995 Central Organisation for Statistics and Information Technology, Iraq Household Socio‐Economic Survey, 
Volume II, 308. 
996 Kurdistan Region Statistics Office, Labor Force, 3. 
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investigation has found that of 27 female mayors, municipal chiefs and general-
directors in the Sulaimaniya province, only ten still hold their posts. It is said that 
this development is due to the tribal thinking and the fact that women are not 
sufficiently supported in public positions and their abilities appreciated.997 
The situation is particularly problematic for women with low skill jobs in private 
companies and factories. They are they are not highly regarded by society and 
have to work long hours for a low wage and are not adequately protected by 
workplace regulations.998 At the same time, such work does not offer the same 
benefits as the public sector, although efforts are being made to change this 
situation. It follows that the choice of work is limited.999 
Despite all the challenges when it comes to women practically being part of the 
labour force, the population’s theoretical views on the issue were very different 
ones: 
Many interviewees stated that next to that of the family, a woman’s most important 
role in Kurdish society is that of a worker or employee,1000 although it was made 
clear what was thereby seen as acceptable.  
With respect to women as workers, it was most often understood that they should 
be state employees in the ministries, administrative bodies or schools, but not work 
in the private sector. While interviewees from all walks of life were of the opinion 
that it was a woman’s most important role to work, a significant number of men 
expressed the belief that it was the most important role of a women in Kurdistan to 
work specifically as a state employee.1001 People also stated that it was the most 
important roles of women to work in hospitals1002 or as lawyers1003 or on cultural 
                                                            
997 Nawzad Mahmoud, “Female Leaders Decline in Kurdistan” (Rudaw, in English – The Happening, 
21.09.2011) hƩp://www.rudaw.net/english/kurds/3993.html (Accessed on 1.10.2011) 
998 Trades Union Congress, “Women in Iraqi Kurdistan – demanding their rights at work and at home” (19 
May 2010) http://www.tuc.org.uk/international/tuc‐17949‐f0.cfm (Accessed on 29.01.2013) 
999 UNDP – Iraq, Women’s Economic Empowerment, 10. 
1000 Interview AF, Erbil on 09/04/2012; Interview AG, Erbil on 13/04/2012; Interview AK, Erbil on 
20/04/2012; Interview AL, Erbil on 25/04/2012; Interview AP, Sulaimaniya on 18/05/2012 
1001 See e.g. Interview BQ, Erbil on 21/07/2012; Interview BT, Erbil on 24/07/2012 
1002 Interview BW, Sulaimaniya on 08/08/2012 
1003 Interview AX, Sulaimaniya on 03/06/2012 
  
Page | 216  
 
matters,1004 thereby acknowledging the importance of work in general, but not 
accepting all types of jobs. 
This way of thinking was also reflected in the children’s wishes for future career 
choices, with the majority aiming at a career in medicine, engineering, teaching, or 
in general as a state employee. According to the Iraq Women Integrated Social 
and Health Survey (I-WISH), the vast majority of girls in between 10 and 14 in the 
region desired a career in education, i.e. working as a government employee, 
teacher, nurse, etc. While approximately 10 per cent aspired to become a public 
figure, another 10 per cent wanted to work in a different sector, and only 4.5 per 
cent wished to become house wives.1005 
Clearly the general importance of economic activity for the rebuilding of the region 
is embedded in the people’s thinking, with nearly half of the people questioned 
expressing the view that it is the women’s most important role to support the 
physical reconstruction and peace building process, through being part of the work 
force.1006 The concept of women working for the support of the region pervades all 
strata of society, as well as men and women. However, in practice they sometimes 
do not include the actual women in their family. Many people believe that women, 
just as men, should work to reconstruct the country, as everybody is needed, 
especially in the areas of engineering, doctors and teachers.  Further they should 
engage in paid work more than they have done until now, but this should never go 
“against the interest of the family”.1007 In practice this often means that women are 
not working after all or that they have only specific jobs. 
Hence a woman’s employment is still very dependent on the family and society as 
a whole, rather than her individual decision and consequently the opportunities for 
women are not equal to those for men, even if they are greater for women from 
more advantaged backgrounds. 
                                                            
1004 Interview BX, Sulaimaniya on 09/08/2012 
1005 Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office, Iraq Women Integrated Social and Health Survey, Knowledge and 
behavior of adolescent girls (10‐14) age (I‐WISH, October 2012) 2. 
1006 See e.g. Interview AM, Erbil on 27/04/2012; Interview AS, Sulaimaniya on 23/05/2012; Interview BB, 
Erbil on 24/06/2012; Interview BD, Erbil on 25/06/2012 
1007 Interview AD, Erbil on 06/04/2012 
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Related to the differences in classes is the correlation over the region between 
economic activity and education. Research has shown that the participation of 
women in the labour force in Iraq is highly dependent on the level of education. 
While only about 10 per cent of women with primary education are employed or 
seeking a job, 30 per cent of women with secondary education and 80 per cent of 
university-educated women participate in the labour force.1008 
The great divergences between women’s participation in the labour force based  
inter alia on education levels have also been observed by international 
organizations, such as the IOM, according to which women face a variety of 
difficulties in accessing the labour market, such as a lack of qualifications, 
childcare responsibilities or constraints resulting from social norms.1009 
The consequences of the strong concentration on government and professional 
jobs for women in the region are twofold. From a national point of view, it would 
preclude nearly half the population of participating in low skill jobs, which are 
needed as much as the professional jobs to realise the region’s full economic 
potential.  
Secondly it needs to be remembered that the public employment opportunities are 
only accessible to highly educated women. Consequently uneducated women only 
have very low chances of employment, which makes them automatically 
dependent on their husbands or other male relatives. This limits their personal 
development and has flow on effects nationally.  
At the same time, Iraq and the Kurdistan Region are not following other countries 
around the world and advancing their economies by employing the vast cheap 
female labour currently available.1010 This would arguably offer the women who are 
currently in dire straits, a higher personal quality of life, and thus generally reduce 
the potential for conflict.  
The situation for women even in high skilled job is often worse than that for men. 
Their roles as carers of the families make it more difficult for them to accept the 
                                                            
1008 IAU, Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003‐2008 (January 2009) 3. 
1009 IOM‐Iraq, Female Headed Households (Special Report 2011) 6. 
1010 True, The Political Economy of Violence against Women, 77. 
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stipulated working hours. Their remuneration is often less than that of men and 
they are seen as unfit by some to fill certain positions. This is especially so for 
women who have no immediate male relatives. Since women are not expected by 
the society to need to work, they do not have the same chances as men for 
employment and are often forced to accept low paid work in the informal sector 
where they are frequently exploited and remain poor. 
Several women interviewees complained that the conditions in the work place are 
generally far from easy. They feel watched and some have the feeling that they 
always have to be careful so that nothing happens involving a man, which could 
ruin their reputation. As explained by a previous teacher, who later continued her 
studies: 
“When I was a teacher at a village school, I had to take the bus 
there every day. It was not possible to do anything right. The men 
who went with me always talked about me, and some told my family 
about what I was doing. Once I was in school, I always had to take 
care that the door of the class room was open at all times and that I 
always had a few children around me, so that some of my 
colleagues could not assume anything wrong.”1011 
Many men do not want their wives to work, because they do not see it as their role 
and because of possible connections with other men. Hence if a married woman 
finds a job that she likes, she cannot complain if she is treated badly, because her 
family would most likely make her quit. 
As argued by Cynthia Cockburn, this situation is a result of the relationship 
between capitalism and patriarchy with each reinforcing the other.1012 Capitalism 
has developed in the same patriarchal way as the rest of society. Skilled men are 
generally privileged over skilled women and many workplaces and workers’ unions 
choose the patriarchal model, rather than accept the full inclusion of women and 
their skills into their organisations.1013 In order for women to enhance their own and 
their country’s prosperity they do not simply be appended to the job market. Often 
the whole social system needs to be changed, as to ensure equality in outcome. 
                                                            
1011 Interview CH, Vienna on 05/11/2012 
1012 Cockburn, “On ‘The Machinery of Dominance,” 269. 
1013 Ibid.p.270 
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As emphasised by Günseli Berik, Yana van der Meulen Rodgers and Stephanie 
Seguino the equality in outcomes is just as important as the equality of 
opportunities. As observed in the Kurdistan Region, equal opportunities, for 
example equal access to the labour market, might not lead to equal outcomes, for 
example equal pay, working hours etc.1014  
Working women encounter problems not only in the workplace, but also in their 
homes. In reality in most households still consider that women should stay at home 
and look after the family. Employment is often seen as a privelege which does not 
change their traditional role. In addition many work places do not provide adequate 
working conditions for women, such as flexible working hours, or part time jobs. It 
follows that many of the working women, while they also do not enjoy being 
housewives, feel under pressure because of the dual responsibilities. One young 
newlywed and pregnant woman explained outside the formal interviews, that while 
she has enjoyed working, she is waiting for the day that she can finally stay at 
home. The duties of a wife, in addition to the long hours at work and the additional 
physical challenges of pregnancy, are becoming too much to handle.  
As noted above, women’s employment in the current social structure might well 
lead to enhanced inequality for women on a personal level. However this does not 
need to be the case. Such trends can be addressed by the state, by providing 
access to child care, giving women more time through better infrastructure, 
improving parental leave policies, facilitating women’s access to markets through 
technologies, or introducing flexible working hours.1015 While some of these 
initiatives have been taken to a certain extent in the Kurdistan Region, they are far 
from sufficient and inclusive.  
In conclusion  the development of a truly gender equal work force in the region is 
still in the formative stage. The legal provisions are not sufficient for gender 
equality and while society agrees, in principle, with gender equality in the 
workplace, in practice, this compact seldom extends to the home and family. Apart 
                                                            
1014 Günseli, Van der Meulen and Seguino, “Feminist Economics,” 5. 
1015 The World Bank, Gender Equality and Development, 297. 
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from the consequences already noted above, this has several effects on individual, 
social and national transformation: 
3. The Effects of Women’s Employment Situation on 
Individual and Social Transformation 
From the analysis above, two developments can be observed, which hamper 
women’s personal economic development. One the one hand, the family and 
society, i.e. men, are still crucial factors in deciding which employment, if any, 
women may seek, and this greatly limits their possibilities. On the other hand, it 
would appear that the government is greatly supporting women in the work force, 
primarily to promote economic development in the region, but without necessarily 
considering their personal choices and empowerment. The support does not 
explicitly extend to gender equality.  
The consequential limited contribution of women to the official economy and their 
limited choices of employment is arguably detrimental to the region’s development 
and the conflict transformation process as a whole. 
From a national point of view, the importance of women using their skills and 
participating in the labour market after the end of the conflict should not be 
underestimated. At the time of violence it is often the highly educated people with 
money from the upper and middle class who leave the country and it is only the 
poor with no other choice who to stay. Post conflict reconstruction is therefore 
more difficult as every skill is needed.1016 Furthermore, as argued by the ILO, 
increasing employment rates are one way of facilitating peace. High levels of 
unemployment and limited economic opportunities are sources of dissent and 
social unrest, and thus feed the cycle of conflict and obstruct peacebuilding.1017 It 
follows that the situation in the Kurdistan region, with female economic inactivity 
reaching over 80 per cent, is in a greater risk of returning to violence than a country 
with a lower percentage of economic inactivity. 
From an individual point of view, the time of reconstruction is the best time to re-
evaluate gender relations and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace within 
                                                            
1016 Enloe, “Cynthia Enloe speaks on Women in Iraq”. 
1017 Rashid and Havers (eds.), Jobs for Iraq, 1. 
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society. Working women can also act as role models and change the outlook of the 
next generation, with potentially long-lasting impacts on the development of the 
country. Positive economic development can thereby be used to enhance general 
equality amongst the population. This was also be opinion, especially of educated 
women interviewees, who stated that equality implies having women working in all 
sectors including the law, academia, security etc.  
As discussed by the IOM, the exclusion of women from the labour force leads to 
their isolation from other groups in society and marginalization in day-to-day 
life.1018 This could also be observed in the Kurdistan Region, where non-working 
women, who did not have a large tightly knit family, had great difficulties contacting 
and making friends with other women, except in the immediate neighbourhood. 
Many pursued scarcely any activities outside the house. 
In addition the inability of women to work, especially when they are heads of 
households, puts a strain on their family members, who experience an increased 
financial burden.1019 As noted by the Kurdistan Region Statistics Office, a 
household, comprising of an average of five people, in the Kurdistan Region 
spends an average of just under 1500 thousand Iraqi Dinars, approximately 1.300 
US Dollars, per month,1020 with an average of 55 per cent for food, and 
residency.1021 Given that there are no minimum wages in Iraq and the Kurdistan 
Region and that the average wage for low skilled jobs falls much below the stated 
average spending,1022 not every household with a single breadwinner is 
economically stable. The existence two breadwinners, enhances the chances of 
raising families out of poverty. This reduces the potential for conflict within society, 
and also offers enhanced opportunities to the next generation.  
Furthermore employment and economic activity in general, can provide women 
with access to the public sphere. Work might also give women the opportunities to 
develop skills needed for political involvement and the confidence to stand up for 
                                                            
1018 IOM‐Iraq, Female Headed Households, 6. 
1019 Ibid. 
1020 Kurdistan Region Statistics Office, Expenditures (Fact Sheet 6, September 2012) 1. 
1021 Ibid.p.2 
1022 With interviewees explaining that a low‐skilled worker could get as liƩle as 300 to 500 dollars per month 
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themselves.1023 Access to paid work has the potential to shift boundaries and to 
give women more power. If women earn their own money, they are economically 
independent or at least semi-independent. This increases their and their family’s 
quality of life and gives them a say in how the money is to be spent.1024 While this 
point is currently contested by several academics, it could be observed that, even if 
the women did not have a greater say in household budgeting, they cherished 
having their own money available.1025 
These arguments are especially valid for those households which are headed by 
women. During and often also after armed conflict, women become main 
breadwinners for the family and heads of households. They assume all the 
responsibilities men had before going to war, in addition to their traditional chores. 
Since they have to carry all the responsibilities alone, the female-headed 
households and widows are often poorer than others and require special 
attention,1026 although it has been shown that female-headed households cannot 
per se be said to be more vulnerable than male-headed households, but that they 
experience vulnerability in a different, gendered way.1027  
In 2003 UNICEF (the United Nations Children's Fund) estimated that 60 per cent of 
households in the Iraqi city Basra were led by women. If this is true for most larger 
cities, it becomes apparent that the success of conflict transformation will be limited 
unless the government supports and empowers these women and their families. 
Clearly they will be unable to effectively support the reconstruction of their country 
if they have difficulties in obtaining enough food for their family.1028 An estimated 
1,5 million women lost their husbands in Iraq due to violence from 1980 to 2010. 
Many of them lost, not only their husbands but also their income. Widows without a 
supporting family and who are unable to provide for themselves end up living in 
                                                            
1023 Regan and Paskeviciute, “Women’s Access to PoliƟcs and Peaceful States,” 293. 
1024 Naila Kabeer, “Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment: A Critical Analysis of the Third Millennium 
Development Goal” Gender and Development 13(1) (2005): 18. 
1025 See e.g. Interview AP, Sulaimaniya on 18/05/2012 
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camps with their children.1029 Those women need the opportunity to earn their own 
money, in order to be able to feed their children and to give them a secure future. If 
the children do not see any future, they will not see any reason to support stability.   
According to IOM there are currently between one to two million female headed 
households in Iraq, with a substantial percentage in the Kurdistan Region. Only two 
per cent of the female headed households assessed by the IOM are employed 
regularly.1030 The women themselves ranked access to work as their most 
important need, as this would solve many of their other problems, such as 
insufficient food, or inadequate health services.1031 
However, as already shortly noted above, paid work can also have negative impact 
on women’s lives. Women do not merely need the opportunity to get any job. They 
need a job matching their abilities and the opportunity for choices in employment or 
business. As the Gender Inequality Index shows the simple fact of having more 
women in the labour force does not mean a higher level of development for the 
country or increased equality between the sexes because employment can often 
be used to exploit women.1032 It is often not about the access to work, but rather 
about the nature of work. Even if women manage to obtain an acceptable job, the 
mere fact of earning money does not mean that they have a greater control over 
their lives. Even if women increase their time at paid work, their domestic chores 
are rarely renegotiated. They still bear the main burden for domestic chores and as 
a consequence gender inequality in the total amount of work seems to be 
intensified.1033 Therefore one needs to ask whether the outside work is well paid 
and fulfilling or rather badly paid, and exploitive.1034 
As expressed by Lakshmi Lingam: “Women are being considered a ‘resource’ for 
globalizing capital,”1035while the implications for them as individuals are not always 
taken into account. According to feminist researchers the mere integration of 
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1034 Abu‐Lughod, “Dialects of Women’s Empowerment,” 88. 
1035 Bakker and Silvey, Beyond States and Markets, 72. 
  
Page | 224  
 
women into paid labour does not necessarily give them any advantages. They are 
integrated into a patriarchal system, which has the opportunity of exploiting them. 
The system needs to change, to make it more accessible for women, and to 
empower rather than exploit them.1036 Measures can include more part time jobs, 
the possibility of a career within a part-time job and more flexible working hours, 
etc. The mere fact of employment is not by nature liberating. Women need to be 
allowed economic independence by the family as well as by society.1037 
It has consequently been argued that women should not be forced to be ‘pushed’ 
into economic activities, as this will result in their suffering through double or triple 
burdens, and it might lead to even more inequality rather than the hoped for 
equality. Persuading women to become economically active may have negative 
consequences. It follows from this argument that it may be in a woman’s interest to 
remain economically inactive. As argued by the researcher this way of thinking is 
exactly one of the problems. Several other feminist researchers, such as Carolyn 
Nordstrom maintain that women are already economically active, but this activity is 
most often not formally recognized.1038 Hence it is necessary to make women’s 
current economic activities visible and to provide the women in these situations 
with the opportunity of moving from economically invisible corners to economically 
viable activities with all the benefits enjoyed by the rest of the population. 
The field research in the Kurdistan region confirmed that many interviewees that it 
was vital for women stay at home and take care of the family and the household. 
However, this was generally not seen as “work” or anything worth mentioning. 
When people described women as “not having a role”1039 or not being of political or 
economic value, it generally meant that the woman stayed at home and looked 
after the family. According to the interviewees, also the government is not doing 
enough to recognise women’s positions within the home.1040 While this is not only a 
                                                            
1036 Moghadam, Modernizing women, 67. 
1037 Abu‐Lughod, “Dialects of Women’s Empowerment,” 89. 
1038 Carolyn Nordstrom, “Women, economy, war” International Review of the Red Cross 92(877) (2010): 162. 
1039 See e.g. Interview AG, Erbil on 13/04/2012; Interview BN, Erbil on 17/07/2012; Interview BQ, Erbil on 
21/07/2012; Interview CA, Sulaimaniya on 13/08/2012 
1040 Interview AG, Erbil on 13/04/2012; Interview AH, Erbil on 15/04/2012; Interview BV, Sulaimaniya on 
06/08/2012 
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Kurdish problem, the recognition of unremunerated work, especially by women, 
would be a big step towards achieving equality.  
In conclusion improved access to the work force by women from all strata of 
society would likely benefit not only national development, but also individual 
development and gender equality, and would thus decrease the potential for 
conflict. At the same time it is necessary to change the employment system, to 
ensure a decrease in pressure on and violence against female workers. This will 
require further government regulations and interventions.1041 
Furthermore, to improve women’s opportunities and to ensure more equal gender 
relations, the barriers between the public and private sector employment conditions 
need to be broken down. Finally, so to give women’s work in society a greater 
standing, volunteer work, household work, subsistence labour and reproduction 
have to be taken into account when discussing economic productivity.1042 
If all of the above issues were resolved, the productivity of the region and the living 
standards of the whole population would rise. Further, the empowerment of women 
and a reduced potential for conflict inside the homes, would follow. 
The positive utilisation of employment is only one way individual and national 
development can be influenced by the population as a whole. A second way is 
through of self-employment. 
C. Running Businesses to Achieve Equality 
When driving through Kurdistan’s bigger cities new businesses can be seen 
popping up everywhere, from factories, to beauty salons and shops. It has been 
part of the government’s plan for the region’s reconstruction to support the rising 
economic boom, through fostering business opportunities, especially on an 
international level.1043 If and how this development has influenced the situation of 
women and gender equality in the region will be subject of this subchapter. 
                                                            
1041 True, The Political Economy of Violence against Women, 80. 
1042 Tickner, Gender in International Relations, 93. 
1043 Kurdistan board of investment, http://www.kurdistaninvestment.org/ (Accessed on 14.07.2013) 
Kurdistan Regional Government, “Fact sheet: Doing business in the Kurdistan Region” 
http://www.krg.org/p/p.aspx?l=12&s=050000&p=302 (Accessed on 14.07.2013) 
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As with any other country in the world, there is a certain percentage of women in 
the Kurdistan Region, albeit small in comparison to their male counterparts, who 
make it to the top of the top. Some of these include Ghada Gebrar, who has been 
the CEO of Korek Telecom Iraq since 1st of August 2011,1044 Talar Faiq, who is the 
director of Erbil International Airport, and as such the first female airport director in 
Iraq, and the only one across the Middle East,1045 as well as Ferda Cemiloğlu, a 
Kurdish entrepreneur, who owns a construction company in Erbil, and is the Head 
of the Management Committee of the Kurdish Women Entrepreneurs Association, 
which provides micro credits and prepares vocational courses for women.1046 
According to these women, the opportunities in the region exist, but practical 
implementation is still problematic.  
Talar Faiq is of the view that women in Kurdistan today have every chance to 
become successful, even though it is still a difficult for them reach the top CEO 
positions. According to her, making it to the top is about setting priorities. She 
notes that the situation of ‘the woman at home’ is slowly changing in the region, 
because middle class families can no longer thrive with one breadwinner, and 
because women speak up and no longer accept to merely stay at home.1047 Ferda 
Cemiloğlu also believes that women in Kurdistan have everything it takes to 
become successful entrepreneurs, and observes that the number of female 
entrepreneurs registered at the Commercial Organisation has increased in the 
previous years. At the same time it is a problem for the region that many women 
are educated very well but do not take up professions once they finish their 
education. They choose to stay at home, or are content to become civil servants, 
but do not invest their knowledge in the private sector.1048 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
United States ‐ Kurdistan Business Council, http://uskbc.org/ (Accessed on 14.07.2013) 
1044 Korektel, “CEO – Ghada Gebara” http://www.korektel.com/top‐links/about‐us/ceo (Accessed on 
27.01.2013) 
1045 Rabar Ruwayada Mustafa, The Kurdish Globe, “'The opportunities are always there, but we need the 
right mindset for it' – Talar Faiq” (31 December 2012) http://www.kurdishglobe.net/display‐
arƟcle.html?id=DCA3483B1F76D860D6B9A36CDE2C203B (Accessed on 27.01.2013) 
1046 Solin Hacador, The Kurdistan Tribune “The Big Success of women Entrepreneurs is a Kurdish Princess” 
(24 December 2011) hƩp://kurdistantribune.com/2011/big‐success‐of‐women‐entrepreneurs‐kurdish‐
princess/ (Accessed on 27.01.2013) 
1047 Mustafa, “'The opportunities are always there”. 
1048 Hacador, “The Big Success of women Entrepreneurs is a Kurdish Princess”. 
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The reason for such a development was explained by a woman, who is currently 
living with her family in Europe, but who is intending to return to Kurdistan: 
“I am intending on opening a shop for cosmetics in Kurdistan. The 
women would love that. My husband is not very fond of the idea, but 
I will do it anyway. As a woman one simply has to fight for 
everything. It is possible to achieve a lot, but one has to fight for 
everything.”1049 
It follows that while the organisational and legal structures may be in place in the 
region, the social circumstances still prevent or impede many women from 
establishing their own businesses or achieving high-level positions in existing 
businesses.  
While it is certainly not possible for all women in the region to reach the position of 
a CEO, the existing female CEOs can play an important role, not only in using their 
skills to support development in the region, but also in opening up possibilities for 
other women. Increasing gender equality at the top can be another way of 
supporting the development of equality in general, through role models facilitating 
changes on the ground. This has already happened, although only to a limited 
extent: 
The Kurdish population seems very much in favour, at least in principle, of 
increasing gender equality at a higher level, with nearly three quarters of the 
interviewees indicating that they would support such a development.1050 
Nevertheless, in practice, the concept that men should be in leading positions is 
still embedded in society. Interestingly there were more women than men who 
clearly stated that they did not think that women should be in positions of power. 
Many such women were from well-off families, and would have the possibility of 
reaching positions of power. Especially noteworthy were young women with a high 
standard of education and otherwise vocal supporters of women’s rights believed 
                                                            
1049 Interview CH, Vienna on 05/11/2012 
1050 See e.g. Interview AP, Sulaimaniya on 18/05/2012; Interview AQ, Sulaimaniya on 19/05/2012; Interview 
AV, Sulaimaniya on 28/05/2012; Interview BC, Erbil on 25/06/212; Interview BD, Erbil on 25/06/2012 
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that they did not have the chance to achieve high positions or should not aspire to 
such positions.1051  
Many of the younger men especially were of the opinion that while there should be 
few women in positions of power in order to have some balance, there should not 
be too many.1052  
The general opinions of the interviewees demonstrated once more that the legal 
structures and framework which already exist are not yet embedded in people’s 
thinking or put into practice.  
But it should thereby not be forgotten that the vast majority of people surveyed 
believed that there should be more women in positions of power. These included 
both women and men, although the women, and especially young educated 
women, were in the majority. The men included middle aged and religious men. 
The people interviewed, who were in favour of a higher percentage of women’s 
inclusion, were of the opinion that a higher number of women in high positions 
would be positive for their personal, as well as the region’s development. Their 
reasons included the following: in order not to forget women’s rights;1053 simply 
because there are currently not enough women in these positions;1054 or because 
women as well as men should also have the chance to achieve high office,1055 
especially those with the same or equivalent education. At the same time they also 
reasoned that women are sometimes better than men in certain areas,1056 that this 
creates more balance in society1057 and that it is especially important for women to 
be in high positions, in order to free themselves.1058 Finally it was argued that a 
                                                            
1051 See e.g. Interview AM, Erbil on 27/04/2012; Interview AW, Sulaimaniya on 01/06/2012; Interview BG, 
Erbil on 02/07/2012; Interview AI, Erbil on 16/04/2012; Interview BF, Erbil on 29/06/2012; Interview BU, 
Erbil on 14/07/2012 
1052 Interview AF, Erbil on 09/04/2012; Interview AX, Sulaimaniya on 03/06/2012; Interview BK, Erbil on 
12/07/2012 
1053 Interview BV, Sulaimaniya on 06/08/2012 
1054 Interview AK, Erbil on 20/04/2012 
1055 Interview AT, Sulaimaniya on 24/05/2012 
1056 Interview BH, Erbil on 05/07/2012 
1057 Interview AO, Sulaimaniya on 13/05/2012 
1058 Interview BN, Erbil on 17/07/2012 
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society cannot develop and move forward without the involvement of women at all 
levels including positions of power.1059  
The prevailing opinion was that there should be more women in positions of power. 
This view was mostly qualified by the reservation that women should only have 
certain positions, if they have the necessary abilities and personal qualities. It was 
very important to the interviewees that women, as well as men, only advanced to a 
high position if they had the capability. For many, it was especially important that 
such people live according to the law and are not corrupt. They did not care 
whether there was a man or a woman on top, if they were qualitatively good. They 
did not support the notion of having somebody in the top position merely because 
he or she was a man or a woman.1060 A middle aged teacher expressed this view 
as follows: “In several areas women can have good roles, but not in others. The 
distribution is dependent on the ability of each person”.1061 In this regard the 
people’s opinions represented gender equal ideas at a very high level. By stating 
that it should be ability that counts irrespective of gender, social class, ethnic 
background or religious belief, the interviewees were supporting the concept of 
utopian gender equality.  
With reference to the practical aspects of women’s access to high positions, 
opinions were split. Some interviewees believed that no further development is 
necessary, as enough has already been achieved.1062 Others disagreed including a 
28 year old house wife who was of the view that women have little chance of 
achieving higher positions, as they have no say and are not accepted by men in 
the working environment. She added that a large number of men in positions of 
power will not readily change, “as the society believes in this and women will only 
be let into these type of positions if the thinking of the whole society will 
change.”1063 In addition it was noted that the concept of positive discrimination was 
                                                            
1059 Interview CF, Vienna on 16/11/2012 
1060 Interview AZ, Sulaimaniya on 06/06/2012; Interview AU, Sulaimaniya on 28/05/2012; Interview BT, Erbil 
on 24/07/2012; Interview BW, Sulaimaniya on 06/08/2012; Interview BQ, Erbil on 21/07/2012 
1061 Interview BA, Erbil on 21/06/2012 
1062 Interview AI, Erbil on 16/04/2012 
1063 Interview AY, Sulaimaniya on 04/06/2012 
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not well received by many, who believed that everybody in the region should have 
the same opportunities.1064 
Despite the above contradictory statements, the reality is that men and women are 
still seen by many as having their specific roles, and that it is not acceptable for 
everyone to aspire to every available post. To underling this point one young 
doctor explained in a half joking way that “women should certainly be in positions 
of power, but only in the finance authorities, as women are better in dealing with 
money than men are.”1065 It became clear through other remarks and by observing 
their lives that it was very important to many interviewees that every person “is on 
their respective place”. While people then added that this place could be anywhere 
and that women could aspire to the same positions as men, provided they had the 
abilities, in practice it was most often the case that a “woman’s place” was in the 
house and with the family.1066  
While the interviews revealed an in principle positive attitude when it came to 
gender equality in higher positions, it could be seen that many women with realistic 
hopes for such positions, feel barred and do not achieve them in the end. This 
results in a loss of human resources for the region, and a resulting  loss of potential 
development. One way to counter this situation was through the introduction and 
support for the microfinance sector: 
1. Raising Economic Productivity – The Microfinance Sector  
As discussed previously, peace and economic development go hand in hand. 
Peace is a prerequisite for economic growth and investment, while economic 
development can help diminish the likelihood of social unrest and ultimately armed 
conflict. To support economic development it is not enough to improve employment 
opportunities in the public sector, or in private companies through foreign 
investment. Citizens need to have the opportunity to build up businesses 
themselves. In order for women to be economically independent and to generate 
their own living through business, they need, as a prerequisite, the secure right to 
                                                            
1064 Interview AD, Erbil on 08/04/2012 
1065 Interview AN, Erbil on 03/05/2012 
1066 Interview AU, Sulaimaniya on 28/05/2012; Interview BM, Erbil on 13/07/2012 
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property,1067 as well as access to either macro, or micro credit.1068 Small 
businesses, especially in the rural regions, can provide women with more flexibility 
and with the ability to support their family, to develop themselves, and to contribute 
to national development. Further, the women are not dependent on an employer, 
do not need to keep fixed hours or travel far.   
In Kurdistan it has been normal for women contribute to the household income by 
working at their own small business, generally from home. Several women 
explained that they sewed clothes or weaved carpets to earn some money for 
themselves and the family especially during times of war.1069 
In order to start such a business, however small, capital is needed. Commercial 
banks often attach conditions to their loans, which numerous women in a post-
conflict situation are unable to meet. They therefore cannot obtain a loan.1070 
Further, today’s trade liberalization, especially on an international level, favours 
large and medium producers over small ones. In many countries women, 
especially from poorer backgrounds, do not have the same access as men to credit 
as well as modern technologies and marketing know-how. They are therefore not 
able to participate in the current market in the same way as their male 
counterparts.1071 
In response to these difficulties faced especially by women, a new system has 
been developed, as an adjunct to the formal loan system, to provide the poorer 
population with the opportunity of acquiring loans and opening businesses: the 
system of micro-loans, as pioneered by Muhammad Yunus, Nobel Peace Prize 
winner of 2006. Through his program millions of Bangladeshis, mostly women, 
were able to start their own businesses. Today micro-credit projects are being 
funded across Asia, Latin America and Africa and they play an important role in the 
development of these countries.1072 Many of the projects target especially women, 
                                                            
1067 Addison and Brück, Making Peace Work, 107. 
1068 Ibid. p.115 
1069 Interview CH, Vienna on 05/11/2012; Interview CD, Vienna on 21/10/2012 
1070 Zuckermann and Greenberg, “The Gender Dimensions of Post‐Conflict Reconstruction,” 74. 
1071 Bakker and Silvey, Beyond States and Markets, 43. 
1072 Michael Kevane, Women and Development in Africa, How Gender works (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2004) 160. 
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as it is said that these are most successful.1073 Microfinance is seen as part of the 
solution to reduce poverty and to create and reconstruct job opportunities.1074 In 
recent years microfinance has become increasingly important to the international 
community, and has been inter alia deployed to countries at a conflict 
transformation stage.  
In Iraq there is a microfinance sector, which includes fourteen Microfinance 
Institutions (MFIs), which operate in all of the 18 provinces to provide financial 
services for the 7.1 million poor or low-income people in Iraq.1075 Microfinance 
started in Iraq in 2003 and it is funded through US Government sources.1076 In 
2007 the Iraqi government established microfinance programs as well through the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and through the Ministry of Industry and 
Minerals.1077 As noted above, one of the development strategies for the country is 
to expand micro finance programs, especially for women.1078 
The number of active clients in 2010 was 75,182, of which an average of 16 per 
cent were women. Even though the interest rates are comparably high1079 the 
availability of small loans to poor people gives them the opportunity to build up their 
lives in a way, which might not be otherwise possible.1080  
According to Tijara the microfinance industry in Iraq has a priority to reach women, 
as they have high success rates in terms of repayment as well as a positive socio-
economic impact on their families. In order to support the involvement of women, 
MFIs have actively hired female loan officers, which in 2010 represent 19 per cent 
of all such staff. 1081  
                                                            
1073 Engelhardt, Starke Frauen für den Frieden, 150. 
1074 USAID Iraq, Provincial Economic Growth Program, State of Iraq’s Microfinance Industry (Tijara, June 
2011) 15. 
1075 USAID Iraq, State of Iraq’s Microfinance Industry (Tijara, June 2010) 5. 
1076 USAID Iraq, Provincial Economic Growth Program, 15. 
1077 Ibid.p.16 
1078 IAU, Iraq, The National Development Strategy, 63. 
1079 12% to 18% per annum 
1080 USAID Iraq, Provincial Economic Growth Program, 18. 
1081 Ibid.p.38 
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Women have so far used the loans from the microfinance organisations to build 
sewing businesses1082, frozen food businesses1083, beauty salons1084 and a 
kindergarten.1085 
Despite certain success stories, the microfinance sector has still got some work 
ahead to release the whole entrepreneurial potential of Iraqi women due to 
women’s often limited social and economic mobility within the region.1086 
Micro-finance programmes are said to be positive, especially for poorer women. 
They are said to close the gender gap in areas such as holding custody of income, 
ownership of and control over assets, productive versus reproductive roles, gaining 
access to domestic and community economic/other resources; and 
indebtedness.1087 Women additionally get more confidence in dealing with banks, 
markets and the public in general. 
As argued by Stefan Lovgren, micro-credit projects help people to lift themselves 
out of poverty. They encourage social responsibility, through the repayments of the 
loan, and consequently strengthen the whole community and help prevent social 
unrest.1088 Even though the banks charge relatively high interest rates, their 
repayment rates are over 95 per cent. One reason is that borrowers are placed into 
groups and if a member of the group does not pay, the others are liable for their 
debt and might suffer penalties. This joint liability leads to people working together 
and to a sense of commitment.1089  The outcome of the work will result in better 
living standards, better health and improved opportunities for education1090 and 
consequently less reason for conflict.  
                                                            
1082 Ibid.p.20 
1083 USAID Iraq, State of Iraq’s Microfinance Industry, 14. 
1084 Ibid.p.17 
1085 Ibid.p.47 
1086 USAID Iraq, Provincial Economic Growth Program, 38. 
1087 Johnson (ed.), Small Change or Real Change?, 54. 
1088 Stefan Lovgren, for National Geographic News, “Nobel Peace Prize Goes to Micro‐Loan Pioneers” 
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(Accessed on 15.09.2011) 
1089 Kevane, Women and Development in Africa,” 160/161. 
1090 Ibid. p.166 
  
Page | 234  
 
Academics supporting microcredit projects are of the opinion that they enable 
women to improve their standing in their households, and thus gives them more 
influence and freedom.1091 
At the same time, feminists and academics, critical of micro credits, argue that 
money is not sufficient to change gender relations. They claim that even if 
microcredit programmes are successful from the outside, in terms of loan 
repayment rates and growth of memberships, they do not challenge the existing 
social hierarchies. According to some researchers, such as Fernando and Heston, 
they even validate these hierarchies.1092 It is argued that men may take the loans 
from the women, or that the women spend the money in the way wanted by the 
men. Kabeer even went so far as to suggest that the micro credits provide a ‘safety 
net’ for the poor, but do not help them to leave poverty behind.1093 It is therefore 
questionable, whether microfinance projects really give the women more freedom 
or empowerment.  
As part of the field research in Kurdistan, it was observed that none of the 
interviewees questioned on the subject had considered applying for a micro-credit 
loan, or knew anyone who had done so. The majority of the respondees were not 
even aware that these possibilities exist.  
While the microfinance sector is certainly important in providing opportunities, the 
steps taken by the government and the different organizations have not yet been 
sufficient to make the sector accessible to the whole of the local population. In 
addition, while the microfinance sector might give the women involved certain 
opportunities, it should not be seen as a substitute for gender inclusion measures 
for national loan systems, or for medium or large companies. Banks as well as 
companies should be aware that their economic policies may intensify social 
tension and contribute to the potential for conflict.1094  
                                                            
1091 Bakker and Silvey, Beyond States and Markets, 73. 
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In conclusion, while the economy in general, and employment generating in 
particular, may support progress towards gender equality and positive peace, there 
is still insufficient progress in the Kurdistan Region. Basically only women from the 
higher classes of society have access to well-paid jobs, and not enough is being 
done to raise women’s general economic activity. This leads to a loss of resources 
for the region, as well as reduced potential for personal development.  
There is a problem that macro-economic measures are largely decided by the men 
in power, and thus lack a gender balanced point of view. The result is that the 
current economic system dose not serve the the majority of Kurdistan’s women 
very well. This was apparent within society, where gender equal employment and 
economic activity were seen as positive in principle but not realisable in practice.  
The various measures taken by the government, such as the appointment of a 
female Minister of Labour, the inclusion of gender issues in the national strategy 
plan, the employment of women within government institutions and the support of 
microfinance projects all look great on the surface and are cited by regional 
officials. However, progress towards female inclusion in the economy and the flow 
on benefits to  national as well as the individual development of the people are far 
from exhausted.  
Social perceptions on women and work seem hardly to have changed. While some 
women have made it to the top, others are struggling under a double or triple 
burden, or are unable to get any job at all, which could place their families in 
precarious situations.  
The lack of support for all levels of society within the current economic structure is 
likely to have resulted in a substantial under-utilisation of the nation’s human 
resources. That many women are unable to generate income risks impoverishment 
of certain parts of the population and enhances the possibility of future conflict.  
As yet, the economic measures taken to redress gender inequality do not seem to 
be having a great effect. This lack of a gender inclusive economic system hampers 
development of equality in the private sphere. Many women wish to, or have to, 
generate their own income. However, the current system often makes this 
  
Page | 236  
 
impossible, and places many of those, who must work in an even more restricted 
situation.  
At the same time it is conceded that the necessary legal and administrative 
provisions for women’s inclusion in the economic sphere exist, and that some 
women who were either supported by their immediate environment or stood up 
against the social mores, made it to the top. As with female politicians, these 
women can function as role models and lay the foundation for the future.  
These women were able to struggle through a patriarchal structure and ensure 
their personal ‘empowerment’ on a greater scale. However a change of the system 
as a whole is needed, which improves the working conditions, gives women from 
all social backgrounds opportunities to work, provides women with enhanced rights 
to receive assets and recognizes the economic value of ‘non-marketed activities’. 
Once this is achieved, positive peace will be one step closer.  
One way to guarantee a basis for providing equal opportunities for women in the 
work force is to firstly provide them with equal opportunities in education: 
VI. Gender, Women and Society – The Power of Education 
“Education is a fundamental human right and it is decisive to the development of 
individuals (men and women) and societies” 1095 
Education can form people’s minds and be employed as a tool to influence 
transformation in any way desired. While it offers the skills and knowledge 
necessary for economic development and the transfer of social and cultural values, 
education can also be used politically for the development of particular ideologies, 
from liberal ideas to extremism.1096 
                                                            
1095 UNESCO Iraq Office, Literacy Network for Iraq, “Gender and Education for All” 
http://www.lifeforiraq.org/en/content/gender‐and‐education‐all (Accessed on 09.01.2013) 
1096 Fiona Leach and Mairead Dume (ed.), Education, Conflict and Reconciliation, International Perspectives 
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For instance, education has been used as a tool to indoctrinate and to fuel 
radicalism, chauvinism and militarism.1097 Schools have been transformed into 
indoctrination centers, where children are made to sing patriotic songs, cite a 
dictator’s speeches and salute his picture in school, as it was done under the 
Saddam regime in Iraq.1098  
But just as education can fuel conflict, it provides all the tools necessary to achieve 
equality, development and peace. As explained by the World Bank:  
"Education is one of the most powerful instruments societies 
have for reducing deprivation and vulnerability: it helps lift 
earnings potential, expands labor mobility, promotes the health of 
parents and children, reduces fertility and child mortality, and 
affords the disadvantaged a voice in society and the political 
system".1099 
Education can thereby support personal as well as national economic 
development, through providing people with the ability to work and consequently to 
feed themselves and their families, as well as to boost the country’s economy.1100  
In addition, literacy and critical thinking provides people with the opportunity to 
enhance their knowledge, and hence to shape their personal outlooks and form 
their own opinions on all life matters. This empowers them to take part in political 
and other decision-making. 1101  
Positive or critical education can thereby lead to a broader understanding by 
people of people, which can in turn result in a lessening of discrimination, as well 
as ethnic, religious and cultural impediments. Education will in the long run lead to 
a more peaceful society and can therefore also have a profound influence on social 
equality. Many people, whether in conflict situations or not, grow up with certain 
prejudices which have either been created through particular experiences or which 
have been nourished by their immediate surroundings. In the extreme, prejudices 
                                                            
1097 Clayton Thyne, “ABC’s, 123’s, and the Golden Rule: The Pacifying Eﬀect of EducaƟon on Civil War, 19080‐
1999” International Studies Quarterly 50(4) (2006): 738. 
1098 Al‐Ali, Iraqi Women, 120. 
1099 Thyne, “ABC’s, 123’s, and the Golden Rule,” 735. 
1100 Alice Tuyizere, Peace, Gender and Development, The Role of Religion and Culture (Kampala: Makerere 
University, Fountain Publishers Ltd, 2007) 194. 
1101 Ibid.p.194 
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can lead to a willingness to kill people from another group, simply because of a 
wrong perception of that group. Education can be used to work against such 
prejudices. 1102 As discussed above, a society in which people believe in the idea of 
equality is less likely to start a violent conflict, than a society which does not 
believe in equality, whether such inequality is based on ethics, religion, or 
gender.1103 
As already argued by Bertha von Suttner1104, the achievement of more equality 
between women and men lies partly in education. Education can contribute to a 
more equitable relationship between the genders,1105 through better understanding, 
as well as the provision of more equal opportunities. 
Do all types of education lead to more equality? Can education do more harm than 
good? Is it truly possible to achieve peace through education? What is the impact 
on a woman’s individual standing, whether or not she attended school? 
As argued by academics, such as Naila Kafeer, increased participation of women 
in all levels of the education system will change their positions in society and 
consequently change society as a whole. Studies have shown that power 
relationships within and outside of the home change with the level of education. 
Educated women are less likely to suffer from domestic violence.1106 Knowledge 
thereby goes together with power,1107 and arguably has a positive influence on 
women’s personal development. At the same time gender inclusive education is 
said to be greatly influential on the development of a region as a whole. The way 
an education system operates, whether it supports equal access to high quality 
education and training, and in which way it communicates particular values to the 
group taught, will influence whether conflicts between particular groups are 
ameliorated or inflamed.1108 Education is therefore seen as a tool not only to 
decrease social tensions and prejudices, but also as a first step to improve 
                                                            
1102 Ibid.p.4 
1103 See: Caprioli and Boyer, “Gender, Violence and International Crisis,” 509. 
1104 Sandra Hedinger, Frauen über Kried und Frieden (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2000) 95. 
1105 Tuyizere, Peace, Gender and Development, 194. 
1106 Kabeer, “Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment,” 17. 
1107 Hartwig, Rural African Women as Subjects of Social and Political Change, 144. 
1108 Leach and Dume (ed.), Education, Conflict and Reconciliation, 22. 
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economic development. As part of Iraq’s National Development Plan for 2010 to 
2014, it is planned to develop intellectual know-how to increase economic 
productivity, the employment rate and the GDP as well as to reduce differences 
between urban and rural areas. It is therefore tacitly acknowledged that access to 
quality education, particularly for vulnerable groups, which include women, is vital 
to ensuring participation in economic activities and consequently in the economic 
development of the country as a whole.1109 
Considering the large number of relevant international conventions and 
declarations, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICECSR, 
the CEDAW, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Millennium 
Development Goals and many more, it would appear that there is universal 
agreement at the international level for the need to achieve gender equality in 
education and to provide education for every child. Despite this clear intention, the 
international community has as yet only partially achieved equality in education.1110  
The majority of school drop outs and illiterate people around the world are still girls 
and women.1111 
With respect to gender equality and gender parity Iraq, and thus also the Kurdistan 
Region, they lie within the lower range of countries in a world-wide comparison,1112 
and there is a growing demand for improvement. 
As explained by UNESCO’s World Data on Education report from 2011, education 
in Iraq has always been highly dependent on the leader’s objective at that point of 
time.1113 There have been times when religion was at the forefront or nationalism 
and other times when the education of women and girls have been more 
supported. According to the report, the overall aim of education in Iraq until the end 
of the 1990s was to construct an “enlightened” generation, who believe in God, are 
                                                            
1109 UNESCO Iraq Office, Literacy IniƟaƟve for Empowerment in Iraq 2010‐2015 (Literacy Needs Assessment 
Report, UNESCO) 19. 
1110 Christopher Colclough, “Achieving Gender Equality in Education: What Does It Take?” Prospects XXXIV/1 
(2004): 3. 
1111 Ibid. p.4 
1112 UNESCO, World Atlas of Gender Equality in Education (Paris: UNESCO, 2012) 
1113 UNESCO, World Data on Education, Iraq, “Principles and general objectives of education”. 
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loyal to their country and dedicated to the larger Arab nation, but who also maintain 
a scientific approach to reasoning.1114  
As part of the political shift in 2003, the education system needed reform to 
respond to the shift in society. The new curriculum framework, which was drafted 
with the support of UNESCO, aims at underpinning the faith in God, and respect 
for all, as well as putting the family back in the centre of attention and the 
foundation of society.1115 Education was thereby used once more to convey the 
ideologies of the leaders and society to the next generation, as well as a tool to 
support the reconstruction of the country.  
It is observed that little trust is put into education by the population at large. Only 
very few people were of the opinion that political education and an anti-war 
programme, from Kindergarten to University, is needed and would change people’s 
outlook on war and consequently its likelihood.1116 Only few of the interviewees 
were of the view that intellectuals are the driving force for change in the region and 
that a country can only be rebuilt on the basis of thought and reason and that this 
can only be achieved by the intellectuals.1117 For instance, as explained by an 
elderly blacksmith, their know-how is needed to build up the region and also to 
educate the next generation, so that they will not make the same mistakes 
again.1118 However, when asked about conflict prevention techniques, many more 
people believed in the power of politicians, than in the power of education.1119 
The following chapter will discuss exactly how far education has come in the region 
and how it influences the development of gender equality and consequently conflict 
transformation as a whole. Firstly a more in depth review will be presented of the 
analyses of generations of researchers on the influence of the different forms of 
education on peace and equality. This will be followed by a discussion of legal 
                                                            
1114 Ibid.  
1115 UNESCO, International Bureau of Education, World Data on Education, Iraq (IBE/2011/CP/WDE/IQ, 7th 
EdiƟon 2010/2011) “Principles and general objecƟves of educaƟon” 
1116 Interview BI, Erbil on 08/07/2012; Interview CF, Vienna on 16/11/2012; Interview CI, Vienna on 
26/10/2012 
1117 Interview AN, Erbil on 03/05/2012; Interview BE, Erbil on 26/06/2012 
1118 Interview BN, Erbil on 17/07/2012 
1119 See e.g. Interview BW, Sulaimaniya on 08/08/2012; Interview BS, Erbil on 24/07/2012; Interview AS, 
Sulaimaniya on 23/05/2012; Interview AM, Erbil on 27/04/2012; Interview CI, Vienna on 26/10/2012 
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options related to gender and education in the Kurdistan Region with more 
concrete and practical illustrations. These will include examples of children’s 
schooling and higher education, gender equality and gender parity, i.e. equal 
access to education and the quality of education. From the analyses, conclusions 
will be drawn on how the different forms of education are currently supporting 
positive transformation within the region and which further developments will be 
needed to ensure full gender equality and sustainable peace. Finally, the adults’ 
role in the development of the region will be considered from an educational 
perspective, by concentrating on the education of women through literacy 
programs and on women’s roles as educators of the new generation. The different 
chapters will then lead to the conclusion that while education is certainly seen as a 
priority in the region and huge developments are currently taking place, which will 
undoubtedly lead to positive economic development, the current education system 
as constructed at the moment, supports social inequalities rather diminishes them. 
Education has therefore not led either to gender equality and hence the elimination 
of conflict potential in the private sphere, or to a reduction of conflict potential in the 
public sphere. 
1. A Theoretical Overview 
“In many conflicts around the world, education is part of the problem, not the 
solution.”1120 
Reflecting on education as a separate factor influencing conflict and conflict 
transformation is an emerging field of study. It has been considered by several 
academics in analysing current situations, and options for the future, in conflict 
ridden areas of the world, such as Rwanda, Palestine and Nepal.1121 Different 
academics ascribe to education various functions and roles, which all in one way or 
another influence conflict within society.  
While the positive impact of education must always be recognized, it is also 
important for academics to point out the devastating effects that education can 
                                                            
1120 Bush/Saltarelli quoted in Klaus Seitz, Bildung und Konflikt, Die Rolle von Bildung bei der Entstehung, 
Prävention und Bewältigung gesellschaftlicher Krisen – Konsequenzen für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit 
(Rossdorf: TZ‐VerlagsgesellschaŌ, 2004) 49. 
1121 Leach and Dume (ed.), Education, Conflict and Reconciliation. 
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have on the population. Klaus Seitz especially underlines the importance of not 
only seeing education as a measure to prevent or overcome conflict, but also as a 
tool, which can be used to support social differences and inequalities within a 
society and consequently increase the potential for conflict.1122 Education has been 
used in the past, for example, to promote propaganda concerning national identity 
and has consequently exacerbated social tensions and fuelled violent 
escalations.1123 
Seitz is only one of many scholars who argue that education and schooling is “the 
primary vehicle through which society produces and legitimates inequality”.1124 As 
demonstrated by Svi Shapiro the education of children is influenced by factors 
such as race and wealth, or gender. She argues that schools pursue a “hidden 
curriculum”, which gives more chances to some than to others, and consequently 
decides on the children’s future life style long before their adult life.1125 From a 
gender perspective, the formal education system is thus seen as reinforcing a 
traditional hegemonic masculinity, as explained by Davies, and discouraging 
greater gender equality.1126 
When the inequality within the school system augments other conflict promoting 
factors, education in general and schooling in particular can have a role in creating 
and sustaining conflict, as shown by Sarah Parker and Kay Standing using the 
example of Nepal. By not addressing inequalities within society, whether social, 
ethical, religious or gender inequalities, schooling contributes to the alienation of 
certain elements of the population. This is a problem which cannot be solved by 
merely providing enhanced access to education. As emphasized by Parker and 
Standing, the solution involves creating a similar range of schools and quality of 
teaching. If parts of the population have access only to inappropriate educational 
facilities and poor teaching quality, violence at school will be high and the drop-out 
                                                            
1122 Seitz, Bildung und Konflikt, 48/49. 
1123 Ibid.p.51 
1124 Ibid.p.82. 
1125 Svi Shapiro, Educating Youth for a World beyond violence, A Pedagogy for Peace (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010) 83. 
1126 See Davies (2004) in Seitz, Bildung und Konflikt, 53. 
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rate even higher with the consequent impact on the children’s future 
opportunities.1127 
According to Salmi there are four different forms of violence in education: 
“deliberate injury to the integrity of human life”, such physical violence and 
weapons in schools, “indirect violation of the right to survival”, such as inequality in 
accessing education, or unequal chances in education, “deprivation of fundamental 
political rights”, such as the lack of democracy and the right of participation in 
school and “deprivation of higher rights”, such as the dominance of certain learning 
content over another, or the suppression of languages or points of views of ethnic 
minorities.1128 
One may compare the forms of violence outlined above to the ones discussed by 
Galtung, which are said to determine the existence of peace within society. Thus 
Salmi’s “indirect violation of the right to survival”, and the “deprivation of 
fundamental political rights” can be related to Galtung’s “structural violence”, while 
the “deprivation of higher rights” can be seen as equivalent to “cultural violence”. 
Considering that these different forms of violence are present in many education 
systems and schools around the world, it may be concluded that in practice 
schools and other educational institutions are often counterproductive to the 
establishment of positive peace. 
While the potential for education to fuel conflict needs to be understood, Seitz also 
recognises the other side of the coin. Through education the very strategies used 
to support the development of violent conflict may also be used to support peace. If 
schools and other educational institutions have a culturally and gender sensitive 
curriculum and encourage all students to support democracy and participation in 
community activities as well as to reduce physical violence within the student 
environment, they have the potential to decrease the use of violence within society. 
This can be done by providing scholarships for children from less advantaged 
families, to teach multiple languages and points-of-views, to teach critical thinking 
                                                            
1127 Leach and Dume (ed.), Education, Conflict and Reconciliation, 53. 
1128 As explained in Seitz, Bildung und Konflikt, 52. 
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and to support political participation in a peaceful way.1129 If social inequalities and 
exclusion within education can be ameliorated, the basis will be laid for 
establishing peace and preventing violent conflict.1130 
On the basis of this hypothesis, several scholars have argued only through 
education can peace be established and future conflict prevented. This starts with 
the building of new schools after a time of violent conflicts. As argued by Clayton 
Thyne, education is an especially powerful influence following violent conflict, as 
educational investment provides a signal to the people that actions are being taken 
to improve their lives and to give them the tools needed to generate political, 
economic and social stability as well as to resolve disputes peacefully.1131 Parents 
who see schools being built will be more positive about their children’s future and 
young adults who have the possibility of attending adequate higher education will 
see a better future for themselves and be less likely to become involved in 
violence.1132 
Scholars such as Eifler and Seifter further argue that it is of crucial importance for a 
long term change at a time of conflict transformation to make primary, secondary 
and university educational opportunities available to all, as well as to support adult 
learning skills.1133 Education can then play a positive role in economic 
development, political decision making and social life in general, and thus increase 
understanding and reduce hatred against ‘the other’. Education can be used as a 
tool to make people aware of past atrocities and to teach them to react differently 
should conflict reoccur. 
A strong educational system is also critical for the maintenance of democracy, 
since it teaches people to participate as well as to respect others’ views.1134 As 
stated by Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer, people are more able to participate in 
                                                            
1129 Seitz Klaus, Bildung und Konflikt, Die Rolle von Bildung bei der Entstehung, Prävention und Bewältigung 
gesellscahftlicher Krisen – Konsequenyen für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (TZ‐Verlagsgesellschaft, 
Rossdorf 2004) p.56 
1130 Ibid.p.59 
1131 Thyne, “ABC’s, 123’s, and the Golden Rule,” 733. 
1132 Ibid.p.735 
1133 Eifler and Seifert, Gender Dynamics and Post‐Conflict Reconstruction, 85. 
1134 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, „Winning the Peace“.  
  
Page | 245  
 
democracies because education provides them with a better understanding of their 
country’s politics.1135 According to Thyne, schools teach people the social, legal, 
political and interpersonal principles, which are expected of them as “good 
citizens”, as well as the consequences of not observing these norms. Schools bring 
together people from different backgrounds and origins and teach them to work 
together peacefully, while giving them the chance to succeed in life.1136 In addition, 
in schools, children are taught values and respect for each other, as well as the 
right to speak and to listen. As a consequence the right for everybody to participate 
in politics can be one of the lessons learnt.1137  
Finally it has been reasoned by Thyne that an educated population will be less 
likely to resort to conflict as a first option, since they are more likely to be able to 
express their grievances through peaceful means and to be able to distinguish 
between a bad government and a government which simply takes time to 
overcome a difficult economic situation.1138 
Internationally it has been recognized that specific type of education should be 
used within the school curriculum as well as part of university courses to reduce 
the likelihood of conflict. Within the campaign for a Culture of Peace, the 
international community saw education as one of the highest priorities.1139 Projects 
and initiatives have been started by UNESCO as well as regional organizations 
and national institutions to support this education for peace.1140 
While these arguments for education as a tool for conflict prevention and for 
reconstruction have validity, it would be wrong to take them for granted within any 
education system, as they are dependent on surrounding factors. For instance, as 
explained by Semra Demir, for peace education to be successful teachers are 
                                                            
1135 Edward Glaeser, Giacomo Ponzetto and Andrei Shleifer, “Why does democracy need education?” Journal 
of Economic Growth 12(2) (2007): 81. 
1136 Thyne, “ABC’s, 123’s, and the Golden Rule,” 737. 
1137 Glaeser, PonzeƩo and Shleifer, “Why does democracy need educaƟon?,” 82. 
1138 Thyne, “ABC’s, 123’s, and the Golden Rule,” 750. 
1139 Ratkovic and Wintersteiner (Eds.), Yearbook Peace Culture 2010, 20. 
1140 Majid Tehranian (ed.), Bridging a Gulf, Peacebuilding in West Asia (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003) 222. 
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needed, who are tolerant, socially sensitive and who have the adequate 
knowledge.1141  
As with other aspects of society, the education system is in need of transformation 
before it can ensure a positive influence on the population. It is especially after the 
end of violent conflict, when change is necessary and wanted, that the education 
system can be revamped to support equality and positive conflict transformation. 
In order to support positive development within society the concept of “peace 
education” has been developed. Peace education aims to create a culture of peace 
based on equality, justice, democracy, human rights, solidarity and tolerance and 
thereby diminish violent behaviour and conflict potential within society.1142 Through 
peace education pupils will be taught to think critically and analytically and will 
thereby gain skills and knowledge which are a prerequisite to achieving the above 
aims.1143  
Peace education is therefore designed to transform thinking which has previously 
supported oppressive societal structures and consequently the use of violence as a 
mean to resolve conflicts. Peace education aims to communicate skills like 
reflection, cooperation, listening and problem-solving, to create an attitude which 
fosters peace. Peace education is thereby not limited to a certain age group, but it 
is applicable to people from all paths of life and at all ages.1144 To implement peace 
education, a reform of the old education system is needed. 
In their 2003 CPR Working Paper “Central: America: Education Reform in a Post-
Conflict Setting, Opportunities and Challenges” Marques and Bannon established 
several recommendations for a possible positive education reform in societies 
arising from violent conflicts. These were based on examples from El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Nicaragua and included the need: 
                                                            
1141 Semra Demir, “An Overview of Peace Education in Turkey: Definitions, Difficulties and Suggestions: A 
Qualitative Analysis” Educational Sciences: Theory & Practice 11(4) (2011): 1740. 
1142 Ibid.p.1739 
1143 Ibid.  
1144 Susan Opotow, Janet Gerson and Sarah Woodside, “From Moral Exclusion to Moral Inclusion: Theory for 
Teaching Peace” Theory into Practice 44(4) (2005): 305. 
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 To establish a clear vision of the reform wanted, which is in consensus with 
society, 
 To openly discuss sensitive topics, such as cultural discrimination, 
 To initiate the practical steps for implementation as early as possible, 
 To gain the support of the most important social actors, 
 To depoliticise the education system, 
 To decentralise the education system and to give parents the opportunity to 
participate, and 
 To establish appropriate curricula.1145 
As will be seen in the subsequent chapters, initiatives have been taken in the 
Kurdistan Region to create a reform closely following the recommendations of 
Marques and Bannon. While these reforms have led to visible progress, it is still 
arguable that education is not reaching its full potential within the region. There are 
two reasons, which are necessary to ensure that education is truly used to prevent 
rather than further conflict, in addition to those listed above, namely: the application 
of the reform uniformly across the whole population; and the implementation by all 
means necessary to ensure a cultural, religious, social and gender sensitive 
education including critical thinking.  
As explained by Betty Reardon, critical education can filter religion, culture, politics 
and international dealings through a variety of lenses and thereby empower people 
to better able support prosperity in a country and maintain a situation free of 
violence. If people stop seeing things in black and white or simply “good” and 
“bad”, they will be more open to others, and will consequently resist the urge to use 
violence as a first option. Education thereby gives the opportunity to develop ideas 
and facilitate a space for open thoughts, which will lead to a culture of peace.1146 
                                                            
1145 Jose Marques and Ian Bannon, Central Amercia: Eduation Reform in a Post‐Conflict Setting, 
Opportunities and Challenges (CPR Working Papers, Paper No. 4, April 2003) 20/21. 
1146 Reardon, Education for a culture of peace in a gender perspective, 40. 
  
Page | 248  
 
Clearly the quality of education is the key. The knowledge taught in schools and 
universities can start students questioning traditional thinking and fighting for 
change.1147 
As stipulated by the ICESCR:  
“that education shall be directed to the full development of the 
human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen 
the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They 
further agree that education shall enable all persons to participate 
effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and 
friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, 
and further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance 
of peace.”1148 
Through critical education people can start anticipating and thinking about issues 
which have not yet emerged. As Cynthia Enloe shows, the militarization of the 
nation, and consequently also of women, often starts long before conflict arises. 
Militarism “creeps” into ordinary life. The army uses advertisements as recruitment 
techniques, and thereby influences people to join up.1149 But militarization can be 
more hidden. Food can be shaped like weapons, films can be crafted to convey a 
militarized message, clothing design can reflect a militarized style and toys can 
come on the market which celebrate war.1150 If people are made aware of these 
facts, they cannot be influenced so easily. Only if people experience critical and 
free education, will they be able to question political messages and cast a fully 
considered vote at elections and thereby influence the future well-being of their 
country. 
The most important way of ensuring this critical education is by appointing 
appropriate teachers. With reference to Rwanda, John Rutayisire points out that it 
is especially challenging for countries arising from conflict to establish educational 
institutions which will eliminate injustices and discrimination. Teachers are crucial 
                                                            
1147 Glaeser, PonzeƩo and Shleifer, “Why does democracy need educaƟon?,” 78. 
1148 InternaƟonal Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, ArƟcle 13 
1149 Enloe, “Women and Men in the Iraq War”. 
1150 Ford (Review), “ Maneuvers,” 1175. 
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in the process as it is they who are the main medium through which different 
values are transmitted.1151 
For instance, it is the teachers who communicate to their pupils discriminatory or 
harmonious attitudes towards the sexes. When it comes to gender relations, it has 
been established, that greater equality leads to an enhanced rate of development, 
and consequently to the positive transformation of conflict. 
The use of education to promote peace, and the importance of gender equality in 
education as a prerequisite to this goal, are not new ideas. In 1999, as part of the 
Hague Appeal for Peace Conference, the Global Campaign for Peace Education 
(GCPE) was launched to support the development of peace education globally.1152 
Earlier in 1990, a World Declaration on Education for All was adopted in Jomtien, 
Thailand, and later confirmed in Dakar in 2000.1153 It stated that 
“The most urgent priority is to ensure access to, and improve the 
quality of, education for girls and women, and to remove every 
obstacle that hampers their active participation. All gender 
stereotyping in education should be eliminated.”1154 
Arguably it follows that that if men and women both receive adequate education 
their situations will become more balanced, their mutual understanding will 
increase and the country will be less conflict prone. On the basis of Galtung’s 
theory that violence is partly socially constructed,1155 it may be assumed that in 
order to decrease the level of violence, a different social framework needs to be 
constructed. For example, if boys and girls are raised in the same way, the concept 
of manhood as it exists today will be redefined and replaced with the concept of 
equality, which will consequently lead to less use of direct violence.1156 
                                                            
1151 Leach and Dume (ed.), Education, Conflict and Reconciliation, 118. 
1152 Global Campaign for Peace Education, “Campaign Statement” http://www.peace‐ed‐
campaign.org/statement.html (Accessed on 08.01.2013) 
1153 UNESCO, World Education Forum, The Dakar Framework for Action, Education for All: Meeting our 
Collective Commitments (ED‐2000/WS/27, Dakar, Senegal, 26‐28 April 2000) 
1154 See World DeclaraƟon on EducaƟon for All 1990, ArƟcle 3(3) in UNESCO, The Dakar Framework for 
Action, 75. 
1155 Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means, 42/43. 
1156 Ibid.p.46 
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This idea has also been taken up by scholars like Abu-Lughod, who argues that 
women’s education is fundamental for a nation’s development. If women as well as 
are well educated, the whole nation is educated and consequently development is 
advanced.1157 As the UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index shows development is 
highly dependent on the percentage of men and women having at least a 
secondary education: the higher the percentage of educated people, the higher the 
country’s development.1158 
Or as explained by UNESCO,  
“a quality basic education is essential to provide girls and boys with 
the knowledge and skills necessary to take an active role in social, 
economic and political decision-making, to adopt healthy lifestyles 
and to become engaged citizens.”1159 
According to Opotow, Gerson, and Woodside, peace education has been used as 
one of the pillars to diminish gender inequality. By revealing disparities between 
men and women, the oppressive structures leading to these disparities and the 
consequences of the continuation of these disparities, gender inclusiveness can 
increase and societies, as well as the individuals themselves, will be enriched.1160 
Furthermore, it is recognized that education can have a positive effect on women’s 
participation in political and other decision making. Using elections as an example, 
AbuKhalil points out that women in the Arab and other regions today are often still 
influenced by their fathers, brothers and husbands who cast their vote. Women will 
be less able to make an informed decision of their own if they are illiterate.1161 If 
literacy and consequently the access to information increases, the possibility of 
making an informed political decision increases as well. That educated women can 
support development through having a voice in the community has also been 
recognized by the KRG. As put plainly by one KRG representative as part of a 
private interview: “Equality can be achieved through education. Often girls only 
attend primary school, and because of that they cannot be involved in all areas.”  
                                                            
1157 Abu‐Lughod (ed.), Remaking Women, 102. 
1158 UNDP, “Gender Inequality Index and related indicators”. 
1159 UNESCO Iraq Office, “Gender and Education for All”. 
1160 Opotow, Gerson, Woodside, “From Moral Exclusion to Moral Inclusion,” 309. 
1161 AbuKhalil, “Toward the Study of Women and PoliƟcs in the Arab World,” 13. 
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But, as rightly stated by Lila Abu-Lughod, it is not sufficient to give women and girls 
merely the opportunity to access any education, but they are in need of high quality 
education, which is too often not the case.1162 
In addition, according to Christopher Colclough several associated issues have to 
be considered when it comes to promoting gender equality in education. Firstly it 
needs to be acknowledged that educational inequality is both a consequence and a 
cause of wider gender-based discrimination within society. The “right environment” 
has to be provided a basis for girls and women to receive education, such as the 
reform of family law and the passing of more gender-equal legislation, including 
inheritance rights. Furthermore poverty has to be considered through a gender lens 
and measures need to be taken which allow families to survive while sending all 
the children to school. Finally the practices inside the classes need to be 
appropriate for girls. The curriculum, as well as the teachers, need to be gender-
sensitive and girls need to be protected from violence within the schools.1163 
The necessity of a “gender sensitive environment”, not only as part of the pupil-
teacher relationship, but also in the family, and in society as a whole, was 
recognized by UNESCO.1164 In order to provide women and girls with a quality 
education and open the way to improved social and economic development, a 
strategy is needed to end discrimination within the education sectors and to 
promote gender equality. According to UNESCO, four dimensions have to be 
considered when implementing such a strategy: equality of access, equality of the 
learning process, equality of educational outcomes and equality of external 
results.1165 
The following sections will focus on whether and to what extent the first two of 
these dimensions are present in the Kurdistan Region’s education system, and the 
implications for society. The third and fourth dimensions will be discussed in the 
section on the economy. 
                                                            
1162 Abu‐Lughod, “Dialects of Women’s Empowerment,” 87. 
1163 Colclough, “Achieving Gender Equality in Education,” 5‐8. 
1164 UNESCO Iraq Office, “Gender and Education for All”. 
1165 Ibid. 
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To conclude, while the negative consequences of education should not be 
forgotten, the opportunities of achieving positive development through critical 
education equally have to be remembered. Education has the potential to 
contribute to the development of both peaceful co-existence and gender equality. 
2. Legal Foundation 
Today the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has every opportunity of providing their people 
with the best of education.  
Through being a signatory to several international treaties concerning access to 
schooling and training programmes for men as well as women, Iraq, including the 
Kurdistan Region, has agreed to: 
“recognize the right of everyone to education,”1166  
“take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in order to ensure to them equal rights with men in the 
field of education,”1167 and 
“to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical 
support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those 
undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the 
United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children’s 
Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees and other relevant bodies.”1168 
Concerning the education of their citizens, the national, as well as the regional, 
authorities in Iraq are supporting the same line: 
According to Article 3 of the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 everybody has the right to be 
educated in their mother tongue, which gives all people in the Kurdistan Region the 
possibility to access education in their mother tongue.  
Furthermore the constitution stipulates that: 
“First: Education is a fundamental factor for the progress of 
society and is a right guaranteed by the state. Primary education 
                                                            
1166 InternaƟonal Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, ArƟcle 13(1) 
1167 The ConvenƟon on the EliminaƟon of All Forms of DiscriminaƟon Against Women 1979, ArƟcle 10 
1168 UN Security Council ResoluƟon 1325 
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is mandatory and the state guarantees that it shall combat 
illiteracy. 
Second: Free education in all its stages is a right for all Iraqis. 
Third: The State shall encourage scientific research for peaceful 
purposes that serve humanity and shall support excellence, 
creativity, invention, and different aspects of ingenuity. 
Fourth: Private and public education shall be guaranteed, and 
this shall be regulated by law.”1169 
In the Draft Constitution of the Kurdistan Region, corresponding provisions state 
that 
“First: The Government of the Region shall guarantee free 
education at the primary, secondary and university levels.  The 
Government shall also guarantee vocational training and 
technical education.  Education shall be compulsory until the 
completion of the primary level.  
Second: The Government of the Region shall be in charge of the 
campaign against illiteracy. 
Third:  The family is the fundamental core of society.  Therefore, 
mothers and children must be protected, and the economic 
exploitation of children must be prohibited.  
Fourth:  The government of the Region shall guarantee the 
establishment of special homes to protect and care for women 
who have, for social reasons, lost their family security. 
Fifth: All forms of discrimination, violence and abuse in society, 
school, and in the family shall be forbidden.”1170 
In addition, in accordance with its responsibilities, the Kurdish government has set 
itself the task of supporting young people by providing the following opportunities 
namely: to enhance their skills, through education as well as in their leisure times; 
to enhance their moral and national values; to support their involvement in 
economic, social and educational projects; and to encourage their working 
together, as well as democratic practice.1171 
                                                            
1169 ConsƟtuƟon of Iraq 2005, ArƟcle 34 
1170 Draft Constitution of the Kurdistan Region 2009, ArƟcle 27 
1171 Draft Constitution of the Kurdistan Region 2009, ArƟcle 55 
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Hence all people in the Kurdistan Region, regardless of their ethnicity, class or 
gender, have the right and even some obligation to access education. The aim is to 
offer a “moral” and “democratic” education, even though this is not always available 
in practice, as will be seen in the following subchapter: 
A. Children’s Schooling 
“A culture of peace will be achieved when citizens of the world understand global 
problems, have the skills to resolve conflicts and struggle for justice non-violently, 
live by international standards of human rights and equity, appreciate cultural 
diversity and respect the Earth and each other. Such learning can only be achieved 
with systematic education for peace.”1172 (Hague Appeal for Peace, Global 
Campaign for Peace Education)  
Years of war and violent conflicts not only destroy buildings and infrastructure but 
also often destroy the morals and values of the population1173 as well as an 
intellectual culture, a critical teaching environment and an open system of 
knowledge exchange.  While houses can be easily rebuilt, it takes much more time 
and effort to rebuild the intellectual foundation of a whole nation. As already noted, 
an enlightened education policy can be used as a tool to achieve the aims outlined 
above, and thereby help to create a culture of peace.1174 
During times of war high quality education for all is not considered a priority. The 
little education received by the population leading up to and during, armed conflict 
is most often marked by a manipulated account of culture and history, as for 
example in the Iraq of Saddam during the Iran-Iraq war.1175 It follows that after the 
cessation of an on-going conflict, a high percentage of the population are 
uneducated. The few who attended schools and universities were most likely been 
manipulated to a certain extent through the education received. As the name 
                                                            
1172 Hague Appeal for Peace, “Global Campaign for Peace EducaƟon, Campaign Statement” (2003‐2005) 
http://www.haguepeace.org/index.php?action=pe  (Accessed on 15.07.2013) 
1173 Al‐Ali, “ReconstrucƟng Gender,” 751. 
1174 Reardon, Education for a culture of peace in a gender perspective, 26. 
1175 Cooke, Women and the War Stories, 230. 
Nabil Al‐Tikriti, “War, State Collapse and the Predicament of Education in Iraq.” In Education and the Arab 
World: Political Projects, Struggles, and Geometries of Power, World Yearbook of EducaƟon 2010, eds. André 
E. Mazawi and Ronald G. Sultana (London: Routledge Press, 2009) 352. 
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suggests, change is needed at a time of “conflict transformation” and one way such 
change or transformation comes about is through education and knowledge 
exchange. 
Also in the Kurdistan Region, the education sector was greatly destroyed and 
prevented from developing during the decades of armed conflicts. It is 
consequently the aim today to rebuild and enhance educational possibilities in the 
region, starting at school level. Still today, about 14 years after the end of the civil 
war in the region, pressures on the school system remain, with insufficient 
buildings, discrepancies between basic facilities in the rural and urban areas, and 
with challenges in making suitable facilities available to all pupils.1176 
As a result of the wars and recent developments in health care and other social 
developments, the Kurdish society today is a very young, with about 37 per cent of 
citizens being under the age of 15.1177 Education will play a vital role in the lives of 
this young generation but also for the region as a whole. As explained by Majid 
Tehranian, education is critical in shaping children’s attitude. The values and skills 
children learn at school will influence how they will lead and shape their society 
and country in the future. 1178  
While the high percentage of young people in the region is an enormous potential 
for future development, it currently gives rise to the challenge of raising and 
educating them in a way which will lead to prosperity, development and peace for 
the region.  
The various challenges have also been recognized by representatives of 
Kurdistan’s society. They placed special emphasis on eliminating gender 
discrimination through critical education as part of their proposed Bill of Rights for 
Kurdish Women, by demanding: 
“Commitment to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of 
women and men through public education, information, education 
                                                            
1176 Audrey Osler and Chalank Yahya, “Challenges and complexity in human rights education, Teachers’ 
understandings of democratic participation and gender equity in post‐conflict Kurdistan‐Iraq” Education 
Inquiry 4(1) (2013): 191. 
1177 Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office, Iraq Women Integrated Social and Health Survey. 
1178 Tehranian (ed.), Bridging a Gulf, 224. 
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and communication strategies in order to eliminate the harmful 
cultural and traditional practices and all other practice which are 
based on the idea of inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes, 
or on stereotyped roles for women and men.”1179 
“Actively promoting peace education through curricula and social 
communication in order to eradicate elements in traditional and 
cultural beliefs, practices and stereotypes which legitimize and 
exacerbate the persistence and tolerance of violence against 
women,”1180 and 
“Elimination of all stereotypes that perpetuate discrimination 
between the female and male genders in the school system.”1181 
“Provision of equal access for women to enrolment in universities 
and institutions and eradication of all forms of discriminative 
requirements against women in those areas.”1182 
“Elimination of all stereotypes in textbooks and syllabus that 
perpetuate discrimination against women.”1183 
From the governmental side, the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, meant a turning 
point in education, especially in the Kurdistan Region, where Prime Minister 
Nechirvan Barzani at the time promised to improve teaching methods and raise 
education standards.1184 The last ten years has seen development in education in 
the Kurdistan Region, initiated by the KRG with help from outside.1185 However, as 
argued below, while improvements in access to education and in educational 
standards have been achieved for some, it will take a long time to ensure 
development for all, and the consequent reduced potential for conflict at all levels. 
Using the example of gender equality and gender parity, the approach the KRG 
has taken to raising the standard of education will be the subject of this sub-
chapter. The question of whether these efforts meet the aspirations of the civil 
population, as expressed through the proposed Bill of Rights for Kurdish Women, 
                                                            
1179 Bill of Rights for Kurdish Women, ArƟcle 1(6) 
1180 Ibid. ArƟcle 2(2)(d) 
1181 Ibid. ArƟcle 4(1) 
1182 Ibid. ArƟcle 4(5) 
1183 Ibid. ArƟcle 4(6) 
1184 Kurdistan Regional Government, “New School Year Starts” (22 September 2003) 
http://old.krg.org/news/index.asp (Accessed on 04.01.2013) 
1185 Ministry of Planning, “The Ministries of Planning, Education and Health announced the results of four 
RAND Projects to improve Region’s health, EducaƟon and Economic Systems” (8 March 2011) 
http://www.mop‐krg.org/index.jsp?sid=3&nid=52&y=2011&m=2&d=8&lng=en (Accessed on 04.01.2013) 
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will be raised by discussing both the access to and the quality of schooling in the 
Kurdistan Region. 
1. Access to Schooling 
“Education is the most important process by which people can attain the values, 
attitude and behavioural patterns consistent with a culture of peace”. 1186 (Ingeborg 
Breines) 
Equal access to schooling for boys and girls constitutes a prerequisite for the 
support of gender equality through education. Equal access to schooling can 
provide pupils with equal access to education taught and consequently equal 
educational outcomes and chances in life. As such equal provision of education for 
women has always been a highly political subject,1187 with those in power deciding 
whether girls should have equal access to schooling and consequently better 
opportunities to shape the future of their society and region.  
In Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region, education for all remains a great challenge. 
According to IAU, in Iraq today the illiteracy among women today (24 %)1188 is 
more than double that of Iraqi men (11 %).1189 Additionally, there are great 
discrepancies between the rural and the urban population, with over 50 per cent of 
women between fifteen and twenty-four in rural areas being illiterate, but only 20 to 
28 per cent of women in the same age group being illiterate in the cities.1190  Girls 
are generally less than half of the children enrolled in primary education and 
according to UNICEF about 75 per cent of girls who started school dropout during 
or at the end of primary school.1191 
This is a general problem, which has persisted since the wars, and is still not 
diminished. According to the Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey from 2007, 
approximately 90 per cent of children attended primary school in the Kurdistan 
Region, but only about 45 per cent continued intermediate education, with the 
                                                            
1186 Ratkovic and Wintersteiner (Eds.), Yearbook Peace Culture 2010, 12. 
1187 Colclough, “Achieving Gender Equality in Education,” 4. 
1188 According to IAU in March 2012 
1189 Ibid. 
1190 IAU, Women in Iraq Fact sheet (March 2012) 
1191 UNICEF, Girls Education in Iraq (2010) 4. 
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percentage being higher in cities (51%) than in the rural areas (32%). The 
percentages are reasonably comparable between boys and girls in the cities, but 
with more boys (34%) than girls (30%) attending in the country side.1192 In the 
Kurdistan Region secondary enrolments dropped to an average of 22 per cent, 
with more girls (29%) than boys (22%) attending in the cities, but with nearly twice 
as many boys (13%) than girls (7%) attending in the rural areas.1193 Clearly access 
to education is generally dependent on geography, as well as class, and 
consequently not all children, and especially not all girls, are offered the same 
opportunities of education and consequently of life choices. 
In comparison to the rest of the country, positive developments have taken place in 
the Kurdistan Region especially over the past ten years. Today the percentage of 
girls enrolled in primary school is the highest in Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaimaniya and 
the region also has the highest percentage of children in pre-school education.1194 
Nevertheless, the percentage of girls drop out before intermediate education is still 
very high in Kurdistan, although it is slightly less than the national average of 75 
per cent, with 35 per cent of girls starting intermediate education in Sulaimaniya 
and 30 per cent in Erbil.1195  
Illiteracy among the young generation remains high, and is generally higher for 
women than for men. According to the Kurdistan Region Statistics Office, 25.9 per 
cent of women between 20 and 29 are currently illiterate, compared with 11.1 per 
cent of men. In contrast only 8.4 per cent of girls between the age of 12 and 19 are 
illiterate compared with 5.5 per cent of boys. As pointed out by the Statistics Office, 
significant improvements have obviously taken place in the previous ten years, 
especially when it comes to female education, considering that the illiteracy rate for 
girls dropped 17.5 per cent over this period compared with 5.6 per cent for boys. 
The higher enrolment of children, and especially girls, according to the 
government, is linked to the increased awareness of the importance of girl’s 
education by the people, as well as to improvement in the political and economic 
                                                            
1192 Central Organisation for Statistics and Information Technology, Iraq Household Socio‐Economic Survey, 
Volume II, 230/231. 
1193 Ibid.p.232 
1194 UNICEF, Girls Education in Iraq, 4. 
1195 Ibid.p.15 
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situation in general.1196 This supports Thyne’s argument stated above, namely that 
the provision of education after conflict is a sign of peace, which leads to families 
feeling more secure and sending their children to school again, which in turn leads 
to less potential for conflict.1197 The statistics also support Colclough’s contention 
that it is just as important to look at the surrounding circumstances, such as 
poverty reduction, as a pre-requisite to equal access to schooling. Only families 
who feel secure and have the financial means will send their children, and 
especially their girls, to school.1198 
While developments have led to children, including an increasing number of girls, 
entering the school system, the greatest challenge for the Kurdistan Region at the 
moment seems to be retaining children at school. About 30 per cent of people from 
12 to 29 years old have no official school certificate. Thirty two (32) per cent 
finished primary school, 22 per cent secondary school, 10 per cent high school. 
Only 3 per cent have graduated from an institute and another 3 per cent have 
achieved a bachelor degree or higher.1199 
The most significant factor determining girls and women attendance at learning 
facilities are family attitudes and circumstances. Poverty, the journey to school, 
lack of security, displacement, the low quality of teaching and teachers, as well as 
the mixing of girls and boys are often factors preventing girls from attend 
school.1200 According to the Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey of 2007, 
which has still some relevance today, the two greatest challenges facing children in 
general, and girls in particular, wishing to attend schools, are the lack of 
appropriate facilities in their region, the lack of interest in schooling by their families 
or themselves and social reasons, which are more important for girls than boys.1201 
Also according to a UNICEF survey conducted in 2008 throughout the whole of 
Iraq, the most decisive factor in girls’ education is their families. The parents, and 
                                                            
1196 Kurdistan Region Statistics Office, Education (Fact Sheet 2, October 2012) 1. 
1197 Thyne, “ABC’s, 123’s, and the Golden Rule,” 733. 
1198 Colclough, “Achieving Gender Equality in Education,” 5‐8. 
1199 Kurdistan Region Statistics Office, Education, 3. 
1200 UNICEF, Girls Education in Iraq, 20‐22. 
1201 Central Organisation for Statistics and Information Technology, Iraq Household Socio‐Economic Survey, 
Volume II, 234. 
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especially the fathers, play a significant role in either pushing their girls to stay in 
education or preventing them from attending school. The family’s attitude towards 
their daughters’ schooling is often dependent on the family’s income1202, as well as 
one their attitude towards the role of girls once they reach puberty.  
This has been supported by the people themselves, who asserted that the most 
important reason for girls to drop out of school or never attend school lies with the 
family.1203 As some explained, the families are sometimes put under pressure by 
the local community, and in turn put pressure on their girls, who have no option but 
to obey.1204 As one woman explained: 
“One day a family friend came to my father, who was a very 
respected men in our neighbourhood, and he told my father that it 
would be better if my sister did not continue to go to school, as this 
was not proper. My father consequently took my sister out of school, 
but one year later this same man let his own girls go to school. My 
sister never concluded any education level, and she still feels sorry 
about that.”1205 
A further reason lies with their treatment at school and the state of the schools 
themselves. Some of the schools are not well maintained and do not have 
adequate resources. Some are simply very far away from the children’s homes and 
the girls are either unable or not permitted to travel to school.1206 In addition to 
other problems, such as displacement or a lack of papers, another very significant 
factor in deciding whether or not girls attend school are the teachers. School 
children have complained that the behaviour of their teacher is unacceptable to 
them and that they do not explain the subjects in an way the children can 
understand. If together with all the other aggravating circumstances, girls have 
teachers who are unable to teach their subject, are insensitive to their needs or 
even themselves oppose the their education, it is more likely that girls will drop out 
of school.1207 
                                                            
1202 UNICEF, Girls Education in Iraq, 20. 
1203 Interview BL, Erbil on 12/07/2012; Interview BP, Erbil on 21/07/2012; Interview AD, Erbil on 08/04/2012  
1204 Interview AJ, Erbil on 20/04/2012; Interview BE, Erbil on 26/06/2012 
1205 Interview AZ, Sulaimaniya on 06/06/2012 
1206 UNICEF, Girls Education in Iraq, 21. 
1207 Ibid.p.22 
  
Page | 261  
 
The treatment of girls by the teachers, especially in previous generations when it 
was normal to hit children, was a reason for them to leave school. As explained by 
a 33 year old woman from Erbil, the children were very scared of the teachers and 
some left school out of this fear. She continued that the general situation has 
improved today, but that it is still not perfect. She still knows of schools, where 
children are hit, but nobody goes to the police, because the people are scared. It is 
one of the consequences that some children leave school.1208 
Another reason for the high dropout rate for girls, especially in the country side, is 
the inability to access schools above primary school level in their area. The 
government is trying to combat this problem by building new schools. According to 
Hero Talabani in 2008, there have been more schools built since 2003, than 
between 1958 and 2003 together1209. In 2003 there was a total of 2,986 schools in 
the governorates of Erbil and Duhok and 544,937 students were about to enroll at 
kindergarten, primary, secondary and vocational schools. Of these students 43 per 
cent were female (236,607) and 57 per cent male (308,330).1210 In comparison, 
according to UNESCO there were a total of 5,323 schools in the Kurdistan Region 
for academic year 2008/91211. Nevertheless, there is still a problem concerning the 
number of schools in the region, with many pupils having to rotate in school. For 
this reason the RAND cooperation, a research and analysis centre which works 
with the KRG on development strategies, proposed in 2011 the building of up to 
200 new schools per year for the following ten years.1212 
Despite efforts by the government to raise the numbers of schools, many people 
and especially those who were educated themselves had the feeling that not 
enough is being done for women’s and girls’ education in the region. They saw a 
problem particularly in the country side, where women only go to primary school. 
They often do not have the opportunity to proceed to higher education and 
                                                            
1208 Interview BR, Erbil on 22/07/2012 
1209 Randa Jamal, UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Educational Reform in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq” (19 
August 2008) http://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/educational‐reform‐kurdistan‐region‐iraq (Accessed on 
04.01.2013) 
1210 Kurdistan Regional Government, “New School Year Starts”. 
1211 UNESCO, NaƟonal EducaƟon Support Strategy, Republic of Iraq, 2010‐2014, 24. 
1212 Ministry of Planning, “The Ministries of Planning, Education and Health announced the results of four 
RAND Projects to improve Region’s health, Education and Economic Systems”.  
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consequently lack certain knowledge. Hence the gap between the different social 
groups is growing.1213 At the same time in the city, while more and more 
international schools are built to teach the elite of the country, many local schools 
still have to accommodate different groups of children in the morning and in the 
afternoon, as there is not enough space. This results in a situation of inequality, 
where people from the upper class people have the feeling that the state is 
investing enough in education, while others, especially from the middle class, 
believe that this is not the case. 
The statistics support the general feeling of the people, namely that there is still a 
great discrepancy between the education of different social groups as well as 
between men and women, and increasing the number of school buildings will not 
be sufficient to ensure equal access to education for the whole population.  
While the situation has improved in today’s Kurdistan Region, representatives from 
the Kurdish population showed that the problems, though ameliorated, still persist 
in the region.  
It follows that equal access to schooling in general, and quality schooling in 
particular, is yet to be achieved in the Kurdistan Region. There is a discrepancy in 
school enrolments between children of different social classes, as well as between 
boys and girls. Consequently the attainment of gender equity is impossible. Even 
though the vast improvements in school enrolments need to be recognized, further 
work is still required to provide the whole population with the opportunity for quality 
education; a pre-requisite for all citizens to realise their full personal potential and 
to maximise human resources for the benefit of the region. 
Girls need the opportunity to attend schools which are situated near them and have 
all the basic facilities. The families need to be made aware of the importance of 
educating their daughters and security of the girls in school must be assured. But 
the best school buildings count for nothing if there is nobody to teach the children 
constructively.1214 Quality of the teaching is the most important when it comes to 
                                                            
1213 Interview BB, Erbil on 24/06/2012; Interview BY, Sulaimaniya on 10/08/2012; Interview BZ, Sulaimaniya 
on 10/08/2012 
1214 UNICEF, Girls Education in Iraq, 25. 
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school, because with the profession of the teaching comes a great responsibility. 
The quality of schooling in the region from a region as a whole is the subject of the 
following section. 
2. Quality of Schooling 
“There is a direct connection between violent conflict and intransigent, 
uncompromising worldviews.”1215 
While equal access to schooling is a vital step for achieving gender equality and 
diminishing social discrimination, gender equality in education is more than an 
equal number of boys and girls enrolling into school at all levels. In the view of 
UNESCO,1216 and as explained by Colclough,1217 gender equality implies equal 
chances to attend school, equal learning experiences and an equal outcome in 
society. 
It will only be through equal learning experiences and their high quality that 
transformation will take place for all. If children are taught to place themselves into 
the shoes of another, and to see life through the lens of somebody who is different 
from them, whether ethnically, sexually, socially, or by age or religion, their 
understanding will broaden. They will first consider others as fellow  human beings, 
before resorting to violent behaviour towards them.1218 The classroom can be used 
as a space for children to learn self-respect and respect for others, to express their 
points of views and to resolve problems without violence. Hopefully these skills and 
knowledge will be applied outside the classroom and will consequently influence 
the children’s dealings with the wider society and the world.1219 From a gender 
perspective it is argued that high quality education for all has the potential to 
diminish violent behaviour within the household, as well as violence between the 
different social groups outside.  This outcome is sought by teaching the traditional 
“stronger” party to value their “weaker” counterparts and not to misuse them.  
                                                            
1215 Shapiro, Educating Youth for a World beyond violence, 26. 
1216 UNESCO Iraq Office, “Gender and Education for All”. 
1217 Colclough, “Achieving Gender Equality in Education,” 4. 
1218 Shapiro, Educating Youth for a World beyond violence, 28. 
1219 Tehranian (ed.), Bridging a Gulf, 224. 
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At the same time high quality education can empower the “weaker” party. From a 
gender perspective this means that women need to learn about their legal and 
religious rights and how to use them so as not to be restricted in their development 
and opportunities by men, by other women or by the state system.1220 
High quality education is thereby crucial to the empowerment of women. For 
women to be able to make choices about their lives, they must be aware of the 
alternatives which exist for them. Education can help to clarify these alternatives, 
as well as to give women the opportunity to access different options.1221 Education 
can empower girls and women and give them the right skills to be more productive, 
to enhance their status and to enable them see the world in a different way. 
However education can also be used to limit a woman’s abilities and skills and to 
make it even more difficult for her to become employed or even to see the 
possibilities of work, if that is what she needs or wants.1222 
In the Kurdistan Region the quality of education has suffered under the different 
wars and is still at the state of recovery. The education system in the region was 
subject to Ba’athist ruling until the 1990s, and until 2002 school material differed 
between the different sub-regions, controlled by the KDP and PUK respectively, 
which lead to a unified system only establishing after 2002.1223 According to Hero 
Talabani, the problems of the educational system in the Kurdistan Region are 
connected to a lack of schools as well as an old curriculum, which has not been 
adequately updated over time.1224 Other representatives from the political, 
international and civil society communities concur and have demanded or 
recommended the improvement of the quality of education in the region. For 
example, the outcomes of the 2011 conference on “The Role of Women in Peace-
Building, Reconciliation and Accountability in Iraq” in Erbil, included 
recommendations to 
“Reform and develop school curriculums, including those of higher 
education, to avoid sectarian ideologies, and disseminate a culture 
                                                            
1220 Eifler and Seifert, Gender Dynamics and Post‐Conflict Reconstruction, 85. 
1221 Kabeer, “Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment,” 15. 
1222 Ibid.p.9 
1223 Al‐Tikriti, “War, State Collapse and the Predicament of Education in Iraq,” 354/355. 
1224 Randa Jamal, “Educational Reform in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq”.   
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of partnership, pluralism, and to promote an inclusive national 
identity.”1225 
As a reaction to these shortcomings, the changing of the national school curriculum 
has come to the forefront in recent years.  
Even before 2008, in response to the need for reform, the KRG introduced new 
text books and has reformed the curriculum for certain subjects. Reforms included 
the introduction of new material for teaching English, revising the curricula for 
Mathematics, Science and Social Economics, developing plans to improve the 
Kurdish language programs, History, Geography and other ‘social’ classes as well 
as to incorporate Arabic as a second language. In addition modern teaching 
methods were encouraged leading to more analytical thinking amongst the 
children.1226 
As part of the 2009 curriculum reform, an emphasis on human rights education 
was introduced, but its implementation remained challenging as a consequence of 
a lack in trained teachers and textbooks lacking in quality.1227 
Consequently, in 2011, “The new Iraqi Curriculum Framework” was drafted with 
help from UNESCO’s International Bureau of Education. The document aims to 
define a common curriculum model, for the Arab as well as the Kurdish regions of 
Iraq, and to raise the quality of education by orientating the curriculum to provide 
education which “promotes human rights, gender equality, intercultural 
understanding and sustainable development”.1228 As stated in the document, it is 
the government’s intention to develop a curriculum, which meets the needs of the 
labour market, addresses the developments on a local and international level, as 
well as the needs of the learners themselves and which raises a generation of 
moral persons, who reject radicalism, who believe in justice, freedom and 
democracy, who think critically and who have a perspective of lifelong learning,1229 
                                                            
1225 No Peace Without Justice, The Role of Women in Peace‐Building, RecommendaƟon 41. 
1226 Randa Jamal, “Educational Reform in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq”. 
1227 Osler and Yahya, “Challenges and complexity in human rights education,” 199. 
1228 UNESCO, World Data on Education, Iraq, “The educational process”. 
1229 Ibid. 
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while putting specific emphasis on the faith in God, love of the homeland, and also 
open expression and love to the environment. 
The intention behind the reform demonstrates clearly that the new curriculum is 
aimed at supporting a culture of peace, while at the same time communicating 
values, which are currently seen as admirable by the leading parties and most of 
society.  
According to UNESCO, gender equality and women’s empowerment is also 
promoted through its work on curriculum reform and teacher training.1230 However 
it is not clear how this is to be achieved, and it is thus arguable that there is 
currently not sufficient consideration of a gender perspective within the revised 
curricula and this may hamper the work towards gender equality.  
Next to reforming the school curriculum UNESCO notes that the KRG, is 
prioritising the enhancement of the quality of teaching and administration, as well 
as to “increase(ing) the role of the private sector in the education and increasing 
the number of quality schools in the region.”1231 
In the Kurdistan Region today an emphasis on private education at an international 
standard is clear. The region is currently constructing a network of international 
schools, with the SABIS schools being in the forefront. In 2012 alone four new 
SABIS schools opened their doors, which raises their number of SABIS schools to 
seven. These schools implement the SABIS Educational System, are taught in 
English and aim to be a college-preparation for their pupils.1232 In contrast to the 
Kurdish state schools, the international schools charge tuition fees at an average of 
3800 US dollars per year, in addition to transportation, book and lunch and other 
fees.1233  They therefore arguably develop an elite, which remains inaccessible to 
other parts of society. And while gender based divisions between children within 
these schools is diminishing, social and gender differences are increasing in 
                                                            
1230 UNESCO, NaƟonal EducaƟon Support Strategy, Republic of Iraq, 2010‐2014, 49. 
1231 Ibid.p.10 
1232 SABIS, “About SABIS” http://www.pppkurdistan‐sabis.net/fakhir‐mergasori/general/fakhir‐about‐sabis 
(04.01.2013) and SABIS, “Project Overview” http://www.pppkurdistan‐sabis.net/fakhir‐
mergasori/general/fakhir‐project‐overview (Accessed on 04.01.2013) 
1233 SABIS, “Fees Structure” http://www.iscerbil‐sabis.net/fees‐structure/ (Accessed on 04.01.2013)   
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society as a whole as development is occurring unequally. While those members of 
society who are provided with the best basis remain on top, the others are left 
behind. In addition to the SABIS schools, the Kurdistan Region is also the seat for 
other international schools, such as the British International Schools-Kurdistan1234, 
the Cambridge International School-Kurdistan,1235 the American International 
School Kurdistan,1236 the Deutsche Schule Erbil (German School Erbil),1237 and the 
Danielle Mitterrand MLF International French School, Erbil.1238  
Many members of high-income families, especially returnees from the diaspora 
favour the existence of private schools, as they, according to them, they offer 
education of better quality to their children.1239 Also the government is very 
supportive of the international private education developing in the region, as it is 
hoping to raise educational standard in the region through these schools. Many 
also believe that is the responsibility of private people and businesses to contribute 
to the financing of the education sectors, so that the government can focus on 
other areas. At the same time there is some awareness that the great differences 
between public and private schools will result in sever class distinctions, which 
raise the potential of conflict and should be therefore be opposed. 1240 
Large discrepancies between education in the cities and in the country side were 
noted especially by representatives of the urban population. According to two 
students from the University of Kurdistan Hawler, the lack of education for women 
in rural areas holds back the development of the country as well as of the people 
themselves1241, as “the women in the country side only live in their small worlds 
                                                            
1234 British International Schools, “Welcome to British International Schools in Kurdistan – Hawler” 
http://www.bis‐kurdistan.co.uk/ (Accessed on 04.01.2013) 
1235 Cambridge International School‐Kurdistan, “About CISK” http://www.cis‐kurdistan.com/aboat‐us/about‐
cisk.html (Accessed on 04.01.2013) 
1236 American International School Kurdistan http://ais‐k.org/ (Accessed on 04.01.2013) 
1237 Deutsche Schule Erbil, “Willkommen” http://www.ds‐e.org/ (Accessed on 04.01.2013)  
1238 Danielle Mitterrand MLF International French School, Erbil http://erbilfrenchschool.com/about.php 
(Accessed on 04.01.2013) 
1239 Interview AD, Erbil on 08/04/2012; Interview AO, Sulaimaniya on 13/05/2012 
1240 Rashadaddin Hawzhen, The Kurdish Globe, “Private schools provide beƩer educaƟon in the region” (08 
January 2011) http://www.kurdishglobe.net/display‐arƟcle.html?id=1B11C0EEF9F7159B921BD87E606616E9 
(Accessed on 05.01.2013) 
1241 Interview BL, Erbil on 12/07/2012; Interview AE, Erbil on 09/04/2012 
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and they don’t know their rights, because they only go to primary school.”1242 
Additionally it was argued that the quality of some of the state schools is not 
comparable to that provided by the private schools. But as argued by Parker, 
Standing and others, equity in high quality schooling should be aspired to, as it 
would lead to improvements in the region’s as well as the individual’s situation and 
thus greater equality and less potential for conflict.1243  
Concerning gender inclusion, research shows that schoolbooks still continue to 
promote traditional gender roles. Kurdish school books, especially in primary 
school, reflect the traditional roles of women as mothers, cooks and carers for the 
families. In subsequent years children learn about the great and strong women of 
the past, who led battles, saved people’s lives and safeguarded the  Kurdistan 
identity. However, they read like myths in the distant past rather than events 
relevant to today.  
Svi Shapori1244 argues that some of these obvious differences in education 
between girls and boys from the same ‘level’ may reflect a ‘hidden curriculum’. 
However, such differences are generally not considered problematic by the Kurdish 
population. As explained by a mother, who also worked as a teacher in the region 
for several years, there is no obvious discrimination between boys and girls in the 
Kurdish school system, although it is common that the teachers support the 
traditional gender roles in front of their pupils, especially when it comes to the 
career choice. Girls are encouraged to become teachers or nurses, but they are 
taught that it is not acceptable for women to become engineers or lawyers or to 
study art.1245 
One factor, which is seen as far more important than the child’s sex, is the 
achievement of high marks. Successful pupils are supported by the teachers, while 
those who do not manage to achieve high marks by themselves are told to leave 
school. The situation is different when it comes to children from wealthy or well-
known families. Indeed it is argued by some interviewees from less-advantageous 
                                                            
1242 Interview AE, Erbil on 09/04/2012 
1243 Leach and Dume (ed.), Education, Conflict and Reconciliation, 53. 
1244 Shapiro, Educating Youth for a World beyond violence, 82. 
1245 Interview AL, Erbil on 25/04/2012 
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backgrounds that corruption inside the school system, when it comes to marks, 
especially in the final exams, is very high.1246 The resulting differentiation between 
the sexes and between the different social classes leads certain groups within 
society to believe that they are unable to achieve their aspirations. 
Further, when it came to critical education, it was noted by several locals that 
teachers simply do not have enough leeway, as their schedules are so tight that 
they are unable to truly meet the needs of individual students.1247 
It has been argued that especially the so called “shift schools”, which still exist over 
the whole region, and in which a high number of children are forced to rotate in 
school, do not allow quality to flourish.1248 This is certainly true to a certain extent 
and new schools are needed in the region. However, it may be argued that the 
reaction to the problem of the rapid rise in the school population in a very short 
time, is currently also impeding the quality of teaching at these schools. For 
instance several interviewees from the civil society contend that that the quality of 
teaching is inadequate, especially in subjects like English, as the teachers 
themselves are lacking qualifications and experience.1249 It was consequently the 
opinion of a large number of the people questioned for this thesis, that there needs 
to be further development in education.1250  
The teachers themselves and the people working in the education sector, 
especially, were of the opinion that more focus should be on education and that 
more development is needed.1251 While the exact nature of the recommended 
development depended on the personal experience, there was a focus on 
increasing literacy within the population1252 and giving the children a better 
                                                            
1246 Interview AJ, Erbil on 20/04/2012; Interview BJ, Erbil on 09/07/2012 
1247 Interview BL, Erbil on 12/07/2012; Interview BO, Erbil on 18/07/2012; Interview BP, Erbil on 21/07/2012 
1248 Interview BY, Sulaimaniya on 10/08/2012 
1249 See e.g.: Interview AD, Erbil on 08/04/2012; Interview AG, Erbil on 13/04/2012; Interview AP, 
Sulaimaniya on 18/05/2012 
1250 See e.g.: Interview BV, Sulaimaniya on 06/08/2012; Interview AR, Sulaimaniya on 21/05/2012; Interview 
AS, Sulaimaniya on 23/05/2012 
1251 Interview AS, Sulaimaniya on 23/05/2012; Interview BC, Erbil on 25/06/2012; Interview BT, Erbil on 
24/07/2012 
1252 Interview BU, Erbil on 24/07/2012 
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opportunity to have higher education.1253 Other interviewees were of the opinion 
that a necessary first step is to make further education (high school) compulsory 
for everybody1254 and to support people’s reading opportunities by opening more 
public libraries. This will give them more access to a wider variety of knowledge 
and better enable them to inform their own opinions.1255 As explained by one girl 
from a low-income family, who herself did not get the best education: “There are 
still many problems here. There should be more public libraries to educate the 
people”.1256 
Several people had the feeling that, while Kurdistan is thriving on the outside, there 
is still a great need to change “in the inside”, such as a change in morals and 
mentality. It was recognized that this “change of the inside” needs to include the 
entire society.1257 Time and time again interviewees expressed the wish for a 
change in the mentality of all people, men as well as women, in order to have more 
openness in society, including awareness of the suppression of women.  
The Kurdish women who have lived part of their lives in the West especially hoped 
that a reformed school system would be the first step towards more liberal thinking 
and towards openness towards women.1258 In comparison, when people in the 
Kurdistan Region were asked on how this type of equality could be achieved, the 
term “enlightenment” came up time and time again. Society as a whole, women as 
well as men, have to be enlightened, so that their mentality changes and equality 
becomes possible.1259 Surprisingly for the researcher, the people did not consider 
education or schools as a way to bring forward or achieve this enlightenment. 
While people who had a connection to the West were of the opinion that education 
should be used to achieve equality,1260 Kurds who have lived their whole life in 
                                                            
1253 Interview BT, Erbil on 24/07/2012 
1254 Interview BZ, Sulaimaniya on 10/08/2012 
1255 Interview BU, Erbil on 24/07/2012 
1256 Interview AV, Sulaimaniya on 28/05/2012 
1257 See e.g.: Interview AO, Sulaimaniya on 13/05/2012; Interview CA, Sulaimaniya on 13/08/2012; Interview 
BM, Erbil on 17/07/2012  
1258 Interview CF, Vienna on 16/11/2012; Interview CE, Vienna on 21/10/2012; Interview CK, Vienna on 
20/10/2012 
1259 Interview AU, Sulaimaniya on 28/05/2012; Interview AV, Sulaimaniya on 28/05/2012; Interview BN, Erbil 
on 17/07/2012; Interview BP, Erbil on 21/07/2012 
1260 Interview CE, Vienna on 21/10/2012; Interview CK, Vienna on 20/10/2012 
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Kurdistan did not really consider this option. This may be due to the fact that 
people in the region had not experienced school as a place of critical exchange. 
Only a very few interviewees noted that educating women is very important as this 
will give them the ability to do everything else. It was stated that “already in 
kindergarten girls have to be taught to get involved. There are in general not 
enough well educated adolescents in Kurdistan today. Good education of all is 
simply a necessity”. 1261 Others believed that women need education to be able to 
teach their children at home.1262 While it was recognized by the majority that the 
education of women is vital for economic or social reasons, the transformative 
capability was not seen. 
In contrast, several men explained that in their opinion equality for the women has 
to start in the families and in the house and not in public. As explained by a 29-year 
old teacher:  
“Equality has to start within the family. Women first have to establish 
equality in their families, so that they have a right to live, after that it 
is only possible to become truly equal”1263. 
Following the idea of an education for peace, namely that, apart from having the 
possibility to achieve a more equalised society and to support positive conflict 
transformation, education should also be used in the future to already make 
children aware on how it is possible to prevent further conflict from happening and 
a new dictator from rising to power. This idea was brought up only by one person, 
a social researcher.1264 Other conversations showed that people did not believe 
that society itself has to change, in order to prevent further violent conflict. Many 
were of the view that the existence of a state of peace or war is not the choice of 
the people, but rather imposed on them by a force from above.1265 
                                                            
1261 Interview CI, Vienna on 26/10/2012 
1262 Interview AH, Erbil on 15/04/2012; Interview AI, Erbil on 16/04/2012; Interview AL, Erbil on 25/04/2012; 
Interview AR, Sulaimaniya on 21/05/2012 
1263 Interview BQ, Erbil on 21/07/2012 
1264 Interview BT, Erbil on 24/07/2012 
1265 Interview AJ, Erbil on 20/04/2012; Interview AM, Erbil on 27/04/2012; Interview AN, Erbil on 
03/05/2012; Interview AQ, Sulaimaniya on 19/05/2012; Interview BD, Erbil on 25/06/2012; Interview BE, 
Erbil on 26/06/2012 
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Teachers, who are every day at the forefront in the education system, were of the 
same opinion as the rest of the population. When the teachers themselves were 
asked how development in the country could be improved or how gender equality 
could be enhanced, they did not see themselves or their schools as being able to 
do so. While they considered morality, understanding and involvement as core 
principles, they did not consider themselves or their schools at the forefront of 
pursuing these principles. While all the teachers interviewed considered that 
educated women had an easier life in society, the majority did not think that women 
should be especially favoured when it comes to education; rather that the situation 
at schools should further improve as a whole.1266 At the same time only some 
would like to see further development in the education sector, relative to other 
developments.1267 However one teacher put a special emphasis on improving the 
culture of reading in the region, which is still much lacking in her opinion1268 and 
two others believed that it will be necessary to develop more well-educated people 
able to further advance the reconstruction efforts.1269 Finally there was only one 
teacher who stated that political education will be necessary to prevent further 
conflict from erupting.1270 
Considering that education will only have an impact that is broadly supported by 
society, the population in general and teachers in particular need to be made 
aware of the role education can play in fuelling or preventing private as well as 
public violent conflict. If the teachers are not aware of the role they are playing, 
they can fuel social inequalities rather than undermine them. Gender stereotyping 
by the school curriculum or by the teacher for example might show girls as passive 
and modest and might reinforce their inferior status and thus create a culture of low 
                                                            
1266 Interview AK, Erbil on 20/04/2012; Interview AZ, Sulaimaniya on 06/06/2012; Interview BA, Erbil on 
21/06/2012; Interview BC, Erbil on 25/06/2012; Interview BQ, Erbil on 21/07/2012; Interview BR, Erbil on 
22/07/2012; Interview BU, Erbil on 24/07/2012 
1267 Interview AK, Erbil on 20/04/2012; Interview BP, Erbil on 21/07/2012 
1268 Interview BU, Erbil on 24/07/2012 
1269 Interview AZ, Sulaimaniya on 06/06/2012; Interview BA, Erbil on 21/06/2012 
1270 Interview BA, Erbil on 21/06/2012 
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self-esteem.1271 Further, the division between various social classes in schools will 
most likely fuel conflict and extremism if not worked against.  
Clearly much work will be necessary to provide high quality education in all schools 
in the Kurdistan Region. As a first step people should be made more aware of the 
important role school is playing in the development of a child, society and the 
region as a whole. While positive reforms are taking place on a national level, 
these do not seem to have already reached the population on the ground.  
In the Kurdistan Region today great discrepancies exist especially between public 
and private schools, which split the population. While the one part of society has 
the feeling that development is underway, another part of the population feels that 
it is being left behind and does not have the same chances of succeeding, as their 
wealthier counterparts. The lack of high quality education for all arguably hampers 
the development of the region, and the feeling of distinction between the different 
social groups over time raises the potential for conflict.   
On an individual level, while the school system as a whole, and the schools 
themselves do not openly discriminate between the genders, practice shows that 
especially in the schools for children from less advantaged families, the teachers 
and school in general often merely support or even deepen gender inequalities, 
which exist in society, and thus often do not have any empowering functions for 
women, and cannot be said to improve a peaceful and democratic development 
within the region, which schools would be able to support, as explained by 
academics, such as Glaeser, Ponzetto, Shleifer and Thyse,1272 or as wished for by 
the drafters of the proposed Bill of Rights for Kurdish Women.1273 
The numbers of new institutions, the increased enrolments of children, and 
especially girls and the reforms initiated at the political level, show that 
development of education in the Kurdistan region is taking place. Nevertheless, as 
reflected in the statements of several of the residents, as well as scholars, there is 
                                                            
1271 Kabeer, “Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment,” 18. 
1272 Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer, “Why does democracy need education?,” 81. 
Thyne, “ABC’s, 123’s, and the Golden Rule,” 737. 
1273 Bill of Rights for Kurdish Women, ArƟcles 1(6), 2(2)(d), 4(1) and 4(6) 
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still need for improvement in quality and gender inclusiveness, in order that 
education becomes a comprehensive force for fighting discrimination and 
supporting conflict transformation.  Educational institutions should therefore be 
used to make people aware of the roles they play in their society and the 
consequences their day-to-day actions will have for the region as a whole. People 
should also be made aware of the role of education, as this is not happening at 
present. 
While people in the region do not yet consider educational institutions to be leading 
forces in equalising society, and all had different ideas on what this leading force is 
or should be, one principle on which everybody agreed was, in the words of a 
young woman from Sulaymania, “for both to be equal, this needs to be reality, not 
mere talking”.1274 If this has been achieved for the higher education sector will be 
subject of the following subchapter. 
B. Higher Education and Social Research 
“Education is one of life’s most important necessities. It is the only way for an 
individual to face the requirements of the modern age, its variables, the emergence 
of modern concepts such as human rights and, most importantly, to claim their 
right to education, culture, and health care.” (Ministry of Education – Erbil)1275 
As with a high quality basic education system, institutions for higher education as 
well as a thriving academic community, which encompass representatives of the 
whole community, are vital if the region is to flourish. University and other higher 
education being the peak of the education system, play a vital role in the 
development of society. Higher education can promote intellectual values  within a 
region, and provide citizens with the skills to support development at an 
international level, and to create future leaders for a country. Universities can thus 
be at the forefront of development by training academics and highly qualified 
professionals to assist in economic, medical or technical progress. Institutions of 
higher education can also form the basis for knowledge exchange, which can 
                                                            
1274 Interview BW, Sulaimaniya on 08/08/2012 
1275 UNESCO Iraq Office, The Power of Literacy, Stories from Iraq (IQ/2011/PI/H/1 2011) 3. 
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change a region’s intellectual landscape. Students are often the first to demand 
social change.  
In the Kurdistan Region today the development of higher education is seen as vital 
for the development of the region by all parts of society, the general population, as 
well as the authorities, although occasionally for different reasons: 
Many amongst the Kurdish people interviewed, and especially those from the 
upper class and those who opposed the current ruling parties were of the opinion 
that a country can only be rebuilt with the force of thought and reason and this can 
only be done by the intellectuals. Their know-how is needed to build up the region 
and also to educate the next generation, so that they will not make the same 
mistakes again.1276 
In comparison, higher education in the Kurdistan Region is seen by decision 
makers as the pathway to international recognition and especially to increased 
economic development in the region. As expressed by Dlawer Ala’Aldeen, former 
Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research:  
“These exciting developments are just the beginning. They must be 
underpinned by serious investment in human capacity and higher 
standards in the fields of science, technology and management.”1277 
The reform of the higher education sector is thereby seen as an important step in 
the transformation of the region from a state of conflict to a state of peace, and 
from a marginal to a high level player in the international field. For this reason great 
efforts have been made in the region to develop the sector. 
As a result of these efforts, the Kurdistan Region is currently undergoing a great 
transformation within higher education. As with the other sectors, the whole  higher 
education infrastructure had been destroyed during the various wars over the 
previous decades. Before 1991, the education sector in the Kurdistan Region was 
administered by and dependent on the regime of Saddam Hussein. Until 2003, the 
                                                            
1276 See e.g.: Interview AN, Erbil on 03/05/2012; Interview BE, Erbil on 26/06/2012; Interview BN, Erbil on 
17/07/2012 
1277 Dlawer Ala’Aldeen, University World News, “A determined push for higher education progress in 
Kurdistan” (17 June 2012) hƩp://www.universityworldnews.com/arƟcle.php?story=20120615064310850 
(Accessed on 06.12.2012) 
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civil war within the region as well as its general isolation prevented education from 
flourishing and the quality of teaching from rising. 
Since 2003, the KRG has been working hard to establish an internationally 
competitive higher education sector. New universities, including international 
universities, were established and professors from around the world are lecturing 
especially at the international universities. The Ministry of Higher Education and 
Scientific Research published “A Roadmap to Quality” in 2010, which aims to form 
the basis to “reform teaching to ensure quality”, “to promote scientific research and 
connecting the Region’s scientists with their counterparts in international centres of 
excellence”, to “invest in higher education and establish new universities”, to 
“change the management structure of the universities and the institutes of technical 
education”, to “institute administrative reforms” and to “protect human rights and 
establish social justice”.1278 In addition the reform included modernization of the 
curricula, “with an emphasis on self-learning, critical thinking, developing IT skills 
and learning international languages […]”.1279 
The wish for international recognition can be seen especially in the reformed ‘new 
PhD pathway’. With reference to scientific research, the KRG has placed emphasis 
on “connecting the scientific research community of the Kurdistan Region to the 
academic community in the rest of the modern world”. In order to produce experts 
who will make the Kurdistan Region competitive within international academia and 
the international marketplace, the new PhD pathway requires a four year PhD 
program, with a the second year spent abroad “in a centre of excellence under the 
supervision of a collaborating scientist”. It aims to develop collaboration between 
academics in Kurdistan and colleagues around the world.1280 In addition the KRG 
has endeavoured to bring “internationality” into the region, by supporting the 
opening of English-speaking and international universities in the region. However 
                                                            
1278 Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, A Roadmap to Quality, Reforming the System of 
Higher Education and Scientific Research in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, A Report on the Main 
Achievements, From 1st November 2009 to 1st September 2010 (Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific 
Research, Kurdistan Regional Government 2010) 
1279 Ala’Aldeen, “A determined push for higher education progress in Kurdistan”. 
1280 Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Kurdistan Region, Iraq, “A New PhD pathway in 
Kurdistan, Promoting Research and raising standards” http://www.mhe‐krg.org/node/343 (Accessed on 
06.12.2012) 
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their sometimes questionable quality is currently proving a challenge to the system, 
as explained by a member of the Education committee for the accreditation of 
universities within the region. Despite such challenges the efforts by the 
government to support higher education in the region have born fruits: 
While in 1992, there was only one university operating, there are now nineteen 
state and state-recognised private higher education institutions in the Kurdistan 
Region1281, which include universities and “equivalent higher education 
establishments such as technical universities, comprehensive universities and 
specialised institutions at university level”.1282 The public universities include the 
Salahaddin University, the Hawler Medical University, the University of Duhok, 
Soran University, the University of Sulaimani, the University of Kurdistan Hawler, 
Koya University, the University of Zakho, the University of Raparin, the University 
of Halabja, and the University of Garmian. The private universities include the 
American University of Iraq – Sulaimani, the Sabis University, the Jihan University 
and the Ishik University.1283 In addition, the number of students has risen 
dramatically. As an example, the University of Duhok was opened in 1992 with 214 
students1284 and in 2010 enrolled more than 11,000 students.1285 The total number 
of students in institutions of higher education is currently around 100,000, with a 
female percentage of just under fifty per cent.1286  
The rapid development in the higher education sector within the Kurdistan Region 
has also been welcomed and supported by other countries around the world. For 
example the UK Higher Education International Unit of the Illuminate Consulting 
Group, issued a report in 2009, which noted that the success of Kurdistan’s higher 
                                                            
1281 Ala’Aldeen, “A determined push for higher education progress in Kurdistan”. 
1282 Kurdistan Board of Investment, “Education” http://www.kurdistaninvestment.org/education.html 
(Accessed on 06.12.2012) 
1283 Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, “Universities in Kurdistan” http://www.mhe‐
krg.org/node/23 (Accessed on 06.12.2012) 
1284 University of Duhok, “The University” http://www.uod.ac/en/university (Accessed on 08.12.2012) 
1285 University of Duhok, http://www.uod.ac/en/ (Accessed on 08.12.2012) 
1286 Kurdistan Board of Investment, “Education”.  
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education sector had already received praised in 2007, but which warned of 
challenges to quality.1287 
The recent growth and reform of the higher education sector, including the 
challenges to quality will be discussed in the following section. Attention will be 
paid to the implications for gender equality in the sector and in the region and for 
peace building in general.  
1. Supporting Equality in Higher Education 
In contrast to primary and secondary education, where number of boys at school 
normally exceeds that of girls, in the tertiary education sector women start to 
comprise equal, or even higher enrolments.1288 This development can also be seen 
in the Kurdistan region. However, for higher education to benefit the whole of 
society, numbers are not enough. Higher education needs to be accessible to all, 
regardless of class, religion, ethnicity or gender.  
In the Kurdistan Region the authorities placed support for development through 
higher education as a clear aim. As stated in the University Act, universities in the 
Kurdistan Region shall  
“encourage academic research, cultivate talent, enhance culture, 
serve society and accelerate the development of the country. 
Universities shall be guaranteed academic freedom and shall 
enjoy autonomy as the laws and regulations allow.”1289 
However, there is no specific stipulation in the national legislation for the support of 
women or of students from less advantaged backgrounds, unless they qualify 
under the exceptions of Article 25. These exceptions relate to students who 
received excellent grades in international fields or in written contests or to students 
with excellent sports achievements.1290 
                                                            
1287 The Illuminate Consulting Group, UK Higher Education International Unit, UK Higher Education 
engagement with Iraq (Research Series/4, June 2009) 22. 
1288 The World Bank, Gender Equality and Development, 107. 
1289 University Act, Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Kurdistan Region Iraq, 
http://www.mhe‐krg.org/node/28 (Accessed on 06.12.2012) ArƟcle 1 
1290 Ibid. ArƟcle 25: 
“Students suffering serious trauma, children of foreign service personnel of the government, students 
receiving excellent grades in international field or written contests, students with excellent sports 
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Nevertheless, the official website of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific 
Research states that  
“The University seeks to prevent discrimination on the grounds of 
race, colour, ethnic origin, nationality, religious belief, gender, 
sexual orientation, disability, age, marital status, family 
circumstance, citizenship, social and economic status, or any 
other individual differences.”1291 
In addition ministerial regulations were issued to enforce equal opportunities, as 
well as gender equality.1292 According to the Ministry, the concept of equal 
opportunity is an important element of the debate around undergraduate education. 
The universities aim to provide an environment which is free from discrimination, 
whether against students or staff, and in which all are treated solely according to 
their merits.1293 From the outset, the KRG was aware of the importance gender 
equality in higher education to the social and economic development of their region 
and was hence supportive. 
However, in general there is no official quota for gender balance in the different 
faculties. However, there are some exceptions, such as the college of nursing at 
the University of Duhok, which has established a quota of 25 per cent of places for 
male versus 75 per cent for female students. Admission to the different faculties at 
the universities is rather dependent on the final marks in high school, and is thus 
greatly dependent on achievements.1294 While this can be seen as a way to ensure 
quality as well as equity and to ensure that only the best of the best are admitted to 
the courses, regardless of where these ‘bests’ came from, it may also be seen as 
discriminatory, as children who were from less advantageous backgrounds, or 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
achievements, veterans, overseas compatriot students, and Mongolian and Tibetan students shall not be 
limited by the previous paragraph in terms of quotas and means when entering universities to study for 
degrees. Regulations on the quota, means, qualifications, terms of transaction, composition of the student 
recruitment committee, principles of recruitment and other proceedings about the rights and responsibilities 
of examinees, shall be stipulated by the Ministry of Higher Education.” 
1291 Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, “Equal Opportunities” http://www.mhe‐
krg.org/node/27 (Accessed on 06.12.2012) 
1292 Ala’Aldeen, “A determined push for higher education progress in Kurdistan”. 
1293 Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, “Equal Opportunities”. 
1294 University of Duhok, “Undergraduate Admission” http://www.uod.ac/en/undergraduateadmission 
(Accessed on 08.12.2012) 
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were not supported with their education, will be less likely to achieve the high 
marks necessary to enter the courses.  
For the most able of their students, the KRG has initiated different mechanisms of 
financial support, so that the financial background does not have to play a role in 
accessing higher education. There are no tuition fees at the public universities and 
higher education is in general free in the Kurdistan Region. For students who live 
too distant from the university, the state also provides free dormitories although 
places are limited.1295 The universities have in general established support facilities 
such as student homes and financial assistance, to enable students from all 
backgrounds to continue their education. Inevitably the nature and level of support 
varies.1296  
Furthermore, as recognized by the former Minister for Higher Education and 
Scientific Research, Professor Dlawer Abdul Aziz Ala’Aldeen, the region is in need 
of more postgraduates in order to meet the demands of the Regions developing 
economy. 1297 To support PhD candidates, the state pays for salaries and 
allowances throughout their study.1298 In addition, the KRG has developed the 
Human Capacity Development Program in Higher Education (HCDP), a 
scholarship programme for Master and PhD students, which aims at developing 
human capacities in the field of higher education. Through the scholarship 
programme, the KRG has sent thousands of students abroad to study for their 
master or PhD degrees at internationally renowned universities in North America, 
Europe, Australia, Asia or a neighbouring country. The aim of the programme is to 
train the young generation in order to ensure future development in the Kurdistan 
Region. The generous scholarship gives all students the opportunity to complete 
their postgraduate studies abroad. The program certainly supports the 
                                                            
1295 Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, “Higher Education in Kurdistan Region” 
http://www.mhe‐krg.org/node/105 (Accessed on 06.12.2012) 
1296 See for example: University of Duhok, “Financial Aid” http://www.uod.ac/en/financialaid (Accessed on 
08.12.2012) or University of Sulaimani, “Study” http://www.univsul.org/E_U_Xwendin.aspx (Accessed on 
08.12.2012) 
1297 Dlawer Abdul Aziz Ala’Aldeen, Minister for Higher Education and Scientific Research, “Studying for 
Master’s degree in Kurdistan Region, Reforming the Master’s Degree in the Kurdistan Region: Enhancing 
Capacity and Quality” http://www.mhe‐krg.org/node/117 (Accessed on 06.12.2012) 
1298 Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, “A New PhD pathway in Kurdistan”. 
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internationalization of Kurdistan’s economy, technology and politics. While there 
are a certain number of scholarship spaces especially allocated for sons and 
daughters of martyrs, there is no specific allocation of scholarships between male 
and female students. However it is made clear in the official introduction to the 
scholarship programme that everybody, men and women are needed and wanted 
for the programme.1299 In addition, it is possible for students to receive individual 
scholarships from the university or from other countries.1300 Consequently, higher 
education, at least in theory, is accessible to everybody. 
Clearly some children from poorer families have an opportunity for a high quality 
education because of their abilities, which might not have been available if access 
were based on fees. However, many youngsters, who might be just as able as their 
peers, are not admitted to their chosen course, because of lower marks in school, 
as a result of lower quality teaching. The scholarships, especially at a PhD level, 
are not dependent on family income. However, since the long process for gaining 
admission is highly dependent on family support, it seems that the upper class is 
being advantaged, while the majority of the population is effectively excluded. This 
is especially true for women from lower income families, who will not get the 
support needed throughout their childhood and teenage years. Many women still 
suffer from cultural impediments and will never be in the position to access any of 
the support provided by the state.  
Leaving aside the possibility of underlying hidden discrimination, especially when it 
comes to differences between social classes, it can be clearly observed that the 
government has made great efforts to expand the higher education system and to 
provide a system which includes a relatively high percentage of the population, and 
which is on the way to becoming competitive internationally. However, while the 
government publicly promotes the view that it supports the universal education, 
there are many in the civil society, who are rather of the view that the authorities 
                                                            
1299 Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, “KRG‐Scholarship program Human Capacity 
Development” http://www.mhe‐krg.org/index.php?q=node/249 (Accessed on 06.12.2012) 
1300 See e.g. University of Duhok, “Scholarships” http://www.uod.ac/en/scholarships (Accessed on 
08.12.2012) 
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merely provide further opportunities for well-educated or intellectual women among 
the population.  
It was the general opinion among the people interviewed that the government, next 
to supporting the ministerial employees, especially supports educated women 
within their system.1301 Two men even went so far as to say that only the “modern” 
women, who live in the big cities, are supported by the State,1302 although it has to 
be noted that this is not the official stance of the government.1303  
The perception by the population that educated women are supported by the 
government can have the effect that “the educated woman” is seen as acceptable 
in society. Hence, to become an educated woman can be an aspiration or a path to 
follow, and this may lead to more women achieving higher qualifications to the 
benefit of region. 
However, just as people recognised the government’s support for highly educated 
women, they also noted its lack of support for mothers and house wives, a position 
which was shared by much of society.1304 
The prevailing opinion amongst the interviewees was that the only women 
supported by society were the mothers and the housewives and this created a gap 
between the women leaving school and staying at home and the women who were 
highly educated. The women from each group felt unfairly treated. The housewives 
complained of not receiving any, especially financial, support by the 
government,1305 while the students and working women talked about their struggle 
with society. Several students regretted that it was still necessary for girls to fight to 
be recognized in certain subjects and that their families were less sympathetic to 
                                                            
1301 Interview BX, Sulaimaniya on 09/08/2012; Interview BC, Erbil on 25/06/2012; Interview AW, Sulaimaniya 
on 01/06/2012; Interview AJ, Erbil on 20/04/2012; Interview AK, Erbil on 20/04/2012; Interview AL, Erbil on 
25/04/2012; Interview AJ, Erbil on 25/04.2012 
1302 Interview BP, Erbil on 21/07/2012; Interview AN, Erbil on 03/04/2012 
1303 Interview AB, Erbil on 03/04/2012 
1304 Interview AU, Sulaimaniya on 28/05/2012; Interview AG, Erbil on 13/04/2012; Interview BV, Sulaimaniya 
on 06/08/2012 
1305 Interview AI, Erbil on 16/04/2012; Interview AV, Sulaimaniya on 28/05/2012; Interview AY, Sulaimaniya 
on 04/06/2012; Interview BG, Erbil on 02/07/2012 
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them during their student years than to their brothers.1306 For these students it is 
not sufficient that women are allowed to study at university, as they often have to 
overcome great obstacles within society to do so. Many felt pressured to become a 
good wife and a good mother, which meant that they could either not continue their 
education or not use their education in a relevant position in the work force.1307 
According to the Kurdistan Region Statistics Office, the young generation has high 
expectations. Forty-two per cent of girls between ten and fourteen believe that the 
highest level of education girls should achieve is a bachelor degree or higher.1308 
This contradicts the reality that currently three per cent of the whole population 
under 30 received a bachelor degree or higher. 
At the same time it should be noted that within the small percentage of the 
population, who are able to receive a higher education, gender equality is 
increasing. Even though, according to some students, some discrimination is still 
persisting in practice in different institutions, the overall trends in female access to 
universities are highly positive. There has been a rapid increase of female students 
although this increase is not yet reflected among the lecturers and professors or 
among other qualified professions. However, the large number of young women 
graduating from universities and obtaining qualifications equal to their male counter 
parts opens up a variety of opportunities for women to develop professionally as 
well as individuals, to promote gender equity within society and to contribute to the 
future development of the region. 
Apart from general economic and social advantages within the region, the 
provisions for gender equality are also vital for the region’s standing within the 
international community, as the government is aware. The international community, 
and especially the West, is currently placing great emphasis on appointing women 
into leading positions and also expects a similar emphasis from any region wishing 
to play a significant role in international dealings.   
                                                            
1306 Interview AE, Erbil on 09/04/2012; AJ, Erbil on 20/04/2012; Interview AM, Erbil on 27/04/2012 
1307 Interview BW, Sulaimaniya on 08/08/2012; Interview BF, Erbil on 29/06/2012; Interview BB, Erbil on 
24/06/2012 
1308 Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office, Iraq Women Integrated Social and Health Survey, 2. 
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The wider implications to the region of a lack of gender equality within the scholarly 
community will now be considered. Scholarly activities have traditionally been and 
often still are highly gendered. Women’s opinions or findings were seldom 
published.1309 This is especially the case Middle Eastern country, where 
scholarship, especially on women’s issues, is still far from complete.1310 In the 
Kurdistan Region also, scientific research on women and gender is still limited, 
although it exists.1311 Until recently scholars writing about Middle Eastern women 
and being read in the West, were mainly from the West.1312 These views shape the 
attitudes of the rest of the world towards the Middle East and may therefore have a 
negative effect on women’s development. However with the increase of female 
scholars within the region, this development is likely to change. Experts and 
scholars can spread information, as well as new and critical ideas. Women 
participating to conflict transformation as feminist academics are crucial as a 
platform of communication as well as being the producers and distributors of ideas 
and new orders.1313 As shown by the final research report on Female Iraqi 
Academics in Iraqi Kurdistan, the number of female post-graduate students, 
researchers, teachers and lecturers in the region has increased, but women are 
still marginalized when it comes to decision making posts, publishing and 
representing the region’s institutions internationally.1314 The female academics 
explained that while there is no legal discrimination between the sexes, a lack of a 
coherent and transparent system, as well as cultural and social attitudes and a lack 
of support structure when it comes to domestic responsibilities leads to practical 
discrimination.1315 In addition, criticism remains that the government mainly 
supports one part of the population in becoming part of these numbers and that the 
other part of the population have hardly got a chance in getting into the system.  
                                                            
1309 Jaquette Jane and Summerfield Gale (ed.), Women and Gender Equity in Development Theory and 
Practice, Institutions, Resources, and Mobilization (Duke University Press, Durham 2006) p.191 
1310 Sharoni, “Women and Gender in Middle East Studies,” 28. 
1311 See e.g. Al‐Tawil Namir, Hawler Medical University, “Research Article, Association of violence against 
women with religion and culture in Erbil Iraq: a cross‐secƟonal study” (17 September 2012) 
hƩp://www.biomedcentral.com/1471‐2458/12/800/abstract (08.12.2012) 
1312 Yegenoglu Meyda, Colonial fantasies, Towards a feminist reading of Orientalism (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 1998) p. 103 
1313 Julie Pateet and Barbara Harlow, “Gender and Political Change” Middle East Report 173 (1991): 7. 
1314 Nadje Al‐Ali et.al, Female Iraqi Academics in Iraqi Kurdistan: Roles, Challenges & Capacities (Final 
Research Report, DelPHE Iraq) 2. 
1315 Ibid.pp.4‐7 
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For a balanced and peaceful society, it is not possible to only support the one or 
the other element of society with advanced educational opportunities. A way still 
needs to be found in the Kurdistan region to provide opportunities to the whole 
population regardless of the social background. 
It is this disparity in opportunity, which was criticized by the interviewees. While the 
majority of them agreed that within the education system the most support is still 
needed for the less advantaged in the general population including for women. The 
current problem within higher education is not numbers and gender equity, but 
rather social inequality.1316 This loss of a high percentage of human resources for 
the government, as well as a loss of personal chances for individuals, is arguably 
reflected in the job market, as well as the social structure, and should thus be 
changed.  
It can therefore be concluded that while equal access to higher education is in 
theory provided and gender equality in terms of merit is supported by the 
government, substantial developments are still necessary to ensure that also in 
practice all parts of the population have access to the higher education system. It is 
currently unthinkable that a girl from a remote village, who does not even have 
access to secondary education, would have the possibility travel to the UK for her 
PhD, whether she would be fit for a doctorate or not. This fact denies the country 
access to its full potential and leaves people behind, who might one day stand up 
and demand their rights. 
Next to the inclusion of people from all elements of society and of women in 
particular, the quality of the higher education system, and the sensitivity to gender 
within the structure is vital when aiming for the enhancement of gender equality 
within society and positive development within the region at all levels. If and how 
this has been achieved in the Kurdistan Region and what consequences can be 
seen to follow, will be subject of the following section:  
                                                            
1316 Interview BM, Erbil on 13/07/2012; Interview BU, Erbil on 24/07/2012; Interview BD, Erbil on 
25/06/2012 
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2. Quality of Higher Education – Searching for Critical 
Thinking and the Inclusion of Gender 
“It is the duty of school teachers to raise awareness among children. It is also the 
duty of the universities and academic centers to conduct research on this area [of 
violence against women].”1317 
In the Kurdistan Region, the quality of teaching is not only criticized when it comes 
to mandatory education, but also when it comes to higher education and 
scholarship. As with general schooling, access to institutes of higher education is 
of no value for the development of the region if they do not offer courses of high 
quality.  
For instance several scholars at the international conference on Kurdish studies at 
the University of Exeter in September 2012, as well as teaching personnel from the 
University of Kurdistan Hawler, argued that many of the higher education 
institutions in the region today have an outdated system and a weak structure. 
Students and lecturers from different universities inside and outside of the 
Kurdistan Region were particularly critical of some institutes of higher educations 
which they believed are still too influenced by the political parties and too often 
accept not the highly qualified people with a good reputation, but rather family 
members or friends of party members.1318 
In addition, many of the professors, especially at the more newly established 
universities, feel limited in their capacity to exercise professionalism and controlled 
by the system. Such a view was publicly stated by one former professor at the 
University of Kurdistan Hawler.1319 Stories circulate about people, who were thrown 
out from university, because their input was against the political agenda and it was 
                                                            
1317 Kurdistan Regional Government, “Prime Minister Barzani’s speech”.  
1318 Interview AF, Erbil on 09/04/2012; Interview BY, Sulaimaniya on 10/08/2012; Interview CH, Vienna on 
05/11/2012; Interview CB, Vienna on 04/12/2012 
1319 See The Chronicle, “Apply to University of Kurdistan Hawler? Not Recommended” (27 May 2010) 
hƩp://chronicle.com/forums/index.php?topic=69283.0 (Accessed on 08.12.2012) 
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said that there is in general no real freedom of speech, which results in a lack of 
critical thinking, a lack of knowledge circulation and control by politicians.1320   
As experienced during field research in the region, control at the universities was 
high, and some of the students were afraid to discuss certain issues in public. At 
the same time, it needs to be noted that students nevertheless did discuss such 
issues and that the university system clearly produced a large number of active, 
reflective and critically thinking citizens. 
The government recognises that the assurance of quality in the higher education 
sector remains a great challenge, which will need to be tackled, although at a 
different level than the challenges elaborated above. As recognized by the former 
Minister for Higher Education and Scientific Research, Professor Dlawer Abdul 
Aziz Ala’Aldeen, for a long time the government did not have a strategic long-term 
plan for its higher education system. As a consequence there are still problems of 
capacity and space in the different programmes; the quality of teaching and the 
style of learning are not as established as they might be, especially within Master’s 
and PhD programmes; there are several problems with quality assurance in the 
graduation requirements, admission procedure and teaching structure; and finally 
most of the teachers from inside Kurdistan had not had the chance to increase 
their knowledge and experience internationally. To address the last mentioned 
issue the KRG is supporting more professors from outside.1321 This need for 
transformation was met with a reform. 
As part of its “Roadmap to Quality” the KRG sought to raise the quality of higher 
education and scientific research in the Kurdistan Region through a number of 
measures including the establishment of a system of quality assurance; reforming 
the curricula; heavily investing in the sector through the establishment of 
scholarship programmes and through the establishment of new universities; and 
finally initiating an administrative reform.1322 These were all necessary and highly 
positive measures, which are already reflected in the general advances in the 
                                                            
1320 See also: Salman Ahmed Rasul, “Higher EducaƟon in the Kurdistan Region of Iraqi” (6 January 2012) 
hƩp://www.ekurd.net/mismas/arƟcles/misc2012/1/state5770.htm (Accessed on 03.08.2013) 
1321 Ala’Aldeen, “Studying for Master’s degree in Kurdistan Region” 
1322 Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, A Roadmap to Quality, 16‐20. 
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higher education sector and are promising to boost development in the region in 
the near term, if fully implemented. However, they arguably will not work to 
diminish social differences already created by the school system, and certain 
issues, which are vital for a positive academic exchange, such freedom of speech, 
are not discussed. 
As part of the process, the KRG aims at reforming the undergraduate and 
postgraduate curriculum in a way to “encourage students to think critically and 
become more creative self-learners”.1323 If put into practice, this will encourage 
positive social development. In addition the reform promised to “protect human 
rights, achieve social justice and to improve the learning and working 
environment”1324.  
While all other aspects of the reform seem to be well thought through and carefully 
considered, the section on Protecting Human Rights and Establishing Social 
Justice is disappointing. While social justice issues, such as the granting of 
generous scholarships abroad are also included in the package of reforms,1325 they 
are limited to “reforming the recruitment and transfer system” and “to establish a 
Health and Safety Committee”.1326 While both of these measures are important, 
they are limited in their potential. There are no provisions for the specific support of 
less advantaged students, whether financially or through quotas or other 
measures, such as raising awareness of higher education in schools. 
Leaving aside class differences, movement can be seen in the inclusion of gender 
into the study and research curriculum. In the Kurdistan Region certain courses, 
such as medicine and engineering, are still regarded more highly than the social 
sciences. However it is the prevailing opinion that everybody shall receive a place 
to study according to his or her ability, as measured by the final marks in high 
school, without taking into account social issues and other pre-existing 
discrimination. As a result of various measures taken by the universities around the 
region it can be seen that gender and critical thinking are coming more to the fore. 
                                                            
1323 Ibid.p.17 
1324 Ibid.p.12 
1325 Ibid.pp.57/58 
1326 Ibid.pp.88/89 
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Several universities including the Hawler Medical University include in their mission 
statements a commitment to the principle of equal opportunity without 
discrimination.1327 The University of Duhok has as one of its objectives “to promote 
secular, pluralistic and democratic principles with particular emphasis on gender 
equality, equal opportunity and human rights at large”, as well as to “encourage the 
spirit of debate, critical thinking and innovative approach in social, natural, applied, 
engineering and medical sciences”.1328 And the University of Kurdistan Hawler 
goes as far as saying that their philosophy is to teach the students how to think and 
not what to think.1329 
At the University of Sulaimani, a Gender and Violence Studies Centre was 
established, funded by the British Council within its Development Projects in Higher 
Education (DelPHE-Iraq). The aim of the Centre is “to provide robust evidence and 
recommendations to the government”, according to its head, Dr Begikhani. As a 
consequence all sociology students have to complete one unit on gender and 
violence as part of their degree.1330 
Salahaddin University-Hawler for example signed an agreement with the School of 
Oriental and African Studies at the University of London in joint research, 
supervision and student exchange in “gender studies and women empowerment in 
the decision making processes for Kurdistan Region”.1331 
As a contribution to enhancing social and economic development in the region 
through gender equality, the University of Kurdistan Hawler (UKH) initiated a 
women empowerment program, which includes “developing research capabilities 
and managerial skills” among female academics through training sessions and 
                                                            
1327 Hawler Medical University, “Vision and Mission” http://hmu.edu.iq/About/VisionandMission.aspx 
(Accessed on 08.12.2012) 
1328 University of Duhok, “Mission, Vision and Core Values” http://www.uod.ac/en/mission (Accessed on 
08.12.2012) 
1329 University of Kurdistan, Hawler, “About UKH” hƩp://www.ukh.ac/listArƟcls.php?ZID=1&CID=1 (Accessed 
on 08.12.2012) 
1330 Matthew Reisz, Times Higher Education “Iraqi Kurdish scholars put gender theory to the test” 
(13.10.2011) hƩp://www.ƟmeshighereducaƟon.co.uk/story.asp?storycode=417730 (Accessed on 
06.01.2013) 
1331 SUH, “London’s SOAS Signs Agreement with SUH” (31.05.2012) http://www.suh‐
edu.com/index.php?opƟon=com_content&view=arƟcle&id=484%3Alondons‐soas‐signs‐agreement‐with‐
suh&caƟd=1%3Alatest‐news&Itemid=162&lang=en (Accessed on 08.12.2012) 
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workshops.1332 Other initiatives included a women leadership seminar for the 
female students of UKH presented by Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman, the current 
KRG High Representative to the UK, who spoke to the students about her personal 
experiences.1333 Furthermore, the university celebrated international women’s day, 
during which Vice Chancellor Professor Serwan Baban emphasised that it is 
necessary to work for collective human rights and that “the development process in 
Kurdistan needs to harness 100% of its human resources and cannot proceed 
successfully without fully utilising the talents of women, i.e. some 50% of the 
population”1334, the university initiated Female Academic Network Workshops for 
female students at UKH, in which they are supported to strive for success,1335 and 
the university has amongst its staff academics who are specialized in gender 
studies.1336 In addition the university also participated in the workshop “sixteen 
days of activism to end violence against women”, which took place from 29 
November to third December 2012 under the slogan “from peace in the home to 
peace in the Society”, and which had at its purpose to raise awareness about 
gender based violence and to make the young generation fight against it.1337  
Also the University of Zakho was very active in raising awareness “to combat 
domestic violence”1338, with speeches being held by personalities like MP Zakiya 
Sayed Saleh,1339 Dr. Paru Karadaghi, the executive director of Kurdish Human 
Rights in the USA and Mr. Ahmed Musleh Saleh, the Director of the Office of 
                                                            
1332 University of Kurdistan, Hawler, “UKH Leads Women Empowerment in Higher Education” 
hƩp://www.ukh.ac/detailsArƟcls.php?ZID=1&CID=106&AID=602 (Accessed on 08.12.2012) 
1333 University of Kurdistan, Hawler, “Women Leadership Seminars to UKH Female Students” 
hƩp://www.ukh.ac/detailsArƟcls.php?ZID=1&CID=106&AID=689 (Accessed on 08.12.2012) 
1334 University of Kurdistan, Hawler, “University of Kurdistan Hewler Celebrated International Women’s Day” 
hƩp://www.ukh.ac/detailsArƟcls.php?ZID=1&CID=106&AID=1006 (Accessed on 08.12.2012) 
1335 University of Kurdistan, Hawler, “Female Academic Network Workshop” 
hƩp://www.ukh.ac/detailsArƟcls.php?ZID=1&CID=106&AID=1132 (Accessed on 08.12.2012) 
1336 University of Kurdistan, Hawler, “Katherine Carter” 
hƩp://www.ukh.ac/detailsArƟcls.php?ZID=1&CID=106&AID=1141 (Accessed on 08.12.2012) 
1337 University of Kurdistan, Hawler, “UKH Students Fight Violence against Women” 
hƩp://www.ukh.ac/detailsArƟcls.php?ZID=1&CID=106&AID=913 (Accessed on 08.12.2012) 
1338 University of Zakho, “First Day of (16 Days Campaign) To Combat DomesƟc Violence” (27 November 
2012) http://www.uoz‐krg.org/node/278 (Accessed on 12.12.2012) 
1339 University of Zakho, “(16 Days Campaign) To Combat DomesƟc Violence AcƟviƟes from 29/11‐3/12/2012 
(10 December 1012) http://www.uoz‐krg.org/node/281 (Accessed on 12.12.2012) 
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Domestic Violence in Zakho.1340 They spoke on the role of women in society, as 
well as the role of the family and that of the parents in educating children in society. 
However one has to remind oneself that the initiatives taken above only affect a 
small percentage of the people in higher education, who themselves comprise only 
a small percentage of the population as a whole. Nevertheless the potential of such 
measures should not be underestimated. Some female students at university 
argued that these programmes only reach “those, who do not need it anyway” and 
that they should rather increasingly reach women from less educated backgrounds 
as well as men.1341 Nevertheless, the very existence of such measures points to 
the values of the region, and provides a foundation for the students, some of whom 
will most likely become the next leaders of Kurdistan and substantially influence 
the region’s future development.  
In addition, the various initiatives by the universities are partly reflected in the 
students’ opinions. Most of the students questioned were very positive when it 
came to women’s role in Kurdish society. They cherish their opportunities and are 
positive about future development in the region in general and also about issues of 
gender equality.1342 Nevertheless many female students still have the feeling that 
despite their high level of education they will not be able to achieve high positions 
or that they will have to become housewives once they get married.1343 At the 
same time, the open discussions among most students also showed that critical 
debate is flourishing amongst them and that women are generally supported in the 
higher education structure. However while gender inclusion within the university 
sector has not yet had any major influence on society as a whole, it has most 
certainly raised awareness amongst the small number of engaged students, which 
may eventually be reflected in the wider population. 
All in all it can therefore be concluded that positive development in the university 
system, especially when it comes to gender inclusion, is under way. The 
                                                            
1340 University of Zakho, “Second Day of (16 Days Campaign) To Combat DomesƟc Violence” (29 November 
2012) http://www.uoz‐krg.org/node/279 (Accessed on 12.12.2012) 
1341 See e.g. Interview BZ, Sulaimaniya on 10/08/2012  
1342 See e.g. Interview BL, Erbil on 12/07/2012; Interview AS, Sulaimaniya on 23/05/2012; Interview AT, 
Sulaimaniya on 24/05/2012 
1343 Interview AQ, Sulaimaniya on 19/05/2012; Interview AU, Sulaimaniya on 28/05/2012 
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government has worked hard and has invested a lot to ensure that the quality of 
the higher education system in the region is raised as quickly as possible. Within 
the structure of the higher education system, gender issues are slowly being put on 
centre stage, which will most certainly have a positive effect on the region’s 
development, as it provides the female part of the population with the strength and 
the support, which they will need, if they pursue a career in the region. While there 
are still general problems of equity, including gender equity, the different 
institutions of higher education offer from their outset good and balanced 
opportunities for young men and women in the region. The sharp increase of 
numbers of universities and other institutes of higher education within the region 
provides ever more opportunities for citizens to access higher education, especially 
as university services are provided free. Considering that the number of female 
students is nearly as high as that of males, sexual equality can be said to have 
been achieved. The resulting increase in university graduates will push 
development within the region forward. It will also support the intended 
internationalization of the region, by building connections with professionals in 
other countries, as part of the sponsored PhD and Master programmes. From an 
individual point of view, the enhancement of the higher education sector provides 
the women involved with opportunities they would not otherwise have had and with 
the chance to pursue their career of choice. At the same time it has to be 
remembered that many of the current female students do not feel supported by 
society and cannot yet see themselves as having the same access to educational 
support or post university careers, as their male counterparts. Furthermore the 
current structure fails to support gender equality throughout the whole region, as 
there is a large part of the population, including an especially high proportion of 
women, who are in practice unable to access higher education, as they lack the 
essential prerequisites. This results in reduced opportunities for all, and 
consequential differentials between the different social groups, as well as a loss of 
resources for the region. As yet there is no emphasis on actively opening the 
higher education system to people from less advantaged backgrounds. Control by 
the ruling parties still persists, which, if not changed, could one day lead to unrest 
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initiated by opponents of the current leaders or by elements of the population who 
feel left behind and discriminated against.  
Hence in order to make the higher education sector work for long term positive 
development within the region, the sector needs to be opened up and the 
necessary prerequisites adjusted to allow access it have to all people, 
notwithstanding their background. This process should start with the older 
generation: 
C. Women’s Education – Education by Women 
“Since wars begin in the minds of the men, it is in the minds that the defences of 
peace must be constructed.”1344 
When considering education, especially education at a time of transformation, 
nobody can be excluded. It is not enough to merely consider the education of the 
six to twenty-one year olds; rather it is necessary to consider the education of the 
whole population. It is the older generation, who went through or actively took part 
in the wars, and it is they who must come to terms with their pasts. It is the older 
generation, which is currently influencing the dealings within the region, through 
the public as well as private actions they take every day. It is also the older 
generation, which educates the young generation, as mothers, fathers, and 
teachers. It follows that adult education, including the specific education of women, 
must also be seen as vital for the personal development of individuals, as well as 
society as a whole.  
The aim of the following section is to discuss the influence of education on women, 
through the example of teaching literacy, as well as the role of women as 
educators for future development within the region. 
1. Literacy as a Way forward 
“Illiteracy […] is in fact a problem with serious and dangerous socio-economic 
implications. Any interventions to eradicate illiteracy should be viewed as 
developmental interventions.”1345  
                                                            
1344 UNESCO, NaƟonal EducaƟon Support Strategy, Republic of Iraq, 2010‐2014, 7. 
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In today’s world illiteracy is seen as a serious problem for the individuals affected, 
and society as a whole. As a result of how the modern world is constructed, an 
inability to read and write constitutes a barrier in most day-to-day life, which results 
in dependency and a lack of choices in personal development. As demonstrated by 
UNESCO through the example of Iraq, high levels of illiteracy in a country hinder 
the developmental process in a country, as well as frustrate individuals in in their 
efforts to achieve their aspirations.1346 
It is a common consequence of a prolonged armed conflict that levels of illiteracy, 
and in particular the percentage of illiterate women in the regions affected, is very 
high. This development can be observed around the world, and although exact 
numbers are often unclear, the effects of war on literacy are visible. In Rwanda the 
percentage of illiterate women, as measured after the genocide, was at 67,4 per 
cent, in Afghanistan it was 85 per cent and in Ethiopia 66,2 per cent.1347 
For the Kurdistan Region in Iraq the long years of war and social exclusion have 
had similar effects. Education was scarce during the 1990s and consequently 
illiteracy rose. In 2000 the illiteracy rate amounted to 34 per cent, with over 60 per 
cent being women.1348 
Despite great developments, the illiteracy rate in the three northern districts of Iraq 
is today still one of the highest in the country. An average of 26.3 per cent of the 
whole population is illiterate,1349 according to the Kurdistan Region Statistics Office, 
and with an average of 36 to 40 per cent for women above fifteen.1350 The very 
high illiteracy rate amongst women, compared to other parts of Iraq is ascribed to 
the lack of support for the region during the Baathist rule, as well as to the large 
differences between urban and rural life which still exist. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1345 UNESCO Iraq Oﬃce, NaƟonal Strategic Framework for Literacy in Iraq, 2011‐2015 (UNESCO) 11. 
1346 Ibid.p.13 
1347 Petra Purkarthofer, Gender und bewaffnete Konflikte, Vergleichsstudie, (Vienna: Vienna Institute for 
InternaƟonal Dialogue and CooperaƟon, 2008) 10. 
1348 UNESCO Iraq Oﬃce, NaƟonal Strategic Framework for Literacy in Iraq, 21. 
1349 Kurdistan Region Statistics Office, Education, 1. 
1350 IAU, Women in Iraq Fact sheet. 
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Once violence had decreased in the region, and the security situation became 
more stable, several sides lobbied for more educational opportunities for women, in 
order to improve their future prospects, and to support development in the region 
as a whole.   
For example members of the Iraqi Council of Representatives and the Kurdistan 
Parliament-Iraq, as part of the international conference on “The Role of Women in 
Peace-Building, Reconciliation and Accountability in Iraq” proposed to 
“Make eliminating illiteracy a priority by supporting all government, 
private sector, and civil society literacy programmes, and make 
literacy a first step towards the socio-economic empowerment of 
women.”1351 
Also the participants of the “International Conference on Kurdish Women for Peace 
and Equality” lobbied for the establishment of community culture centres, which 
provide professional training, as well as educational opportunities for women.1352 
As a reaction to the need, the Ministry of Education initiated the “Illiteracy Free 
Kurdistan” campaign, which targeted everybody between the age of 15 and 45.1353 
In addition to the literacy and adult education initiative, the KRG introduced the 
“Accelerated Learning Program” in 2005, with the aim of attracting school drop outs 
back into education.1354 According to a UNESCO report, for the academic year 
2010/2011 there were 424 literacy centres present in the Kurdistan Region, which 
accommodated 19.330 learners, of which 57 per cent were women1355 and 140 
Accelerated Learning Schools with 20.212 learners, of which 46 per cent were 
women.1356 In addition, the KRG declared as their goal to establish 3600 centres 
by 2015 with 150,000 learners to reduce illiteracy in the region to eight per cent1357 
                                                            
1351 No Peace Without Justice, The Role of Women in Peace‐Building, RecommendaƟon 46. 
1352 The Kurdish National Congress of North America, International Conference on Kurdish Women, 
SuggesƟon 8. 
1353 UNESCO Iraq Oﬃce, NaƟonal Strategic Framework for Literacy in Iraq, 21. 
1354 Ibid.p.21 
1355 Ibid.p.68 
1356 Ibid.p.71 
1357 Ibid.p.68 
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as well as to establish up to 800 Accelerated Learning Schools for 115.000 
students.1358  
The KRG was not alone with its initiative. As part of its strategy to support the 
improvement of Iraqi education UNESCO has established a priority to support the 
reduction of illiteracy especially amongst out-of-school children and women.1359 An 
increase in the literacy rate is a concern for the region and also for the international 
community as a whole. 
For this reason, UNESCO launched in 2010, in partnership with the Office of Her 
Highness Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser, First Lady of Qatar, the Literacy Initiative for 
Empowerment (LIFE) project in Iraq. This initiative aims at empowering civil society 
and the Iraqi Government to provide equal access to literacy and to reduce the 
illiteracy rate by 50 per cent by 2015.1360 The Iraqi Ministry of Education, together 
with the Ministry of Education of the Kurdistan Region and UNESCO Iraq have 
developed a National Framework for the Literacy Strategy in Iraq for 
implementation until 2015.1361 
Finally, the NGOs are also involved in promoting literacy in the region to maximise 
the outreach to the civil population. In the Kurdistan Region five Kurdish NGOs, 
namely the Civil Development Organisation, Al Messalla Organisation, Harikar, 
Alind Organisation for Youth Democratization and the Public Aid Organisation were 
chosen and sponsored to establish additional community learning centres.1362 
The official statistics indicate that the campaigns have proven a big success. 
According to the Ministry of Education, the KRG has managed, through their 
“Illiteracy Free Kurdistan” campaign to decrease the illiteracy rate in 2010 to 16 per 
cent.1363  While this number does not coincide with the percentage published by 
                                                            
1358 Ibid.p.71 
1359 UNESCO, NaƟonal EducaƟon Support Strategy, Republic of Iraq, 2010‐2014, 13. 
1360 UNESCO Office for Iraq, “Involving local NGOs in Literacy programs in Iraq” (19 October 2011) 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/iraq‐office/about‐this‐office/single‐
view/news/involving_local_ngos_in_literacy_programs_in_iraq/ (Accessed on 09.01.2013) 
1361 UNESCO Iraq Oﬃce, NaƟonal Strategic Framework for Literacy in Iraq, 2. 
1362 UNESCO Office for Iraq, “Involving local NGOs in Literacy programs in Iraq”.  
1363 UNESCO Iraq Oﬃce, NaƟonal Strategic Framework for Literacy in Iraq, 21. 
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the Kurdistan Region Statistics Office in 2012,1364 it can nevertheless be assumed 
illiteracy throughout the region has decreased as a result of the campaign. 
Even if some of the numbers are not totally accurate, it is arguable that by 
prioritising literacy, the leading parties are laying the foundations for boosting 
individual as well as national development, and for eliminating reasons for conflict 
from below. There are several grounds for supporting this theory: 
According to IAU, households headed by an illiterate person are more likely to be 
deprived of basic needs. Such households are more likely to be disadvantaged 
when it comes to sufficient clean water, sanitation, food or electricity, than 
households headed by literate individuals.1365 While it could be argued that it is not 
because of a lack of education that these individuals are suffering from a lack of 
basic necessities, but rather that they are unable to access education as a 
consequence of lacking the basic necessities of life. However, is clear that poverty 
and a lack of education often coincide, and it is thus vital to make education 
accessible, in order to provide the low- or no-income parts of the population with 
enhanced opportunities. Since women comprise the majority of the illiterate 
population, and since they most often manage the households, while the men are 
out working or seeking work, it is of great importance to consider literacy 
programmes through a gendered lens. It is important that women are provided with 
opportunities to access these programmes. 
Furthermore, enhanced literacy not only provides the foundation to improve the  
living standards of the individual and her or his family, but also to boost the 
economic prosperity of the country. Literate and numerate people have an 
advantage in finding employment or in starting their own business, through which 
they can rails their families out of poverty. This in turn leads to further economic 
development throughout the country.  
In addition educated mothers especially benefit their children through example.  It 
has been argued that girls are more likely to attend schools if their mothers are 
                                                            
1364 See above: 26.3%; Kurdistan Region Statistics Office, Education, 1. 
1365 IAU, Literacy in Iraq Fact Sheet. 
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educated, even if this happens in adulthood. The consequential education of the 
next generation will result in even further development of a nation.1366 
Considering individual development, the vast changes in the Kurdistan Region over 
the past 10 years, the increased urbanization, and the level of international 
involvement the region is aiming for, it is inconceivable that part of the population 
could lead a prosperous life while remaining illiterate.  
This also the opinion of most of the Kurdish population, who are, at least in theory, 
very much in favour of the idea of continuing education. According to the Kurdistan 
Regional Statistics Office, six out of ten women between 15 and 45, who did not 
complete their education, are interested in doing so.1367Also amongst the people 
interviewed several women were very supportive of the chances to continue 
education,1368 although others were sceptical.1369 
Finally, apart economic advantages, it is said that literacy programmes are able to 
support individual social development, including an enhancement of gender 
equality. As expressed by Leach and Dume, education is also a link between 
gender and violence.1370 Literacy can have a positive effect on social participation 
and decision making, as it gives people the feeling that they have a voice.1371 As 
explained by Colcough it can also provide people with more self-confidence 
resulting in less dependency on others. However, he continues that this will not be 
achieved by merely teach men and women to read and write. Literacy programmes 
will only truly empower women, when they are tied to income-generating activities, 
as well as to education in health and human rights.1372 
Hence ‘literacy’ includes more than knowing the letters of the alphabet. Taking up 
the argument, several scholars, including Juliet McCaffery maintain that literacy is 
or should be more than merely learning how to read. Literacy can be significant in 
                                                            
1366 Naomi Wolf, Al Jazeera, “Opinion, The price of oppressing your women” (5.10.2011) 
hƩp://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/10/2011102133713539233.html (Accessed on 5.12.2011) 
1367 Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office, Iraq Women Integrated Social and Health Survey, 1. 
1368 Interview AL, Erbil on 25/04/2012; Interview AW, Sulaimaniya on 01/06/2012 
1369 Interview AV, Sulaimaniya on 28/05/2012; Interview BG, Erbil on 02/07/2012 
1370 Leach and Dume (ed.), Education, Conflict and Reconciliation, 22. 
1371 IAU, Literacy in Iraq Fact Sheet. 
1372 Colclough, “Achieving Gender Equality in Education,” 8. 
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changing individuals as well as society as a whole and in certain situations can 
challenge the social order. Whether and how literacy will influence people’s lives is 
thereby dependent on the way it is taught. While it can be taught simply as a skill, 
without any specific background, the social model theory stresses that it is 
particularly important that “literacy learned by adults should relate directly to their 
cultural and communal practices”, which can then result in transformative literacy 
or literacy as a critical reflection. Literacy can consequently be used as a tool by 
the learner to take control over developments in their lives, and to engage with the 
world around them in a different way. This can be achieves by teaching critical 
analysis, problem solving, active methods of learning and context-related literacy, 
as part of literacy itself.1373 
It follows that literacy’s true transformative potential will only be achieved, if the aim 
for transformation is included into the programme.  
Lessons form the failure to teach critical analysis and to read context as part of 
literacy programs could already be learned from Iraq in the 1980s, when, just as 
today, reading classes were conducted for all illiterate Iraqis between 15 and 45 
years of age. As noted by Salvesberg, Hajo and Borck it was an important aim at 
the time to include rural women into modern society. However when the women 
were later asked about the usefulness of these classes, many were of the opinion 
that they had no use for reading and writing, since their lives remained the same in 
every other way. By not giving the graduates of these programmes the 
opportunities to put their skills to use, or by not providing them with the necessary 
expertise to achieve transformation by themselves, the literacy campaigns did not 
fulfil their potential.  
Even today there persist problems surrounding the literacy initiatives. As analysed 
by UNESCO, while Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region, has the will and the 
possibility to decrease illiteracy within the population, there are still several 
challenges to be overcome. These include the effective deployment of human 
resources, an inadequate outreach to the population, the lack of enforcement of 
                                                            
1373 Leach and Dume (ed.), Education, Conflict and Reconciliation, 136/7. 
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the compulsory education law, as well as a lack of including gender and cultural 
diversity within the curricula.1374 
As with compulsory education, the great efforts by the authorities to support 
development in the region through enhanced literacy are limited by inter alia not 
reaching the whole population and by not including enough practical gender 
considerations in their programmes.  
In order to provide opportunities for all parts of the population to enhance their 
education, to advance their personal development, as well as to support national 
development, it is vital to not only make literacy classes generally available, but to 
also provide the surrounding circumstances, which enable people to benefit from 
their new capabilities.  
According to IAU, the most significant reasons for young illiterate women not 
attending school is their parents’ refusal, followed by the distance to school and 
problems of financing.1375 Hence the government should seek to achieve an 
environment where the parents support sending their girls to school. There are 
similar problems for older illiterate women. As described by Salih Waladbagi from 
the KurdishGlobe, women in the region respond very well to the literacy initiatives 
by the government and they are happy to study, but there are persisting problems 
of resources, as well as social and cultural impediments. These include the 
problem of being out in the evening, the lack of child care, the lack of 
transportation, and the lack of family support, which make it difficult for women to 
resume their studies.1376 These problems could also be seen, when observing 
parts of the Kurdish population first hand. When older women with limited 
education were asked why they did not pursue further education after the war, the 
common replies were that they did not have the necessary finances, that they 
needed to pursue their responsibilities at home, that it was not seen as necessary 
anymore by the family, or that they felt too old. At the same time it has to be said 
                                                            
1374 UNESCO Iraq Oﬃce, NaƟonal Strategic Framework for Literacy in Iraq, 24‐27. 
1375 IAU, Literacy in Iraq Fact Sheet. 
1376 Salih Waladbagi, “350.000 people being literate since 2000 in Kurdistan” (08 October 2011) 
http://www.kurdishglobe.net/display‐arƟcle.html?id=6D96CE6D5F034867ABF590E232704E63 (Accessed on 
09.01.2013) 
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that most of the families questioned strongly supported the education of their 
children and of the next generation.  
It may be concluded that the support of literacy initiatives in the region in general is 
certainly needed and is positive for individual, as well as for national development. 
However is unclear to what extent the initiatives have yet influenced progress 
towards gender equality and development within the region. While the potential for 
development is certainly there, it is questionable whether the quality of the courses, 
as well as the level of their accessibility by all parts of the population is yet high 
enough to realise the potential. Even if the benefits are not clearly measurable, it is 
vital to continue these initiatives, as they provide people, and especially women, 
with the possibility to pursue education, which is arguably necessary in today’s 
world and which will have an effect on the region’s development in the long run.  
While it is vital to give women, and men, the opportunities to become students 
once more, the most important roles in shaping the region’s future arguably belong 
to the teachers, namely of teachers of their children, the next generation. 
2. Women as Educators for a New Generation 
“It is necessary to remove the idea of war from the heads of the people and to work 
against the application of this idea.”1377 
Conflicts change the values and norms of a society. They make people much more 
tolerant towards violent behaviour, which is consequently difficult to reverse.1378 It 
follows that after a time of conflict, especially after decades of internal conflict, 
there is a need to build up social relations from the bottom up. Hence not only the 
officials, but also groups within civil society are of great importance in the 
reconstruction of relationships born out of conflict. One way of doing so is through 
education, whether formal or informal, and it in this area that women are the most 
experienced, the most active,1379 and also the most recognized. Interviewees both 
men and women, and from different social backgrounds, all agreed, whether they 
                                                            
1377 Interview BO, Erbil on 18/07/2012 
1378 Christina Steenkamp, Violence and Post‐War Reconstruction, Managing Insecurity in the Aftermath of 
Peace Accords (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2009) 29/30. 
1379 Golan, “Viewpoints,” 94. 
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liked it or not, that an important, or even the most important role of a woman, is and 
always has been that of a mother.1380 In their roles as educators, women have a 
profound influence on conflict transformation.  
As explained by Al-Suwaiji, women have the ability to restore the Iraqi family, the 
personal one, as well as the national one. After decades of the government trying 
to turn different ethnic and religious groups against one another, and of having 
their informants and the secret police everywhere, it is a challenge to bring people 
together again and to restore positive values. Women are first and foremost in 
meeting this challenge through educating their children as well as everybody else 
around.1381 
Further, women have a very important role as mothers and their teachings will 
influence their children and the next generation. 
This fact was also recognized by some of the interviewees from the Kurdistan 
Region.1382 It was the prevailing opinion among the interviewees that next to their 
role as workers, women have their most important role in their families, as 
nurturers, as well as as teachers.  “Teaching” and conveying knowledge is seen by 
many as women’s task or purpose, whether as teachers or as mothers in educating 
their children.1383  
Nearly half of the interviewees (49%) believed that women especially should work 
in schools, as teachers. Teaching has good working hours and as with being a 
mother, is seen as a respectable calling for a woman in the Kurdistan Region.1384 
Teaching, especially at primary school level, has often been regarded as a 
“woman’s job”. In the Kurdistan Region the number of female teachers was often 
higher than that of male. In 2003 of 25,782 teachers there were 15,179 women in 
                                                            
1380 See e.g. Interview AR, Sulaimaniya on 21/05/2012; Interview BB, Erbil on 24/06/2012; Interview AZ, 
Sulaimaniya on 06/06/2012; Interview BT, Erbil on 24/07/2012; Interview BU, Erbil on 24/07/2012 
1381 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, „Winning the Peace”. 
1382 Interview BG, Erbil on 02/07/2012; Interview BK, Erbil on 12/07/2012; Interview AZ, Sulaimaniya on 
06/06/2012 
1383 Interview BW, Sulaimaniya on 08/08/2012; Interview AX, Sulaimaniya on 03/06/2012; Interview CA, 
Sulaimaniya on 13/08/2012; Interview AI, Erbil on 16/04/2012 
1384 See e.g. Interview AZ, Sulaimaniya on 06/06/2012; Interview BQ, Erbil on 21/07/2012; Interview BJ, Erbil 
on 09/07/2012; Interview AF, Erbil on 09/04/2012 
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comparison to 10,603 men.1385 As more fully elaborated above, schools, like family 
and social surroundings, can be considered as “human-making factories”.1386 
Schools can change thinking and they will influence a person’s mind for the rest of 
his or her life.1387 Further, the teachers often provide role models for the children, 
and thereby play a decisive role in breaking down or in supporting stereotypes.1388 
The results of the interviews conducted correlate with the results of the Kurdistan 
Regional Statistics Office, according to which the vast majority of men (71%) 
believe that it is women’s main role to build up society and establish a household; 
while 24 per cent were of the opinion that the woman’s most important role to give 
birth and raise their children.1389 
The mother, especially in traditional societies, is the person who spends the most 
time with the child in the first years of its development. 1390 It is the parents who 
communicate values concerning war and peace to their children and mothers can 
have a great influence on the outlook of their children in these areas.1391 The family 
is the first social institution which reinforces patriarchal relationships, which 
supports or works against gender discrimination and which influences social 
behaviour in general.1392 The child will feel if something is important for the mother 
or not and will act accordingly. It follows that if the mother is a pacifist or puts a 
great emphasis on education, the child is likely though not inevitably to do so as 
well. Mothers are a driving force in forming their children, and through giving a 
young boy the feeling that he is superior to his female family members, and 
through giving a girl the feeling that it is her role to serve the men, the mother lays 
                                                            
1385 Kurdistan Regional Government, “New School Year Starts”.  
1386 Abu‐Lughod (ed.), Remaking Women, 95. 
1387 Jolynn Shoemaker, “In War and Peace: Women and Conflict Prevention” Civil Wars 5(1) (2002): 49. 
1388 Colclough, “Achieving Gender Equality in Education,” 7. 
1389 Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office, Iraq Women Integrated Social and Health Survey, Men Influence (I‐
WISH, October 2012) 1. 
1390 Kandiyoti (ed.), Gendering the Middle East, 206. 
1391 Judith Myers‐Walls, Karen Myers‐Bowman and Ann Pelo, „Parents as educators about war and peace“ 
Family Relations 42(1) (1993): 66. 
1392 UNDP, Arab Human Development Report 2005,  16. 
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the foundation for the continuance of inequality between men and women in 
society.1393 
As explained by a 20 year old house wife from Erbil, who had three children and 
had a very open and feminist outlook on the world,  
“many of them (the women today) have an important position in the 
field of education and in educating. Some have educated their 
children in such a way that they can serve their home country. That 
is very great and a truly important role.”1394  
Many people, especially from less educated backgrounds, see it as a “normal role” 
and not out of the ordinary that women have to educate the next generation and to 
pass on their national heritage to them. However, as explained by a young woman 
who herself had not finished school,1395 women’s roles as educators cannot be 
underestimated, and is in one way or another recognized by the whole of society. 
About two thirds of the Kurds interviewed were of the opinion that women did not 
make a contribution to peace building, as they were not involved in high level 
politics.1396 Amongst the one third who agreed that women have a role in conflict 
transformation, the majority saw this role in raising the next generation, as well as 
in supporting the men at home.1397 As explained by different people in form of a 
metaphor, women in Kurdistan are the “interior ministry”, caring for the family and 
society within, while men are the “exterior ministry” and depending on the position 
of the person the one or the other are slightly more important, but both are needed 
to stabilize the region.1398  
Apart from supporting the decrease of violent behaviour, and supporting the 
increase of national development, it also falls upon the parents to convey gender 
ideologies to the next generation. With reference to gender equity within the 
households, several of the younger women interviewed complained that they were 
                                                            
1393 Kandiyoti (ed.), Gendering the Middle East, 206. 
1394 Interview AI, Erbil on 16/04/2012 
1395 Interview AV, Sulaimaniya on 28/05/2012 
1396 See e.g. Interview BA, Erbil on 21/06/2012; Interview BN, Erbil on 17/07/2012; Interview BI, Erbil on 
08/07/2012; Interview AX, Sulaimaniya on 03/06/2012; Interview AN, Erbil on 03/05/2012 
1397 See e.g. Interview BM, Erbil on 13/07/2012; Interview BX, Sulaimaniya on 09/08/2012; Interview AP, 
Sulaimaniya on 18/05/2012; Interview AJ, Erbil on 20/04/2012; Interview BB, Erbil on 24/06/2012 
1398 Interview CI, Vienna on 26/10/2012; Interview CK, Vienna on 20/10/2012 
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treated differently from their brothers, and that they had to fight harder to be 
allowed the same things as the male members of their families.1399 These 
differences could also be witnessed, when observing family life, especially in more 
traditional households, where girls were rather taught the skills needed to become 
a good housewife and mother, while boys were encouraged to find a suitable 
career choice. When parents were then asked why they treated their children 
differently, the general reply was that they treated them equally, according to their 
roles in society1400, or, when it came to individual freedom outside the house, that 
girls had to be treated differently for their protection.1401  
The above statement seems to support one strand of criticism, which has been 
discussed time and time again in this thesis, namely that it is society, which is 
holding back the development of gender equality. While this might be true in 
certain individual circumstances, it cannot be accepted as a general conclusion. 
While parents might be the cause of restriction, they are also the cause of 
development and success for their children. This has been especially visible, when 
it came to the issue of education, as the majority of female students when asked 
how they achieved success in university despite possible social challenges, replied 
that it was due to their parents’ support.1402 Equally, when women with a visibly 
strong character were asked, where they thought they derived their personality 
from, one reason was often their mother. As explained by one woman: 
“My mother was a really strong person. She just did everything she 
had to do and she wanted to do. She did not care if she sat with 
men or not, and she did not care how she dressed. My mother was 
a lot extremer than me. She always taught me that I could achieve 
everything I wanted in life and she made me to the person I am.”1403 
It follows that mothers can have a great influence on the individual development of 
their children, and consequently also on the wider national development. However, 
for this to happen, support by society, as well as by the authorities, has to go hand 
                                                            
1399 See e.g. Interview AJ, Erbil on 20/04/2012; Interview BY, Sulaimaniya on 10/08/2012 
1400 Interview BA, Erbil on 21/06/2012; Interview BR, Erbil on 22/07/2012; Interview BS, Erbil on 24/07/2012 
1401 Interview BE, Erbil on 26/06/2012; Interview BG, Erbil on 02/07/2012 
1402 Interview AJ, Erbil on 20/04/2012; Interview BB, Erbil on 24/06/2012; Interview BV, Sulaimaniya on 
06/08/2012 
1403 Interview CH, Vienna on 05/11/2012 
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in hand. It is thus seen as detrimental and criticized by a considerable percentage 
of interviewees that the government and the public do not value the work of 
mothers sufficiently and that they are not well enough supported in their work of 
raising the next generation.1404  
While the perceived lack of governmental support for mothers will most likely not 
directly change the way in which women raise their children, it is in general vital to 
recognize the role mothers are playing and to also make women aware of the 
importance of their position, especially as caretakers, in maintaining and 
reproducing a warlike society.1405 It is necessary to make women aware of the 
importance of their roles in society, and especially of their roles as mothers. The 
norms and values with which they bring up their children can contribute on the one 
hand to discriminatory or violent behaviour, but on the other hand to open and 
positive contact with others, free of violence.1406 This can lead to changes in 
thinking and to the prevention of future conflict.  
The recognition of this role links to the previous consideration of the education of 
women, since, as mentioned by some, the role as a mother can only be properly 
fulfilled when the women themselves are educated. Currently the women are not 
sufficiently well educated, but are considered to be the educators of the next 
generation, which is simply not possible. This was also the opinion of more than 
half (60%) of the people interviewed. They agreed that women should participate in 
transformation as their role of mothers, but at the same time some were worried 
that women could convey the wrong ideas to their children. Several interviewees 
believed that women should only teach children, “if they are educated enough”, 
which brings us back to the importance of educating women.1407 
The section above argues that future development lies in the hands of every single 
person within society. Parents and especially mothers have the responsibility to 
                                                            
1404 Interview BV, Sulaimaniya on 06/08/2012; Interview AP, Sulaimaniya on 18/05/2012 
1405 Development Studies Network, Women, Gender and Development in the Pacific: Key Issues, Conflict and 
Peacemaking: Gender Perspectives, (Australian NaƟonal University 2000) 81. 
1406 Sorensen, Women and Post‐Conflict Reconstruction, 11. 
1407 Interview AT, Sulaimaniya on 24/05/2012; Interview BC, Erbil on 25/06/2012; Interview BD, Erbil on 
25/06/2012; Interview AY, Sulaimaniya on 04/06/2012; Interview BG, Erbil on 02/07/2012; Interview CJ, 
Vienna on 28/10/2012 
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influence the next generation in a way that enhances development at the individual 
as well as the regional level.  Whether this is happening at the moment or not is 
very dependent on every individual. It is vital to make women aware of the 
important role they are playing. One way is to increase government support for 
housewives and women, or alternatively make such support more widely available 
as it cannot yet be felt by society as a whole.  
As a general conclusion education has the ability to enhance positive development 
towards peace and social equality, but its potential until now has only partly been 
realised in the Kurdistan Region. While the government has clearly put a great 
effort into improving and enhancing education at all levels, from compulsory 
education, to higher education and adult education, these efforts have not yet been 
as successful as they might. The measures already undertaken, such as the 
building of new schools, the revision of the curriculum, the introduction of the 
“Roadmap to Quality” at university level, the initiation of a literacy campaign, and 
the support of international involvement at all levels, have certainly enhanced 
opportunities for the privileged classes in general, who have a feeling of positive 
development and peace within the region. However this is not the case for the 
lower classes. The reforms have not yet reached the general population and high 
quality education for children from less advantaged families is still scarce. This 
leads to families not sending their girls to school, especially at a later age, which 
results in their having the same social and economic problems as the previous 
generations. The same is true for the higher education system, where great 
developments have taken place, but large segments of the population are still 
excluded, and thus cannot feel the development of the region in the same way. 
Education in the Kurdistan Region might still, as argued by Seitz,1408 be a tool to 
support social differences and inequalities rather than diminish them. Especially 
from a class perspective, gender equality is yet to be achieved. While the 
educational institutions for the upper classes can promote peace and gender 
equality within their system, the same cannot be said for the other educational 
institutions, and this leads to a general inequality within society.  
                                                            
1408 Seitz, Bildung und Konflikt, 48/49. 
  
Page | 308  
 
From an individual point of view, this lack of equality and especially a lack of 
access to high quality education for all levels of society, impedes members of low 
income families, and especially girls, to fulfil their full potential. This results in 
possible social deprivation, economic hardship, or lack of self-fulfilment. The 
resulting loss of human potential for national development, the increasing disparity 
between social groups and the consequential lack of education for a substantial 
part of society are likely to increase the potential for conflict. 
To redress these issues it would be advisable to further improve the quality of the 
schooling system by also viewing it from a gender perspective, to make higher 
education accessible to a higher percentage of the population, and to raise the 
status of mothers and teachers as educators for the next generation. The aim is to 
ensure that opportunities are given for all and that positive peace can be achieved 
at all levels. Finally, and maybe most importantly, there should be a special 
emphasis on diminishing the discrepancy between rich and poor, which might 
otherwise lead to the persistence of private violence and the flaring up of public 
violence once again. 
VII. Conclusion 
From the outset, it has been the aim of this thesis to research the effects of gender 
inclusive policies or the lack thereof on development in a region which is currently 
undergoing the process of conflict transformation; in this case: the Kurdistan 
Region. 
It has been recognized today by the international community,1409 as well as by 
academics1410 that ‘peace’ is more than merely the laying down of arms and that 
the equality of men and women is hugely influential on development, arguably 
especially so after the cessation of violent conflicts. 
                                                            
1409 United Nations. “Peace inextricably linked with equality between women and men says Security Council 
in International Women’s Day statement”. 
1410 See e.g.: Eifler and Seifert, Gender Dynamics and Post‐Conflict Reconstruction; Enloe, Nimo’s War, 
Emma’s War, Making Feminist Sense of the Iraq War; or Pankhurst (ed.), Gendered Peace, Women’s 
Struggles for Post‐War Justice and Reconciliation. 
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Despite this knowledge, little has changed.1411 Women are still often marginalized 
and gender inclusion is not seen as relevant at the time of peacemaking.1412  
It was thus the aim to demonstrate on the example of a region currently in this 
situation, and which at the same time publicly set itself the task to stand up for the 
advancement of gender equality and for women in their society,1413 what effect 
their gender policies have on the development of the region as a whole, as well as 
the development of their citizens on a more individual level. 
A variety of different areas were considered, in order to give the reader a taste of 
the vast range of issues to be considered when it comes to developing a country or 
region, as well as to be able to derive to a realistic conclusion on the measures 
deployed by the KRG and the consequential effects on the region and society. 
While this method proved far from fully inclusive, as the topics to be considered in 
a situation of conflict transformation seem never ending, it was possible to come to 
the general conclusion that while the KRG’s actions to support women in the region 
are present to a certain extent, the policies in question have until now concentrated 
too much on quantity, i.e. sexual inclusion, rather than quality, i.e. gender inclusion. 
In addition, the fact that the policies deployed mainly target, or are accessible by, 
women from more advantaged family backgrounds, leads to inequality and an 
enhancement of the divide between rich and poor. 
As could already be derived from an interpretation of previous research on similar 
subject matters, and as confirmed by the Kurdistan Region’s citizens through their 
actions and points of views, it follows that the policies enacted by the government 
have not gone unnoticed and have had an effect on the development of the region, 
as well as its individuals, but with any positive effect remaining marginal.  
The insufficient concentration on true gender equality, and especially the lack of 
attention to the inclusion of the different classes, has led to a loss of deeper 
transformative influence, which is visible in the current day-to-day life of the Kurds 
                                                            
1411 Security Council, Women and Peace and Security. 
1412 Bonta, “Conflict Resolution among Peaceful Societies,” 409. 
1413 RUDAW “Kurdistan Regional Government, PM Barzani kicks off campaign protecting women’s rights, 
combating domestic violence”. 
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in the region and which can be assumed to be detrimental to the region’s 
development as a whole. 
More specifically, when viewing in more detail the three different areas of 
involvement considered, the conclusions are: 
A. Politics 
It has become consensus by academics and practitioners that inclusive 
involvement is needed in the political sphere in order to ensure development and 
the mitigation of conflict potential.1414 Feminists in recent times have thereby 
particularly stressed that numbers are not enough and that it is vital to consider 
which type of women are getting involved.1415 If done correctly, it is the 
presumption by the academics that equal representation on a political level will 
lead to enhanced appreciation of equality on the ground, and thus decrease 
conflict potential.1416 
When it came to the issue of negotiations, it could be observed that the Kurdistan 
Region did not follow the recommendations by the international community1417 and 
neither included women in numbers in their negotiations,1418 nor gender 
considerations within the agreements reached as part of the negotiations,1419 with 
the latter possibly, but not exclusively, being a consequence of the former.  
                                                            
1414 Hunt, “Inclusive Security”. 
Suthanthiraraj and Ayo, Promoting Women’s Participation in Conflict and Post‐Conflict Societies, 11. 
Caprioli and Boyer, “Gender, Violence and International Crisis,” 505. 
Zuckermann and Greenberg, “The Gender Dimensions of Post‐Conflict Reconstruction,” 79. 
1415 Al‐Ali in Simon, “Kurdistan, Women in Iraq”. 
1416 Melander, “Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict,” 696. 
1417 Through Res 1325 
1418 Osman, “The Washington agreement, the negotiations”. 
Iraq Helsinki Project, “Invited Parties”. 
1419 Osman, “The Washington agreement, the negotiations”. 
Sharifi, “Kurdish lawmaker”. 
Muhammed, “Problems with Baghdad are on the table”.  
Investors Iraq, “High‐level Kurdish delegation to visit Baghdad to resolve the crisis file and Kirkuk oil”. 
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Despite, or maybe because of, the lack of women and gender inclusion, the 
majority of the people interviewed were of the opinion that it would be 
advantageous to include women in this process.1420 
As can be derived from previous findings by academics, and as also recognised by 
many among the interviewees, the lack of gender inclusion could be seen as taking 
away the chance for enhanced positive development on a national as well as 
individual level and has thus resulted in a loss of opportunities. 
The situation was quite a different one when it came to the inclusion of women in 
parliament.  
The KRG initiated the introduction of a quota and enshrined in its draft constitution 
that a minimum of 30 per cent of MPs have to be women.1421 In addition, several 
committees specifically engaged with women’s issues were created,1422 women’s 
inclusion was publicly promoted by the politicians in power,1423 and conferences 
were held and sponsored to support women’s standing in the political sphere as 
well as in society as a whole.1424 
While all of this seemed to serve as a great starting point for a positive gender 
inclusion, the KRG arguably failed to take necessary further steps. 
                                                            
1420 Interview BV, Sulaimaniya on 06/08/2012; Interview BN, Erbil on 17/07/2012; Interview BW, Sulaimaniya 
on 08/08/2012; Interview AJ, Erbil on 20/04/2012; Interview CI, Vienna on 26/10/2012; Interview CK, Vienna 
on 20/10/2012; Interview BQ, Erbil on 21/07/2012; Interview BR, Erbil on 22/07/2012; Interview CJ, Vienna 
on 28/10/2012; Interview CD, Vienna on 21/10/2012; Interview AN, Erbil on 03/05/2012; Interview BK, Erbil 
on 08/07/2012; Interview BS, Erbil on 24/07/2012 
1421 Draft of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s ConsƟtuƟon 2009, ArƟcles 41(2) and 106(2) 
1422 KRG, “The Kurdistan Parliament”. 
KRG‐DFR, “Swedish rights training programme”. 
Rudaw, “New monitoring body established to protect women’s rights”. 
1423 PUKmedia, “President Barzani congratulates Kurdistan Women.” 
PUKmedia, “Dr. Masum: We wish woman to occupy sovereign position in Iraq”. 
1424 Fallah, “Press Release Resolution and Suggestion”. 
No peace without justice, “International Conference on “The Role of Women in Peace‐Building, 
Reconciliation and Accountability in Iraq””. 
Chung, “Conference in Erbil Focuses on Women’s Role in Politics”. 
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It has been criticized that only so called ‘token women’ are present in Kurdistan’s 
politics today,1425 that only a certain class of women is in practice able to access 
the political sphere,1426 and that they lack the necessary power.1427 
The results of the actions taken by the KRG when it comes to women and gender 
inclusion into parliament are clearly visible in the region’s development and within 
society. 
While the efforts taken to increase the number of female MPs are certainly seen as 
positive by the international community and have also led to acceptance of female 
representatives by the population,1428 the influence of the measures, just as the 
measures themselves, have until now only been on the surface.  
On an individual level, the policies deployed cannot be seen to have resulted in 
increased gender equality, as the majority of the population in practice does not 
see themselves as being part of the development and many families would not 
allow their daughters to become politicians.1429 In addition, as a consequence of 
their lack of power, und thus also a lack of accountability, many among the 
interviewees stated that they did not trust the capabilities of the female MPs.1430 
The absence of actual power, as well as the non-existence of gender equal 
representation, also results in a loss for the development of region – as predicted 
by the academics1431 – as many of their concerns are not heard, and their ideas 
not implemented.1432 
It can thus be said that while the current measures certainly provide a starting point 
for the future, they are until now far from inclusive. 
The issue of civil society organisations inside the region presents a similar picture. 
                                                            
1425 Interview CB, Vienna on 04/12/2012 
1426 Al‐Ali in Simon, “Kurdistan, Women in Iraq”. 
1427 The Kurdish Globe, “Statistics suggest women's role is "weak" in government, politics and civil society”. 
1428 See e.g. Interview AK, Erbil on 20/04/2012; Interview AR, Sulaimaniya on 21/05/2012; Interview AS, 
Sulaimaniya on 23/05/2012; Interview AT, Sulaimaniya on 24/05/2012 
1429 Interviews BY and BZ, Sulaimaniya on 10/08/2012 
1430 See e.g.: Interview BN, Erbil on 17/07/2012 
1431 Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, “Women at the Peace Table ‐ Nepal Roundtable”. 
1432 Warvin, “Regional Parliament Denies Women Demand, Endorses Budget”. 
Hadi, “No one arrested for women provocation in Kurdistan Region, says MP” 
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While people in the region today have all the theoretical possibilities to found 
organisations and to let their voices being heard,1433 and many are making great 
usage of these provisions,1434 the government is said to merely support 
organisations of its liking.1435 
Despite certain challenges it has been said that the continuous efforts of local 
women’s groups and organisations have had an implication and positive influence 
for gender equality within the national development, as their tireless demands 
resulted in more gender focused legislation.1436 Furthermore the NGOs are 
providing necessary services, which would otherwise be inaccessible in the 
region.1437 
Considering the organisations’ influence on women’s personal lives, the situation 
looks different once more. Implementation of the gendered legislations is not 
consistent,1438 and the different services provided by NGOs are not fully accessible 
to the population, as they are not widely known.1439 
While the lack of support by the government for all organisations or initiatives 
equally, can thereby be seen as a detrimental factor for the influence of the 
grassroots level on development, the grassroots sector’s scattered system and the 
lack of cooperation between the different organisations is equally detrimental.1440 
Consequently it is positive that grassroots organisations in general have the 
possibility to blossom. Also many are also using these opportunities and are 
working hard to positively influence development in general, and gender equality in 
particular, in the region as well as to provide enhanced possibilities for local 
women, their lack of coherency and public presence leads to a lack of 
                                                            
1433 Iraqi ConsƟtuƟon 2005 ArƟcle 20; Drat ConsƟtuƟon of the Kurdistan Region 2009 ArƟcles 18, 21 and 26 
1434 Al‐Ali and Pratt, “Between Nationalism and Women’s Rights.” 
Al‐Ali and PraƩ, “Women’s organizing and the conflict in Iraq since 2003”. 
1435 Carpenter and Rubin, “Kurdistan’s Troubled Democracy”. 
1436 Al‐Zubaidi, Amendments to the Personal Status Law in Iraqi Kurdistan strengthen women’s rights. 
1437 Naggar, “Women’s Rights in Iraqi Kurdistan”. 
Abdulrahman and Vormann, “Iraqi Kurdistan: Free yourself from FGM”. 
WADI, “Drei erfolgreich geführte Frauenzentren in Halabja, Kifri und Biara“. 
1438 Al‐Ali and Pratt, “Between Nationalism and Women’s Rights,” 342. 
1439 See e.g. Interview AZ, Sulaimaniya on 06/06/2012; Interview BB, Erbil on 24/06/2012; Interview BD, Erbil 
on 25/06/2012; Interview BF, Erbil on 29/06/2012 
1440 Al‐Ali and Pratt, “Between Nationalism and Women’s Rights,” 344. 
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acknowledgment of their efforts by the local population, and hence to a lack of 
practical influence.1441 
It can thus be seen that while positive measures are present in the political sphere, 
although more on certain levels than on others, their potential influence on society 
and consequently also on the region’s development as a whole is minimalized by 
merely taking the initial steps and not implementing them to the fullest of their 
potential. 
Following the assessment of academics and practitioners, who conducted research 
in other areas around the world, and following the evaluation of the interviews 
conducted, this leads to the conclusion that the policies deployed have until now 
only had a limited impact on the enhancement of gender equality and on the 
reduction of conflict potential on a nation, as well as individual level, within the 
region.  
A comparable set of circumstances can be observed when it comes to the issue of 
economy: 
B. Economy 
Since the fall of the Saddam regime and the cessation of armed conflict within the 
Kurdistan Region, economic prosperity had been one of the key aims of the KRG. 
If deployed correctly, it has been agreed by experts that economic policies can 
constitute a key tool in managing peacebuilding.1442 At the same time it has been 
agreed by the international community,1443 and academics1444 that gender inclusion 
in economic measures is vital for sustainable development. 
While it is thus univocally agreed that women’s inclusion is of great importance 
when considering national development, opinions are split on the advantages for 
women’s individual development as well as the support of gender equality within 
society,1445 the main argument being that without the necessary prerequisites, such 
                                                            
1441 Interview AL, Erbil on 25/04/2012; Interview AM, Erbil on 27/04/2012 
1442 Raul Caruso, “On the Nature of Peace Economics,” 1. 
1443 UNDP, Powerful Synergies, 3.  
1444 True, The Political Economy of Violence against Women, 85. 
1445 Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Gender Politics Makes A Difference, 52. 
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as a decrease in household chores, equal distribution of resources within the 
family, the recognition of non-marketed activities or the support by their social 
surroundings, the inclusion of women in the formal economic structure can be to 
their detriment.1446 It follows that well thought-through and fully inclusive gender 
policies are necessary to ensure their positive effect on development.  
In the Kurdistan Region, the foundation has been laid to include women into the 
formal economy,1447 but it is arguable that the policies deployed are not sensitive 
enough to the practical circumstances.  
When considering wider macroeconomic policies it could be observed that, as part 
of their official stance, Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, support gender inclusion into 
the economy,1448 but this cannot be seen in practice.  
Two of the main three foci of the KRG’s path to economic success, namely 
internationalization of the region’s economy and privatisation,1449 are of minimal 
importance for the current practical day-to-day life of the majority of women in the 
region. Additionally it could not be seen that the KRG actively encourages a gender 
perspective within these areas.  
The lack, or rather unclarity, of the KRG’s consideration of gender as part of its 
national plan for economic success, could also be observed at the region’s yearly 
budgeting.1450 Despite the budget’s great influential powers within the region, its 
usage is unclear, and gender consideration cannot be seen incorporated.1451 
Considering the findings of feminist academics specialized in the area, the lack of 
gender inclusion as a whole in macroeconomic plans for the region can only result 
in a detriment for the region’s development, as the policies will only target half of 
                                                            
1446 UNDP, Arab Human Development Report 2005, 10. 
Soderberg Jacobson, Security on whose terms?, 14. 
Young and Scherrer (eds.), Gender Knowledge, 59/60. 
1447 See secƟon V.A.2. on ‘legal foundaƟon’ 
1448 IAU, Iraq, The National Development Strategy, 53/60. 
Ministry of Planning – Republic of Iraq, NaƟonal Development Plan for the Years 2010‐2014, 18. 
1449 Law No.4 of 2006, Law of Investment in Kurdistan Region – Iraq 
ILO, “Private Sector Development Programme”. 
1450 Jamal, “Iraqi Kurdish State Budget Passes”. 
1451 Warvin, “Regional Parliament Denies Women Demand, Endorses Budget”. 
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the population, and will thus not be applicable to all. It follows that on an individual 
level, the lack of a clear gender inclusive strategy results in the people having the 
feeling that the majority of the female population in the region is not supported in 
their respective economic involvement,1452 which leads to a lack of possibilities for 
the individuals, as well as a feeling of being treated in a discriminatory way, which 
in return fuels the possibility of conflict.  
The situation is a slightly different one, when focusing solely on women’s inclusion 
within the work force. 
The KRG has been active in increasing the number of women in the labour market 
as part of its plan to increase economic productivity and to become more 
competitive internationally. Today, legislation provides equal access to work for 
men and women1453 and the KRG is increasingly hiring female employees in the 
public sector.1454 
While the slow increase of female workers1455 provides the Kurdistan Region with a 
positive picture for the international community and makes available additional 
human resources for increasing economic prosperity within the region, it cannot be 
seen as supporting gender equality on a broader level. Lucrative employment 
possibilities are mainly seen as accessible to women from an upper class 
background, and women from low income families are seen as lacking equal 
opportunities.1456 
As explained by the interviewees, as a consequence of society’s preconceptions, it 
is not possible to women to accept any job,1457  and it is said that the government 
is not active enough in improving this situation.1458 The implementation of 
regulations for low-skilled employment is said to be scarce,1459 part time jobs and 
                                                            
1452 See e.g. Interview BO, Erbil on 18/07/1012; Interview AZ, Sulaimaniya on 06/06/2012; Interview BB, Erbil 
on 24/06/2012; Interview BC, Erbil on 25/06/2012; Interview BP, Erbil on 21/07/2012 
1453 Iraq Labor Code, Act No. 71 of 1987, ArƟcle 2 
1454 Mahmoud, “Steady Rise in Women Civil Servants”. 
1455 Kurdistan Region Statistics Office, Labour Force, 2. 
1456 Interview CF, Vienna on 16/11/2012; Interview BS, Erbil on 24/07/2012; Interview BJ, Erbil on 
09/07/2012 
1457 Interview AD, Erbil on 06/04/2012 
1458 Trades Union Congress, “Women in Iraqi Kurdistan”. 
1459 Ibid. 
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flexible working hours are not widely on the agenda, and it is criticisable that the 
government is not providing women from less advantaged backgrounds with the 
skills necessary to succeed in the labour market.1460 
Next to the criticism of one-sided support by the authorities, the majority of the 
people interviewed stated it is one of women’s most important roles in Kurdish 
society to work,1461 which resulted from the idea that all human resources are 
needed to build up the region.1462 But just as it was the case with the theoretical 
support of women as politicians, support faded when it came to practically 
implementing the ideas within their own families. 
This practical lack of backing by the government as well as society for women of all 
parts of society to participate in the labour force leads to a variety of consequences 
within the region.  
On a national level, the lack of gender equality and the consequential very high 
percentage of ‘economically inactive’ women, leads to a lack in human resources 
and in a lack of development of gender equality, which in the long run is likely to 
minimize potential economic development, and thus supports conflict potential, 
which is increased if parts of the population lack in economic opportunities. 
From an individual point of view, the lack of support results in a loss of 
opportunities, and thus in a loss of potential individual fulfilment, a loss of decrease 
in poverty, and in the subsistence of current patterns of male domination within the 
household and consequently results in no increase of gender quality. At the same 
time, it has been noted that this might equally be the case if job opportunities were 
offered, depending on which job opportunities these are.1463 
                                                            
1460 IAU, Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003‐2008, 3. 
1461 Interview AF, Erbil on 09/04/2012; Interview AG, Erbil on 13/04/2012; Interview AK, Erbil on 
20/04/2012; Interview AL, Erbil on 25/04/2012; Interview AP, Sulaimaniya on 18/05/2012 
1462 See e.g. Interview AM, Erbil on 27/04/2012; Interview AS, Sulaimaniya on 23/05/2012; Interview BB, 
Erbil on 24/06/2012; Interview BD, Erbil on 25/06/2012 
1463 UNDP, “Gender Inequality Index and related indicators”. 
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Also when it comes to the setting up of businesses, women are in theory provided 
with the same possibilities as men, but specific gender sensitive measures, as well 
as wider support by society are lacking.1464 
Just as with general employment, the reaction of the Kurdish population towards 
enhanced gender equality in business is in theory a positive one,1465 while practical 
support is often lacking.1466 
One measure adopted by the KRG to fight poverty and to empower women in this 
regard was the introduction of microfinance institutions within the region.1467 While 
they arguably provide enhanced possibilities for starting up small businesses, 
especially for women in rural areas, or from less advantaged backgrounds, and to 
thus increase gender equality,1468 their current influence is difficult to measure, as it 
is highly dependent on individual experience and no interviewee could be found, 
who was involved in the microfinance sector. 
As a general conclusion it can thus be said that following current knowledge on the 
influence of gender equal provision in the economic sector or the lack thereof on 
development in a region at a time of conflict transformation, the mere concentration 
on numbers in the Kurdistan Region and the lack of support for creating a gender 
equal system at all levels of the economy is likely to be detrimental for national 
development, as a loss of human resources is  the consequence, and it is 
disadvantageous to women’s personal development, as many women are losing 
the chance to become economically active, and the ones who do, often suffer 
under a double burden.  
These findings were supported by the reactions of the general public, who were in 
theory very much in favour of women’s involvement, but who criticized the 
government’s lack of support and who in practice often did not support gender 
equality within the system themselves.  
                                                            
1464 Hacador, “The Big Success of women Entrepreneurs is a Kurdish Princess”. 
1465 See e.g. Interview AP, Sulaimaniya on 18/05/2012; Interview AQ, Sulaimaniya on 19/05/2012; Interview 
AV, Sulaimaniya on 28/05/2012; Interview BC, Erbil on 25/06/212; Interview BD, Erbil on 25/06/2012 
1466 Interview AU, Sulaimaniya on 28/05/2012; Interview BM, Erbil on 13/07/2012 
1467 USAID Iraq, State of Iraq’s Microfinance Industry, 5. 
1468 Johnson (ed.), Small Change or Real Change?, 54. 
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The consequential loss of resources for the region and individuals alike is likely to 
increase the potential in conflict over time, as the unequal support is likely to lead 
to an increase in the divide between rich and poor, rather than to equality, and will 
thus possibly fuel a feeling of hatred within the less advantaged parts of society. 
One area, which has the capability to counter this development, but which once 
more shows similarities to the other areas discussed in the approach towards it by 
the government and its policies, is the area of education. 
C. Education 
Whether for better or for worse, it seems agreed that education, whether inside or 
outside of educational institutions, is the most important and effective measure in 
influencing people’s development.1469 
According to the results of previous research conducted, the educational system is, 
either openly or through a ‘hidden curriculum’, the primary vehicle to either produce 
and legitimate inequalities and conflict within society,1470 or to prevent future 
conflict from arising1471 and to support the development of equality.1472 
The positive effect of education has thereby be said to correlate with gender 
equality within the education system.1473 Although it has been remarked that true 
gender equality will only be possible once a gender sensitive environment within 
the system is ensured1474 and when high quality education for all is provided.1475 
In the Kurdistan Region, all legal prerequisites have been laid down to make 
equality in education possible,1476 and the KRG is aware that great improvement in 
the sector is needed and has worked hard to ensure that improvement is 
happening. 
                                                            
1469 Seitz, Bildung und Konflikt, 48/49, 56. 
1470 Ibid., Shapiro, Educating Youth for a World beyond violence, 83. 
1471 Thyne, “ABC’s, 123’s, and the Golden Rule,” 733. 
1472 Global Campaign for Peace Education, “Campaign Statement”. 
1473 UNESCO Iraq Office, “Gender and Education for All”. 
1474 Ibid. 
1475 Abu‐Lughod, “Dialects of Women’s Empowerment,” 87. 
1476 Draft Constitution of the Kurdistan Region 2009, ArƟcle 27 
  
Page | 320  
 
In the case of children’s schooling, the KRG has initiated the building of new 
schools,1477 as well as the updating of the old curricula.1478 
From a gender perspective, while the initiatives taken by the government have led 
to an improvement of numbers of young girls attending school,1479 sexual equality 
has not yet been achieved within the school sector, arguably as a consequence of 
the lack of sufficient gender consideration when it came to the building of schools 
and its surrounding circumstances, such as geographical proximity adequate 
resources, teachers and change of ideologies of groups of the population.1480 As 
confirmed by the interviewees, consequences are a great discrepancy in education 
between different social groups, as well as between the urban and the rural 
areas.1481 
A similar situation persists when considering the quality of schooling, and 
specifically the inclusion of gender equality within the learning experience.  
Great differences in the quality of education can be observed in the public and 
private sector education.1482 In addition, a coherent framework for gender sensitive 
education is non-existent in the region. This was confirmed by the local population, 
who did not even consider gender considerations as being part of the school 
curriculum.1483 While it was in general considered that further development of the 
sector is needed,1484 education was by many not considered as being able to 
function as tool to bring transformation within society.1485 
It follows that the government policies to improve the education system have until 
now not had a transformative effect, with gender equality neither existing in 
                                                            
1477 Jamal, “Educational Reform in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq”. 
1478 UNESCO, World Data on Education, Iraq, “The educational process”. 
1479 Kurdistan Region Statistics Office, Education, 1. 
1480 UNICEF, Girls Education in Iraq, 20,21. 
1481 Interview BB, Erbil on 24/06/2012; Interview BY, Sulaimaniya on 10/08/2012; Interview BZ, Sulaimaniya 
on 10/08/2012 
1482 SABIS, “About SABIS”. 
Interview BY, Sulaimaniya on 10/08/2012 
1483 Interview AL, Erbil on 25/04/2012 
1484 Interview AS, Sulaimaniya on 23/05/2012; Interview BC, Erbil on 25/06/2012; Interview BT, Erbil on 
24/07/2012 
1485 Interview CE, Vienna on 21/10/2012; Interview CK, Vienna on 20/10/2012 
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schools, as especially girls from low-income families often do not continue 
schooling after primary school, nor as part of the curriculum conveyed to the pupils. 
As a consequence, gender equality is far from achieved and that once more 
potential human resources for the development of the region are lost, already at a 
very young age, which in return also results in possible unhappiness and the 
feeling of unfair treatment within less advantaged groups of society, which once 
more raises the conflict potential. 
When considering women’s individual situation, the loss of education for certain 
parts of the population leads to the subsistence of the patriarchal structure and to a 
loss of opportunities and feeling of equality for the young girls. 
The problem of great discrepancy between the different parts of the population 
could also be observed in the case of higher education. 
It is probably here that the government has made the biggest effort in ensuring the 
deployment and implementation of gender equal policies within the structure. New 
universities were opened to provide more young people with access to such,1486 “A 
Roadmap to Quality” was introduced to increase quality at the institutions,1487 and 
the different universities had been supported to incorporate gender study 
centres,1488 and women empowerment programmes1489 into their structure, and to 
raise awareness on combating domestic violence.1490  
Even though there do not exist any provisions on positive discrimination or active 
encouragement of introducing female students into the higher education sector, the 
number of girls attending university is steadily rising. But just as in the case of MPs 
or government employees, it is mainly women from an advantaged family 
background who manage to go to university. 
Despite the fact that university education is free in the region, boys and girls from 
less advantaged backgrounds are missing the possibility to access higher 
                                                            
1486 Ala’Aldeen, “A determined push for higher education progress in Kurdistan”. 
1487 Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, A Roadmap to Quality. 
1488 Reisz, “Iraqi Kurdish scholars put gender theory to the test”. 
1489 University of Kurdistan, Hawler, “UKH Leads Women Empowerment in Higher Education”. 
1490 University of Zakho, “First Day of (16 Days Campaign) To Combat DomesƟc Violence”. 
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education, as they often lack the necessary prerequisites, such as a good school 
education, or support by their social surroundings. 
As explained by the interviewees, the government is thereby seen as mainly 
supporting already educated women,1491 while not doing enough to support other 
women to get them to this point. In contrast, society is generally seen by the 
interviewees as supporting the mothers and housewives,1492 possibly as a reaction 
to the considered lack of support by government. As a consequence, both groups 
of women feel treated unfairly. 
The lack of consistent support once more leads to a loss of potential human 
resources for the region. Equally, it does not provide all women with the 
possibilities of enhancing their knowledge at university level, and thus cannot be 
said to fully support gender equality. Even the positive steps taken to ensure 
enhanced gender equality within the universities has to be considered with caution 
under this light, as it is merely accessible by a very small part of the population, 
although it has to be noted that it can be seen reflected positively on them.1493 
It can thus be said that the ‘inside’ of the higher education system is mostly positive 
in the encouragement of positive development as well as gender equality within the 
region, but that access needs to be provided for all to make it fully successful. 
One way of influencing the future generation’s success in education is by 
educating their parents and by supporting them in educating their children. 
The former has been aimed for by the KRG by introducing literacy programmes.1494  
While the literacy initiatives as such could certainly be seen as positive, as a way 
of opening up employment possibilities, enhancing capabilities and creating role 
                                                            
1491 Interview BX, Sulaimaniya on 09/08/2012; Interview BC, Erbil on 25/06/2012; Interview AW, Sulaimaniya 
on 01/06/2012; Interview AJ, Erbil on 20/04/2012; Interview AK, Erbil on 20/04/2012; Interview AL, Erbil on 
25/04/2012; Interview AJ, Erbil on 25/04.2012 
1492 Interview AU, Sulaimaniya on 28/05/2012; Interview AG, Erbil on 13/04/2012; Interview BV, Sulaimaniya 
on 06/08/2012 
1493 See e.g. Interview BL, Erbil on 12/07/2012; Interview AS, Sulaimaniya on 23/05/2012; Interview AT, 
Sulaimaniya on 24/05/2012 
1494 UNESCO Iraq Oﬃce, NaƟonal Strategic Framework for Literacy in Iraq, 21. 
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models for the younger generation, the arguable lack of sufficient gender 
consideration in its deployment,1495 leads to a loss in its potential positive influence.  
It can thus be seen that the government’s actions, not only in training women for 
themselves, but supporting them in their roles as educators of the new generation 
has not been as extensive as would have been desirable. 
For the interviewees the role of women as educators of their children, as well as 
children in general, is the most important.1496 As the influence by mother on their 
children is substantial when it comes to the development of gender equality within 
society as well as to the general positive development for the region and to the 
decrease of conflict potential within the next generation, supporting them in their 
own development is vital, in order to ensure their positive influence on their 
children. But considering everything elaborated in this conclusion, this is only partly 
being done by the government at the moment. 
Just as in the areas of politics and the economy, it can consequentially be 
concluded that the policies deployed by the KRG within the education sector are, 
while positive, not gender sensitive enough. Wider gender considerations are often 
not taken into account and the thereby created gap between the different groups of 
society, which results in a loss of potential in regional development, as well as in 
the advancement of gender equality. 
When considering all the gender policies deployed, including the ones lacking, in 
the different areas, a general pattern can be observed. While the government has 
made an effort in introducing policies for the advancement of women’s inclusion in 
every one of the three main areas discussed in this thesis, the deployment of 
gender inclusive policies within these main areas has been inconsistent. In 
addition, the policies deployed tend to merely focus on the increase of numbers, 
rather than the increase of gender inclusiveness, which has especially significant 
implications for the less wealthy part of the population, as the government policies 
                                                            
1495 Ibid.pp.24‐27. 
1496 Interview BW, Sulaimaniya on 08/08/2012; Interview AX, Sulaimaniya on 03/06/2012; Interview CA, 
Sulaimaniya on 13/08/2012; Interview AI, Erbil on 16/04/2012 
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in their practical implementation proved more successful for members of the upper 
classes, than for the rest of society.  
Despite of a consequential loss of potential human resources for the region, the 
policies deployed can be seen as positive to a certain extent for the region’s 
development, especially when it comes to positively influencing their standing 
within the international community. 
For society on an individual level, the implications of the policies enacted are 
twofold. While the minority of the female population enjoys increased possibilities, 
a high standard of living, and a feeling of gender equality, for the majority of 
women, the policies do not seem to greatly influence their day to day life at the 
moment, and for many gender equality appears to be far from achieved. 
Considering thereby the definitions of peace by scholars, such as Galtung1497 and 
Enloe,1498 the lack of fully gender inclusive policies for all prevents women from 
experiencing peace, and thus prevents the region from creating sustainable peace. 
The great differences between the actions taken for the different social groups, and 
the consequential still existing divide between rich and poor is thereby one 
indicator for future conflict potential. 
In order to work against this development and to ensure the achievement of gender 
equality within the region, as well as sustainable peace for the region and all its 
citizens, the KRG would have to use all their policies enacted until now as a 
starting point, and further develop them into more inclusive policies with a gender 
sensitive view, listen to the people influenced by these policies, and ensure the 
practical implementation for all levels of society. 
As explained by representatives of the Kurdish population themselves:  
Further development in the region, including the prevention of future conflict, 
requires a stop of corruption and an inclusive political system,1499 the improvement 
                                                            
1497 Galtung, Peace, 29/30. 
1498 Cynthia Enloe in Al‐Ali, “Reconstructing Gender,” 742. 
1499 Interview AY, Sulaimaniya on 04/06/2012; Interview AW, Sulaimainya on 01/06/2012; Interview AJ, Erbil 
on 20/04/2012 
  
Page | 325  
 
of the judiciary and the implementation of legislation,1500 and respectful treatment 
without discrimination.1501 Or as put by one young girl: All we need is 
“Unity, Freedom and Love for All.”1502 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1500 Interview BI, Erbil on 08/07/2012; Interview AG, Erbil on 13/4/2012 
1501 Interview AY, Sulaimaniya on 04/06/2012; Interview AR, Sulaimaniya on 21/05/2012; Interview AI, Erbil 
on 16/04/2012; Interview AE, Erbil on 09/04/2012 
1502 Interview AW, Sulaimaniya on 01/06/2012 
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IX. Appendix 
A. Field Research - Information on Interviews & Interviewees 
 
Note: This section was deleted from the publicly available version of this thesis, for 
reasons of anonymity.  
 
B. Map of Iraq and the Kurdistan Region 
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C. The Kurdistan Region in Pictures 
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D. Women’s Situation in Numbers 
 
POLITICS 
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1504 The Kurdish Globe, “Statistics suggest women's role is "weak" in government, politics and civil society”. 
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ECONOMY 
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EDUCATION 
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1510 UNICEF, Girls Education in Iraq. 
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E. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) 
 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, on 31 October 2000 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its resolutions 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999, 1265 (1999) of 17 
September 1999, 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000 and 1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000, as 
well as relevant statements of its President, and recalling also the statement of its 
President to the press on the occasion of the United Nations Day for Women’s Rights and 
International Peace (International Women’s Day) of 8 March 2000 (SC/6816), 
Recalling also the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 
(A/52/231) as well as those contained in the outcome document of the twenty-third Special 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled “Women 2000: Gender Equality, 
Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century” (A/S-23/10/Rev.1), in particular 
those concerning women and armed conflict, 
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations 
and the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, 
Expressing concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the 
vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and 
internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed 
elements, and recognizing the consequent impact this has on durable peace and 
reconciliation, 
Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of 
conflicts and in peace-building, and stressing the importance of their equal participation 
and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, 
and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention 
and resolution, 
Reaffirming also the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human 
rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts, 
Emphasizing the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine 
awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls, 
Recognizing the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into 
peacekeeping operations, and in this regard noting the Windhoek Declaration and the 
Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional 
Peace Support Operations (S/2000/693), 
Recognizing also the importance of the recommendation contained in the 
statement of its President to the press of 8 March 2000 for specialized training for all 
peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and 
children in conflict situations, 
Recognizing that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and 
girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation 
in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of 
international peace and security, 
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Noting the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and 
girls, 
1. Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all 
decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms 
for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict; 
2. Encourages the Secretary-General to implement his strategic plan of action 
(A/49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of women at decisionmaking levels in 
conflict resolution and peace processes; 
3. Urges the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives 
and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf, and in this regard calls on Member 
States to provide candidates to the Secretary-General, for inclusion in a regularly updated 
centralized roster; 
4. Further urges the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution 
of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military 
observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel; 
5. Expresses its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping 
operations, and urges the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field 
operations include a gender component; 
6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines 
and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on 
the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures, 
invites Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness 
training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in 
preparation for deployment, and further requests the Secretary-General to ensure that 
civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training; 
7. Urges Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and 
logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by 
relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United 
Nations Children’s Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees and other relevant bodies; 
8. Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace 
agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia: 
(a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and 
for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction; 
(b) Measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous 
processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation 
mechanisms of the peace agreements; 
(c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women 
and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and 
the judiciary; 
9. Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law 
applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians, in 
particular the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 
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the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Protocol 
thereto of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999 and the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto of 25 
May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court; 
10. Calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women 
and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, 
and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict; 
11. Emphasizes the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to 
prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes 
including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this 
regard stresses the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty 
provisions; 
12. Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian 
character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs 
of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 
November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000; 
13. Encourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to 
take into account the needs of their dependants; 
14. Reaffirms its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under Article 41 of 
the Charter of the United Nations, to give consideration to their potential impact on the 
civilian population, bearing in mind the special needs of women and girls, in order to 
consider appropriate humanitarian exemptions; 
15. Expresses its willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into 
account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultation 
with local and international women’s groups; 
16. Invites the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed 
conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender 
dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution, and further invites him to submit a 
report to the Security Council on the results of this study and to make this available to all 
Member States of the United Nations; 
17. Requests the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting 
to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping 
missions and all other aspects relating to women and girls; 
18. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 
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F. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women 1979 
The States Parties to the present Convention, 
Noting that the Charter of the United Nations reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights, 
in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women, 
Noting that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms the principle of the 
inadmissibility of discrimination and proclaims that all human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights and that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set 
forth therein, without distinction of any kind, including distinction based on sex, 
Noting that the States Parties to the International Covenants on Human Rights have the 
obligation to ensure the equal rights of men and women to enjoy all economic, social, 
cultural, civil and political rights, 
Considering the international conventions concluded under the auspices of the United 
Nations and the specialized agencies promoting equality of rights of men and women, 
Noting also the resolutions, declarations and recommendations adopted by the United 
Nations and the specialized agencies promoting equality of rights of men and women, 
Concerned, however, that despite these various instruments extensive discrimination 
against women continues to exist, 
Recalling that discrimination against women violates the principles of equality of rights and 
respect for human dignity, is an obstacle to the participation of women, on equal terms 
with men, in the political, social, economic and cultural life of their countries, hampers the 
growth of the prosperity of society and the family and makes more difficult the full 
development of the potentialities of women in the service of their countries and of 
humanity, 
Concerned that in situations of poverty women have the least access to food, health, 
education, training and opportunities for employment and other needs, 
Convinced that the establishment of the new international economic order based on equity 
and justice will contribute significantly towards the promotion of equality between men and 
women, 
Emphasizing that the eradication of apartheid, all forms of racism, racial discrimination, 
colonialism, neo-colonialism, aggression, foreign occupation and domination and 
interference in the internal affairs of States is essential to the full enjoyment of the rights of 
men and women, 
Affirming that the strengthening of international peace and security, the relaxation of 
international tension, mutual co-operation among all States irrespective of their social and 
economic systems, general and complete disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament 
under strict and effective international control, the affirmation of the principles of justice, 
equality and mutual benefit in relations among countries and the realization of the right of 
peoples under alien and colonial domination and foreign occupation to self-determination 
and independence, as well as respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, will 
promote social progress and development and as a consequence will contribute to the 
attainment of full equality between men and women, 
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Convinced that the full and complete development of a country, the welfare of the world 
and the cause of peace require the maximum participation of women on equal terms with 
men in all fields, 
Bearing in mind the great contribution of women to the welfare of the family and to the 
development of society, so far not fully recognized, the social significance of maternity and 
the role of both parents in the family and in the upbringing of children, and aware that the 
role of women in procreation should not be a basis for discrimination but that the 
upbringing of children requires a sharing of responsibility between men and women and 
society as a whole, 
Aware that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society 
and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between men and women, 
Determined to implement the principles set forth in the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women and, for that purpose, to adopt the measures required for 
the elimination of such discrimination in all its forms and manifestations, 
Have agreed on the following: 
PART I 
Article I 
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "discrimination against women" shall 
mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect 
or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, 
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any 
other field. 
Article 2 
States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to pursue by 
all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against 
women and, to this end, undertake: (a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and 
women in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated 
therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization 
of this principle; 
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where 
appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women; 
(c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to 
ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective 
protection of women against any act of discrimination; 
(d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to 
ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation; 
(e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any 
person, organisation or enterprise; 
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing 
laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women; 
  
Page | 381  
 
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women. 
Article 3  
States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic and 
cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to en sure the full 
development and advancement of women , for the purpose of guaranteeing them the 
exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality 
with men. 
Article 4 
1. Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de 
facto equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination as defined 
in the present Convention, but shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of 
unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be discontinued when the objectives 
of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved. 
2. Adoption by States Parties of special measures, including those measures contained in 
the present Convention, aimed at protecting maternity shall not be considered 
discriminatory. 
Article 5  
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: (a) To modify the social and cultural 
patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of 
prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the 
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and 
women; 
(b) To ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of maternity as a 
social function and the recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in the 
upbringing and development of their children, it being understood that the interest of the 
children is the primordial consideration in all cases. 
Article 6 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all 
forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women. 
PART II 
Article 7 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure to 
women, on equal terms with men, the right: (a) To vote in all elections and public 
referenda and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies; 
(b) To participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof 
and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of government; 
(c) To participate in non-governmental organisations and associations concerned with the 
public and political life of the country. 
Article 8  
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States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure to women, on equal terms 
with men and without any discrimination, the opportunity to represent their Governments at 
the international level and to participate in the work of international organisations. 
Article 9 
1. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain their 
nationality. They shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor change of 
nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically change the nationality of the 
wife, render her stateless or force upon her the nationality of the husband. 
2. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of 
their children. 
PART III 
Article 10 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in order to ensure to them equal rights with men in the field of education and in 
particular to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: (a) The same conditions for 
career and vocational guidance, for access to studies and for the achievement of diplomas 
in educational establishments of all categories in rural as well as in urban areas; this 
equality shall be ensured in pre-school, general, technical, professional and higher 
technical education, as well as in all types of vocational training; 
(b) Access to the same curricula, the same examinations, teaching staff with qualifications 
of the same standard and school premises and equipment of the same quality; 
(c) The elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and women at all levels 
and in all forms of education by encouraging coeducation and other types of education 
which will help to achieve this aim and, in particular, by the revision of textbooks and 
school programmes and the adaptation of teaching methods; 
(d ) The same opportunities to benefit from scholarships and other study grants; 
(e) The same opportunities for access to programmes of continuing education, including 
adult and functional literacy programmes, particulary those aimed at reducing, at the 
earliest possible time, any gap in education existing between men and women; 
(f) The reduction of female student drop-out rates and the organisation of programmes for 
girls and women who have left school prematurely; 
(g) The same Opportunities to participate actively in sports and physical education; 
(h) Access to specific educational information to help to ensure the health and well-being 
of families, including information and advice on family planning. 
Article 11 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and 
women, the same rights, in particular: (a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all 
human beings; 
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(b) The right to the same employment opportunities, including the application of the same 
criteria for selection in matters of employment; 
(c) The right to free choice of profession and employment, the right to promotion, job 
security and all benefits and conditions of service and the right to receive vocational 
training and retraining, including apprenticeships, advanced vocational training and 
recurrent training; 
(d) The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal treatment in respect of 
work of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of 
work; 
(e) The right to social security, particularly in cases of retirement, unemployment, sickness, 
invalidity and old age and other incapacity to work, as well as the right to paid leave; 
(f) The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions, including the 
safeguarding of the function of reproduction. 
2. In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or 
maternity and to ensure their effective right to work, States Parties shall take appropriate 
measures: (a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds 
of pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis of marital 
status; 
(b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without loss of 
former employment, seniority or social allowances; 
(c) To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services to enable 
parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities and participation in public 
life, in particular through promoting the establishment and development of a network of 
child-care facilities; 
(d) To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of work proved to be 
harmful to them. 
3. Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this article shall be reviewed 
periodically in the light of scientific and technological knowledge and shall be revised, 
repealed or extended as necessary. 
Article 12 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and 
women, access to health care services, including those related to family planning. 
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph I of this article, States Parties shall ensure 
to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-
natal period, granting free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during 
pregnancy and lactation. 
Article 13  
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in other areas of economic and social life in order to ensure, on a basis of equality 
of men and women, the same rights, in particular: (a) The right to family benefits; 
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(b) The right to bank loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit; 
(c) The right to participate in recreational activities, sports and all aspects of cultural life. 
Article 14  
1. States Parties shall take into account the particular problems faced by rural women and 
the significant roles which rural women play in the economic survival of their families, 
including their work in the non-monetized sectors of the economy, and shall take all 
appropriate measures to ensure the application of the provisions of the present 
Convention to women in rural areas. 
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, that 
they participate in and benefit from rural development and, in particular, shall ensure to 
such women the right: 
(a) To participate in the elaboration and implementation of development planning at all 
levels; 
(b) To have access to adequate health care facilities, including information, counselling 
and services in family planning; 
(c) To benefit directly from social security programmes; 
(d) To obtain all types of training and education, formal and non-formal, including that 
relating to functional literacy, as well as, inter alia, the benefit of all community and 
extension services, in order to increase their technical proficiency; 
(e) To organize self-help groups and co-operatives in order to obtain equal access to 
economic opportunities through employment or self employment; 
(f) To participate in all community activities; 
(g) To have access to agricultural credit and loans, marketing facilities, appropriate 
technology and equal treatment in land and agrarian reform as well as in land resettlement 
schemes; 
(h) To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, 
electricity and water supply, transport and communications. 
PART IV 
Article 15 
1. States Parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law. 
2. States Parties shall accord to women, in civil matters, a legal capacity identical to that of 
men and the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. In particular, they shall give 
women equal rights to conclude contracts and to administer property and shall treat them 
equally in all stages of procedure in courts and tribunals. 
3. States Parties agree that all contracts and all other private instruments of any kind with 
a legal effect which is directed at restricting the legal capacity of women shall be deemed 
null and void. 
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4. States Parties shall accord to men and women the same rights with regard to the law 
relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and 
domicile. 
Article 16 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall 
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: (a) The same right to enter into 
marriage; 
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free 
and full consent; 
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution; 
(d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital status, in 
matters relating to their children; in all cases the interests of the children shall be 
paramount; 
(e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their 
children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them to 
exercise these rights; 
(f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship, trusteeship 
and adoption of children, or similar institutions where these concepts exist in national 
legislation; in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount; 
(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a family 
name, a profession and an occupation; 
(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, 
management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of 
charge or for a valuable consideration. 
2. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and all necessary 
action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age for marriage and to 
make the registration of marriages in an official registry compulsory. 
PART V 
Article 17 
1. For the purpose of considering the progress made in the implementation of the present 
Convention, there shall be established a Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) consisting, at the time of entry 
into force of the Convention, of eighteen and, after ratification of or accession to the 
Convention by the thirty-fifth State Party, of twenty-three experts of high moral standing 
and competence in the field covered by the Convention. The experts shall be elected by 
States Parties from among their nationals and shall serve in their personal capacity, 
consideration being given to equitable geographical distribution and to the representation 
of the different forms of civilization as well as the principal legal systems. 
2. The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot from a list of persons 
nominated by States Parties. Each State Party may nominate one person from among its 
own nationals. 
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3. The initial election shall be held six months after the date of the entry into force of the 
present Convention. At least three months before the date of each election the Secretary-
General of the United Nations shall address a letter to the States Parties inviting them to 
submit their nominations within two months. The Secretary-General shall prepare a list in 
alphabetical order of all persons thus nominated, indicating the States Parties which have 
nominated them, and shall submit it to the States Parties. 
4. Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at a meeting of States Parties 
convened by the Secretary-General at United Nations Headquarters. At that meeting, for 
which two thirds of the States Parties shall constitute a quorum, the persons elected to the 
Committee shall be those nominees who obtain the largest number of votes and an 
absolute majority of the votes of the representatives of States Parties present and voting. 
5. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of four years. However, the 
terms of nine of the members elected at the first election shall expire at the end of two 
years; immediately after the first election the names of these nine members shall be 
chosen by lot by the Chairman of the Committee. 
6. The election of the five additional members of the Committee shall be held in 
accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this article, following the thirty-
fifth ratification or accession. The terms of two of the additional members elected on this 
occasion shall expire at the end of two years, the names of these two members having 
been chosen by lot by the Chairman of the Committee. 
7. For the filling of casual vacancies, the State Party whose expert has ceased to function 
as a member of the Committee shall appoint another expert from among its nationals, 
subject to the approval of the Committee. 
8. The members of the Committee shall, with the approval of the General Assembly, 
receive emoluments from United Nations resources on such terms and conditions as the 
Assembly may decide, having regard to the importance of the Committee's responsibilities. 
9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the necessary staff and 
facilities for the effective performance of the functions of the Committee under the present 
Convention. 
Article 18 
1. States Parties undertake to submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for 
consideration by the Committee, a report on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other 
measures which they have adopted to give effect to the provisions of the present 
Convention and on the progress made in this respect: (a) Within one year after the entry 
into force for the State concerned; 
(b) Thereafter at least every four years and further whenever the Committee so requests. 
2. Reports may indicate factors and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfilment of 
obligations under the present Convention. 
Article 19  
1. The Committee shall adopt its own rules of procedure. 
2. The Committee shall elect its officers for a term of two years. 
Article 20 
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1. The Committee shall normally meet for a period of not more than two weeks annually in 
order to consider the reports submitted in accordance with article 18 of the present 
Convention. 
2. The meetings of the Committee shall normally be held at United Nations Headquarters 
or at any other convenient place as determined by the Committee. (amendment, status of 
ratification) 
Article 21 
1. The Committee shall, through the Economic and Social Council, report annually to the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on its activities and may make suggestions and 
general recommendations based on the examination of reports and information received 
from the States Parties. Such suggestions and general recommendations shall be included 
in the report of the Committee together with comments, if any, from States Parties. 
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the reports of the Committee 
to the Commission on the Status of Women for its information. 
Article 22 
The specialized agencies shall be entitled to be represented at the consideration of the 
implementation of such provisions of the present Convention as fall within the scope of 
their activities. The Committee may invite the specialized agencies to submit reports on 
the implementation of the Convention in areas falling within the scope of their activities. 
PART VI 
Article 23 
Nothing in the present Convention shall affect any provisions that are more conducive to 
the achievement of equality between men and women which may be contained: (a) In the 
legislation of a State Party; or 
(b) In any other international convention, treaty or agreement in force for that State. 
Article 24 
States Parties undertake to adopt all necessary measures at the national level aimed at 
achieving the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Convention. 
Article 25 
1. The present Convention shall be open for signature by all States. 
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is designated as the depositary of the 
present Convention. 
3. The present Convention is subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
4. The present Convention shall be open to accession by all States. Accession shall be 
effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations. 
Article 26 
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1. A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any 
State Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations. 
2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be 
taken in respect of such a request. 
Article 27 
1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of 
deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the twentieth instrument of 
ratification or accession. 
2. For each State ratifying the present Convention or acceding to it after the deposit of the 
twentieth instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on 
the thirtieth day after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of ratification or 
accession. 
Article 28 
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall receive and circulate to all States the 
text of reservations made by States at the time of ratification or accession. 
2. A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention shall 
not be permitted. 
3. Reservations may be withdrawn at any time by notification to this effect addressed to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall then inform all States thereof. Such 
notification shall take effect on the date on which it is received. 
Article 29 
1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or 
application of the present Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall, at the 
request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the 
request for arbitration the parties are unable to agree on the organisation of the arbitration, 
any one of those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by 
request in conformity with the Statute of the Court. 
2. Each State Party may at the time of signature or ratification of the present Convention or 
accession thereto declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph I of this 
article. The other States Parties shall not be bound by that paragraph with respect to any 
State Party which has made such a reservation. 
3. Any State Party which has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 2 of this 
article may at any time withdraw that reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations. 
Article 30 
The present Convention, the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts 
of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed the present 
Convention. 
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G. Constitution of Iraq 2005 
 
Constitution of Iraq  
 
The Iraqi constitution was approved by a national referendum held on 15 October 2005. 
The text was drafted by the Iraq Constitutional Committee. The following is an unofficial 
English translation by the Associated Press of the final approved text of the constitution.  
 
The Preamble 
 
In the name of God, the Most merciful, the Most compassionate 
 
{We have honored the sons of Adam} 
 
We, the people of Mesopotamia, the homeland of the apostles and prophets, resting place 
of the virtuous imams, cradle of civilization, crafters of writing, and home of numeration. 
Upon our land the first law made by man was passed, and the oldest pact of just 
governance was inscribed, and upon our soil the saints and companions of the Prophet 
prayed, philosophers and scientists theorized, and writers and poets excelled; 
 
Acknowledging God’s right over us, and in fulfillment of the call of our homeland and 
citizens, and in a response to the call of our religious and national leaderships and the 
determination of our great authorities and of our leaders and politicians, and in the midst of 
international support from our friends and those who love us, marched for the first time in 
our history towards the ballot boxes by the millions, men and women, young and old, on 
the thirtieth of January 2005, invoking the pains of sectarian oppression inflicted by the 
autocratic clique and inspired by the tragedies of Iraq’s martyrs, Shiite and Sunni, Arabs 
and Kurds and Turkmen and from all other components of the people, and recollecting the 
darkness of the ravage of the holy cities and the South in the Sha’abaniyya uprising and 
burnt by the flames of grief of the mass graves, the marshes, Al-Dujail and others and 
articulating the sufferings of racial oppression in the massacres of Halabcha, Barzan, Anfal 
and the Fayli Kurds and inspired by the ordeals of the Turkmen in Bashir and the 
sufferings of the people of the western region, as is the case in the remaining areas of Iraq 
where the people suffered from the liquidation of their leaders, symbols, and Sheiks and 
from the displacement of their skilled individuals and from drying out of its cultural and 
intellectual wells, so we sought hand in hand and shoulder to shoulder to create our new 
Iraq, the Iraq of the future, free from sectarianism, racism, complex of regional attachment, 
discrimination, and exclusion. 
 
Accusations of being infidels, and terrorism did not stop us from marching forward to build 
a nation of law. Sectarianism and racism have not stopped us from marching together to 
strengthen our national unity, following the path of peaceful transfer of power, adopting the 
course of just distribution of resources, and providing equal opportunity for all. 
 
We, the people of Iraq, who have just risen from our stumble, and who are looking with 
confidence to the future through a republican, federal, democratic, pluralistic system, have 
resolved with the determination of our men, women, elderly, and youth to respect the rule 
of law, to establish justice and equality, to cast aside the politics of aggression, to pay 
attention to women and their rights, the elderly and their concerns, and children and their 
affairs, to spread the culture of diversity, and to defuse terrorism. 
 
We, the people of Iraq, of all components and across the spectrum, have taken upon 
  
Page | 390  
 
ourselves to decide freely and by choice to unite our future, to take lessons from yesterday 
for tomorrow, and to enact this permanent Constitution, through the values and ideals of 
the heavenly messages and the findings of science and man’s civilization. The adherence 
to this Constitution preserves for Iraq its free union of people, of land, and of sovereignty.  
 
Section One 
Fundamental Principles 
 
Article 1: 
The Republic of Iraq is a single federal, independent and fully sovereign state in which the 
system of government is republican, representative, parliamentary, and democratic, and 
this Constitution is a guarantor of the unity of Iraq.  
 
Article 2: 
First: Islam is the official religion of the State and is a foundation source of legislation: 
A. No law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam  
B. No law may be enacted that contradicts the principles of democracy. 
C. No law may be enacted that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in this 
Constitution. 
 
Second: This Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people 
and guarantees the full religious rights to freedom of religious belief and practice of all 
individuals such as Christians, Yazidis, and Mandean Sabeans. 
 
Article 3: 
Iraq is a country of multiple nationalities, religions, and sects. It is a founding and active 
member in the Arab League and is committed to its charter, and it is part of the Islamic 
world.  
 
Article 4: 
First: The Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the two official languages of Iraq. 
The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue, such as Turkmen, 
Syriac, and Armenian shall be guaranteed in government educational institutions in 
accordance with educational guidelines, or in any other language in private educational 
institutions. 
 
Second: The scope of the term “official language” and the means of applying the 
provisions of this article shall be defined by a law and shall include: 
 
A. Publication of the Official Gazette, in the two languages; 
 
B. Speech, conversation, and expression in official domains, such as the Council of 
Representatives, the Council of Ministers, courts, and official conferences, in either of the 
two languages; 
 
C. Recognition and publication of official documents and correspondence in the two 
languages; 
 
D. Opening schools that teach the two languages, in accordance with the educational 
guidelines; 
 
E. Use of both languages in any matter enjoined by the principle of equality such as bank 
notes, passports, and stamps. 
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Third: The federal and official institutions and agencies in the Kurdistan region shall use 
both languages. 
 
Fourth: The Turkomen language and the Syriac language are two other official languages 
in the administrative units in which they constitute density of population.  
 
Fifth: Each region or governorate may adopt any other local language as an additional 
official language if the majority of its population so decides in a general referendum. 
 
Article 5: 
The law is sovereign. The people are the source of authority and legitimacy, which they 
shall exercise in a direct, general, secret ballot and through their constitutional institutions. 
 
Article 6: 
Transfer of authority shall be made peacefully through democratic means as stipulated in 
this Constitution. 
 
Article 7: 
First: Any entity or program that adopts, incites, facilitates, glorifies, promotes, or justifies 
racism or terrorism or accusations of being an infidel (takfir) or ethnic cleansing, especially 
the Saddamist Ba’ath in Iraq and its symbols, under any name whatsoever, shall be 
prohibited. Such entities may not be political pluralism in Iraq. This shall be regulated by 
law. 
 
Second: The State shall undertake to combat terrorism in all its forms, and shall work to 
protect its territories from being a base, pathway, or field for terrorist activities. 
 
Article 8: 
Iraq shall observe the principles of good neighborliness, adhere to the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of other states, seek to settle disputes by peaceful 
means, establish relations on the basis of mutual interests and reciprocity, and respect its 
international obligations.  
 
Article 9: 
First:  
A - The Iraqi armed forces and security services will be composed of the components of 
the Iraqi people with due consideration given to their balance and representation without 
discrimination or exclusion. They shall be subject to the control of the civilian authority, 
shall defend Iraq, shall not be used as an instrument to oppress the Iraqi people, shall not 
interfere in the political affairs, and shall have no role in the transfer of authority. 
 
B - The formation of military militias outside the framework of the armed forces is 
prohibited.  
 
C - The Iraqi armed forces and their personnel, including military personnel working in the 
Ministry of Defense or any subordinate departments or organisations, may not stand for 
election to political office, campaign for candidates, or participate in other activities 
prohibited by Ministry of Defense regulations. This ban includes the activities of the 
personnel mentioned above acting in their personal or professional capacities, but shall 
not infringe upon the right of these personnel to cast their vote in the elections. 
 
D - The Iraqi National Intelligence Service shall collect information, assess threats to 
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national security, and advise the Iraqi government. This Service shall be under civilian 
control, shall be subject to legislative oversight, and shall operate in accordance with the 
law and pursuant to the recognized principles of human rights. 
 
E- The Iraqi Government shall respect and implement Iraq’s international obligations 
regarding the non-proliferation, non-development, non-production, and non-use of nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons, and shall prohibit associated equipment, materiel, 
technologies, and delivery systems for use in the development, manufacture, production, 
and use of such weapons. 
 
Second: Military service shall be regulated by law. 
 
Article 10: 
The holy shrines and religious sites in Iraq are religious and civilizational entities. The 
State is committed to assuring and maintaining their sanctity, and to guaranteeing the free 
practice of rituals in them.  
 
Article 11: 
Baghdad is the capital of the Republic of Iraq.  
 
Article 12: 
First: The flag, national anthem, and emblem of Iraq shall be regulated by law in a way that 
symbolizes the components of the Iraqi people. 
 
Second: A law shall regulate honours, official holidays, religious and national occasions 
and the Hijri and Gregorian calendar. 
 
Article 13: 
First: This Constitution is the preeminent and supreme law in Iraq and shall be binding in 
all parts of Iraq without exception. 
 
Second: No law that contradicts this Constitution shall be enacted. Any text in any regional 
constitutions or any other legal text that contradicts this Constitution shall be considered 
void. 
 
Section Two 
 
Rights and Liberties 
 
Chapter One 
[Rights]  
 
First: Civil and Political Rights 
 
Article 14: 
Iraqis are equal before the law without discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, 
nationality, origin, color, religion, sect, belief or opinion, or economic or social status. 
 
Article 15: 
Every individual has the right to enjoy life, security and liberty. Deprivation or restriction of 
these rights is prohibited except in accordance with the law and based on a decision 
issued by a competent judicial authority. 
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Article 16: 
Equal opportunities shall be guaranteed to all Iraqis, and the state shall ensure that the 
necessary measures to achieve this are taken.  
 
Article 17: 
First: Every individual shall have the right to personal privacy so long as it does not 
contradict the rights of others and public morals. 
 
Second: The sanctity of the homes shall be protected. Homes may not be entered, 
searched, or violated, except by a judicial decision in accordance with the law. 
 
Article 18: 
First: Iraqi citizenship is a right for every Iraqi and is the basis of his nationality.  
 
Second: Anyone who is born to an Iraqi father or to an Iraqi mother shall be considered an 
Iraqi. This shall be regulated by law. 
 
Third: 
A. An Iraqi citizen by birth may not have his citizenship withdrawn for any reason. Any 
person who had his citizenship withdrawn shall have the right to demand its reinstatement. 
This shall be regulated by a law.  
B. Iraqi citizenship shall be withdrawn from naturalized citizens in cases regulated by law. 
 
Fourth: An Iraqi may have multiple citizenships. Everyone who assumes a senior, security 
or sovereign position must abandon any other acquired citizenship. This shall be regulated 
by law. 
 
Fifth: Iraqi citizenship shall not be granted for the purposes of the policy of population 
settlement that disrupts the demographic composition of Iraq. 
 
Sixth: Citizenship provisions shall be regulated by law. The competent courts shall 
consider the suits arising from those provisions. 
 
Article 19: 
First: The judiciary is independent and no power is above the judiciary except the law. 
 
Second: There is no crime or punishment except by law. The punishment shall only be for 
an act that the law considers a crime when perpetrated. A harsher punishment than the 
applicable punishment at the time of the offense may not be imposed. 
 
Third: Litigation shall be a protected and guaranteed right for all. 
 
Fourth: The right to a defense shall be sacred and guaranteed in all phases of 
investigation and the trial. 
 
Fifth: The accused is innocent until proven guilty in a fair legal trial. The accused may not 
be tried for the same crime for a second time after acquittal unless new evidence is 
produced. 
 
Sixth: Every person shall have the right to be treated with justice in judicial and 
administrative proceedings. 
 
Seventh: The proceedings of a trial are public unless the court decides to make it secret. 
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Eighth: Punishment shall be personal. 
 
Ninth: Laws shall not have retroactive effect unless stipulated otherwise. This exclusion 
shall not include laws on taxes and fees.  
 
Tenth: Criminal laws shall not have retroactive effect, unless it is to the benefit of the 
accused. 
 
Eleventh: The court shall appoint a lawyer at the expense of the state for an accused of a 
felony or misdemeanor who does not have a defense lawyer. 
 
Twelfth: 
A. Unlawful detention shall be prohibited. 
B. Imprisonment or detention shall be prohibited in places not designed for these 
purposes, pursuant to prison laws covering health and social care, and subject to the 
authorities of the State.  
 
Thirteenth: The preliminary investigative documents shall be submitted to the competent 
judge in a period not to exceed twenty-four hours from the time of the arrest of the 
accused, which may be extended only once and for the same period. 
 
Article 20: 
Iraqi citizens, men and women, shall have the right to participate in public affairs and to 
enjoy political rights including the right to vote, elect, and run for office. 
 
Article 21: 
First: No Iraqi shall be surrendered to foreign entities and authorities. 
 
Second: A law shall regulate the right of political asylum in Iraq. No political refugee shall 
be surrendered to a foreign entity or returned forcibly to the country from which he fled. 
 
Third: Political asylum shall not be granted to a person accused of committing international 
or terrorist crimes or to any person who inflicted damage on Iraq. 
 
Second: Economic, Social and Cultural Liberties 
 
Article 22: 
First: Work is a right for all Iraqis in a way that guarantees a dignified life for them. 
 
Second: The law shall regulate the relationship between employees and employers on 
economic bases and while observing the rules of social justice. 
 
Third: The State shall guarantee the right to form and join unions and professional 
associations, and this shall be regulated by law. 
 
Article 23: 
First: Private property is protected. The owner shall have the right to benefit, exploit and 
dispose of private property within the limits of the law. 
 
Second: Expropriation is not permissible except for the purposes of public benefit in return 
for just compensation, and this shall be regulated by law. 
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Third: 
A. Every Iraqi shall have the right to own property anywhere in Iraq. No others may 
possess immovable assets, except as exempted by law. 
B. Ownership of property for the purposes of demographic change is prohibited. 
 
Article 24: 
The State shall guarantee freedom of movement of Iraqi manpower, goods, and capital 
between regions and governorates, and this shall be regulated by law. 
 
Article 25: 
The State shall guarantee the reform of the Iraqi economy in accordance with modern 
economic principles to insure the full investment of its resources, diversification of its 
sources, and the encouragement and development of the private sector. 
 
Article 26: 
The State shall guarantee the encouragement of investment in the various sectors, and 
this shall be regulated by law. 
 
Article 27: 
First: Public assets are sacrosanct, and their protection is the duty of each citizen.  
 
Second: The provisions related to the preservation of State properties, their management, 
the conditions for their disposal, and the limits for these assets not to be relinquished shall 
all be regulated by law. 
 
Article 28: 
First: No taxes or fees shall be levied, amended, collected, or exempted, except by law.  
 
Second: Low income earners shall be exempted from taxes in a way that guarantees the 
preservation of the minimum income required for living. This shall be regulated by law. 
 
Article 29: 
First: 
A. The family is the foundation of society; the State shall preserve it and its religious, 
moral, and national values. 
 
B. The State shall guarantee the protection of motherhood, childhood and old age, shall 
care for children and youth, and shall provide them with the appropriate conditions to 
develop their talents and abilities. 
 
Second: Children have the right to upbringing, care and education from their parents. 
Parents have the right to respect and care from their children, especially in times of need, 
disability, and old age. 
 
Third: Economic exploitation of children in all of its forms shall be prohibited, and the State 
shall take the necessary measures for their protection. 
 
Fourth: All forms of violence and abuse in the family, school, and society shall be 
prohibited. 
 
Article 30: 
First: The State shall guarantee to the individual and the family - especially children and 
women – social and health security, the basic requirements for living a free and decent life, 
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and shall secure for them suitable income and appropriate housing.  
 
Second: The State shall guarantee social and health security to Iraqis in cases of old age, 
sickness, employment disability, homelessness, orphanhood, or unemployment, shall work 
to protect them from ignorance, fear and poverty, and shall provide them housing and 
special programs of care and rehabilitation, and this shall be regulated by law.  
 
Article 31: 
First: Every citizen has the right to health care. The State shall maintain public health and 
provide the means of prevention and treatment by building different types of hospitals and 
health institutions. 
 
Second: Individuals and entities have the right to build hospitals, clinics, or private health 
care centers under the supervision of the State, and this shall be regulated by law. 
 
Article 32: 
The State shall care for the handicapped and those with special needs, and shall ensure 
their rehabilitation in order to reintegrate them into society, and this shall be regulated by 
law. 
 
Article 33: 
First: Every individual has the right to live in safe environmental conditions. 
 
Second: The State shall undertake the protection and preservation of the environment and 
its biological diversity. 
 
Article 34: 
First: Education is a fundamental factor for the progress of society and is a right 
guaranteed by the state. Primary education is mandatory and the state guarantees that it 
shall combat illiteracy. 
 
Second: Free education in all its stages is a right for all Iraqis. 
 
Third: The State shall encourage scientific research for peaceful purposes that serve 
humanity and shall support excellence, creativity, invention, and different aspects of 
ingenuity. 
 
Fourth: Private and public education shall be guaranteed, and this shall be regulated by 
law. 
 
Article 35: 
The state shall promote cultural activities and institutions in a manner that befits the 
civilizational and cultural history of Iraq, and it shall seek to support indigenous Iraqi 
cultural orientations. 
 
Article 36: 
Practicing sports is a right of every Iraqi and the state shall encourage and care for such 
activities and shall provide for their requirements. 
 
Chapter Two 
[Liberties] 
 
Article 37: 
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First: 
A. The liberty and dignity of man shall be protected. 
 
B. No person may be kept in custody or investigated except according to a judicial 
decision. 
 
C. All forms of psychological and physical torture and inhumane treatment are prohibited. 
Any confession made under force, threat, or torture shall not be relied on, and the victim 
shall have the right to seek compensation for material and moral damages incurred in 
accordance with the law. 
 
Second: The State shall guarantee protection of the individual from intellectual, political 
and religious coercion. 
 
Third: Forced labor, slavery, slave trade, trafficking in women or children, and sex trade 
shall be prohibited. 
 
Article 38: 
The State shall guarantee in a way that does not violate public order and morality: 
A. Freedom of expression using all means. 
B. Freedom of press, printing, advertisement, media and publication. 
C. Freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration, and this shall be regulated by law. 
 
Article 39: 
First: The freedom to form and join associations and political parties shall be guaranteed, 
and this shall be regulated by law.  
 
Second: It is not permissible to force any person to join any party, society, or political 
entity, or force him to continue his membership in it. 
 
Article 40: 
The freedom of communication and correspondence, postal, telegraphic, electronic, and 
telephonic, shall be guaranteed and may not be monitored, wiretapped, or disclosed 
except for legal and security necessity and by a judicial decision.  
 
Article 41: 
Iraqis are free in their commitment to their personal status according to their religions, 
sects, beliefs, or choices, and this shall be regulated by law.  
 
Article 42: 
Each individual shall have the freedom of thought, conscience, and belief.  
 
Article 43: 
First: The followers of all religions and sects are free in the: 
A- Practice of religious rites, including the Husseini rituals. 
B- Management of religious endowments (waqf), their affairs, and their religious 
institutions, and this shall be regulated by law. 
 
Second: The State shall guarantee freedom of worship and the protection of places of 
worship. 
 
Article 44: 
First: Each Iraqi has freedom of movement, travel, and residence inside and outside Iraq. 
  
Page | 398  
 
 
Second: No Iraqi may be exiled, displaced, or deprived from returning to the homeland. 
 
Article 45: 
First: The State shall seek to strengthen the role of civil society institutions, and to support, 
develop and preserve their independence in a way that is consistent with peaceful means 
to achieve their legitimate goals, and this shall be regulated by law. 
 
Second: The State shall seek the advancement of the Iraqi clans and tribes, shall attend to 
their affairs in a manner that is consistent with religion and the law, and shall uphold their 
noble human values in a way that contributes to the development of society. The State 
shall prohibit the tribal traditions that are in contradiction with human rights. 
 
Article 46: 
Restricting or limiting the practice of any of the rights or liberties stipulated in this 
Constitution is prohibited, except by a law or on the basis of a law, and insofar as that 
limitation or restriction does not violate the essence of the right or freedom. 
 
Section Three 
 
Federal Powers 
 
Article 47: 
The federal powers shall consist of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and they 
shall exercise their competencies and tasks on the basis of the principle of separation of 
powers. 
 
Chapter one 
[The Legislative Power] 
 
Article 48: 
The federal legislative power shall consist of the Council of Representatives and the 
Federation Council. 
 
First: The Council of Representatives 
 
Article 49: 
First: The Council of Representatives shall consist of a number of members, at a ratio of 
one seat per 100,000 Iraqi persons representing the entire Iraqi people. They shall be 
elected through a direct secret general ballot. The representation of all components of the 
people shall be upheld in it.  
 
Second: A candidate to the Council of Representatives must be a fully qualified Iraqi.  
 
Third: A law shall regulate the requirements for the candidate, the voter, and all that is 
related to the elections. 
 
Fourth: The elections law shall aim to achieve a percentage of representation for women 
of not less than one-quarter of the members of the Council of Representatives. 
 
Fifth: The Council of Representatives shall promulgate a law dealing with the replacement 
of its members on resignation, dismissal, or death. 
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Sixth: It is not permissible to combine membership in the Council of Representatives with 
any work or other official position. 
 
Article 50: 
Each member of the Council of Representatives shall take the following constitutional oath 
before the Council prior to assuming his duties:  
 
“I swear by God Almighty to carry out my legal duties and responsibilities with devotion 
and integrity and preserve the independence and sovereignty of Iraq, and safeguard the 
interests of its people, and ensure the safety of its land, sky, water, wealth, and federal 
democratic system, and I shall endeavor to protect public and private liberties, the 
independence of the judiciary, and pledge to implement legislation faithfully and neutrally. 
God is my witness.”  
 
Article 51: 
The Council of Representatives shall establish its bylaws to regulate its work. 
 
Article 52: 
First: The Council of Representatives shall decide, by a two-thirds majority, the authenticity 
of membership of its member within thirty days from the date of filing an objection.  
 
Second: The decision of the Council of Representatives may be appealed before the 
Federal Supreme Court within thirty days from the date of its issuance. 
 
Article 53: 
First: Sessions of the Council of Representatives shall be public unless, for reasons of 
necessity, the Council decides otherwise. 
 
Second: Minutes of the sessions shall be published by means considered appropriate by 
the Council.  
 
Article 54: 
The President of the Republic shall call upon the Council of Representatives to convene 
by a presidential decree within fifteen days from the date of the ratification of the general 
election results. Its eldest member shall chair the first session to elect the speaker of the 
Council and his two deputies. This period may not be extended by more than the 
aforementioned period.  
 
Article 55: 
The Council of Representatives shall elect in its first session its speaker, then his first 
deputy and second deputy, by an absolute majority of the total number of the Council 
members by direct secret ballot.  
 
Article 56: 
First: The electoral term of the Council of Representatives shall be four calendar years, 
starting with its first session and ending with the conclusion of the fourth year.  
 
Second: The new Council of Representatives shall be elected forty-five days before the 
conclusion of the preceding electoral term.  
 
Article 57: 
The Council of Representatives shall have one annual term, with two legislative sessions, 
lasting eight months. The bylaws shall define the method to convene the sessions. The 
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session in which the general budget is being presented shall not end until approval of the 
budget. 
 
Article 58: 
First: The President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the Council of 
Representatives, or fifty members of the Council of Representatives may call the Council 
to an extraordinary session. The session shall be restricted to the topics that necessitated 
the call for the session. 
 
Second: The legislative session of the Council of Representatives may be extended for no 
more than 30 days to complete the tasks that require the extension, based on a request 
from the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the Council, or fifty 
members of the Council of Representatives. 
 
Article 59: 
First:  
The Council of Representatives quorum shall be achieved by an absolute majority of its 
members. 
 
Second: 
Decisions in the sessions of the Council of Representatives shall be made by a simple 
majority after quorum is achieved, unless otherwise stipulated.  
 
Article 60: 
First: 
Draft laws shall be presented by the President of the Republic and the Council of 
Ministers. 
 
Second: 
Proposed laws shall be presented by ten members of the Council of Representatives or by 
one of its specialized committees. 
 
Article 61: 
The Council of Representatives shall be competent in the following: 
First: Enacting federal laws.  
 
Second: Monitoring the performance of the executive authority. 
 
Third: Electing the President of the Republic. 
 
Fourth: Regulating the ratification process of international treaties and agreements by a 
law, to be enacted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Council of 
Representatives. 
 
Fifth: Approving the appointment of the following: 
A. The President and members of the Federal Court of Cassation, the Chief Public 
Prosecutor, and the President of Judicial Oversight Commission by an absolute majority, 
based on a proposal from the Higher Juridical Council.  
B. Ambassadors and those with special grades, based on a proposal from the Council of 
Ministers. 
C. The Iraqi Army Chief of Staff, his assistants, those of the rank of division commander 
and above, and the director of the intelligence service, based on a proposal from the 
Council of Ministers. 
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Sixth: 
A. Questioning the President of the Republic, based on a petition with cause, by an 
absolute majority of the members of the Council of Representatives. 
 
B. Relieving the President of the Republic by an absolute majority of the Council of 
Representatives after being convicted by the Federal Supreme Court in one of the 
following cases: 
1 - Perjury of the constitutional oath. 
2 - Violating the Constitution. 
3 - High treason. 
 
Seventh: 
A. A member of the Council of Representatives may direct questions to the Prime Minister 
and the Ministers on any subject within their specialty and each of them shall answer the 
members’ questions. Only the member who has asked the question shall have the right to 
comment on the answer. 
 
B. At least twenty-five members of the Council of Representatives may raise a general 
issue for discussion in order to inquire about a policy and the performance of the Council 
of Ministers or one of the Ministries and it shall be submitted to the Speaker of the Council 
of Representatives, and the Prime Minister or the Ministers shall specify a date to come 
before the Council of Representatives to discuss it. 
 
C. A member of the Council of Representatives, with the agreement of twenty-five 
members, may direct an inquiry to the Prime Minister or the Ministers to call them to 
account on the issues within their authority. The debate shall not be held on the inquiry 
except after at least seven days from the date of submission of the inquiry. 
 
Eighth: 
A. The Council of Representatives may withdraw confidence from one of the Ministers by 
an absolute majority and he shall be considered resigned from the date of the decision of 
withdrawal of confidence. A vote of no confidence in a Minister may not be held except 
upon his request or on the basis of a request signed by fifty members after the Minister 
has appeared for questioning before the Council. The Council shall not issue its decision 
regarding the request except after at least seven days from the date of its submission. 
 
B.  
1 - The President of the Republic may submit a request to the Council of Representatives 
to withdraw confidence from the Prime Minister. 
2 - The Council of Representatives may withdraw confidence from the Prime Minister 
based on the request of one-fifth of its members. This request shall not be submitted 
except after an inquiry directed at the Prime Minister and after at least seven days from the 
date of submitting the request. 
3 - The Council of Representatives may decide to withdraw confidence from the Prime 
Minister by an absolute majority of the number of its members. 
 
C. The Government is deemed resigned in case of withdrawal of confidence from the 
Prime Minister. 
 
D. In case of a vote of withdrawal of confidence in the Council of Ministers as a whole, the 
Prime Minister and the Ministers continue in their positions to run everyday business for a 
period not to exceed thirty days until a new Council of Ministers is formed in accordance 
  
Page | 402  
 
with the provisions of Article 76 of this Constitution. 
 
E. The Council of Representatives may question independent commission heads in 
accordance with the same procedures related to the Ministers. The Council shall have the 
right to relieve them by absolute majority. 
 
Ninth:  
A. To consent to the declaration of war and the state of emergency by a two-thirds majority 
based on a joint request from the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. 
 
B. The state of emergency shall be declared for a period of thirty days, which can be 
extended after approval each time. 
 
C. The Prime Minister shall be delegated the necessary powers which enable him to 
manage the affairs of the country during the period of the declaration of war and the state 
of emergency. These powers shall be regulated by a law in a way that does not contradict 
the Constitution.  
 
D. The Prime Minister shall present to the Council of Representatives the measures taken 
and the results during the period of the declaration of war and the state of emergency 
within 15 days from the date of its end.  
 
Article 62: 
First: The Council of Ministers shall submit the draft general budget bill and the closing 
account to the Council of Representatives for approval. 
 
Second: The Council of Representatives may conduct transfers between the sections and 
chapters of the general budget and reduce the total of its sums, and it may suggest to the 
Council of Ministers that they increase the total expenses, when necessary. 
 
Article 63: 
First: A law shall regulate the rights and privileges of the speaker of the Council of 
Representatives, his two deputies, and the members of the Council of Representatives. 
 
Second:  
A. A member of the Council of Representatives shall enjoy immunity for statements made 
while the Council is in session, and the member may not be prosecuted before the courts 
for such.  
 
B. A Council of Representatives member may not be placed under arrest during the 
legislative term of the Council of Representatives, unless the member is accused of a 
felony and the Council of Representatives members consent by an absolute majority to lift 
his immunity or if he is caught in flagrante delicto in the commission of a felony. 
 
C. A Council of Representatives member may not be arrested after the legislative term of 
the Council of Representatives, unless the member is accused of a felony and with the 
consent of the speaker of the Council of Representatives to lift his immunity or if he is 
caught in flagrante delicto in the commission of a felony. 
 
Article 64:  
First: The Council of Representatives may be dissolved by an absolute majority of the 
number of its members, or upon the request of one-third of its members by the Prime 
Minister with the consent of the President of the Republic. The Council shall not be 
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dissolved during the period in which the Prime Minister is being questioned. 
 
Second: Upon the dissolution of the Council of Representatives, the President of the 
Republic shall call for general elections in the country within a period not to exceed sixty 
days from the date of its dissolution. The Council of Ministers in this case is deemed 
resigned and continues to run everyday business.  
 
Second: The Federation Council 
 
Article 65:  
A legislative council shall be established named the “Federation Council,” to include 
representatives from the regions and the governorates that are not organized in a region. 
A law, enacted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Council of Representatives, 
shall regulate the formation of the Federation Council, its membership conditions, its 
competencies, and all that is connected with it.  
 
Chapter Two 
[The Executive Power] 
 
Article 66:  
The federal executive power shall consist of the President of the Republic and the Council 
of Ministers and shall exercise its powers in accordance with the Constitution and the law. 
 
First: The President of the Republic 
 
Article 67:  
The President of the Republic is the Head of the State and a symbol of the unity of the 
country and represents the sovereignty of the country. He shall guarantee the commitment 
to the Constitution and the preservation of Iraq’s independence, sovereignty, unity, and the 
safety of its territories, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. 
 
Article 68:  
A nominee to the Presidency of the Republic must be: 
First: An Iraqi by birth, born to Iraqi parents. 
 
Second: Fully qualified and must be over forty years of age. 
 
Third: Of good reputation and political experience, known for his integrity, uprightness, 
fairness, and loyalty to the homeland. 
 
Fourth: Free of any conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. 
 
Article 69:  
First: The provisions for nomination to the office of the President of the Republic shall be 
regulated by law. 
 
Second: The provisions for nomination to the office of one or more Vice Presidents of the 
Republic shall be regulated by law. 
 
Article 70:  
First: The Council of Representatives shall elect a President of the Republic from among 
the candidates by a two-thirds majority of the number of its members. 
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Second: If none of the candidates receive the required majority vote then the two 
candidates who received the highest number of votes shall compete and the one who 
receives the majority of votes in the second election shall be declared President. 
 
Article 71:  
The President shall take the constitutional oath before the Council of Representatives 
according to the language stipulated in Article 50 of the Constitution. 
 
Article 72:  
First: The President of the Republic’s term in office shall be limited to four years. He may 
be re-elected for a second time only. 
 
Second: 
A - The President of the Republic’s term in office shall end with the end of the term of the 
Council of Representatives. 
 
B - The President of the Republic shall continue to exercise his duties until after the end of 
the election and the meeting of the new Council of Representatives, provided that a new 
President of the Republic is elected within thirty days from the date of its first convening. 
C - In case the position of the President of the Republic becomes vacant for any reason, a 
new President shall be elected to complete the remaining period of the President’s term.  
 
Article 73:  
The President of the Republic shall assume the following powers: 
First: To issue a special pardon on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, except for 
anything concerning a private claim and for those who have been convicted of committing 
international crimes, terrorism, or financial and administrative corruption. 
 
Second: To ratify international treaties and agreements after the approval by the Council of 
Representatives. Such international treaties and agreements are considered ratified after 
fifteen days from the date of receipt by the President. 
 
Third: To ratify and issue the laws enacted by the Council of Representatives. Such laws 
are considered ratified after fifteen days from the date of receipt by the President. 
 
Fourth: To call the elected Council of Representatives to convene during a period not to 
exceed fifteen days from the date of approval of the election results and in the other cases 
stipulated in the Constitution. 
 
Fifth: To award medals and decorations on the recommendation of the Prime Minister in 
accordance with the law. 
 
Sixth: To accredit ambassadors. 
 
Seventh: To issue Presidential decrees. 
 
Eighth: To ratify death sentences issued by the competent courts. 
 
Ninth: To perform the duty of the High Command of the armed forces for ceremonial and 
honorary purposes.  
 
Tenth: To exercise any other presidential powers stipulated in this Constitution. 
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Article 74:  
A law shall fix the salary and the allowances of the President of the Republic. 
 
Article 75:  
First: The President of the Republic shall have the right to submit his resignation in writing 
to the Speaker of the Council of Representatives, and it shall be considered effective after 
seven days from the date of its submission to the Council of Representatives. 
 
Second: The Vice President shall replace the President in case of his absence. 
 
Third: The Vice President shall replace the President of the Republic in the event that the 
post of the President becomes vacant for any reason whatsoever. The Council of 
Representatives must elect a new President within a period not to exceed thirty days from 
the date of the vacancy. 
 
Fourth: In case the post of the President of the Republic becomes vacant, the Speaker of 
the Council of Representatives shall replace the President of the Republic in case he does 
not have a Vice President, on the condition that a new President is elected during a period 
not to exceed thirty days from the date of the vacancy and in accordance with the 
provisions of this Constitution. 
 
Second: Council of Ministers 
 
Article 76:  
First: The President of the Republic shall charge the nominee of the largest Council of 
Representatives bloc with the formation of the Council of Ministers within fifteen days from 
the date of the election of the President of the Republic.  
 
Second: The Prime Minister-designate shall undertake the naming of the members of his 
Council of Ministers within a period not to exceed thirty days from the date of his 
designation. 
 
Third: If the Prime Minister-designate fails to form the Council of Ministers during the 
period specified in clause “Second,” the President of the Republic shall charge a new 
nominee for the post of Prime Minister within fifteen days. 
 
Fourth: The Prime Minister-designate shall present the names of his members of the 
Council of Ministers and the ministerial program to the Council of Representatives. He is 
deemed to have gained its confidence upon the approval, by an absolute majority of the 
Council of Representatives, of the individual Ministers and the ministerial program. 
 
Fifth: The President of the Republic shall charge another nominee to form the Council of 
Ministers within fifteen days in case the Council of Ministers did not win the vote of 
confidence. 
 
Article 77:  
First: The conditions for assuming the post of the Prime Minister shall be the same as 
those for the President of the Republic, provided that he has a college degree or its 
equivalent and is over thirty-five years of age.  
 
Second: The conditions for assuming the post of Minister shall be the same as those for 
members of the Council of Representatives, provided that he holds a college degree or its 
equivalent.  
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Article 78:  
The Prime Minister is the direct executive authority responsible for the general policy of the 
State and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He directs the Council of Ministers, 
presides over its meetings, and has the right to dismiss the Ministers, with the consent of 
the Council of Representatives.  
 
Article 79:  
The Prime Minister and members of the Council of Ministers shall take the constitutional 
oath before the Council of Representatives according to the language stipulated in Article 
50 of the Constitution. 
 
Article 80:  
The Council of Ministers shall exercise the following powers: 
First: To plan and execute the general policy and general plans of the State and oversee 
the work of the ministries and departments not associated with a ministry. 
 
Second: To propose bills. 
 
Third: To issue rules, instructions, and decisions for the purpose of implementing the law. 
 
Fourth: To prepare the draft of the general budget, the closing account, and the 
development plans. 
 
Fifth: To recommend to the Council of Representatives that it approve the appointment of 
undersecretaries, ambassadors, state senior officials, the Chief of Staff of the Armed 
Forces and his deputies, division commanders or higher, the Director of the National 
Intelligence Service, and heads of security institutions. 
 
Sixth: To negotiate and sign international agreements and treaties, or designate any 
person to do so. 
 
Article 81:  
First: The President of the Republic shall take up the office of the Prime Minister in the 
event the post becomes vacant for any reason whatsoever. 
 
Second: If the event mentioned in “First” of this Article occurs, the President shall charge 
another nominee to form the Council of Ministers within a period not to exceed fifteen days 
in accordance with the provisions of Article 76 of this Constitution. 
 
Article 82:  
A law shall regulate the salaries and allowances of the Prime Minister and Ministers, and 
anyone of their grade. 
 
Article 83:  
The responsibility of the Prime Minister and the Ministers before the Council of 
Representatives is of a joint and personal nature. 
 
Article 84:  
First: A law shall regulate the work and define the duties and authorities of the security 
institutions and the National Intelligence Service, which shall operate in accordance with 
the principles of human rights and shall be subject to the oversight of the Council of 
Representatives. 
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Second: The National Intelligence Service shall be attached to the Council of Ministers. 
 
Article 85:  
The Council of Ministers shall establish internal bylaws to organize the work therein. 
 
Article 86:  
A law shall regulate the formation of ministries, their functions, and their specializations, 
and the authorities of the minister. 
 
Chapter Three 
[The Judicial Power] 
 
Article 87:  
The judicial power is independent. The courts, in their various types and levels, shall 
assume this power and issue decisions in accordance with the law.  
 
Article 88:  
Judges are independent, and there is no authority over them except that of the law. No 
power shall have the right to interfere in the judiciary and the affairs of justice. 
 
Article 89:  
The federal judicial power is comprised of the Higher Juridical Council, the Federal 
Supreme Court, the Federal Court of Cassation, the Public Prosecution Department, the 
Judiciary Oversight Commission, and other federal courts that are regulated in accordance 
with the law. 
 
First: Higher Juridical Council 
 
Article 90:  
The Higher Juridical Council shall oversee the affairs of the judicial committees. The law 
shall specify the method of its establishment, its authorities, and the rules of its operation.  
 
Article 91:  
The Higher Juridical Council shall exercise the following authorities: 
First: To manage the affairs of the judiciary and supervise the federal judiciary. 
 
Second: To nominate the Chief Justice and members of the Federal Court of Cassation, 
the Chief Public Prosecutor, and the Chief Justice of the Judiciary Oversight Commission, 
and to present those nominations to the Council of Representatives to approve their 
appointment. 
 
Third: To propose the draft of the annual budget of the federal judicial authority, and to 
present it to the Council of Representatives for approval. 
 
Second: Federal Supreme Court 
 
Article 92:  
First: The Federal Supreme Court is an independent judicial body, financially and 
administratively. 
 
Second: The Federal Supreme Court shall be made up of a number of judges, experts in 
Islamic jurisprudence, and legal scholars, whose number, the method of their selection, 
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and the work of the Court shall be determined by a law enacted by a two-thirds majority of 
the members of the Council of Representatives. 
 
Article 93:  
The Federal Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the following: 
 
First: Overseeing the constitutionality of laws and regulations in effect. 
 
Second: Interpreting the provisions of the Constitution. 
 
Third: Settling matters that arise from the application of the federal laws, decisions, 
regulations, instructions, and procedures issued by the federal authority. The law shall 
guarantee the right of direct appeal to the Court to the Council of Ministers, those 
concerned individuals, and others.  
 
Fourth: Settling disputes that arise between the federal government and the governments 
of the regions and governorates, municipalities, and local administrations. 
 
Fifth: Settling disputes that arise between the governments of the regions and 
governments of the governorates.  
 
Sixth: Settling accusations directed against the President, the Prime Minister and the 
Ministers, and this shall be regulated by law. 
 
Seventh: Ratifying the final results of the general elections for membership in the Council 
of Representatives. 
 
Eight: 
A. Settling competency disputes between the federal judiciary and the judicial institutions 
of the regions and governorates that are not organized in a region. 
B. Settling competency disputes between judicial institutions of the regions or 
governorates that are not organized in a region. 
 
Article 94:  
Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court are final and binding for all authorities. 
 
Third: General Provisions 
 
Article 95:  
The establishment of special or extraordinary courts is prohibited. 
 
Article 96:  
The law shall regulate the establishment of courts, their types, levels, and jurisdiction, and 
the method of appointing and the terms of service of judges and public prosecutors, their 
discipline, and their retirement. 
 
Article 97:  
Judges may not be removed except in cases specified by law. Such law will determine the 
particular provisions related to them and shall regulate their disciplinary measures. 
 
Article 98:  
A judge or public prosecutor is prohibited from the following: 
First: Combining a judicial position with legislative and executive positions and any other 
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employment. 
 
Second: Joining any party or political organisation or performing any political activity. 
 
Article 99:  
A law shall regulate the military judiciary and shall specify the jurisdiction of military courts, 
which are limited to crimes of a military nature committed by members of the armed forces 
and security forces, and within the limits established by law. 
 
Article 100:  
It is prohibited to stipulate in the law the immunity from appeal for any administrative action 
or decision. 
 
Article 101:  
A State Council may be established, specialized in functions of the administrative judiciary, 
issuing opinions, drafting, and representing the State and various public commissions 
before the courts except those exempted by law. 
 
Chapter Four 
[Independent Commissions]  
 
Article 102:  
The High Commission for Human Rights, the Independent Electoral Commission, and the 
Commission on Public Integrity are considered independent commissions subject to 
monitoring by the Council of Representatives, and their functions shall be regulated by 
law. 
 
Article 103:  
First: The Central Bank of Iraq, the Board of Supreme Audit, the Communication and 
Media Commission, and the Endowment Commissions are financially and administratively 
independent institutions, and the work of each of these institutions shall be regulated by 
law.  
 
Second: The Central Bank of Iraq is responsible before the Council of Representatives. 
The Board of Supreme Audit and the Communication and Media Commission shall be 
attached to the Council of Representatives.  
 
Third: The Endowment Commissions shall be attached to the Council of Ministers. 
 
Article 104:  
A commission named The Martyrs’ Foundation shall be established and attached to the 
Council of Ministers, and its functions and competencies shall be regulated by law.  
 
Article 105:  
A public commission shall be established to guarantee the rights of the regions and 
governorates that are not organized in a region to ensure their fair participation in 
managing the various state federal institutions, missions, fellowships, delegations, and 
regional and international conferences. The commission shall be comprised of 
representatives of the federal government and representatives of the regions and 
governorates that are not organized in a region, and shall be regulated by a law. 
 
Article 106:  
A public commission shall be established by a law to audit and appropriate federal 
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revenues. The commission shall be comprised of experts from the federal government, the 
regions, the governorates, and its representatives, and shall assume the following 
responsibilities: 
 
First: To verify the fair distribution of grants, aid, and international loans pursuant to the 
entitlement of the regions and governorates that are not organized in a region. 
 
Second: To verify the ideal use and division of the federal financial resources. 
 
Third: To guarantee transparency and justice in appropriating funds to the governments of 
the regions and governorates that are not organized in a region in accordance with the 
established percentages. 
 
Article 107:  
A council named the Federal Public Service Council shall be established and shall 
regulate the affairs of the federal public service, including appointments and promotions, 
and its formation and competencies shall be regulated by law. 
 
Article 108:  
Other independent commissions may be established by law, according to need and 
necessity. 
 
Section Four 
 
Powers of the Federal Government 
 
Article 109:  
The federal authorities shall preserve the unity, integrity, independence, and sovereignty of 
Iraq and its federal democratic system.  
 
Article 110:  
The federal government shall have exclusive authorities in the following matters: 
First: Formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation; negotiating, signing, and 
ratifying international treaties and agreements; negotiating, signing, and ratifying debt 
policies and formulating foreign sovereign economic and trade policy. 
 
Second: Formulating and executing national security policy, including establishing and 
managing armed forces to secure the protection and guarantee the security of Iraq’s 
borders and to defend Iraq. 
 
Third: Formulating fiscal and customs policy; issuing currency; regulating commercial 
policy across regional and governorate boundaries in Iraq; drawing up the national budget 
of the State; formulating monetary policy; and establishing and administering a central 
bank. 
 
Fourth: Regulating standards, weights, and measures. 
Fifth: Regulating issues of citizenship, naturalization, residency, and the right to apply for 
political asylum. 
Sixth: Regulating the policies of broadcast frequencies and mail. 
Seventh: Drawing up the general and investment budget bill. 
 
Eighth: Planning policies relating to water sources from outside Iraq and guaranteeing the 
rate of water flow to Iraq and its just distribution inside Iraq in accordance with international 
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laws and conventions. 
 
Ninth: General population statistics and census. 
 
Article 111:  
Oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates. 
 
Article 112:  
First: The federal government, with the producing governorates and regional governments, 
shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present fields, provided that 
it distributes its revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all 
parts of the country, specifying an allotment for a specified period for the damaged regions 
which were unjustly deprived of them by the former regime, and the regions that were 
damaged afterwards in a way that ensures balanced development in different areas of the 
country, and this shall be regulated by a law. 
 
Second: The federal government, with the producing regional and governorate 
governments, shall together formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop the oil 
and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people using the 
most advanced techniques of the market principles and encouraging investment. 
 
Article 113:  
Antiquities, archeological sites, cultural buildings, manuscripts, and coins shall be 
considered national treasures under the jurisdiction of the federal authorities, and shall be 
managed in cooperation with the regions and governorates, and this shall be regulated by 
law. 
 
Article 114:  
The following competencies shall be shared between the federal authorities and regional 
authorities: 
First: To manage customs, in coordination with the governments of the regions and 
governorates that are not organized in a region, and this shall be regulated by a law.  
 
Second: To regulate the main sources of electric energy and its distribution. 
 
Third: To formulate environmental policy to ensure the protection of the environment from 
pollution and to preserve its cleanliness, in cooperation with the regions and governorates 
that are not organized in a region. 
 
Fourth: To formulate development and general planning policies. 
 
Fifth: To formulate public health policy, in cooperation with the regions and governorates 
that are not organized in a region. 
 
Sixth: To formulate the public educational and instructional policy, in consultation with the 
regions and governorates that are not organized in a region. 
 
Seventh: To formulate and regulate the internal water resources policy in a way that 
guarantees their just distribution, and this shall be regulated by a law.  
 
Article 115:  
All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal government belong to the 
authorities of the regions and governorates that are not organized in a region. With regard 
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to other powers shared between the federal government and the regional government, 
priority shall be given to the law of the regions and governorates not organized in a region 
in case of dispute. 
 
Section Five 
 
Powers of the Regions 
 
Chapter One 
[Regions] 
 
Article 116:  
The federal system in the Republic of Iraq is made up of a decentralized capital, regions, 
and governorates, as well as local administrations. 
 
Article 117:  
First: This Constitution, upon coming into force, shall recognize the region of Kurdistan, 
along with its existing authorities, as a federal region. 
 
Second: This Constitution shall affirm new regions established in accordance with its 
provisions. 
 
Article 118:  
The Council of Representatives shall enact, in a period not to exceed six months from the 
date of its first session, a law that defines the executive procedures to form regions, by a 
simple majority of the members present. 
 
Article 119:  
One or more governorates shall have the right to organize into a region based on a 
request to be voted on in a referendum submitted in one of the following two methods: 
First: A request by one-third of the council members of each governorate intending to form 
a region. 
 
Second: A request by one-tenth of the voters in each of the governorates intending to form 
a region. 
 
Article 120:  
Each region shall adopt a constitution of its own that defines the structure of powers of the 
region, its authorities, and the mechanisms for exercising such authorities, provided that it 
does not contradict this Constitution. 
 
Article 121:  
First: The regional powers shall have the right to exercise executive, legislative, and 
judicial powers in accordance with this Constitution, except for those authorities stipulated 
in the exclusive authorities of the federal government. 
 
Second: In case of a contradiction between regional and national legislation in respect to a 
matter outside the exclusive authorities of the federal government, the regional power shall 
have the right to amend the application of the national legislation within that region. 
 
Third: Regions and governorates shall be allocated an equitable share of the national 
revenues sufficient to discharge their responsibilities and duties, but having regard to their 
resources, needs, and the percentage of their population. 
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Fourth: Offices for the regions and governorates shall be established in embassies and 
diplomatic missions, in order to follow cultural, social, and developmental affairs. 
 
Fifth: The regional government shall be responsible for all the administrative requirements 
of the region, particularly the establishment and organisation of the internal security forces 
for the region such as police, security forces, and guards of the region. 
 
Chapter Two 
[Governorates that are not incorporated in a region]  
 
Article 122: 
First: The governorates shall be made up of a number of districts, sub-districts, and 
villages. 
 
Second: Governorates that are not incorporated in a region shall be granted broad 
administrative and financial authorities to enable them to manage their affairs in 
accordance with the principle of decentralized administration, and this shall be regulated 
by law.  
 
Third: The governor, who is elected by the Governorate Council, is deemed the highest 
executive official in the governorate to practice his powers authorized by the Council. 
 
Fourth: A law shall regulate the election of the Governorate Council, the governor, and 
their powers. 
 
Fifth: The Governorate Council shall not be subject to the control or supervision of any 
ministry or any institution not linked to a ministry. The Governorate Council shall have 
independent finances.  
 
Article 123:  
Powers exercised by the federal government can be delegated to the governorates or vice 
versa, with the consent of both governments, and this shall be regulated by law. 
 
Chapter Three 
[The Capital]  
 
Article 124:  
First: Baghdad in its municipal borders is the capital of the Republic of Iraq and shall 
constitute, in its administrative borders, the governorate of Baghdad. 
 
Second: This shall be regulated by a law. 
 
Third: The capital may not merge with a region. 
 
Chapter Four 
[The Local Administrations] 
 
Article 125:  
This Constitution shall guarantee the administrative, political, cultural, and educational 
rights of the various nationalities, such as Turkomen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and all other 
constituents, and this shall be regulated by law.  
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Section Six 
 
Final and Transitional Provisions 
 
Chapter One 
[Final Provisions]  
 
Article 126: 
First: The President of the Republic and the Council of the Ministers collectively, or one-
fifth of the Council of Representatives members, may propose to amend the Constitution. 
 
Second: The fundamental principles mentioned in Section One and the rights and liberties 
mentioned in Section Two of the Constitution may not be amended except after two 
successive electoral terms, with the approval of two-thirds of the members of the Council 
of Representatives, the approval of the people in a general referendum, and the ratification 
by the President of the Republic within seven days. 
 
Third: Other articles not stipulated in clause “Second” of this Article may not be amended, 
except with the approval of two-thirds of the members of the Council of Representatives, 
the approval of the people in a general referendum, and the ratification by the President of 
the Republic within seven days.  
 
Fourth: Articles of the Constitution may not be amended if such amendment takes away 
from the powers of the regions that are not within the exclusive powers of the federal 
authorities, except by the approval of the legislative authority of the concerned region and 
the approval of the majority of its citizens in a general referendum. 
 
Fifth:  
A - An amendment is considered ratified by the President of the Republic after the 
expiration of the period stipulated in clauses “Second” and “Third” of this Article, in case he 
does not ratify it. 
 
B - An amendment shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official 
Gazette.  
 
 
Article 127:  
The President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, members of the Council of Ministers, 
the Speaker of the Council of Representatives, his two Deputies, members of the Council 
of Representatives, members of the Judicial Authority, and people of special grades may 
not use their influence to buy or rent any state properties, to rent or sell any of their assets 
to the state, to sue the state for these assets, or to conclude a contract with the state 
under the pretense of being building contractors, suppliers, or concessionaires. 
 
Article 128:  
The laws and judicial judgments shall be issued in the name of the people. 
 
Article 129:  
Laws shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall take effect on the date of their 
publication, unless stipulated otherwise.  
 
Article 130:  
Existing laws shall remain in force, unless annulled or amended in accordance with the 
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provisions of this Constitution. 
 
Article 131:  
Every referendum mentioned in this Constitution is deemed successful with the approval of 
the majority of the voters unless otherwise stipulated. 
 
Chapter Two 
[Transitional Provisions] 
 
Article 132:  
First: The State shall guarantee care for the families of the martyrs, political prisoners, and 
victims of the oppressive practices of the defunct dictatorial regime.  
 
Second: The State shall guarantee compensation to the families of the martyrs and the 
injured as a result of terrorist acts.  
 
Third: A law shall regulate matters mentioned in clauses “First” and “Second” of this 
Article. 
 
Article 133:  
The Council of Representatives shall adopt in its first session the bylaws of the 
Transitional National Assembly until it adopts its own bylaws. 
 
Article 134:  
The Iraqi High Tribunal shall continue its duties as an independent judicial body, in 
examining the crimes of the defunct dictatorial regime and its symbols. The Council of 
Representatives shall have the right to dissolve it by law after the completion of its work. 
 
Article 135:  
First: The High Commission for De-Ba’athification shall continue its functions as an 
independent commission, in coordination with the judicial authority and the executive 
institutions within the framework of the laws regulating its functions. The Commission shall 
be attached to the Council of Representatives. 
 
Second: The Council of Representatives shall have the right to dissolve this Commission 
by an absolute majority after the completion of its function.  
 
Third: A nominee to the positions of the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the 
members of the Council of Ministers, the Speaker, the members of the Council of 
Representatives, the President, members of the Federation Council, their counterparts in 
the regions, or members of the judicial commissions and other positions covered by de-
Ba’athification statutes pursuant to the law may not be subject to the provisions of de-
Ba’athification. 
 
Fourth: The conditions stated in clause “Third” of this Article shall remain in force unless 
the Commission stated in item “First” of this Article is dissolved. 
 
Fifth: Mere membership in the dissolved Ba’ath party shall not be considered a sufficient 
basis for referral to court, and a member shall enjoy equality before the law and protection 
unless covered by the provisions of De-Ba’athification and the directives issued according 
to it. 
 
Sixth: The Council of Representatives shall form a parliamentary committee from among 
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its members to monitor and review the executive procedures of the Higher Commission for 
De-Ba’athification and state institutions to guarantee justice, objectivity, and transparency 
and to examine their consistency with the laws. The committee’s decisions shall be subject 
to the approval of the Council of Representatives.  
 
Article 136:  
First: The Property Claims Commission shall continue its functions as an independent 
commission in coordination with the judicial authority and the executive institutions in 
accordance with the law. The Property Claims Commission shall be attached to the 
Council of Representatives. 
 
Second: The Council of Representatives shall have the right to dissolve the Commission 
by a two-thirds majority vote of its members. 
 
Article 137:  
Application of the provisions of the articles related to the Federation Council, wherever it 
may be cited in this Constitution, shall be postponed until the Council of Representatives 
issues a decision by a two-thirds majority vote in its second electoral term that is held after 
this Constitution comes into force.  
 
Article 138:  
First: The expression “the Presidency Council” shall replace the expression “the President 
of the Republic” wherever the latter is mentioned in this Constitution. The provisions 
related to the President of the Republic shall be reactivated one successive term after this 
Constitution comes into force. 
 
Second:  
A. The Council of Representatives shall elect the President of the State and two Vice 
Presidents who shall form a Council called the “Presidency Council,” which shall be 
elected by one list and with a two-thirds majority. 
 
B. The provisions to remove the President of the Republic present in this Constitution shall 
apply to the President and members of the Presidency Council. 
 
C. The Council of Representatives may remove a member of the Presidency Council with 
a three-fourths majority of the number of its members for reasons of incompetence and 
dishonesty. 
 
D. In the event of a vacant seat in the Presidency Council, the Council of Representatives 
shall elect a replacement by a two-thirds majority vote of its members. 
 
Third: Members of the Presidency Council shall be subject to the same conditions as a 
member of the Council of Representatives and must: 
A. Be over forty years of age. 
B. Enjoy good reputation, integrity and uprightness. 
C. Have quit the dissolved (Ba’ath) Party ten years prior to its fall, in case he was a 
member of it. 
D. Have not participated in suppressing the 1991 and Al-Anfal uprisings. He must not have 
committed a crime against the Iraqi people. 
 
Fourth: The Presidency Council shall issue its decisions unanimously and any member 
may delegate to one of the two other members to take his place. 
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Fifth: 
A - Legislation and decisions enacted by the Council of Representatives shall be 
forwarded to the Presidency Council for their unanimous approval and for its issuance 
within ten days from the date of delivery to the Presidency Council, except the stipulations 
of Articles 118 and 119 that pertain to the formation of regions.  
 
B - In the event the Presidency Council does not approve, legislation and decisions shall 
be sent back to the Council of Representatives to reexamine the disputed issues and to 
vote on them by the majority of its members and then shall be sent for the second time to 
the Presidency Council for approval. 
 
C - In the event the Presidency Council does not approve the legislation and decisions for 
the second time within ten days of receipt, the legislation and decisions are sent back to 
the Council of Representatives, which has the right to adopt it by three-fifths majority of its 
members, which may not be challenged, and the legislation or decision shall be 
considered ratified. 
 
Sixth: The Presidency Council shall exercise the powers of the President of the Republic 
stipulated in this Constitution.  
 
Article 139:  
The Prime Minister shall have two deputies in the first electoral term.  
 
Article 140:  
First: The executive authority shall undertake the necessary steps to complete the 
implementation of the requirements of all subparagraphs of Article 58 of the Transitional 
Administrative Law.  
 
Second: The responsibility placed upon the executive branch of the Iraqi Transitional 
Government stipulated in Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law shall extend and 
continue to the executive authority elected in accordance with this Constitution, provided 
that it accomplishes completely (normalization and census and concludes with a 
referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of their citizens), 
by a date not to exceed the 31st of December 2007. 
 
Article 141:  
Legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan since 1992 shall remain in force, and 
decisions issued by the government of the region of Kurdistan, including court decisions 
and contracts, shall be considered valid unless they are amended or annulled pursuant to 
the laws of the region of Kurdistan by the competent entity in the region, provided that they 
do not contradict with the Constitution. 
 
Article 142:  
First: The Council of Representatives shall form at the beginning of its work a committee 
from its members representing the principal components of the Iraqi society with the 
mission of presenting to the Council of Representatives, within a period not to exceed four 
months, a report that contains recommendations of the necessary amendments that could 
be made to the Constitution, and the committee shall be dissolved after a decision is made 
regarding its proposals. 
 
Second: The proposed amendments shall be presented to the Council of Representatives 
all at once for a vote upon them, and shall be deemed approved with the agreement of the 
absolute majority of the members of the Council. 
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Third: The articles amended by the Council of Representatives pursuant to item “Second” 
of this Article shall be presented to the people for voting on them in a referendum within a 
period not exceeding two months from the date of their approval by the Council of 
Representatives. 
 
Fourth: The referendum on the amended Articles shall be successful if approved by the 
majority of the voters, and if not rejected by two-thirds of the voters in three or more 
governorates. 
 
Fifth: Article 126 of the Constitution (concerning amending the Constitution) shall be 
suspended, and shall return into force after the amendments stipulated in this Article have 
been decided upon.  
 
Article 143:  
The Transitional Administrative Law and its Annex shall be annulled on the seating of the 
new government, except for the stipulations of Article 53(A) and Article 58 of the 
Transitional Administrative Law. 
 
Article 144:  
This Constitution shall come into force after the approval of the people thereon in a 
general referendum, its publication in the Official Gazette, and the seating of the 
government that is formed pursuant to this Constitution. 
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H. Draft Constitution of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region 2009 
 
Iraq - Kurdistan Parliament 
June 23, 2009  
Draft Constitution of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region 
Prepared by: The Committee for Revising the Draft Constitution of the Iraqi Kurdistan 
Region 
June 23, 2009 
The Preamble 
We, the People of Iraqi Kurdistan,  
    Acknowledging that successive generations of our people have suffered from 
oppression, persecution, tyranny and campaigns of genocide, that they have been 
deprived and dispossessed of their rights to freedom, equality and justice, which 
were granted by God to all of mankind; carrying out crimes against humanity and 
ethnic cleansing the history has rarely witnessed the unprecedented; presented by 
the removal of about four thousands five hundred villages and change 
demographic features in large parts of Iraq-Kurdistan by forced displacement of its 
population, forcing them to change their nationality, using chemical weapons and 
other internationally forbidden weapons against civilian in Halabcha city, Balisan, 
Karmyan, Bahdinan and other wide areas, and gave thousands of Fayli Kurds  to 
their death in the fields of chemical testing and genocide campaigns after that of 
the remaining abandoned out of Iraq and their Iraq nationality was shot down, 
followed by genocide campaigns including more than eight thousands of Baraznis, 
and the Anfal genocide operation that claimed more than 182 thousand people.  
[TC: The paragraph in Red above has been added to 2009 version]  
 
Cherishing the leaders and symbols of the Kurdish Liberation Movement, its 
Peshmerga fighters, and its devoted martyrs; appreciating the sacrifices they 
offered for our freedom, for the defense of our dignity, the protection of our nation, 
and in order to safeguard our right to determine our destiny in our own complete 
free will ; 
Honoring the mission, the goals and the values for which they sacrificed so 
much; 
Aiming to establish a developed and cultivated Kurdish society which prides itself 
on its ethnic and religious groups, is open to all, unleashes the energies of its 
citizens, and where a spirit of fraternity and tolerance prevails; 
Seeking to build Kurdistan as a nation united for all, founded upon democratic 
values, enlightened by the principles of human rights, where law and justice prevail 
;  
Striving to anchor good governance that emanates from our free will, embodies 
our hopes, and honors our sacrifices; 
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Our choices have become unified, and our desire converges with that of the 
other components of the people of Iraq and its national forces for Iraqi Kurdistan to 
be a federal region within the federal state of Iraq; 
As an embodiment of this desire, and a fulfillment of these aims, we have 
adopted this constitution.  
Section One 
Fundamental Principles 
Article 1: 
The Iraqi Kurdistan Region is a region within the Federal State of Iraq.  It is a democratic 
republic with a parliamentary political system that is based on political pluralism, the 
principle of separation of powers, and the peaceful transfer of power through direct, 
general, and periodic elections that use a secret ballot. 
Article 2:  
First:  The Iraqi Kurdistan Region is a geographical historical entity consisting of Dohuk 
governorate with its existing administrative borders, Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah, Arbil, and 
districts of ‘Aqrah, Shaikhan, Sinjar, Talkaif, Qaraqush, and townshipsh of Zamar, 
Ba’asheeqa, and Aski Kalak from Nineveh province, districts of Khanaqeen and Mandali 
from Diyala province with its administrative boarder before 1968.  
[TC: Item first above reflects the new text in 2009, however, the text in Red below reflects 
2008 version]  
First:  The Iraqi Kurdistan Region is a geographical, historical and political entity that 
includes all of the areas indicated in Article 143 of the Federal Constitution, and the other 
areas that shall be recovered according to Article 140 of the aforementioned Constitution.  
Second: The political borders of the Region shall be determined through the 
implementation of Article 140 of the Federal Constitution. 
Third:  A new region may not be established within the borders of the Iraqi Kurdistan 
Region. 
 
Article 3: 
First:  The people are the source of authority and the basis of its legitimacy; said authority 
shall be exercised by the people through their constitutional institutions.  The Constitution 
and the laws of the Kurdistan Region are sovereign and supersede all laws issued by the 
Iraqi government outside of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Authorities, as 
stipulated in Article 110 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Iraq.   
Second:  In accordance with Article 115 and Paragraph 2 of Article 121 of the Federal 
Constitution, in the event that the federal law deals with matters within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the federal authorities, as listed in Article 110 of the Federal Constitution, or 
with other matters outside this jurisdiction, this shall not detract from the sovereignty and 
supremacy of the Constitution and laws of the Kurdistan Region, nor shall it limit the 
powers of the Region’s authorities. 
Article 4:  
The Parliament of Kurdistan may put into effect in the Region any federal law that is 
outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal authorities, as stipulated in Article 110 of 
the Federal Constitution of the Republic of Iraq. 
Article 5: 
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 The people of the Kurdistan Region are composed of Kurds, Turkmens, Arabs, Chaldo-
Assyrian-Syriacs, Armenians and others who are citizens of Kurdistan. 
Second:  The right to citizenship in the Region shall be regulated by law.  
[TC: The item (Second) in Red above is not included in the new constitution]. 
Article 6: 
This Constitution confirms and respects the Islamic identity of the majority of the people of 
Iraqi Kurdistan.  It considers the principles of Islamic Sharia as one of the main sources of 
legislation.  Likewise, this Constitution upholds and respects all the religious rights of 
Christians, Yazidis, and others, and it guarantees to every individual in the Region 
freedom of belief and the freedom to practice their religious rites and rituals.  It is not 
allowed: 
First: Enact a law inconsistent with the provisions of the fundamentals of Islam. 
Second: Enact a law inconsistent with Democracy principals.   
Third: Enact a law inconsistent with the rights and fundamental freedoms contained in this 
constitution. 
[TC: The items in Red above have been added to 2009 edition] 
 
Article 7: 
The people of Iraqi Kurdistan shall have the right to determine their own destiny, and they 
have chosen, out of their own free will, to be a federal region within Iraq, as long as Iraq 
abides by the federal, democratic, parliamentary and pluralistic system, and remains 
committed to the human rights of individuals and groups, as stipulated in the Federal 
Constitution. 
Article 8: 
First: International treaties and agreements which the Federal Government enters into with 
any foreign state or party, and which affect the status or rights of the Kurdistan Region 
shall be effective in the Region if said treaties and agreements meet with the approval of 
an absolute majority of the Members of the Parliament of Kurdistan. 
Second: Treaties and agreements which the Federal Government enters into with foreign 
states shall not be effective in the Kurdistan Region if they deal with matters outside the 
Federal Government’s exclusive jurisdiction, in accordance with Article 110 of the Federal 
Constitution, unless an absolute majority of the Members of the Parliament of Kurdistan 
approve the implementation of said treaties and agreements in the Region. 
Third: The Kurdistan Region shall have the right to enter into agreements with foreign 
states or with regions within foreign states regarding issues that do not lie within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal authorities, as stipulated in Article 110 of the Federal 
Constitution.  
Fourth: An agreement concluded between the Kurdistan Region and the governments of 
foreign states shall be submitted to the Federal Government to secure its approval.  Said 
agreement shall not be effective if the Federal Government refuses to approve it for legal 
reasons.  
Article 9: 
With regard to the Federal Government, the Region shall have a fundamental and 
constitutional right to:  
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First:, An equitable share of federal income, including international grants, aid, and loans, 
pursuant to Articles 106 and 112 of the Federal Constitution.  This share shall be 
determined according to the principle of demographic proportionality and equality, while 
taking into consideration the policy of genocide, scorching and destruction that afflicted 
Iraqi Kurdistan during previous regimes and deprived its people of their entitlements. 
Second:  Equitable participation, in a balanced and proportionate manner, in the 
administration of the different institutions of the federal state, in academic deputations and 
scholarships, in delegations and in regional and international conferences.  Pursuant to 
Article 105 of the Federal Constitution, positions in Federal Government offices that are 
located in the Kurdistan Region shall be entrusted to the citizens of the Region. 
Article 10: 
The city of Erbil (Hewlêr1514) shall be the capital of the Kurdistan Region.  The parliament 
may select another city in Kurdistan as the capital. 
Article 11: 
First: The Iraqi Kurdistan Region shall have its own flag, which shall be flown side-by-side 
with the federal flag.  The Kurdistan Region shall have its own national emblem, national 
anthem, and National Day (Noruz1515).   This shall be regulated by law. 
Second:  The flag shall be composed of a red [stripe], a white [stripe], and a green [stripe].  
A yellow sun with twenty-one rays emanating from it shall be located in the middle.  The 
dimensions of the flag and the meaning of its components shall be determined by law. 
Third:  A law shall be enacted to regulate official holidays, badges and medals.  
Article 12: 
The defensive Peshmerga Forces shall guard the Kurdistan Region in accordance with 
item Five of Article (121) of the constitution.  The organisation and duties of these forces 
shall be regulated by law.  Armed militias may not be formed outside of the scope of the 
law.   
Article 13: 
No fee or tax may be imposed, modified or waived in the Kurdistan Region without the 
approval of the parliament of Kurdistan, who must pass a law to that effect.  
Article 14: 
First:  Kurdish and Arabic shall be the two official languages of the Kurdistan Region.  This 
Constitution guarantees the right of the citizens of the Kurdistan Region to educate their 
children in their mother tongue, including Turkmen, Assyrian, and Armenian, in the 
government’s educational institutions and in accordance with pedagogical guidelines. 
Second:  Along with Kurdish and Arabic, Turkmen and Assyrian shall be official languages 
in administrative districts that are densely populated by speakers of Turkmen and 
Assyrian.  This shall be regulated by law. 
Third: Concerning the official language, Article 4 of the Federal Constitution shall be 
adopted wherever there exists a legal possibility to apply its provisions in the Kurdistan 
Region. 
Article 15: 
The Kurdistan Region shall adopt a competitive legal market economy, which encourages 
and embraces economic development on modern foundations, as well as public and 
private investment.  Monopolies shall not be allowed, except as regulated by law.  
                                                            
1514 Translator’s Note: This is the transliteration of the Kurdish name for Erbil.  
1515 Translator’s Note: Noruz is the day celebrating the Kurdish New Year. 
  
Page | 423  
 
Article 16: 
In light of their responsibility to current and future generations, all Regional Authorities 
must protect the environment, the essential means of subsistence, and the natural and 
human environment in the Kurdistan Region.  The law shall regulate the establishment of 
protected areas, wild areas, natural parks and public gardens, in order to protect nature, 
wildlife, wilderness and natural plants and animals, and to preserve them in their natural 
state.  The law shall not permit the erection of buildings or any motorized activity in these 
zones. 
Article 17: 
First: The general sources and components of natural resources, surface and ground 
water, unextracted minerals, quarries, and mines are a public resource.  A law which 
protects these resources for current and future generations shall regulate the extraction, 
exploitation or management of said resources, and the conditions for their allocation. 
Second:  Lands and public property in the Region are the property of the people of 
Kurdistan.  A law shall regulate their allocation and exploitation.  
Section Two 
Fundamental Rights 
Chapter One 
Civil and Political Rights 
 
Article 18 – Commitment and Application: 
First: The legislative, executive and judicial authorities of the Kurdistan Region shall be 
committed to upholding the fundamental rights listed in this Constitution, considering them 
a basic element of legislation that must be applied and implemented, as these are the 
fundamental rights of the Region’s citizens. 
Second: Whenever application of stipulations and provisions related to the fundamental 
rights listed in this Constitution is possible, such stipulation and provisions shall be 
mandatory for natural and juridical persons, while taking into consideration the nature of 
the right and the nature of the duty imposed by this right. 
Third: Within the Kurdistan Region, the fundamental rights granted in this Constitution to 
natural persons shall also be granted to juridical persons, where applicable. 
Ninth: There is no coercion in matters of religion.  Every person has the right to freedom of 
religion, belief, thought and conscience.  The Government of the Region shall guarantee 
the freedom of Muslims, Christians, Yazidis and others to worship and to practice their 
rites and the rituals of their religions without being exposed [to danger].  The government 
of the Region shall guarantee the sanctity of mosques, churches, and places of worship.  
In order to safeguard their sanctity and the holiness of their message, therefore, it is 
forbidden for parties, groups or persons to use mosques, churches or places of worship as 
a place for party activity or political activity. 
1. It is forbidden for parties, groups or persons to use mosques, churches or 
places of worship as a place for party activity or political activity. 
2. It is forbidden for men of religion to use mosques, churches or places of 
worship as a pulpit to promote their factional or political ideas. 
[TC: Item (1.) and (2.) above deleted from 2009 version, however, item (1.) above was 
merged with item (Ninth) above, while Item (2.) is not included]  
 
Tenth: Every person shall have the right to freedom of expression.  The freedom and 
diversity of the press and other media must be guaranteed.  This right shall not apply to 
libel, infringement of others’ rights, sacrilege, provocation to violence, or the incitement of 
hatred between the groups of the people of Kurdistan.  
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Eleventh: The right to access information technology shall be guaranteed by law. 
Twelfth: The Government of the Region shall guarantee the freedom of communication 
and correspondence by post, telegram, telephone, and electronic means.  Such 
communication and correspondence may not be subject to surveillance, wiretapping, or 
disclosure unless for legal or security requirements, and when authorized by a judicial 
decision. 
Thirteenth: The Government of the Kurdistan Region shall be responsible for youth 
welfare, for developing the faculties and abilities of the young generation, and encouraging 
their initiative.  The Government shall establish the institutions required to train young 
people and to empower them to keep up with worldwide scientific and technological 
developments, so that they can play an effective role in society and invest their talents in 
economic, social and scientific development.  The Government shall lay out programs and 
plans to achieve this purpose.  
Fourteenth: Every citizen shall have the right to practice sports.  The Government of the 
Kurdistan Region shall encourage sporting activities, establish dedicated sporting 
institutions, and provide the necessary requirements for them. 
Fifteenth: Artistic and literary expression and scientific research shall be free from any 
restrictions.  Academic freedom to perform scientific research must be guaranteed and 
encouraged.  Universities and scientific centers must be supported and sponsored; their 
sanctity upheld, and the elements of their moral character guaranteed.  Their 
administrative apparatus must be developed on a decentralized basis. 
Sixteenth: The Government of the Region shall be responsible for protecting intellectual 
property, copyright, publication rights, patents, and registered trademarks. 
Eighteenth:  
1. The freedom to found [political] parties shall be guaranteed and regulated by law, 
provided that the internal order, organisations, and activities of the party, as well as 
the rights of its members, abide by the fundamental principles of democracy and 
human rights, and by the provisions of this Constitution.  The party must also 
respect the flag of Kurdistan and its national anthem.  
2. The party may not be the branch of a foreign party, or beholden to foreign interests 
or entities. 
3. A party shall be considered in violation of the Constitution if it seeks through its 
goals, its activities, or the behavior of its followers to violate the fundamental 
democratic system of the Kurdistan Region or to remove this system; or if it seeks 
in the aforementioned manner to threaten the unity of the Region, or the peaceful 
coexistence of its ethnic and religious groups.  The Constitutional Court shall be 
the agency charged with deciding [whether or not the party is considered in 
violation of the Constitution] , and it shall take this decision in light of the imputed 
Constitutional violation, and the extent of its danger.  
4. Any entity or approach that adopts, instigates, facilitates, glorifies, promotes, or 
justifies ethnic or sectarian cleansing or a chauvinist, fascist, racist, terrorist, or 
takfiri1516  ideology shall be prohibited.  The authorities of Iraqi Kurdistan shall be 
committed to combating terrorism in all its forms, and shall work to protect the 
territories of the Region from becoming a center or a gateway or a platform for 
terrorist activity. 
5. A party must disclose to the relevant authorities specified in the law its revenues 
and sources of funding, and how it disposes of them.  
                                                            
1516 Translator’s Note: Takfiri means ‘declaring others infidels’ (kufar).  It is a process often used by extremist 
Sunni groups against other Muslims and non‐Muslims alike, thereby justifying the use of violence against 
them. The translator has chosen to keep the Arabic term, as no single English expression accurately renders 
the meaning of the Arabic.  
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3. Parties shall be forbidden from using religion, quotations from holy books, 
or religious rites and rituals to discredit others for the purpose of achieving 
partisan or electoral goals. 
[TC: Item (3.) in Red above was included in 2008 version; however, this item is eliminated 
from the 2009 constitution]. 
Nineteenth: Collective expulsions shall be forbidden.  
Twentieth: Within the limits of the law, every person shall have the right to own, inherit, or 
bequeath his possessions and his property that he has obtained by legal means. 
Private property shall be protected.  It may not be seized or confiscated except in the 
public interest, and in accordance with a law which provides for fair and immediate 
compensation being paid at the latest on the date the property is seized, unless the owner 
agrees [otherwise] by written approval.1517 
Nineteenth: The right of political asylum shall be guaranteed.  A refugee shall not be 
expelled or returned to a state where he was persecuted.  The Geneva Convention 
[Relating to the Status of Refugees] , adopted on 28 July 1951, and the Protocol [Relating 
to the Status of Refugees] of 31 January 1967 shall be taken into consideration and 
respected.  
[TC: The item in Red above was eliminated from 2009 constitution. There were (21) items 
in 2008 version, while only (20) items are included in Article 18 above of 2009 version] 
Article 20: 
First: All are equal before the law.  
Second: All forms of discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, language, social 
background, nationality, origin, religion, belief, thought, age, social, political or economic 
status, or handicap are prohibited.  The principle of equality shall not prevent redressing 
the effects and consequences of past injustice perpetrated by former regimes against the 
citizens of Kurdistan and its ethnic, religious and linguistic groups.  
Third: Men and women shall be equal before the law.  The Government of the Region 
must seek to remove all obstacles hindering equality in all spheres of life, and in civil, 
political, social, cultural and economic rights.  The Government of the Region guarantees 
that all shall enjoy their rights, as stipulated in this Constitution and the international 
charters signed by the State of Iraq. 
Article 21 –Citizenship Rights: 
First: Any citizen who has reached 18 years of age shall have the right to vote in any 
election or referendum organized in the area of his residence within the Region of 
Kurdistan.  
Second: Any citizen who has reached 18 years of age shall have the right to hold public 
office. 
Third: Freedom of residence, movement and travel shall be guaranteed, within the limits of 
the law. 
Fourth: Every citizen shall have the right to submit a complaint or petition with the 
authorities of the Region, who may not refuse to accept it.  Whoever has submitted a 
complaint or petition has to right to receive a prompt response.  A refusal to deliver said 
response, or a delay in arriving at the response with no legal justification shall entail legal 
responsibility. 
Article 22 – The Right to a Fair Trial 
                                                            
1517 Translator’s Note: The Arabic text is unclear as to what the “owner’s written approval” refers to.  The 
translator’s best guess is reflected in his rendering of the Arabic text. 
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First: The investigating authority shall submit preliminary investigative documents to a 
competent judge within a period not exceeding twenty-four hours from the time at which 
the accused was apprehended.  This period may only be extended once, for another 
period of twenty-four hours. 
Second: [Arbitrary] detention of individuals shall be prohibited.  No one shall be arrested or 
imprisoned except in accordance with the law, and based on an order issued to that effect 
by a competent judicial authority.  Any arrested individual must be informed, immediately 
and in his own language, of the charge brought against him.  The apprehended individual 
has the right of recourse to an attorney.  During the investigation and the trial, the court 
shall appoint an attorney, who shall serve at the Government’s expense, to defend the 
accused charged with committing a felony or a misdemeanor and who does not have an 
attorney to defend him.   
Third: The accused shall be innocent until proven guilty in a fair and legal trial.  After being 
released, the accused shall not be tried again on the same charge, unless new evidence 
appears. 
Fourth: Every one shall have the right to a fair and speedy trial before a competent court. 
Fifth:  No act shall be considered a crime and no punishment shall be imposed except as 
stipulated by law.  No one may be convicted on account of an act or an omission which did 
not constitute a criminal offence at the time it was committed. 
Sixth:   
1. No law shall have a retroactive effect, unless the text of the law stipulates 
otherwise.  This shall not apply to taxes and fees. 
2. Penal law shall not have a retroactive effect, unless this is more favorable for 
the accused. 
Seventh: Punishment shall be individual. 
Eighth: No heavier punishment shall be imposed than the one that was applicable at the 
time the criminal offence was committed. 
Ninth: No one shall be tried or punished twice by criminal or penal procedures for an 
offense of which they were already acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law.  
Tenth: Civilians may not be tried before a military court. 
Eleventh: No one may be detained or imprisoned except in locations designated for this 
purpose and in conformity with the law.  Such locations must include health and social 
services, and be subject to the authority of the Government. 
Twelfth: The religious beliefs and moral principles of prisoners must be respected.  
Chapter Two  
Social and Economic Rights 
Article 23:  
First: The Government of the Kurdistan Region shall be responsible for the welfare of the 
families of the martyrs of the Kurdish People’s Liberation Movement and the welfare of the 
families of the Peshmerga martyrs.  The Government shall also be responsible for the 
welfare of the families of victims of Al-Anfal campaign, and victims of the chemical attacks 
and those affected by permanent disabilities as a result thereof.  Qualified individuals from 
these groups, and their children, shall be given priority in accessing work opportunities, in 
accordance with the law.  
Second: The authorities of the Kurdistan Region shall seek for the Federal Government of 
Iraq to assume its constitutional, legal and moral responsibilities toward the victims 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph, including political prisoners, who have suffered 
from the policies of repression practiced by successive central governments, by 
compensating said victims, and guaranteeing their right to secure healthcare and a 
dignified means of livelihood.  
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Article 24: 
First: Everyone shall have the right to a standard of living adequate for a dignified life, 
including food, clothing and housing. 
Second: Everyone shall have the right to obtain healthcare and medical treatment, 
regardless of their ability to assume the expenses thereof. 
Third: Everyone shall have the right to social security, especially in cases of motherhood, 
sickness, unemployment, injury, disability, old age, displacement, and loss of one’s means 
of livelihood in circumstances beyond one’s control 
Fourth: Everyone shall have the right to work in a profession or an occupation to which he 
or she freely consents.  
Fifth: Every worker shall have the right to equal pay for equal work.  The relations between 
workers and employers shall be regulated by law and founded on economic bases, while 
taking into account the rules of social justice.  
Article 25:  
The authorities of the Region must ensure the welfare of the handicapped and persons 
with special needs, and train them in order to integrate them into society.  This shall be 
regulated by law.  
 
Article 26:  
The Government of the Region shall guarantee the right to form and to freely join 
professional associations, unions, organisations and federations.  This shall be regulated 
by law. 
Article 27 – Education and Family:  
First: The Government of the Region shall guarantee free education at the primary, 
secondary and university levels.  The Government shall also guarantee vocational training 
and technical education.  Education shall be compulsory until the completion of the 
primary level.  
Second: The Government of the Region shall be in charge of the campaign against 
illiteracy. 
Third:  The family is the fundamental core of society.  Therefore, mothers and children 
must be protected, and the economic exploitation of children must be prohibited.  
Fourth:  The government of the Region shall guarantee the establishment of special 
homes to protect and care for women who have, for social reasons, lost their family 
security. 
Fifth: All forms of discrimination, violence and abuse in society, school, and in the family 
shall be forbidden. 
Article 28 – Consumers’ Rights  
The Government of the Kurdistan Region must protect consumers’ rights.  It must create 
legal means to empower consumers to defend their rights and establish consumer 
associations and federations 
Chapter Three 
Ethnic and Religious Rights of the Different Groups of the Kurdistan Region 
Article 29: 
People belonging to one of the ethnic or religious groups shall have the right to legal 
recognition of their names, and the right to use the traditional, local names of places in 
their language, while abiding by the provisions of the language law in the Kurdistan 
Region. 
Article 30: 
  
Page | 428  
 
First: The provisions of the personal status law for the followers of one religion may not be 
imposed on the followers of another religion. 
Second: The followers of non-Muslim religions and sects, such as Christians, Yazidis and 
others may establish their own religious councils and may follow the provisions specific to 
the personal status law of their [faiths].  Such personal status provisions shall be 
determined by law, and personal status cases shall be heard before a personal status 
court. The provisions of personal status laws specific to non-Muslim religions and sects 
shall remain in effect in the Kurdistan Region as long as they are not amended or annulled 
by law. 
[TC: Article 30 was consists of three items in 2008 version. However, items (Second) & 
(Third) in the 2008 version were merged and reflected in item (Second) above of 2009 
version] 
 
Article 31 – The Authorities’ Commitment to Guaranteeing Equality 
The authorities in the Kurdistan Region must guarantee the principle of effective equality 
among people belonging to ethnic and religious groups and must seek to achieve this 
equality.  The authorities must create the conditions which will ensure that the identity of 
these ethnic and religious groups is preserved, and must take the necessary measures to 
reinforce this identity.  
Article 32 – The Authorities’ Commitment to Avoiding Forced Expulsions  
First: The authorities in the Region must protect people belonging to ethnic and religious 
groups from any measure aiming at forced expulsion.  Likewise, the authorities must 
support and encourage these people to establish their own specific leagues and 
associations, and ensure the continuity of such leagues and associations. 
Second: The Government of the Kurdistan Region shall be committed to preventing any 
intentional change in population percentages in the areas inhabited by ethnic or religious 
groups.  This shall not affect the process of equitable restitution for the policies of 
Arabization and forced displacement practiced by the Baathist regime in Iraqi Kurdistan, 
particularly in the city of Kirkuk. 
Article 33 
The authorities in the Kurdistan Region shall strengthen the principle of mutual respect 
between all of the Region’s inhabitants, particularly in the fields of education, media and 
general culture.  The authorities shall create the necessary conditions for persons 
belonging to ethnic or religious groups to participate effectively in all fields of life.   
Article 34 
Every religious group in the Region shall have the right to establish a council to develop, 
organize, and advance its cultural and social affairs, and its heritage.  This shall be 
regulated by law. 
Article 35 
This Constitution guarantees autonomy to the Turkmen, Arabs and Chaldo-Assyrian-
Syriacs wherever they represent a majority of the population.  This shall be regulated by 
law. 
Article 36 
The provisions contained in this Chapter shall be considered additional rights to the rights 
of ethnic and religious groups mentioned in this Constitution.  
Chapter Four 
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Article 37 – International Agreements, Charters and Laws 
Everyone shall have the right to enjoy the rights mentioned in the international 
agreements, charters, covenants and declarations on human rights that have been ratified 
and acceded to by Iraq.  In addition, everyone shall have the right to enjoy the rights 
guaranteed by this Constitution and by international law. 
Article 38 – Scope of Restrictions on Rights  
First: No restriction may be placed on the exercise of civil, political, social, economic and 
cultural rights, or on the rights of ethnic and religious groups recognized in this 
Constitution, unless such a restriction is imposed by law.  Such a restriction may only 
infringe upon the essence of these rights to the extent that is necessary and acceptable in 
a democratic and peaceful society built upon diversity, dignity, equality and freedom.  Any 
restriction that is imposed and that conflict with [this principle] shall be null and void. 
Second: Anyone who is directly concerned [by a restriction imposed on his rights] may 
appeal to the Region’s Constitutional Court against the measure or the law restricting 
these rights. 
Section Three 
The Authorities of the Kurdistan Region 
Chapter One 
The Parliament of Kurdistan 
 
Article 39: 
The Authorities of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region shall be comprised of: 
First: the Legislative Authority (the Parliament of Kurdistan). 
Second: the Executive Authority. 
Third: the Judicial Authority. 
 
Article 40: 
The Parliament of Kurdistan shall be the legislative authority, and it shall be the authority 
for settling decisive issues affecting the people of the Kurdistan Region.  Members of the 
Parliament shall be elected directly by secret ballot in a free and general election. 
 
Article 41: 
First: The law shall determine the manner used to elect the members of the Parliament of 
Iraqi Kurdistan, the timing of the election, how the election is conducted, and the 
proportion of representation. 
Second: Fair representation of all geographic localities, ethnic and religious groups shall 
be taken into consideration when organizing a system for electing members, as well as 
guaranteeing that no less than 30% of the seats in the parliament of Iraqi Kurdistan be 
reserved for women representatives. 
Third: A Member of Parliament shall represent all the groups that make up the people of 
Iraqi Kurdistan, regardless of his or her political, ethnic and religious affiliation, or his or her 
electoral district. 
 
Article 42: 
First: The Parliament shall be elected for a term of four years, starting from the day of its 
first assembly. 
Second: The Parliament shall convene at the invitation of the President of the Kurdistan 
Region, within fifteen days of the announcement of the final election results.  If an 
invitation to convene is not issued, then the Parliament shall convene automatically at 12 
p.m. on the day following this fifteen day period. 
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Article 43: 
The Parliament shall hold its first session under the chairmanship of its oldest Member, 
and shall elect by secret ballot a Speaker, a Deputy Speaker, and a Secretary General 
chosen from its Members. 
 
Article 44: 
Before assuming their duties, Members of Parliament shall take the following 
Constitutional oath: 
“I swear by God Almighty to protect the interests of the people of the Kurdistan Region, to 
safeguard the Region’s unity and dignity, to protect the rights and freedoms of its citizens, 
and to protect public funds.  I swear by God Almighty to abide by the provisions of the 
Constitution, and to perform the duties of a member [of this Parliament] faithfully and 
loyally.” 
 
Article 45: 
Upon taking the Constitutional oath, a Member of Parliament shall be considered to have 
resigned from his [previous] position.  He shall have the right to return to that position, or to 
a similar one, at the end of his term in Parliament.  The length of the term served as a 
Member of Parliament shall be taken into account for purposes of promotion, 
advancement, seniority and retirement. 
 
Article 46:  
A Member of the Parliament of Kurdistan may not serve simultaneously as a member in 
the Federal Parliament, in local and municipal councils, or in the civil service.  A Member 
of Parliament shall be dedicated exclusively to parliamentary work; and shall be forbidden 
from practicing any other profession while serving in Parliament. 
 
Article 47: 
First: Parliament shall hold two sessions a year, each lasting four months.  Parliamentary 
procedure shall define how these sessions are held. 
Second: The parliamentary session in which the general budget is proposed shall not be 
concluded until the budget is approved.  Based on the request of the President of the 
Kurdistan Region, or the Speaker of the Parliament of Kurdistan, or the President of the 
Council of Ministers, or twenty-five Members of Parliament, a parliamentary session may 
also be extended for a period not exceeding thirty days to complete other tasks whose 
importance requires such an extension.  
 
Article 48: 
An absolute majority of the Members of Parliament shall constitute a quorum.  Resolutions 
shall be issued by a majority vote of those in attendance, unless parliamentary law or 
procedure specify otherwise.  If equal votes are cast, the Speaker of the Parliament shall 
cast the deciding vote.   
 
Article 49: 
Ten Members of Parliament, or a competent parliamentary committee, may introduce bills 
or draft resolutions to Parliament. 
 
Article 50: 
First: A Member of Parliament may question the Prime Minister, his Deputy, and the 
Ministers regarding matters that concern the Council of Ministers or one of the Ministries.  
Parliamentary law and procedure shall organize the questioning of these officials. 
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Second: Ten Members of Parliament may request to interpellate the Prime Minister or the 
Members of the Council of Ministers.  The interpellation shall not take place until eight 
days after the date on which the request for the interpellation arrived at the Prime 
Minister’s office. If the interpellation results in a request for a motion of no-confidence in 
the Prime Minister, or one of the Ministers, the motion shall be passed by the agreement of 
two-thirds of the Members of Parliament in the case of the Prime Minister, and by the 
agreement of an absolute majority of the Members of Parliament in the case of a Minister. 
 
Article 51: 
The Speaker of the Parliament, the Deputy Speaker, the Secretary General, and the 
Members of Parliament shall be entitled to rights and privileges which ensure their 
independence and their livelihood.  Such rights and privileges shall be fixed and regulated 
by law. 
 
Article 52: 
Parliamentary law and procedure shall determine and regulate the details of Parliament’s 
work processes, and the manner in which its ordinary and extraordinary sessions are held, 
organized and conducted.  Parliamentary law and procedure shall also address the 
situations in which membership is terminated, and how vacant seats should be filled. 
 
Article 53: 
The Parliament shall exercise the following powers, in addition to any other powers which 
the laws in force in the Region have delegated to it:  
First: Settle decisive issues affecting the people of Kurdistan, by a vote of a majority of 
two-thirds of its members. 
Second: Approve proposed constitutional amendments, according to (Article 120/ Fourth) 
of this Constitution. 
[TC: Article 120 in Red above was 118 in 2009 version]  
Third: 
1. Legislate, amend and repeal laws in all matters in Kurdistan, except for issues that 
lie wholly within the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the Federal Authorities, 
according to Article 110 of the Federal Constitution. 
2. Approve the entry into force of federal laws in the Kurdistan Region, and amend 
their application, in accordance with the law.  However, laws that lie wholly within 
the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the Federal Authorities, according to Article 
110 of the Federal Constitution, shall be exempt from this process, and shall be 
applied in the Region upon their entry into force according to the provisions of the 
Federal Constitution. 
Fourth: Take measures to impeach the President or Vice President of the Kurdistan 
Region, by the agreement of a majority of two-thirds of Parliament’s members, on account 
of perjury of the constitutional oath, serious violation of the Constitution, or high treason. 
Fifth: Pass motions of confidence and no-confidence in the Government and its members, 
by an absolute majority of the Members of Parliament. 
Sixth: Monitor the activities of the executive branch, and hold the Prime Minister, the 
Deputy Prime Minister, and the Ministers accountable, in accordance with parliamentary 
law and procedure. 
Seventh: Approve the general budget for Kurdistan and its final accounts; transfer between 
[appropriation] sections; and approve expenditures not referred to in the budget. 
Eighth: Approve general development plans. 
Ninth:  Levy, amend, annul, or grant exemptions to taxes and duties. 
Tenth:  Settle, by an absolute majority vote of those present, the validity of a Member of 
Parliament’s membership.  This decision shall be subject to appeal before the Region’s 
Constitutional Court within thirty days of the date on which it is issued.  
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Eleventh: Put in place parliamentary procedure, appoint parliamentary staff and 
employees and fix their salaries, and estimate the parliament’s budget.  
Twelfth: Form permanent, temporary, and investigative committees. 
Thirteenth: Confirm, by an absolute majority of its members, the nomination of members to 
the Constitutional Court for the Kurdistan Region. 
Fourteenth: Confirm, by an absolute majority of its members, the nomination of the heads 
of the independent Authorities and Commissions listed in Article 107 of this Constitution.  
Article 54: 
The Parliament may not relinquish its legislative authority, except as stipulated in the 
seventh paragraph of Article 65 of this Constitution. 
Article 55: 
First: Members of Parliament shall enjoy parliamentary immunity, and may speak freely 
within the boundaries outlined in parliamentary procedure. 
Second: The freedom of Members of Parliament may not be restricted, nor may they be 
put under surveillance without the approval of Parliament. 
Third: Except in cases of flagrante delicto, Members of Parliament may not be prosecuted, 
interrogated or searched; their residences and offices may not be searched; nor may they 
be apprehended by any authority while Parliament is in session without prior authorization 
from Parliament. 
Fourth:  Except in cases of flagrante delicto, Members of Parliament may not be 
prosecuted, interrogated or searched; their residences and offices may not be searched; 
nor may they be apprehended by any authority while Parliament is not in session without 
prior authorization from the Speaker of the Parliament. 
 
Article 56: 
First: Parliament may dissolve itself by the approval of a majority of two-thirds of its 
members. 
Second: The President of the Region shall issue a decree to dissolve Parliament in the 
following situations: 
1. Resignation of more than half of the Parliament’s Members. 
2. Failure to achieve quorum for a parliamentary meeting within sixty days of the 
date on which Parliament was invited to convene after being elected.  
3. Parliament’s failure to pass a motion of confidence in three different and 
successive proposed cabinets. 
Third: A decree shall be issued ordering that elections be held for the Parliament of 
Kurdistan and fixing the election date within fifteen days of the date on which Parliament 
was dissolved, or within the two-month period preceding the end of its electoral term. 
[TC: Item Third in Red above has been eliminated from the 2009 version].  
 
Article 57:   
If Parliament is dissolved, or its electoral term comes to an end, a decree should be issued 
to hold the elections and determine the date of the elections within 15 days from the date 
of dissolution or ninety days period preceding the end of its electoral term, provided that to 
be hold no later than ninety days following the dissolution or be within ninety days prior to 
the end of its electoral term date.  
Article 57:   
If Parliament is dissolved, or its electoral term comes to an end, new elections shall be 
held to elect a new Parliament within a period not exceeding 60 days from the date on 
which Parliament was dissolved, or within the sixty day period preceding the end of its 
electoral term. 
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[TC: Article 57 in Red above represents the 2008 version]  
 
Article 58: 
If Parliament is dissolved based on the provisions of Article 56 of this Constitution, or if 
Parliament’s electoral term comes to an end, and new elections are delayed or unfeasible 
due to extraordinary circumstances, Parliament shall remain in session and continue to 
perform its duties and exercise its constitutional authorities until a new parliament is 
elected and its first session held.  In this case, the decree dissolving Parliament shall be 
considered suspended until elections for the new parliament are held.  
 
Chapter Two 
The Executive Authority 
 
Article 59: 
The executive authority shall be composed of The President of Kurdistan Region and the 
Council of Ministers.  The executive authority shall exercise its powers in accordance with 
the Constitution and the law. 
 
First: The President of Iraq Kurdistan 
Article 60: 
First: The President of the Kurdistan Region holds the highest office of the executive 
authority.  He is the Commander-in-Chief of the Regional Guard (the Peshmerga).  He 
shall represent the people of the Region and act on their behalf in all national events. He 
shall be in charge of coordination between Federal and Regional Authorities. 
Second: The President of the Region shall choose a Vice President who shall assist him in 
performing his duties.  The Vice President shall take the place of the President in case of 
the President’s absence. The Vice President shall also be the Deputy Commander-in-
Chief of the Regional Guard (the Peshmerga), provided that to have the consent of 
parliament by absolute majority of its members.  
[TC: The text in Red above has been added to 2009 constitution] 
 
Article 61: 
The President of the Kurdistan Region shall be elected directly by secret ballot in a general 
election by the citizens of the Kurdistan Region.  The law shall determine the manner of 
this election. 
Article 62: 
If the President of the Region, or the Vice President, is impeached by a vote of a majority 
of two-thirds of the members the Members of Parliament on account of perjury of the 
constitutional oath, serious violation of the Constitution, or high treason, and is then found 
guilty by the Region’s Constitutional Court, he shall be removed from his position.  
Article 63: 
Before assuming their duties, the President of the Kurdistan Region and the Vice 
President shall take the following constitutional oath before the Parliament of Kurdistan: 
“I swear by God Almighty to protect the rights, achievements, unity, and interests of the 
people of Iraq Kurdistan.  I swear by God Almighty to perform my duties faithfully and 
loyally, and to adhere to the Constitution of the Kurdistan Region.” 
Article 64: 
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The President of the Kurdistan Region shall be elected for a term of four years, beginning 
on the date on which he takes the constitutional oath.  He may only be reelected once for 
a second term.  
Article 65: 
In addition to any other powers granted to him by the law, the President of the Region shall 
exercise the following powers: 
First: Propose draft laws and resolutions to the Parliament of the Kurdistan Region. 
Second: Promulgate laws and resolutions legislated by the Parliament of Kurdistan within 
fifteen days of receiving them.  During this period, the President shall have the right to 
oppose the law or resolution in entirety or in part, and to send the law or resolution back to 
Parliament for reconsideration.  Parliament’s decision regarding such a law or resolution 
shall then be final.  If the President fails to promulgate such laws and resolutions within the 
aforementioned period and does not oppose them, they shall be considered promulgated 
and shall be published in the Official Gazette. 
Third: Issue a decree for the holding of general elections for the Parliament of Iraqi 
Kurdistan when Parliament is dissolved or at the end of its electoral term.  This shall be 
done in accordance with Article 56 of this Constitution, while respecting the period set forth 
in Article 57 herein.  
Fourth:, Issue a decree inviting the Parliament of Kurdistan to hold the first session of its 
electoral term, within ten days of the date on which final election results are announced.  
Should the President fail to call Parliament [into session], the Parliament shall convene 
automatically on the day following the end of the aforementioned period.  
Fifth: Issue a decree dissolving the Parliament of Kurdistan in the situations that are set 
forth in this Constitution. 
Sixth: Issue a decree dismissing a Minister, based on a proposal brought forward by the 
Prime Minister. 
Eighth:  In cases of war, occupation, insurrection, chaos, natural disasters, epidemics, or 
other unexpected emergencies, the President shall have the power to declare a state of 
emergency, after consulting with the Speaker of the Parliament and the Prime Minister of 
Kurdistan, and obtaining their consent.  The initial period [of the state of emergency] must 
be no longer than one month. Subsequent extensions shall be approved by an absolute 
majority of the Members of Parliament; each extension shall be no longer than three 
months.  Provisions related to a state of emergency shall be regulated by law.  
Ninth: Grant special pardons to convicted persons, by issuing a decree in accordance with 
the law. 
Tenth: Approve death sentences, or commute them to life imprisonment. 
Twelfth: Allow federal armed forces to enter Iraq Kurdistan territory when necessary, after 
obtaining the approval of the Parliament of Iraq Kurdistan and defining the mission of 
these forces, as well as the location and duration of their stay in the Region. 
Thirteenth: Send the Regional Guard (the Peshmerga) or the Domestic Security Forces 
[on a mission] outside of the Region, with the approval of the Parliament of Kurdistan.  
Fourteenth: 
A. Charge the candidate of the majority parliamentary bloc with forming a 
government within forty five days of the date on which so charged. 
B. If the first candidate fails to form a government within forty-five days of being so 
charged, the President of the Kurdistan Region shall charge another candidate 
from the same bloc with forming a government. 
C. If the second candidate fails to form a government, the President of the 
Kurdistan Region may choose whoever he considers fitting, and charge him 
with forming a government.  
D. The person charged with forming a government may be a Member of 
Parliament, or not.  
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Fifteenth: Issue a decree ordering the government to form, after it has obtained a vote of 
confidence from the Parliament. 
Sixteenth: Issue a decree ordering the resignation of the government or of a Minister after 
[Parliament] has passed a motion of a no-confidence in either of them. 
Seventeenth: Issue a decree accepting the resignation of the government or of a Minister, 
and charging them with continuing to act as a caretaker government until a new 
government is formed. 
Eighteenth: Issue a decree appointing the members of the Constitutional Court, after the 
Parliament [of Kurdistan is not mentioned] has confirmed the nominees.  
Nineteenth: Issue a decree appointing judges, the Head of the Judiciary Inspection 
Department, as well as the Head and the members of the Public Prosecution, after these 
individuals have been nominated by the Judiciary Council in Kurdistan.  
Twentieth: Issue a decree appointing the heads of the independent authorities and 
commissions listed in Article 107 of this Constitution, after their nomination has been 
approved by the Parliament of Kurdistan. 
Twenty-First: Issue a resolution establishing special offices for the Kurdistan Region in 
foreign countries, based on a proposal from the Prime Minister, and in coordination with 
the competent agency of the Federal Government.  
Twenty-Second: Appoint individuals to special grades, based on the nomination of the 
competent Minister and the approval of the Council of Ministers. 
Twenty-Third: Confer military ranks on the officers of the Regional Guard (the Peshmerga) 
and the Domestic Security Force; and issue decrees, according to the laws in force, 
discharging them or retiring them. 
Twenty-Fourth: Issue a decree awarding medals and badges, as pursuant to the law. 
 
Article 66: 
The salaries and allowances of the President and Vice President of the Kurdistan Region 
shall be specified by law. 
 
Article 67: 
The President of the Kurdistan Region shall have an office whose organisation, privileges 
and responsibilities shall be specified by law. 
 
Article 68: 
First: If the President of the Kurdistan Region resigns, dies, or becomes afflicted with a 
handicap that prevents him from carrying out his presidential duties, his successor shall be 
elected within sixty days for a period of four years, in accordance with Article 64 of this 
Constitution. 
Second: When the office of President of the Kurdistan Region becomes vacant, the 
Speaker of the Parliament [of Kurdistan is not mentioned], in accordance with the first 
paragraph of this Article, shall assume the duties of the presidential office until a new 
President is elected within sixty days of the day on which the office becomes vacant.  
Third: The Vice President of the Kurdistan Region shall assume the duties of the President 
of the Kurdistan Region when the latter is absent from the Kurdistan Region, is on leave, 
or is temporarily incapable of performing his duties. 
Fourth: If the President’s term comes to an end, but the holding of new presidential 
elections is impossible because of war or natural disasters, the President of the Region 
shall continue to perform his duties until the aforementioned obstacles have been 
removed, and a new President of the Region has been elected.  
 
Second: The Council of Ministers of the Iraq Kurdistan Region 
 
Article 69: 
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The Council of Ministers of the Iraq Kurdistan Region is the executive and administrative 
authority in the Kurdistan Region.   
Article 70: 
First: The Council of Ministers shall be composed of a Prime Minister, a Deputy Prime 
Minister or Deputy Prime Ministers, and [other] Ministers.  The formation of the Council of 
Ministers shall be determined by law. 
Second: A nominee shall be charged with forming a government according to the 
provisions of the fourteenth paragraph of Article 65 of this Constitution. 
[TC: In “Second” above, Article 104 replaced by Article 65]  
Third: The Prime Minister-designate shall select his Deputy or Deputies and the Ministers 
from among the Members of the Parliament of Kurdistan; or he may select other 
individuals who meet the requirements necessary to become Members of the Parliament 
of Kurdistan. 
Fourth: The Prime Minister-designate shall present a list of the members of his 
government to the President of the Kurdistan Region for his approval. 
Fifth: Following the approval of the President of the Kurdistan Region, the Prime Minister-
designate shall present the members of his government to the Parliament of Kurdistan, 
requesting a vote of confidence in the government. 
Sixth: The Prime Minister shall preside over cabinet sessions, except for those sessions 
that are attended by the President of the [Kurdistan is not mentioned] Region. 
 
Article 71: 
Before beginning their official duties and after obtaining Parliament’s vote of confidence, 
the Prime Minister and members of the Council of Ministers shall take the following 
constitutional oath: “I swear by God Almighty to protect loyally the unity of the people and 
the territory of Iraq Kurdistan, to respect the Constitution and the laws that are in effect, to 
protect public funds, and to safeguard fully the interests of the people.” 
Article 72: 
Fair representation of the groups making up the people of Iraq Kurdistan shall be taken 
into account in the formation of the Council of Ministers of the Kurdistan Region. 
Article 73: 
The Prime Minister and the Ministers shall be jointly accountable to the Parliament of 
Kurdistan for matters related to the Council of Ministers.  Each Minister shall be 
individually, primarily, and directly responsible for the activities of his Ministry. 
Article 74: 
The Council of Ministers shall exercise the following powers and authorities: 
First: Implement laws, resolutions, decrees, and regulations; protect the security of Iraq 
Kurdistan and its public funds. 
Second: Outline the general policy of the Kurdistan Region, in coordination with the 
President of the Kurdistan Region; and implement this policy after it is approved by the 
Parliament. 
Third: Prepare the draft general budget for Kurdistan. 
Fourth: Draft bills and resolutions and submit them to the Parliament of Kurdistan. 
Fifth: Issue regulations and executive and administrative resolutions, in accordance with 
the Constitution and law. 
Sixth: Prepare projects for development plans, and implement such projects after they are 
approved by the Parliament. 
Seventh: Form a joint administration with the Federal Government to manage the oil and 
gas extracted from [fields in] Iraq Kurdistan and put into commercial production before 
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August 15, 2005.  Revenues received from these fields must be distributed fairly in 
accordance with the principles specified in Article 112 of the Federal Constitution, and with 
the oil and gas laws of the Kurdistan Region.  For the purposes of enforcing the provision 
of this paragraph, the scale of commercial production shall be defined as the production of 
no less than five thousand (5,000) barrels per day for a period of twelve (12) months.  
Eighth: Work jointly with the Federal Government to formulate the strategic policies 
necessary to develop oil and gas resources.  All matters related to the Region’s resources 
must meet with the approval of the Parliament of Kurdistan. 
Ninth: Manage, in accordance with the laws of the Kurdistan Region, all exploration, 
production, management, development, sales, marketing, and export activities, as well as 
all other operations, required for crude oil and gas fields, [including] oil and gas that has 
not been extracted or that has been extracted but not put into commercial production 
before August 15, 2005.  For the purposes of enforcing the provision of this paragraph, 
commercial production shall be defined as the production of no less than five thousand 
(5000) barrels per day for a period of twelve (12) months. 
Tenth: Exercise executive powers pertaining to all matters in the Kurdistan Region that do 
not lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal authorities, in accordance with Article 
110 of the Federal Constitution. 
Eleventh: Exercise those powers the Federal Authorities and the Kurdistan Authorities 
jointly authorize it to exercise, in accordance with the provisions of the Federal 
Constitution. 
Twelfth: Oversee, direct, follow up, monitor, and coordinate the activities of the ministries, 
institutions and public utilities in Kurdistan. 
Thirteenth: Appoint, promote, dismiss, discharge or retire employees in accordance with 
the law and in a manner that does not conflict with the provisions of this Constitution, or 
the laws that are issued based on these provisions. 
Fourteenth: Propose the establishment of special offices for the Region’s cultural, social 
and developmental affairs in the embassies and diplomatic missions, and manage such 
offices. 
Fifteenth: Organize and administer the Regional Guard (the Peshmerga), in order to 
protect the region, as well as the police, the security agencies, and other internal security 
forces.  
Fifteenth: Organize and administer the Regional Guard (the Peshmerga), in order to 
protect the region, as well as the police, the security agencies, and other internal security 
forces.  
Fourteenth: Nominate representatives of the Region, with the approval of the Parliament of 
Kurdistan, to Independent Federal Authorities and to federal positions at or above the rank 
of general director. 
[TC: Fourteenth in Red above was eliminated from the 2009 constitution and replaced with 
the contents of Item Sixteenth in Red below, yet Article 74 was consists of 16 items in 
2008 constitution, while only 15 items are included in 2009 constitution] 
Sixteenth: Propose the establishment of special offices for the Region’s cultural, social and 
developmental affairs in the embassies and diplomatic missions, and manage such offices. 
Article 75: 
First: In the following situations, the Council of Ministers shall be considered to have 
resigned, and the cabinet shall be charged with acting as a caretaker government until a 
new government is formed: 
1. Acceptance of the Prime Minister’s resignation. 
2. A vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister by the Parliament of Iraq 
Kurdistan. 
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3. Beginning of a new term for the Parliament of Kurdistan.  
4. Beginning of a new term for the President of the Kurdistan Region. 
5. Death of the Prime Minister. 
Second: A Minister shall be considered to have resigned if the Parliament of Iraq Kurdistan 
passes a motion of no confidence in him. 
Article 76: 
First: The law shall regulate the impeachment and trial of the Prime Minister, the Deputy 
Prime Minister, and [other] Ministers. 
Second: The law shall determine the salaries, benefits, and privileges of the Prime 
Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, and the Ministers. 
 
Chapter Three 
The Judicial Authority 
First: General Principles 
 
Article 77: 
The judicial authority in the Region is independent.  It shall be composed of the Judicial 
Council, the Constitutional Court, the Court of Cassation, the Judiciary Inspection 
Department, the Public Prosecution Office, and of the various levels and types of courts, 
and their cadres.  The law shall regulate the manner in which these bodies are formed, the 
conditions and procedures for appointing their members, and for holding these members 
accountable.  
Article 78: 
The judiciary shall be independent and subject to no authority except that of the law. 
 
Article 79: 
The judiciary shall have general jurisdiction over all natural and legal persons in Kurdistan. 
 
Article 80: 
Judicial rulings and decisions shall be issued and implemented in the name of the people. 
 
Article 81: 
All judges shall be appointed for an unlimited term, with compulsory retirement at an age 
specified by law.  Judges may not be removed, except in the cases specified by law.  
Judges must be provided with suitable working conditions, and granted remuneration that 
is consistent with the dignity of their office and the scale of their duties, and that 
guarantees their independence.  While judges in office, their remuneration may not be 
diminished, nor may their working conditions be changed.  
 
Article 82: 
Judges and members of the Public Prosecution shall be prohibited from: 
First: Simultaneously holding a judicial position and a legislative or executive position, or 
any other job. 
Second: Being affiliated with a political party or organisation. 
 
Article 83: 
Court sessions shall be public, unless the court decides in favor of a closed session, for 
the sake of public morals, or sanctity of the family.  In the case of a closed session, the 
ruling must be pronounced in an open session.   
 
Article 84: 
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It shall be forbidden to establish special or extraordinary courts in Kurdistan. 
 
Article 85: 
The law shall regulate which courts have jurisdiction to investigate crimes of a military 
nature committed by members of the Regional Guard (the Peshmerga), or by members of 
the internal security forces, as well as crimes committed by members of these forces 
against each other. 
 
Article 86: 
It shall be prohibited for laws to stipulate that the courts are forbidden from hearing cases 
arising from such laws. 
Article 87: 
It shall be prohibited for laws to stipulate that any executive or administrative resolution or 
procedure is immune from appeal. 
Article 88: 
The law shall guarantee the impartiality of the administration, and that any individual who 
abuses his power shall be punished. 
Article 89: 
Anyone injured as a result of the misconduct or negligence of staff members from the 
Kurdistan Government’s Departments or Authorities, while said staff members are 
performing their jobs, shall be entitled to claim compensation from the aforementioned 
agencies.  
Article 90: 
Judicial decisions must be implemented.  Refusal to implement them, or obstructing their 
implementation, shall be considered a criminal offense punishable by law.  If the accused 
is a civil servant or an individual charged with performing a public service, then in addition 
to receiving a punitive sanction, he shall be dismissed from his position.  The judgment 
beneficiary shall have the right to bring an action directly before the competent court, and if 
he has suffered any harm, the government shall guarantee him full compensation.  This 
compensation shall not detract from the subordinate’s responsibility.  
Second: The Constitutional Court 
Article 91: 
The Constitutional Court of Iraq Kurdistan shall be established by law. 
Article 92: 
First: The Constitutional Court of Kurdistan shall be composed of seven members, 
including the Chief Justice.  Members shall be selected from among judges, law 
professors, and lawyers who have a total of at least twenty years of practice in the judicial 
or legislative field, in teaching or in legal practice. 
Second: The President of the Kurdistan Region, in consultation with the Judicial Council, 
shall nominate the members of the Constitutional Court. 
Third: After the Parliament of Kurdistan has confirmed, by a majority of two-thirds of its 
members, the nominees to the Constitutional Court, the President of the Kurdistan Region 
shall issue a decree appointing these nominees as members of the Court. 
 
Article 93: 
The Court shall elect its Chief Justice from among its members. 
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Article 94: 
Before beginning their duties, the Chief Justice and members of the Constitutional Court 
shall take the legal oath of office before the President of the Kurdistan Region. 
 
Article 95: 
The Constitutional Court shall have jurisdiction over the following matters: 
First: Explain the stipulations of the articles of the Kurdistan Region’s Constitution. 
Second: 
1. Monitor the constitutionality of the laws, based on a request from the President 
of the Kurdistan Region, the Council of Ministers, ten Members of Parliament, 
or any concerned party. 
2. Decide the legality of decrees, regulations, resolutions and instructions, based 
on the request of any concerned party. 
Third: Settle appeals brought before [the Constitutional Court] that arise from an ongoing 
case before a [lower] court and are related to the unconstitutionality of a law or the 
illegality of a resolution, regulation, or instruction.  The aforementioned [lower] court must 
adjourn the case until the result of the appeal is decided.  
Fourth: Certify the results of referendums and of general elections for the President of the 
Region, the Parliament of Iraq Kurdistan, and local and municipal councils.  
Fifth: Decide on the constitutionality of proposed amendments to the Constitution of the 
Kurdistan Region, and decide whether said amendments conform to the requirements 
listed in Article 120 of this Constitution.  
[TC: In Fifth above (Article 120) was (Article 118) in 2008 version] 
Sixth: Try the President or Vice President of the Kurdistan Region after they have been 
impeached by the Parliament in accordance with Article 62 of this Constitution.  The 
conviction of the President or the Vice President requires the agreement of at least five of 
the Court’s members.   
No punishment may be inflicted on them except removing them from their positions.  
[TC: The text in Red above was eliminated from 2009 version] 
Seventh: Settle cases brought before the Court in accordance with Article 19, Paragraph 
18 / 3 of this Constitution. 
[TC: In Seventh above (3) was (4) in the 2008 version] 
Eighth: Settle appeals related to the validity of membership, and lift the immunity of 
parliamentary members.  
Article 96: 
The law shall determine the conditions for membership in the Court, the Court’s work 
processes, and how the Court accepts cases, motions and appeals.  
Article 97: 
The rulings of the Constitutional Court shall be final and binding for all.  If the Court, in 
deciding the constitutionality of laws, or the legality of decrees, regulations, resolutions and 
instructions, resolves that any law, decree, regulation, resolution or instruction violates the 
Constitution or the law, the Court should notify the concerned authority in Kurdistan, so 
that this authority may take the necessary measures to remove or correct the constitutional 
violations. 
Third: The Judicial Council 
Article 98: 
First: The Judiciary Council shall be composed of the President of the Court of Cassation 
and his deputies, the Head of the Judiciary Inspection Department, the Head of the Public 
Prosecution; and the presiding judges of the appellate district courts in Kurdistan. 
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Second: The Judiciary Council shall manage the affairs of the judiciary, guarantee its 
independence, and oversee judicial agencies, in accordance with the law. 
Article 99: 
First: The judicial authority shall have its own special budget that shall be appended to the 
budget of the Region.  This budget shall be financed through judicial fees and fines 
collected in accordance with the law, and by the funds which the Government of Kurdistan 
provides for this purpose. 
Second: The Judicial Council shall be responsible for preparing an annual draft budget for 
the judicial authority, and shall consult the Constitutional Court regarding the allocations 
set aside for it.  The Judicial Council shall present the draft budget to the Parliament of 
Iraq Kurdistan for its approval.  The final figure for this budget must be incorporated into 
the annual budget of the Kurdistan Region. 
Section Four 
First: The Public Prosecution 
Article 100: 
The Public Prosecution shall represent society in defending justice, protecting legality, 
public order, the security of the region and of its public funds, and in protecting families 
and individuals and their freedoms.  This shall be regulated by law.  
Second: The Shura [Advisory] Council 
Article 101: 
A Shura Council of the Iraq Kurdistan Region shall be established. The missions and 
authorities of the Shura Concil shall be regulated by a law.  
[TC: Contents of Article 101 in Red below was eliminated and replaced by the text shown 
in Article 101 above] 
Second: The Shura [Advisory] Council 
Article 101: 
First: A Shura Council of the Kurdistan Region shall be established by law.  It shall have 
jurisdiction in the following matters: 
1. Settle appeals regarding punitive and disciplinary measures, and employment issues 
related to employees of government departments. 
2. Settle issues involving a conflict of jurisdiction between Ministries and government 
institutions and departments, at the request of the Prime Minister’s office.  
3. Study, prepare or draft bills for Kurdistan, at the request of the President of the 
Kurdistan Region, the Council of Ministers, the competent Ministries, or non-ministerial 
agencies. 
4. Express its opinion and offer advice on legal matters brought before it by Ministries and 
non-ministerial agencies; settle issues over which these entities differ when the parties in 
the case appeal to the Council.  In such cases, the opinion of the council shall be binding 
on these parties. 
5. Any other jurisdiction entrusted to the Council by law.  
Second: Administrative courts shall be established in the region; their makeup and their 
duties shall be determined by law.  
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Section Five 
Local Administrations and Municipal Councils 
 
Article 102: 
Administrative divisions in the Kurdistan Region shall be as follows: governorates, districts, 
counties and villages.  The establishment of these administrative divisions, the designation 
or change of their capitals, the settling or modification of their boundaries, and the 
separation of one administrative unit to attach it to other such units shall take place in 
accordance with the law. 
Article 103: 
First: In order to achieve democracy, administrative decentralization shall be applied, 
continuously developed and activated in running the administrative units of Kurdistan 
(governorates, districts, counties and villages), because it is one of the indispensable tools 
for the participation of the Region’s citizens in running the administrative unit’s general 
affairs.  Each administrative unit shall have a local council, chosen by secret ballot in direct 
and general elections.  The method in which these councils are elected, as well as their 
powers and duties, shall be clarified by law. 
Second: Each administrative unit shall have an executive council chaired by the chief 
officer of that administrative unit.  The law shall clarify how this council is formed, 
determine its powers and duties, and define its relationship to the local council of the same 
administrative unit and to the central Ministries and institutions of Kurdistan. 
Article 104: 
The capital of each governorate, district, county, or village with a population of at least 
3,000 people shall have a municipality managed by an elected municipal council which 
shall provide public services to its citizens in accordance with the law. 
Article 105: 
First: Local and municipal councils shall enjoy the status of a legal person. 
Second: Each administrative or municipal unit shall have its own independent budget. 
Article 106: 
First:  Equitable representation of the ethnic groups living within an administrative unit or 
municipality shall be taken into account in the composition of local and municipal councils.  
This process shall be regulated by law. 
Second: The electoral law for local and municipal councils must aim to ensure that at least 
(30%) of the councils’ members are women.  
 
Section Six 
Independent Authorities and Commissions 
 
Article 107: 
First: The following entities shall be established by law: 
1. The Independent High Authority for Elections and Referenda in Iraq Kurdistan. 
2. The Financial Auditing and Integrity Board. 
3. The Public Authority for the Safety and Quality of Local and Imported Products. 
Second: The following entities shall be established by law: 
1. The Advisory Council for Economic and Social Affairs. 
2. The task of this Council shall be to provide advice to the office of the President 
of the Region, the Parliament, and the Council of Ministers on economic and 
social affairs. 
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[TC: contents of Article 107 below was changed and replaced by the above contents of 
2009 version] 
 
Article 107: 
First: The following entities shall be established by law: 
1. The Independent High Authority for Elections and Referenda in Kurdistan. 
2. The Civil Service Board. 
3. The Financial Auditing and Integrity Board. 
4. The Commission for the Protection of the People’s Rights (Ombudsman) 
5. The Special Commission for the Rights of the Faylee Kurds. 
6. The Public Authority for the Safety and Quality of Local and Imported Products. 
7. The Independent Authority of Kurdistan for Media and Communications. 
 
Second: The following entities shall be established by law: 
A. The Advisory Council for Economic and Social Affairs. 
B. The task of this Council shall be to provide advice to the office of the President 
of the Region, the Parliament, and the Council of Ministers on economic and 
social affairs. 
 
Article 108: 
First: The authorities and commissions included in the first paragraph of Article 107 of this 
Constitution shall be subject to oversight by the Parliament of Kurdistan.  The law shall 
regulate the relationship of each aforementioned authority or commission to the 
Parliament.  
Second: Other authorities and commissions may be formed by law, in addition to those 
mentioned in the first paragraph of Article 107 of this Constitution.  
 
Article 109: 
A Council called (The Council of the Regions Security) shall be formed. This Council shall 
be linked to the President of the Region. The powers and duties of this Council shall be 
regulated by the law. 
[TC: Article 109 above was added to 2009 version; however, Article 109 in 2008 version is 
included in Section Seven / Financial Provision with a different text] 
 
Section Seven 
Financial Provisions 
 
[TC: Section Seven in 2008 version starts with Article 109, yet starts with Article 110 in 
2009 version, so, Article 109 is now part of Section Six 
 
Article 110: 
Low income individuals shall be exempt from taxes in a manner that ensures a fair 
minimum standard of living.  This process shall be regulated by law.  
Article 111: 
The revenues of the Kurdistan Region shall be composed of the following: 
First: Kurdistan’s share of the federal government’s general budget, originating from 
proceeds from oil and gas resources, customs duties, and other federal revenues, 
including loans, grants, gifts and aid.  
Second: Proceeds from taxes, fees, and charges for public utilities; and from the revenues 
of public institutions and companies. 
Third: Charges collected from the administration and levying of federal taxes and customs 
fees, and other federal revenues in the Region.  
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Fourth: Proceeds from the regional government’s investments and resources.  
Fifth: Grants and gifts. 
Sixth: Domestic and foreign loans specific to the Region. 
Seventh: Financial support provided by the federal government to the Government of the 
Region.  
Article 112: 
The fiscal year shall be specified by law. 
Article 113: 
First: A budget law for the Kurdistan Region, including estimated revenues and 
expenditures, shall be legislated every fiscal year. 
Second: The draft budget for the [next] fiscal year shall be presented to the Parliament of 
Iraq Kurdistan three months prior to the end of the fiscal year. 
Third: In the event that the preparation or presentation of the budget is delayed for any 
reason beyond the beginning of the fiscal year, the Government of Kurdistan shall, each 
month the budget is delayed, disburse one twelfth of the approved appropriations in the 
budget of the elapsed fiscal year. 
Article 114: 
The President and Vice President of the Kurdistan Region, the Speaker of the Parliament 
of Kurdistan, Members of Parliament, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, 
Ministers, judges, public prosecutors and deputy public prosecutors, individuals with 
special grades, general directors, and individuals of these ranks shall be prohibited from 
buying or renting any public property in Iraq Kurdistan.  The aforementioned individuals 
shall also be prohibited from leasing or selling any part of their property to the regional 
authorities, and from entering into contracts (either directly or by proxy) as 
concessionaires, suppliers, or contractors. 
Section Eight 
Implementation, Explanation and Amendment of the Constitution 
 
Article 115:  
Pursuant to Article 126 / Fourth of the federal Constitution, no amendment to the federal 
Constitution shall be enacted if it diminishes those powers exercised by the authorities of 
the Kurdistan Region that do not lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal 
authorities, unless the agreement of the Region’s Parliament to said amendment has been 
secured, and a majority of voters in a referendum indicate the agreement of the people of 
Kurdistan to this amendment. 
Article 116: 
In addition to its normal areas of jurisdiction, the Kurdistan Court of Cassation shall have 
the authority to explain the stipulations of this Constitution, and to settle appeals that arise 
from ongoing cases before the courts and that are related to the unconstitutionality of laws, 
or the illegality of resolutions, decrees, regulations and instructions.  The Court of 
Cassation shall exercise these authorities until the Constitutional Court of Kurdistan is 
formed. 
Article 117: 
Laws shall be published in the official Kurdistan gazette (Waqai’i Kurdistan [Kurdistan 
Events]), and shall come into force on the date of their publication, unless the given law 
stipulates otherwise. 
Article 118: 
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This Constitution shall be considered ratified after it has been approved in a public 
referendum by a majority of the voters of the people of the Kurdistan Region. 
Article 119: 
In case of amend the sequence of the materials of the Federal Constitution, which was 
considered in the present Constitution the parliament of Iraq Kurdistan, by a majority vote 
of those present, shall correct the sequence based on it.   
[TC: Article 119 was added to 2009 version]  
 
Article 120: 
First: The Constitution may be amended according to the procedures mentioned in this 
article, provided that the amendment not infringe upon the integrity of Iraqi Kurdistan’s 
republican and democratic system,  or upon its territorial unity, and provided that the 
amendment not undermine the basic right and freedoms set forth in the Constitution. 
Second: Together, the President of the Kurdistan Region and the Council of Ministers, or 
half of the Members of Parliament, may propose a constitutional amendment. 
Third: After reviewing the proposed amendment within forty-five days, the Constitutional 
Court shall determine whether the proposed amendment conflicts the conditions set forth 
in the first paragraph of this article.  
Fourth: The Parliament of Iraq Kurdistan may approve the proposed [amendment] by a 
majority of two-thirds of its members. 
Fifth: The majority of the voters of the people of Iraq Kurdistan shall agree to the 
amendment in a general referendum.  
 
Article 121: 
The citizens of the Region shall have the right to a referendum.  Twenty-five percent of 
eligible voters in the Region shall have the right to request a referendum on a particular 
issue, provided that such a referendum is conducted and regulated by law. 
Article 122: 
First: This Constitution shall go into effect sixty days after the date on which it is approved 
in a general referendum.  The President of the Kurdistan Region shall be responsible for 
publishing this Constitution in the official gazette (Waqai’i Kurdistan) within ten days of the 
date on which it is approved in a general referendum. 
Second:  All of the laws in force on the date on which this Constitution comes into effect 
shall remain in force as long as they are not amended or annulled in accordance with the 
provisions of this Constitution. 
 
 
